nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2005‒12‒01
23 papers chosen by
László Á. Kóczy
Universiteit Maastricht
  1. Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring By Stephen Morris; George J Mailath
  2. Theories of Coalitional Rationality By Attila Ambrus
  3. A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games By Luca Anderlini; Dino Gerardi; Roger Lagunoff
  4. Nash Consistent Representation of Effectivity Functions through Lottery Models By Bezalel Peleg; Hans Peters
  5. Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria By Michel Benaim; Josef Hofbauer; Ed Hopkins
  6. Unemployment Dynamics with Staggered Nash Wage Bargaining By Antonella Trigari; Mark Gertler
  7. Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study By Miguel A. Costa-Gomes; Vincent P. Crawford
  8. On Ascending Vickrey Auctions for Heterogeneous Objects By Sven de Vries; James Schummer
  9. Coordination Games, Multiple Equilibria and the Timing of Radio Commercials By Andrew Sweeting
  10. A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Convergence of Statistical to Strategic Equilibria of Market Games By Dimitrios P. Tsomocos; Dimitris Voliotis
  11. The Evolutionary Stability of Optimism, Pessimism and Complete Ignorance By Burkhard C. Schipper
  12. Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? By Vincent P. Crawford; Nagore Iriberri
  13. A Simple Approach to Analyzing Asymmetric First Price Auctions By Rene Kirkegaard
  14. The Timing of Acquisitions By Helen Weeds; Robin Mason
  15. Optimal Auction Design For Multiple Objects with Externalities By Vasiliki Skreta; Nicolas Figueroa
  16. The Wisdom of the Minority By Steven Callander; Johannes Horner
  17. Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems By Utku Unver; Hideo Konishi
  18. A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets By Jorge Oviedo; Federico Echenique
  19. Truthful Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions By Shahar Dobzinski; Noam Nisan; Michael Schapira
  20. The economics of social networks By Jackson, Matthew O.
  21. Can Wages Signal Kindness? By Emrah Arbak; Laurence Kranich
  22. The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: efficiency and behavioral considerations By Marie-Claire Villeval; Manfred Konigstein
  23. PACTO DE ESTABILIDADE E CRESCIMENTO NA UNIÃO EUROPÉIA: HÁ INCENTIVOS AO SEU CUMPRIMENTO? By Fernando B. Meneguin; Maurício S. Bugarin
  1. By: Stephen Morris; George J Mailath (Department of Economics University of Pennsylvania)
    Keywords: repeated games, private monitoring, almost-public monitoring, coordination, bounded recall
    JEL: C72 C73 D82
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed005:25&r=gth
  2. By: Attila Ambrus (Littauer Center Harvard University)
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed005:905&r=gth
  3. By: Luca Anderlini; Dino Gerardi; Roger Lagunoff
    Date: 2005–11–21
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000664&r=gth
  4. By: Bezalel Peleg; Hans Peters
    Abstract: Effectivity functions for finitely many players and alternatives are considered. It is shown that every monotonic and superadditive effectivity function can be augmented with equal chance lotteries to a finite lottery model - i.e., an effectivity function that preserves the original effectivity in terms of supports of lotteries - which has a Nash consistent representation. In other words, there exists a finite game form which represents the lottery model and which has a Nash equilibrium for any profile of utility functions, where lotteries are evaluated by their expected utility. No additional condition on the original effectivity function is needed.
