nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2006‒09‒30
fourteen papers chosen by
Laszlo A. Koczy
Universiteit Maastricht
  1. COALITIONS, AGREEMENTS AND EFFICIENCY By Effrosyni Diamantoudi; Licun Xue
  2. On the Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Symmetric Two-Player Zero-Sum Games with Integer Payoffs By LE BRETON, Michel
  3. Large Newsvendor Games By Luigi Montrucchio; Marco Scarsini
  4. Refinement Derivatives and Values of Games By Luigi Montrucchio; Patrizia Semeraro
  5. Organizational Structure as the Channeling of Boundedly Rational Pre-play Communication By Ellingsen, Tore; Östling, Robert
  6. LUCAS COUNTER EXAMPLE REVISITED By Effrosyni Diamantoudi; Licun Xue
  7. I want to know: Willingness to pay for unconditional veto power By Werner Güth; René Levínský; Tobias Uske; Thomas Gehrig
  8. THE ROBUSTNESS OF EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS: THE CASE OF UNDOMINATED NASH EQUILIBRIUM By Takashi Kunimoto
  9. Asymmetric Auctions: Analytic Solutions to the General Uniform Case By Todd R. Kaplan; Shmuel Zamir
  10. Resultados uniformemente seguros e equilíbrio de Nash em jogos compactos By Paulo Klinger Monteiro; Frank H. Page Jr.
  11. Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach By Matteo Triossi; Luis Corchón
  12. On the Equivalence of Coalitional and Individual Strategy-Proofness Properties By LE BRETON, Michel; ZAPOROZHETS, Vera
  13. Application Costs in Sequential Admission Mechanisms By Matteo Triossi
  14. WINNERS AND LOSERS FROM THE GRADUAL FORMATION OF TRADING BLOCS By Macho-Stadler; Licun Xue
  1. By: Effrosyni Diamantoudi; Licun Xue
    Abstract: If agents negotiate openly and form coalitions, can they reach efficient agreements? We address this issue within a class of coalition formation games with externalities where agents’ preferences depend solely on the coalition structure they are associated with. We derive Ray and Vohra’s (1997) notion of equilibrium binding agreements using von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract stable set and then extend it to allow for arbitrary coalitional deviations (as opposed to nested deviations assumed originally). We show that, while the extended notion facilitates the attainment of efficient agreements, inefficient agreements can nevertheless arise, even if utility transfers are possible.
    JEL: C71 C72
    Date: 2006–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mcl:mclwop:2006-28&r=gth
  2. By: LE BRETON, Michel
    Date: 2006–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:6010&r=gth
  3. By: Luigi Montrucchio; Marco Scarsini
    Abstract: We consider a game, called newsvendor game, where several retailers, who face a random demand, can pool their resources and build a centralized inventory that stocks a single item on their behalf. Profits have to be allocated in a way that is advantageous to all the retailers. A game in characteristic form is obtained by assigning to each coalition its optimal expected profit. A similar game (modeled in terms of costs) was considered by Muller et al. (2002), who proved that this game is balanced for every possible joint distribution of the random demands. In this paper we consider newsvendor games with possibly an infinite number of newsvendors. We prove in great generality results about balancedness of the game, and we show that in a game with a continuum of players, under a nonatomic condition on the demand, the core is a singleton. For a particular class of demands we show how the core shrinks to a singleton when the number of players increases.
    Keywords: newsvendor games, nonatomic games, core, balanced games.
    JEL: C71
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cca:wpaper:15&r=gth
  4. By: Luigi Montrucchio; Patrizia Semeraro
    Abstract: A definition of set-wise differentiability for set functions is given through refining the partitions of sets. Such a construction is closely related to the one proposed by Rosenmuller (1977) as well as that studied by Epstein (1999) and Epstein and Marinacci (2001). We present several classes of TU games which are differentiable and study differentiation rules. The last part of the paper applies refinement derivatives to the calculation of value of games. Following Hart and Mas-Colell (1989), we define a value operator through the derivative of the potential of the game. We show that this operator is a truly value when restricted to some appropriate spaces of games. We present two alternative spaces where this occurs: the spaces pM( ) and POT2. The latter space is closely related to Myerson's balanced contribution axiom.
    Keywords: TU games; large games; non-additive set functions; value; derivatives
    JEL: C71
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cca:wpaper:9&r=gth
  5. By: Ellingsen, Tore (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics); Östling, Robert (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)
    Abstract: We model organizational decision making as costless pre-play communication. Decision making is called authoritarian if only one player is allowed to speak and consensual if all players are allowed to speak. Players are assumed to have limited cognitive capacity and we characterize their behavior under each decision making regime for two different cognitive hierarchy models. Our results suggest that authoritarian decision making is optimal when players have conflicting preferences over the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes, whereas consensual decision making is optimal when players have congruent preferences over this set. The intuition is that authoritarian decision making avoids conflict, but sometimes creates insufficient mutual trust to implement socially optimal outcomes.
