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on Game Theory |
| By: | Jesús Getán, Jesús Montes and Carles Rafels (Universitat de Barcelona) |
| Abstract: | The monotonic core of a cooperative game with transferable utility (T.U.-game) is the set formed by all its Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes. In this paper we show that this set always coincides with the core of certain game associated to the initial game. |
| Keywords: | Cooperative games, monotonic core, population monotonic allocation schemes, restricted games |
| JEL: | C71 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bar:bedcje:2006155&r=gth |
| By: | Potters,Jan; Suetens,Sigrid (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | Results are reported of a laboratory experiment aimed at examining whether strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity have an impact on the tendency to cooperate in two-player dominancesolvable games with a Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium. We find that there is significantly more cooperation when actions exhibit strategic complementarities than in case of strategic substitutes. |
| Keywords: | experiments;cooperation;strategic substitutes and complements;externalities |
| JEL: | C7 C9 L1 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200648&r=gth |
| By: | Branzei,Rodica; Dimitrov,Dinko; Tijs,Stef (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we provide characterizations of convex games and total clan games by using properties of their corresponding marginal games. We show that a "dualize and restrict" procedure transforms total clan games with zero worth for the clan into monotonic convex games. Furthermore, each monotonic convex game generates a total clan game with zero worth for the clan by a "dualize and extend" procedure. These procedures are also useful for relating core elements and elements of the Weber set of the corresponding games. |
| Keywords: | convex games;core;dual games;marginal games;total clan games;Weber set |
| JEL: | C71 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200658&r=gth |
| By: | Peters Hans; Vermeulen Dries (METEOR) |
| Abstract: | The class of bargaining solutions that are defined on the domain of finite sets of alternatives and satisfy Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO), Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and Covariance (COV), is characterized. These solutions select from the set of maximizers of a nonsymmetric Nash product -- i.e., from a nonsymmetric (multi-valued) Nash bargaining solution -- according to a specific decomposition of the indifference curves of this Nash product. We use this characterization in two ways. First, we derive consequences on this domain and on larger domains of compact (non-convex) bargaining problems, and show that most results in the literature are special cases and consequences of our central results -- in particular by adding continuity or symmetry axioms. Second, since the continuity axiom prevents nontrivial selections from the Nash bargaining solutions, we use the Axiom of choice to construct for example non-single-valued discontinuous WPO, IIA and COV bargaining solutions. It is conjectured that, in the case of two-person bargaining problems,the existence of such discontinuous bargaining solutions cannot be shown from the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms for set theory without using the Axiom of Choice. |
| Keywords: | mathematical economics; |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006020&r=gth |
| By: | Grigorieva Elena; Herings P. Jean-Jacques; Müller Rudolf; Vermeulen Dries (METEOR) |
| Abstract: | We show that, when bidders have continuous valuations, any ex post equilibrium in an ex post individually rational query auction can only be ex post efficient when the running timeof the auction is infinite for almost all realizations of valuations of the bidders. We also show that this result applies to the general class of bisection auctions. In contrast we show that, when we allow for inefficient allocations with arbitrarily small probability, there is a query auction (to be more specific, a bisection auction) that attains this level of approximate efficiency in equilibrium, while additionally the running time of the auction in equilibrium is finite for all realizations of valuations. |
| Keywords: | mathematical economics; |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006016&r=gth |
| By: | Nicolas Figueroa; Vasiliki Skreta |
| Date: | 2006–06–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000140&r=gth |
| By: | Leufkens Kasper; Peeters Ronald; Vermeulen Dries (METEOR) |
| Abstract: | In multi-unit (procurement) auctions winning multiple contracts can lead to cost advantages due to synergies. As an example one can think of procurement auctions where construction firms have returns to scale for investments in specialized equipments and workers that are required in large-scale projects. In this paper we analyze the effects of the presence of such synergies on bidding behavior and thus auction outcomes in general. We find that the presence of synergies on the bidders’ side induces more competitive bidding and therefore leads to lower expected payoffs for bidders and higher expected revenues for sellers. Thus, instead of benefiting from the presence of synergies, bidders suffer from it. Moreover it is found that serious bankruptcy problems can occur. In particular the negative welfare consequences caused by these bankruptcy problems are of major importance for auction design when synergies are present. Finally, the presence of synergies leads to a decreasing price trend and can therefore explain the declining price anomaly. |
| Keywords: | industrial organization ; |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006017&r=gth |
| By: | Paul Milgrom |
| Date: | 2006–06–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000131&r=gth |
| By: | Grigorieva Elena; Herings P. Jean-Jacques; Müller Rudolf; Vermeulen Dries (METEOR) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we analyze the performance of a recently proposed sequential auction, called the c-bisection auction, that can be used for a sale of a single indivisible object. We discuss the running time and the e±ciency in the ex-post equilibrium of the auction. We show that by changing the parameter c of the auction we can trade o® e±ciency against running time. Moreover, we show that the auction that gives the desired level of e±ciency in expectation takes the same number of rounds for any number of players. |
| Keywords: | computer science applications; |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006018&r=gth |
| By: | Heydenreich Birgit; Müller Rudolf; Uetz Marc (METEOR) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we survey different models, techniques, and some recent results to tackle machine scheduling problems within a distributed setting. In traditional optimization, a central authority is asked to solve a (computationally hard) optimization problem. In contrast, in distributed settings there are several agents, possibly equipped with private information that is not publicly known, and these agents need to interact in order to derive a solution to the problem. Usually the agents have their individual preferences, which induces them to behave strategically in order to manipulate the resulting solution. Nevertheless, one is often interested in the global performance of such systems. The analysis of such distributed settings requires techniques from classical Optimization, Game Theory, and Economic Theory. The paper therefore briefly introduces the most important of the underlying concepts, and gives a selection of typical research questions and recent results, focussing on applications to machine scheduling problems. This includes the study of the so-called price of anarchy for settings where the agents do not possess private information, as well as the design and analysis of (truthful) mechanisms in settings where the agents do possess private information. |
| Keywords: | computer science applications; |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006021&r=gth |
| By: | Petros Sekeris (CRED - Center of Research in the Economics of Development - [Facultés Universitaire Notre-Dame de la Paix, Namur] - [Facultés Universitaires Notre Dame de la Paix]) |
| Abstract: | Power, defined as the ability to longer sustain a mutually damaging situation, determines both the outcome of the game and the way this outcome is reached. In our model, inspired from the Theory of moves (Brams, 1994), two agents, each facing two choices at their respective decision nodes, play a sequential game over an infinite time horizon. We show that the player who is most able to incur losses -the power wielder- imposes on his opponent the strategy he wants him to adopt, the latter finding himself forced to choose between complying and being punished. These equilibrium strategies are proved to be subgame perfect and unique. In most game configurations, the power wielder can even decide the identity of the endogenously determined first mover. To make the link with a widely analyzed real world conflict situation, we apply our model to the Cuban Missile Crisis. |
| Keywords: | Non-Cooperative Game, Holding Power, Threats Credibility, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. |
| Date: | 2006–06–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00081333_v2&r=gth |