    Date: 2005–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:huj:dispap:dp404&r=gth
  5. By: Michel Benaim; Josef Hofbauer; Ed Hopkins
    Date: 2005–11–21
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000609&r=gth
  6. By: Antonella Trigari; Mark Gertler (Economics IGIER, Università Bocconi)
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed005:921&r=gth
  7. By: Miguel A. Costa-Gomes; Vincent P. Crawford
    Date: 2004–11–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000113&r=gth
  8. By: Sven de Vries; James Schummer
    Keywords: Vickrey auctions, multi-item auctions, combinatorial auctions,
    JEL: D44
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed005:389&r=gth
  9. By: Andrew Sweeting
    Keywords: Multiple Equilibria, Coordination Games, Media
    JEL: L82 C72 C35
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed005:490&r=gth
  10. By: Dimitrios P. Tsomocos; Dimitris Voliotis
    Abstract: We analyze a market game where traders are heterogeneous with respect to their rationality level and have asymmetric information. The market mechanism results into a statistical equilibrium, where traders randomise among their available actions due to their limited rationality. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for convergence of statistical to strategic equilibria of market games, when traders become more informed and increasingly more rational.
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sbs:wpsefe:2005fe14&r=gth
  11. By: Burkhard C. Schipper (Department of Economics, University of California, Davis, One Shields Avenue, Davis, CA 95616, USA. bcschipper@ucdavis.com)
    Abstract: We provide an evolutionary foundation to evidence that in some situations humans maintain optimistic or pessimistic attitudes towards uncertainty and are ignorant to relevant aspects of the environment. Players in strategic games face Knightian uncertainty about opponents’ actions and maximize individually their Choquet expected utility. Our Choquet expected utility model allows for both an optimistic or pessimistic attitude towards uncertainty as well as ignorance to strategic dependencies. An optimist (resp. pessimist) overweights good (resp. bad) outcomes. A complete ignorant never reacts to opponents’ change of actions. With qualifications we show that optimistic (resp. pessimistic) complete ignorance is evolutionary stable / yields a strategic advantage in submodular (resp. supermodular) games with aggregate externalities. Moreover, this evolutionary stable preference leads to Walrasian behavior in those classes of games.
    Keywords: ambiguity, Knightian uncertainty, Choquet expected utility, neo-additive capacity, Hurwicz criterion, Maximin, Minimax, Ellsberg paradox, overconfidence, supermodularity, aggregative games, monotone comparative statics, playing the field, evolution of preferences
    JEL: C72 C73 D43 D81 L13
    Date: 2005–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trf:wpaper:68&r=gth
  12. By: Vincent P. Crawford; Nagore Iriberri
    Date: 2005–11–21
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000604&r=gth
  13. By: Rene Kirkegaard (Department of Economics, Brock University)
    Abstract: In this paper, we propose a new approach to analyzing asymmetric first price auctions. Specifically, we examine winning probabilities, exploiting the connection between winning probabilities and payoffs known from mechanism design. This circumvents the need to look directly at bidding strategies, which are generally complex. We derive new results, and more easily prove almost all existing results. The approach also sheds light on hitherto unexamined types of asymmetry. Moreover, the method also applies to asymmetric all-pay auctions, where all buyers pay their own bid, and about which little is currently known.
    Keywords: Asymmetric Auctions, First Price Auctions, All-Pay Auctions, Winning Probabilities.
    JEL: C72 D44 D82
    Date: 2005–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:brk:wpaper:0504&r=gth
  14. By: Helen Weeds; Robin Mason (Department of Economics University of Southampton)
    Keywords: Real options, Timing games, Auctions, Acquisitions.
    JEL: D44 D81 G34
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed005:255&r=gth
  15. By: Vasiliki Skreta; Nicolas Figueroa
    Keywords: Optimal Auctions, Multiple Objects, Externalities, Mechanism Design
    JEL: D44 C7 C72
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed005:866&r=gth
  16. By: Steven Callander; Johannes Horner
    JEL: C72 D72
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed005:683&r=gth
  17. By: Utku Unver; Hideo Konishi
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed005:208&r=gth
  18. By: Jorge Oviedo; Federico Echenique (Caltech)
    Keywords: Matching market, Core, Setwise stable set
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed005:233&r=gth
  19. By: Shahar Dobzinski; Noam Nisan; Michael Schapira
    Abstract: We design two computationally-efficient incentive-compatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with general bidder preferences. Both mechanisms are randomized, and are incentive-compatible in the universal sense. This is in contrast to recent previous work that only addresses the weaker notion of incentive compatibility in expectation. The first mechanism obtains an $O(\sqrt{m})$-approximation of the optimal social welfare for arbitrary bidder valuations -- this is the best approximation possible in polynomial time. The second one obtains an $O(\log^2 m)$-approximation for a subclass of bidder valuations that includes all submodular bidders. This improves over the best previously obtained incentive-compatible mechanism for this class which only provides an $O(\sqrt m)$-approximation.
