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on Game Theory |
| By: | Martin K. Jensen |
| Abstract: | An abstract notion of aggregative games is introduced and a pure strategy Nash equilibrium shown to exist for such games. Convergence of best-reply improvement dynamics is also studied. All assumptions are straight-forward to check in concrete applications. The paper’s results generalize the main results of Dubey et al. (2006) and Kukushkin (2005). Likewise, the aggregator concept of Alos-Ferrer and Ania (2005) and Schipper (2005) is a special case. The relationship with both is studied in detail. A number of examples illustrate the paper’s main findings. Among these a model of open source development may be of some independent interest. |
| Keywords: | Aggregative Games, Aggregation, Strategic Substitutes, Nash Equilibrium, Potential Game, Best-reply Dynamics |
| JEL: | C72 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bir:birmec:06-10&r=gth |
| By: | Hennlock, Magnus (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University) |
| Abstract: | The recent approach ‘subgame consistency’ in cooperative stochastic differential games by Yeung and Petrosjan (2006) and Yeung and Petrosjan (2004) is applied to the classical Coase theorem in the presence of stochastic stock externalities. The dynamic Coasean bargaining solution is identified involving a negotiated plan of externality trade over time as well as subgame consistent Coasean liability payments flow under different assignments of property rights. The agent with the right to determine the externality has the advantage to choose his own private equilibrium as the initial condition in the dynamic system of the Coasean bargaining solution. The dynamic Coasean bargaining solution is formulated followed by an illustration showing an analytical tractable solution. <p> |
| Keywords: | dynamic cooperative games; cooperative stochastic differential games; dynamic stability; Coase theorem |
| JEL: | C71 C73 Q53 Q56 |
| Date: | 2006–09–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0229&r=gth |
| By: | Oliver Kirchkamp,; Eva Poen,; Philipp Reiß |
| Abstract: | In this paper we derive equilibrium bidding functions for first-price and second-price auctions with private values when bidders have outside options. We then study bidding behaviour with the help of experiments. We find that bidders respond to outside options and to variations of common knowledge about competitors’ outside options, though bidders in first-price auctions show more overbidding with outside options than without. In second-price auctions overbidding is not affected by outside options. As expected first-price auctions yield more revenue than second-price auctions. This revenue-premium is higher in the presence of outside options. |
| Keywords: | Auction, Experiment, Outside Option |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D44 |
| Date: | 2006–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:san:crieff:0605&r=gth |
| By: | Oliver Kirchkamp, |
| Abstract: | The paper compares with the help of experiments dynamic and static wars of attrition (i.e. second price all-pay auctions) and first-price all-pay auctions. While most experimental studies find overbidding in first-price all-pay auctions, we find underbidding in a similar institution, the war of attrition, in particular if the bidding process is dynamic. We study bids and revenue in different experimental frames and matching procedures and draw a link to the literature on stepwise linear bidding functions |
| Keywords: | War of attrition, dynamic bidding, all-pay auction, stabilisation, volunteer’s dilemma, experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D44 E62 H30 |
| Date: | 2006–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:san:crieff:0607&r=gth |
| By: | Romina Boarini (PREG - Pole de recherche en économie et gestion - [CNRS : UMR7176] - [Polytechnique - X]); Jean-Francois Laslier (PREG - Pole de recherche en économie et gestion - [CNRS : UMR7176] - [Polytechnique - X]); Stéphane Robin (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - [CNRS : UMR5824] - [Université Lumière - Lyon II] - [Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines]) |
| Abstract: | This paper presents the experimental results of a “Transcontinental Ultimatum Game” implemented between India and France. The bargaining took the form of standard ultimatum games, but in one treatment Indian subjects made offers to French subjects and, in another treatment, French subjects made offers to Indian subjects. We observed that French→Indian bargaining mostly ended up with unequal splits of money in favour of French, while nearly equal splits were the most frequent outcome in Indian→French interactions. The experimental results are organized through a standard social reference model, modified for taking into account the different marginal value of money for bargainers. In our model bargaining is driven by relative standings comparisons between players, occurring in terms of real earnings (that is monetary earnings corrected for a purchasing power factor) obtained in the game. The norm of equity behind the equalization of real earnings is called local equity norm, and contrasted to a global equity norm which would encompass the wealth of players beyond the game. According to what we observed, no beyond-game concern seems to be relevantly endorsed by subjects. |
| Keywords: | Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility; Fairness; Bargaining experiment; Ultimatum Game |
| Date: | 2006–10–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00104668_v1&r=gth |