nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2006‒09‒03
fourteen papers chosen by
Laszlo A. Koczy
Universiteit Maastricht
  1. Monotonicity and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Contracts By Haake Claus-Jochen; Klaus Bettina
  2. Recommended Play and Correlated Equilibria: An Experimental Study By Cason, Timothy N.; Sharma, Tridib
  3. The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action-monotonic games By Burkhard Hehenkamp
  4. Emergence in multi-agent systems, part II: Axtell, Epstein and Young's revisited By Jean Louis Dessalles
  5. Optimal Search Auctions with Correlated Bidder Types By Cremer, Jacques; Spiegel, Yossi; Zheng, Charles
  6. Optimal Search Auctions By Cremer, Jaques; Spiegel, Yossi; Zheng, Charles
  7. Optimal Auction with Resale By Zheng, Charles
  8. Is America Unrivaled? A Repeated Game Analysis By L. Lambertini
  9. Degenerate Feedback and Time Consistency in Dynamic Games By R. Cellini; L. Lambertini; G. Leitmann
  10. A Chicken Game of Intraindustry Trade By L. Colombo; P. Labrecciosa; L. Lambertini
  11. Weak and Strong Time Consistency in Differential Oligopoly Games with Capital Accumulation By R. Cellini; L. Lambertini
  12. Persuasive Advertising in Oligopoly: A Linear State Differential Game By R. Cellini; L. Lambertini; A. Mantovani
  13. The second-price auction solves King Solomon's dilemma By H. Reiju Mihara
  14. A Note On Generalized Hyperbolic Discounting By Ali al-Nowaihi; Sanjit Dhami
  1. By: Haake Claus-Jochen; Klaus Bettina (METEOR)
    Abstract: We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), and analyze (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts markets the stable correspondence is monotonic and implementable (Theorems 1 and 3). Furthermore, any solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and monotonic is a supersolution of the stable correspondence (Theore m 2). In other words, the stable correspondence is the minimal solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable.
    Keywords: microeconomics ;
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006029&r=gth
  2. By: Cason, Timothy N.; Sharma, Tridib
    Abstract: This study reports a laboratory experiment wherein subjects play a hawk-dove game. We try to implement a correlated equilibrium with payoffs outside the convex hull of Nash equilibrium payoffs by privately recommending play. We find that subjects are reluctant to follow certain recommendations. We are able to implement this correlated equilibrium, however, when subjects play against robots that always follow recommendations, including in a control treatment in which human subjects receive the robot "earnings." This indicates that the lack of mutual knowledge of conjectures, rather than social preferences, explains subjects' failure to play the suggested correlated equilibrium when facing other human players.
    Keywords: Game Theory ; Experiments ; Coordination ; Common Knowledge
    JEL: C72
    Date: 2006–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pur:prukra:1191&r=gth
  3. By: Burkhard Hehenkamp
    Abstract: Investigating the strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action monotonic games, we derive characterizing conditions both for general action monotonic games and for the subclass of action monotonic games with spillovers. Examples demonstrate the generality of our findings, in particular that the strategic advantage prevails beyond the classes of super- and submodular games. The application of two-player rent-seeking contests illustrates how our criteria simplify analyzing the strategic advantage.
    Date: 2006–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mik:wpaper:05_05&r=gth
  4. By: Jean Louis Dessalles (CREM CNRS UMR 6211 University of Rennes I,)
    Keywords: adaptive complex systems, agent based computational economics, behavioural learning in games, cognitive hierarchy, complexity, detection, emergence, population games, signalling, stochastic stability, tag
    Date: 2006–07–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sce:scecfa:348&r=gth
  5. By: Cremer, Jacques; Spiegel, Yossi; Zheng, Charles
    Abstract: We study optimal auctions when contacting prospective bidders is costly and the bidders’ values are correlated. Although full surplus extraction is in general impossible, we can construct a search mechanism that fully extracts the surplus with an arbitrarily high probability.
    Keywords: optimal auction, correlated values, search costs, search mechanism,
    Date: 2006–08–24
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:isu:genres:12663&r=gth
  6. By: Cremer, Jaques; Spiegel, Yossi; Zheng, Charles
    Abstract: We study the design of profit maximizing single unit auctions under the assumption that the seller needs to incur costs to contact prospective bidders and inform them about the auction. With independent bidders’ types and possibly interdependent valuations, the seller’s problem can be reduced to a search problem in which the surplus is measured in terms of virtual utilities minus search costs. Compared to the socially efficient mechanism, the optimal mechanism features fewer participants, longer search conditional on the same set of participants, and inefficient sequence of entry.
    Date: 2006–08–24
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:isu:genres:12662&r=gth
  7. By: Zheng, Charles
    Abstract: his paper investigates the design of seller-optimal auctions when winning bidders can attempt to resell the good. In that case, the optimal allocation characterized by Myerson (1981) cannot be achieved without resale. I find a sufficient and necessary condition for sincere bidding given the possibility of resale. In two-bidder cases, I prove that the Myerson allocation can be achieved under standard conditions supplemented with two assumptions. With three or more bidders, achieving the Myerson allocation is more difficult. I prove that it can be implemented in special cases. In those cases, the Myerson allocation is generated through a sequence of resale auctions, each optimally chosen by a reseller.
    Keywords: Auction, optimal auction, resale, mechanism design.
    Date: 2006–08–24
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:isu:genres:12664&r=gth
  8. By: L. Lambertini
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:563&r=gth
  9. By: R. Cellini; L. Lambertini; G. Leitmann
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:535&r=gth
  10. By: L. Colombo; P. Labrecciosa; L. Lambertini
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:548&r=gth
  11. By: R. Cellini; L. Lambertini
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:544&r=gth
  12. By: R. Cellini; L. Lambertini; A. Mantovani
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:564&r=gth
  13. By: H. Reiju Mihara (Kagawa University)
    Abstract: Consider the problem of allocating k identical, indivisible objects among n agents, where k<n. The planner's objective is to give the objects to the top k valuation agents at zero costs to the planner and the agents. Each agent knows the identity of those k agents, as well as her own valuation of the object. Modify the (k+1)st-price sealed-bid auction by introducing a small participation fee and the option (not) to participate in it. This strikingly simple mechanism (modified auction) implements the desired outcome in iteratively weakly undominated strategies.
    Keywords: Solomon's problem, implementation, incomplete information, voluntary participation, iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies, Olszewski's mechanism, entry fees
    JEL: C72 D61 D71 D82
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nos:wuwpga:mihara_h..76996-mihara06solomon&r=gth
  14. By: Ali al-Nowaihi; Sanjit Dhami
    Abstract: In a major contributions to behavioral economics, Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) set the foundations for the behavioral approach to decision making over time and derive the generalized hyperbolic discounting formula. Here we show that their assumption ‘common difference effect with quadratic delay’ cannot be weakened to ‘common difference effect’.
    Keywords: Intertemporal choice; Generalized hyperbolic discounting
    JEL: C60 D91
    Date: 2006–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lec:leecon:06/10&r=gth
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