    Date: 2005–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:huj:dispap:dp408&r=gth
  20. By: Jackson, Matthew O.
    Abstract: The science of social networks is a central field of sociological study, a major application of random graph theory, and an emerging area of study by economists, statistical physicists and computer scientists. While these literatures are (slowly) becoming aware of each other, and on occasion drawing from one another, they are still largely distinct in their methods, interests, and goals. Here, my aim is to provide some perspective on the research from these literatures, with a focus on the formal modeling of social networks and the two major types of models: those based on random graphs and those based on game theoretic reasoning. I highlight some of the strengths, weaknesses, and potential synergies between these two network modeling approaches.
    Keywords: networks, social networks, network games, network formation, game theory
    Date: 2005–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clt:sswopa:1237&r=gth
  21. By: Emrah Arbak (GATE CNRS); Laurence Kranich
    Abstract: We model the interaction between an employer and a worker with interdependent preferences in a simple one-shot production process. In particular, we assume that the worker becomes kinder if she senses that her employer is an altruist. We assume that intentions are private information. Thus, the wage proposal signals the intentions of the employer to the worker. We show that if the workers have ”reasonable” beliefs, then the unique prediction of the game is a separating equilibrium outcome in which wages are fully informative about the intentions of the employer. However, if there are several employers simultaneously bidding to hire a single worker, then there may exist another equilibrium in which wages are completely uninformative.
    Keywords: Altruism, Reciprocity, Asymmetric information, Labor relations, Behavioral game theory
    JEL: C72 D82 J30
    Date: 2005–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:0511&r=gth
  22. By: Marie-Claire Villeval (GATE CNRS); Manfred Konigstein
    Abstract: The labor economics literature has shown that the “efficient bargaining” model, in which wage and employment are negotiated simultaneously, is less frequently used on unionized markets than the less efficient “right-to-manage” model, in which wage is determined via bargaining and employment determined subsequently and unilaterally by the firm. This paper reports an experiment in which the choice of the bargaining agenda is endogenous within a noncooperative game. We find that participants show a preference for decision authority and choose single-issue bargaining in most cases even though efficiency is lower than in multi-issue bargaining. Furthermore, multi-issue bargaining induces unions to offer smaller payoff shares and leads to a higher conflict rate than in a single-issue bargaining.
    Keywords: Bargaining agenda, Efficient contracts, Right-to manage, Decision authority, Experiments
    JEL: C72 C78 C91 J51 J53
    Date: 2005–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:0508&r=gth
  23. By: Fernando B. Meneguin; Maurício S. Bugarin
    Abstract: The objective of this paper is to analyze, with the instruments of Game Theory, the incentives that can lead a Member State of the European Union to disregard the Stability and Growth Pact, and thus, to keep an excessive deficit, although aware of the political and financial risk associated with the non-compliance. Some games are analyzed: complete and incomplete information between a country and the European Union and incomplete information between the Union and two countries. This last case brings about an equilibrium that involves formation of reputation. The main conclusion is that the European Union must be strong and demand the fulfillment of the agreed, even if this imposes a high cost. If there were a signaling, as is already happening, that the European Union does not detain enough power to compel their members to adjust their deficits, there probably will be a general and in-cascade non-compliance of the Stability and Growth Pact, what will lead to the downfall of the Economic and Monetary Union.
    JEL: C72 F02 H62
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anp:en2005:091&r=gth
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