|
on Game Theory |
| By: | Estevez-Fernandez,Arantza; Borm,Peter; Meertens,Marc; Reijnierse,Hans (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | Traveling salesman problems with revenues form a generalization of traveling salesman problems. Here, next to travel costs an explicit revenue is generated by visiting a city. We analyze routing problems with revenues, where a predetermined route on all cities determines the tours along subgroups. Corresponding routing games with revenues are analyzed. It is shown that these games have a nonempty core and a complete description of the core is provided. |
| Keywords: | routing problems;revenues;core |
| JEL: | C71 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200643&r=gth |
| By: | Ju,Yuan; Wettstein,David (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a framework for implementing and comparing several solution concepts for transferable utility cooperative games. We construct bidding mechanisms where players bid for the role of the proposer. The mechanisms differ in the power awarded to the proposer. The Shapley, consensus and equal surplus values are implemented in subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes as power shifts away from the proposer to the rest of the players. Moreover, an alternative informational structure where these solution concepts can be implemented without imposing any conditions of the transferable utility game is discussed as well. |
| Keywords: | implementation;bidding mechanism;Shapley value;consensus value;equal surplus value |
| JEL: | C71 C72 D62 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200642&r=gth |
| By: | Yuan Ju (Department of Economics, Keele,); Peter Borm (CentER for Economic Research and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University,) |
| Abstract: | The classical literature (Pigou (1920), Coase (1960), Arrow (1970)) and the relatively recent studies (cf. Varian (1994)) associate the externality problem with efficiency. This paper focuses explicitly on the compensation problem in the context of externalities. To capture the features of inter-individual externalities, this paper constructs a new game-theoretic framework: primeval games. These games are used to design normative compensation rules for the underlying compensation problems: the marginalistic rule, the concession rule, and the primeval rule. Characterizations of the marginalistic rule and the concession rule are provided and specific properties of the primeval rule are studied. |
| Keywords: | Externality; compensation; primeval games; marginalistic rule; concession rule; primeval rule. |
| JEL: | C71 D62 D63 |
| Date: | 2005–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kee:kerpuk:2005/05&r=gth |
| By: | Sergiu Hart |
| Date: | 2006–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:huj:dispap:dp421&r=gth |
| By: | Kurtis J. Swope (Department of Economics, U. S. Naval Academy); John Cadigan (Department of Public Administration, American University); Pamela M. Schmitt (Department of Economics, U. S. Naval Academy); Robert S. Shupp (Department of Economics, Ball State University) |
| Abstract: | Student volunteers at the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) participated in one of the following oneshot games: a dictator game, an ultimatum game, a trust game, or a prisoner’s dilemma game. We find limited support for the importance of personality type for explaining subjects’ decisions. With controls for personality preferences, we find little evidence of behavioral differences between males and females. Furthermore, we conclude that seniority breeds feelings of entitlement - seniors at USNA generally exhibited the least cooperative or other-regarding behavior. |
| Keywords: | Experiments; preferences; personality |
| JEL: | A12 C72 C78 |
| Date: | 2005–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bsu:wpaper:200507&r=gth |
| By: | Joseph Tao-yi Wang; Michael Spezio; Colin F. Camerer |
| Date: | 2006–05–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000042&r=gth |
| By: | Pamela M. Schmitt (U. S. Naval Academy); Robert S. Shupp (Department of Economics, Ball State University); Kurtis J. Swope (U. S. Naval Academy); Justin Mayer (U. S. Naval Academy) |
| Abstract: | This paper uses responder pre-commitment and psychological type, as measured by the Myers- Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), to gain insight into subject behavior in a laboratory ultimatum bargaining experiment. Three experiment design details are noteworthy: (1) one design requires responders to make a nonbinding pre-commitment rejection level prior to seeing the offer, (2) one design requires responders to make a binding pre-commitment rejection level, and (3) one design includes a third person (or “hostage”) who makes no decision, but whose payment depends on the proposal being accepted. Offers are higher when proposers know that responders make a binding pre-commitment to reject but are not different when a hostage is present. Responders make lower pre-commitments when they are binding and when a hostage is present. Behavior in our experiment is generally consistent with hypotheses based on theoretical underpinnings of the MBTI and its descriptions of psychological type. |
| Keywords: | Ultimatum game; preferences; personality |
| JEL: | C72 C78 C91 |
| Date: | 2005–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bsu:wpaper:200503&r=gth |