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on Game Theory |
| By: | Bloch, Francis (Department of Economics, University of Warwick); Dutta, Bhaskar (Department of Economics, University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share information about their recommendations in a credible way. When players deviate at the interim stage, coalition-proof correlated equilibria may fail to exist for two-player games. However, coalition- proof correlated equilibria always exist in dominance-solvable games and in games with positive externalities and binary actions. |
| Keywords: | correlated equilibrium ; coalitions ; information sharing ;games with positive externalities |
| JEL: | C72 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:763&r=gth |
| By: | John Duffy; Jack Ochs |
| Abstract: | We report results from an experiment that examines play in an indefinitely repeated, 2-player Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Each experimental session involves N subjects and a sequence of indefinitely repeated games. The main treatment consists of whether agents are matched in fixed pairings or matched randomly in each indefinitely repeated game. Within the random matching treatment, we vary the information that players have about their opponents. Contrary to a theoretical possibility suggested by Kandori (1992), a cooperative norm does not emerge in the treatments where players are matched randomly. On the other hand, in the fixed pairings treatment, the evidence suggests that a cooperative norm does emerge as players gain more experience. |
| Date: | 2006–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pit:wpaper:274&r=gth |
| By: | Alexander Matros |
| Date: | 2006–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pit:wpaper:206&r=gth |
| By: | Vincent C H Chua (School of Economics and Social Sciences, Singapore Management University); C H Ueng (Victoria Junior College) |
| Abstract: | In this note, we demonstrate using two simple examples that generalization of the Banzhaf measure of voter influence to non-binary voting games that requires as starting position a voter’s membership in a winning coalition is likely to incompletely reflect the influence a voter has on the outcome of a game. Generalization of the Banzhaf measure that takes into consideration all possible pivot moves of a voter including those moves originating from a losing coalition will, on the other hand, result in a measure that is proportional to the Penrose measure only in the ternary case. |
| Keywords: | Penrose measure, Banzhaf index, ternary games, multicandidate weighted voting games |
| JEL: | C6 D7 |
| Date: | 2004–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:siu:wpaper:25-2004&r=gth |
| By: | Andreas Blume; Paul Heidhues; Jonathan Lafky; Johannes Muenster; Meixia Zhang |
| Date: | 2006–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pit:wpaper:195&r=gth |
| By: | Alexander Matros; Ted Temzelides |
| Date: | 2006–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pit:wpaper:201&r=gth |
| By: | Andreas Blume; Paul Heidhues |
| Date: | 2005–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pit:wpaper:196&r=gth |
| By: | Andreas Blume; Andreas Ortmann |
| Date: | 2005–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pit:wpaper:197&r=gth |
| By: | Vincent P. Crawford |
| Date: | 2006–10–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000462&r=gth |
| By: | M.Utku Unver; John Dufffy |
| Date: | 2005–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pit:wpaper:260&r=gth |
| By: | Lise Vesterlund; John Duffy; Jack Ochs |
| Date: | 2005–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pit:wpaper:267&r=gth |
| By: | John Bone; John D Hey; John Suckling |
| Abstract: | This paper identifies, and tests experimentally, a prediction of Nash Bargaining Theory that may appear counterintuitive. The context is a simple bargaining problem in which two players have to agree a choice from three alternatives. One alternative favours one player and a second favours the other. The third is an apparently reasonable compromise, but is in fact precluded as an agreed choice by the axioms of Nash Bargaining Theory. Experimental results show that agreement on this third alternative occurs rather often. So the axiomatic Nash theory is not well-supported by our evidence. Our subjects' behaviour could be interpreted as the paying of an irrationally (according to the Nash theory) high price in order to reach a compromise agreement. |
| Keywords: | Experiments, Nash Bargaining Theory |
| JEL: | C78 C92 |
| Date: | 2006–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yor:yorken:06/18&r=gth |
| By: | John Duffy; Andreas Blume; Ted Temzelides |
| Abstract: | We investigate conditions under which self-organized criticality (SOC) arises in a version of a dynamic entry game. In the simplest version of the game, there is a single location - a pool - and one agent is exogenously dropped into the pool every period. Payoffs to entrants are positive as long as the number of agents in the pool is below a critical level. Exiting results in a permanent payoff of zero. Agents in the pool decide simultaneously each period whether to stay in or not. We characterize the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium of the resulting dynamic game. We demonstrate that, under our payoff structure, SOC arises only in the presence of local interactions. Thus, we provide an explicit game-theoretic model of the mechanism through which SOC can arise in a social context with forward looking agents. |
| Date: | 2006–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pit:wpaper:276&r=gth |
| By: | Dubra, Juan |
| Abstract: | I introduce a property of player's valuations that ensures the existence of an ex post efficient equilibrium in asymmetric English auctions. The property is weaker than the one in Echenique and Manelli (2006) and is similar to that in Birulin and Izmalkov (2003). Relative to this latter paper and the work of Krishna (2003), the use of this property has the advantage of yielding the desired results without assuming differentiability of valuations or that signals are drawn from a density. |
| Keywords: | Efficiency; English Auctions; ex-post equilibrium |
| JEL: | C72 D44 |
| Date: | 2006–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:83&r=gth |
| By: | Leufkens Kasper; Peeters Ronald; Vorsatz Marc (METEOR) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we show experimentally that in a sequential auction the presence of synergies leads to more overbidding which in turn may result in bankruptcies. In line with theoretical predictions we find that the seller benefits from the buyers’ synergies. In contrast to theory the buyers also benefit from these synergies. Moreover, opposed to theory and many empirical findings we do not observe declining prices. Finally we find that the overbidding is increasing in the valuation of the object on which the synergy does not materialize and we attribute this finding to anchoring. |
| Keywords: | microeconomics ; |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006040&r=gth |
| By: | Massó Jordi; Vorsatz Marc (METEOR) |
| Abstract: | To allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural extension of Approval Voting [7] by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a non-negative and finite weight. These weights may differ across alternatives. Given the voting decisions of every individual (individuals are allowed to vote for, or approve of, as many alternatives as they wish to), society elects all alternatives for which the product of total number of votes times exogenous weight is maximal. Our main result is an axiomatic characterization of this voting procedure. |
| Keywords: | microeconomics ; |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006038&r=gth |