nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2005‒11‒12
eight papers chosen by
László Á. Kóczy
Universiteit Maastricht

  1. Seemingly Unrelated Repeated Games By John R. Conlon
  2. On Choosing Which Game to Play When Ignorant of the Rules By Murali Agastya
  3. Partially-Specified Large Games By Ehud Kalai
  4. The logic of two-level games with endogenous lobbying : the case of international environmental agreements. By Houda Haffoudhi
  5. Compensating losses and sharing surpluses in project-allocation situations By Ju,Y.; Ruys,P.H.M.; Borm,P.
  6. Balance of power By Boone,J.
  7. Interconnected networks By Bijl,P.W.J. de; Brunekreeft,G.; Damme,E.E.C. van
  8. Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation By Franz Dietrich; Christian List

  1. By: John R. Conlon (University of Mississippi)
    Abstract: Suppose Player A is playing two apparently independent repeated games with two other people, B and C, with A randomly matched, each period, with either B or C. Each dyad maintains the maximum incentive-compatible level of cooperation within the dyad, even if cooperation has broken down in the other dyad. Thus, if A defects against B, say, then C is still willing to cooperate with A to the maximum incentive-compatible degree. Nevertheless, we show that the simple presence of each cooperative relationship can increase the maximum incentive compatible level of cooperation in the other dyad, due to a counterintuitive circular reasoning or “bootstrapping” effect. With more than two relationships, bootstrapping effects alternate with equally counterintuitive reverse bootstrapping effects.
    Keywords: Repeated Games, Random Matching
    JEL: C7 D8
    Date: 2005–11–10
  2. By: Murali Agastya
    Date: 2005–11–04
  3. By: Ehud Kalai
    Date: 2005–11–05
  4. By: Houda Haffoudhi (LAEP)
    Abstract: International environmental agreements (IEAs) are increasingly important in a globalized economy. The aim of our paper is study the effect of political pressure groups-lobbies on the size and stability of IEAs. To this purpose we use the framework of two-level games to explain how national political situation influences the decisions of governments at the international negotiations arena. We present an endogenous lobbying model in which we assume that lobbies try to influence the policy choice of governments by offering political contribution in return for policy compromise. Indeed, we use the "interest based explanation" of international environmental policy to describe the incentives of countries to join an agreement. This approach classifies countries in four categories : pushers, bystanders, intermediate and draggers. We found that, when government gives the same weight to contribution and to social welfare, the contributions from the industrial lobby give incentives to government (Pushers, intermediate) to participate in the grand coalition making it stable. Our results suggest that in order to sustain the grand coalition, weak global environmental agreements -i.e. those involving small abatement targets- should be negotiated. The result is similar if governments are more interested by political contribution. However, if governments care less about political contribution than about social welfare, industrial contribution is not enough to limit the free riding incentives of each type of government. In this situation, pushers are the more expected to sustain a small stable coalition.
    Keywords: Non-cooperative game, interest group, coalition theory, environmental policy.
    JEL: C72 D72 D78 Q28
    Date: 2005–09
  5. By: Ju,Y.; Ruys,P.H.M.; Borm,P. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Keywords: projects;allocation;games
    JEL: C71 H70
    Date: 2004
  6. By: Boone,J. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
  7. By: Bijl,P.W.J. de; Brunekreeft,G.; Damme,E.E.C. van (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
  8. By: Franz Dietrich; Christian List
    Date: 2005–11–04

This nep-gth issue is ©2005 by László Á. Kóczy. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
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