nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2006‒05‒06
four papers chosen by
Laszlo A. Koczy
Universiteit Maastricht
  1. Strategic and extensive games By Martin J. Osborne
  2. Long Persuasion Games By Francoise Forges; Frederic Koessler
  3. Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion By Jerome Mathis
  4. Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations By Philippe Jehiel; Frederic Koessler
  1. By: Martin J. Osborne
    Abstract: The basic theory of strategic and extensive games is described. Strategic game, Bayesian games, extensive games with perfect information, and extensive games with imperfect information are defined and explained. Among the solution concepts discussed are Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, rationalizability, subgame perfect equilibrium, and weak sequential equilibrium.
    Keywords: Strategic games, Bayesian games, extensive games, Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, sequential equilibrium
    JEL: C7
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-231&r=gth
  2. By: Francoise Forges (CEREMADE, Paris-Dauphine University); Frederic Koessler (THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise)
    Abstract: This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first equilibrium characterization is provided for unilateral persuasion games, and the second for multistage, bilateral persuasion games. As in Aumann and Hart (2003), we use the concepts of diconvexification and dimartingale. A leading example illustrates both geometric characterizations and shows how the expert, whatever his type, can increase his equilibrium payoff compared to all equilibria of the unilateral persuasion game by delaying information certification.
    Keywords: Cheap talk, communication, diconvexification, dimartingale, disclosure of certifiable information, jointly controlled lotteries, long conversation, persuasion, verifiable types
    JEL: C72 D82
    Date: 2006–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ema:worpap:2006-01&r=gth
  3. By: Jerome Mathis (THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise)
    Abstract: A Sender-Receiver game is a two-player communication game in which a privately informed party (Sender) sends a payoff-irrelevant message on the basis of his information to a decision maker (Receiver) who then takes a payoff-relevant action. Seidmann-Winter (1997) provides necessary and sufficient conditions on players.preferences for full revelation when the Sender can certify all his payoff-relevant information and that he is not withholding information (formally, each type is certifiable). We generalize Seidmann- Winter's results to a partial certi.ability setting. We characterize the conditions on the information that the informed party can certify and more general conditions on players' preferences, which are sufficient for the existence and uniqueness of a separating equilibrium outcome.
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ema:worpap:2006-02&r=gth
  4. By: Philippe Jehiel; Frederic Koessler (THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise)
    Date: 2005–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ema:worpap:2005-04&r=gth
This nep-gth issue is ©2006 by Laszlo A. Koczy. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.
This page is being maintained by Thomas Krichel. It was last updated on 2023‒07‒08 at 14:07.