nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2006‒04‒01
four papers chosen by
Laszlo A. Koczy
Universiteit Maastricht

  1. A bargaining set based on external and internal stability and endogenous coalition formation By Lazarova,Emiliya; Borm,Peter; Montero,Maria; Reijnierse,Hans
  2. Condorcet Cycles? A Model of Intertemporal Voting By Kevin Roberts
  3. John Charles Harsanyi By John A. Weymark
  4. Robert Aumann’s Game and Economic Theory By Sergiu Hart

  1. By: Lazarova,Emiliya; Borm,Peter; Montero,Maria; Reijnierse,Hans (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: A new bargaining set based on notions of both internal and external stability is developed in the context of endogenous coalition formation. It allows to make an explicit distinction between within-group and outsidegroup deviation options. This type of distinction is not present in current bargaining sets. For the class of weighted majority games, the outcomes in the bargaining set containing a minimal winning coalition are characterized. Furthermore, it is shown that the bargaining set of any homogeneous weighted majority game contains an outcome for which the underlying coalition structure consists of a minimal winning coalition and its complement. The paper also introduces a new class of games called cooperation externalities games. For a symmetric cooperation externalities game conditions are provided such that every outcome in the bargaining set supports the same coalition structure. This coalition structure consists of one coalition of all players with an externality parameter higher than one and a collection of singleton coalitions, one for every player with a cooperation externality parameter lower than one
    Keywords: Bargaining set;endogenous colation;formation;internal and external stability
    JEL: C71 C78
    Date: 2006
  2. By: Kevin Roberts (Nuffield College, University of Oxford)
    Abstract: An intertemporal voting model is examined where, at each date, there is a pairwise majority vote between the existing chosen state and some other state, chosen randomly. Intertemporal voting simplifies the strategic issues and the agenda setting is as unrestricted as possible. The possibility of cycles is examined, both in the intertemporal extension to the Condorcet paradox and in more general examples. The set of possibilities is rich, as is demonstrated by an exhaustive study of a three person, three state world. Equilibrium in pure strategies may fail to exist but a weakening of the equilibrium concept to admit probabilistic voting allows a general existence result to be proved. The analysis leads to the development of a dominant state which extends the notion of a Condorcet winner.
    Keywords: Condorcet paradox; Condorcet winner; Condorcet winner; majority voting; intertemporal voting; strategic voting
    JEL: C73 D72 D78
    Date: 2005–05–01
  3. By: John A. Weymark (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University)
    Abstract: This article provides an overview of the main events in the life of John Harsanyi and a summary of his research on decision-theoretic foundations for utilitarianism, cooperative bargaining theory, games of incomplete information, and equilibrium selection in noncooperative games.
    Keywords: John Harsanyi, utilitarianism, bargaining theory, games of incomplete information, equilibrium selection
    JEL: B31
    Date: 2006–03
  4. By: Sergiu Hart
    Date: 2006–03–27

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