    Keywords: Organizational decision making; coordination games; communication; cognitive hierarchy models
    JEL: C72 L20 M21 M54
    Date: 2006–09–25
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:hastef:0634&r=gth
  6. By: Effrosyni Diamantoudi; Licun Xue
    Abstract: We revisit Lucas’(1968) counter example for the existence of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) stable set (solution) for coalitional games. We show that when we endow the agents with foresight, particularly, when we replace von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) dominance relation with the indirect dominance relations introduced by Harsanyi (1974), Lucas’s example admits a stable set.
    JEL: C71
    Date: 2006–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mcl:mclwop:2005-09&r=gth
  7. By: Werner Güth; René Levínský; Tobias Uske; Thomas Gehrig
    Abstract: In the Yes/No game, like in the ultimatum game, proposer and responder can share a monetary reward. In both games the proposer suggests a reward distribution which the responder can accept or reject (yielding 0-payoffs). The games only differ in that the responder does (not) learn the suggested reward distribution in the Ultimatum (Yes/No) game. Although an opportunistic responder would always accept and therefore should not be willing to pay for knowing the proposal, earlier results (Güth, Levati, Ockenfels, and Weiland, 2005) show that offers in the Yes/No game are less generous and that responders, on average, earn less in the Yes/No game. By experimentally eliciting the willingness to pay for learning the proposal, we investigate whether these effects are adequately anticipated or whether they are overstated, as observed in an earlier related study (Gehrig, Güth, Levinsky, 2003).
    Keywords: Information acquisition, Endowment effect, Veto power, Anticipation, Decision strategy
    JEL: C91 D82
    Date: 2006–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esi:discus:2006-21&r=gth
  8. By: Takashi Kunimoto
    Abstract: I consider a strategic game form with a finite set of payoff states and employ undominated Nash equilibrium (UNE) as a solution concept under complete information. I propose notions of the proximity of information according to which the continuity of UNE concept is considered as the robustness criterion. I identify a topology (induced by what I call d?) with respect to which the undominated Bayesian Nash equilibrium (UBNE) correspondence associated with any game form is upper hemi-continuous at any complete information prior. I also identify a slightly coarser topology (induced by what I call d??) with respect to which the UBNE correspondence associated with some game form exhibits a failure of the upper hemi-continuity at any complete information prior. In this sense, the topology induced by d? is the coarsest one. The topology induced by d?? is also used in both Kajii and Morris (1998) and Monderer and Samet (1989, 1996) with some additional restriction. I apply this robustness analysis to the UNE implementation. Appealing to Palfrey and Srivastava’s (1991) canonical game form, I show, as a corollary, that almost any social choice function is robustly UNE implementable relative to d?. I show, on the other hand, that only monotonic social choice functions can be robustly UNE implementable relative to d??. This clarifies when Chung and Ely’s Theorem 1 2003) applies.
    JEL: C72 D78 D82 D83
    Date: 2006–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mcl:mclwop:2006-26&r=gth
  9. By: Todd R. Kaplan; Shmuel Zamir
    Date: 2006–09–22
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000410&r=gth
  10. By: Paulo Klinger Monteiro (EPGE/FGV); Frank H. Page Jr.
    Date: 2006–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fgv:epgewp:621&r=gth
  11. By: Matteo Triossi; Luis Corchón
    Abstract: In this paper we present a model of implementation based on the idea that agents renegotiate unfeasible allocations. We characterize the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium with a class of renegotiation functions that do not reward agents for unfeasibilities. This result is used to study the possibility of implementing the Walrasian Correspondence in exchange economies and several axiomatic solutions to problems of bargaining and bankruptcy.
    Keywords: State Dependent Feasible Sets, Renegotiation, Implementation.
    JEL: C72 D60 D78
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cca:wpaper:24&r=gth
  12. By: LE BRETON, Michel; ZAPOROZHETS, Vera
    Date: 2006–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:1700&r=gth
  13. By: Matteo Triossi
    Abstract: This paper considers a realistic family of admission mechanisms, with multiple applications and application costs. Multiple applications impose serious coordination problems to colleges, but application costs restore stability. Without application costs and under incomplete information unstable allocations emerge.
    Keywords: Application Costs; Matching Markets; Implementation.
    JEL: C78 D78
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cca:wpaper:23&r=gth
  14. By: Macho-Stadler; Licun Xue
    Abstract: Although global free trade is efficient, each country’s benefit from free trade depends on the path that leads to the global free trade agreement. Using a dynamic model of trading bloc formation, we show that when global free trade is reached gradually, the countries that are initially excluded gain less than the rest and may be even made worse-off by the final free trade agreement, compared with the initial state of no trading blocs.
    JEL: C71 C72 F13
    Date: 2006–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mcl:mclwop:2006-27&r=gth
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