nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2006‒08‒19
six papers chosen by
Laszlo A. Koczy
Universiteit Maastricht
  1. The Theory of Money and Financial Institutions: A Summary of a Game Theoretic Approach By Martin Shubik
  2. What matchings can be stable? The refutability of matching theory By Echenique, Federico
  3. PURE STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA OF SINGLE AND DOUBLE AUCTIONS WITH INTERDEPENDENT VALUES By Aloisio Araujo; Luciano I. de Castro
  4. CORRIGENDUM TO "EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM IN SINGLE AND DOUBLE PRIVATE VALUE ACTIONS" By Luciano I. de Castro
  5. Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment By James Andreoni; Yeon-Koo Che; Jinwoo Kim
  6. Diffusion on social networks By Jackson, Matthew O.; Yariv, Leeat
  1. By: Martin Shubik
    Date: 2006–08–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000299&r=gth
  2. By: Echenique, Federico
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clt:sswopa:1252&r=gth
  3. By: Aloisio Araujo; Luciano I. de Castro
    Abstract: We prove the existence of monotonic pure strategy equilibrium for many types of asymmetric auctions with n bidders and unitary demands, interdependent values and independent types. The assumptions require monotonicity only in the own bidder's type. The payments can be a function of all bids. Thus, we provide a new equilibrium existence result for asymmetrical double auctions and a small number of bidders. The generality of our setting requires the use of special tie-breaking rules. We present a reasonable counterexample for interdependent values auctions that shows that sometimes all equilibria are trivial, that is, they have zero probability of trade. Nevertheless, we give sufficient conditions for non-trivial equilibrium existence.
    Date: 2006–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:werepe:we065320&r=gth
  4. By: Luciano I. de Castro
    Abstract: This is a corrigendum to Theorem 15 of Jackson and Swinkels (2005) [Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions, Econometrica, 73, 93-140], which proves the existence of equilibrium with positive probability of trade for private value auctions.
    Date: 2006–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:werepe:we065219&r=gth
  5. By: James Andreoni; Yeon-Koo Che; Jinwoo Kim
    Date: 2006–08–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000293&r=gth
  6. By: Jackson, Matthew O.; Yariv, Leeat
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clt:sswopa:1251&r=gth
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