nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2005‒10‒04
seven papers chosen by
László Á. Kóczy
Universiteit Maastricht

  1. Participation Games: Market Entry, Coordination and the Beautiful Blonde By Anderson, Simon P; Engers, Maxim
  2. The probabilistic representative values By Lorenzo-Freire,Silvia; Casas-Mendez,Balbina
  3. On the coincidence of the Prenucleolus and the Shapley Value By Anirban Kar; Manipushpak Mitra; Suresh Mutuswami
  4. Cost monotonic 'Construct and Charge' rules for connection situations By Moretti,Stefano; Tijs,Stef; Branzei,Rodica
  5. Perfect Competition in a Bilateral Monopoly (In honor of Martin Shubik) By Pradeep Dubey; Dieter Sondermann
  6. Committees and special interests By Mike Felgenhauer; Hans Peter Grüner
  7. War and Peace - Cyclical Phenomena? By Jacobsson, Adam

  1. By: Anderson, Simon P; Engers, Maxim
    Abstract: We find the Nash equilibria for monotone n-player symmetric games where each player chooses whether to participate. Examples include market entry games, coordination games, and the bar-room game depicted in the movie 'A Beautiful Mind'. The symmetric Nash equilibrium involves excessive participation (a common property resource problem) if participants’ payoffs are decreasing (in the number of participants), and insufficient participation if payoffs are increasing. With decreasing payoffs there can be many equilibria, but with increasing payoffs there are only three. Some comparative static properties of changing one player’s participation payoffs are counter-intuitive, especially with more than two players.
    Keywords: common property resource problem; comparative statics; coordination; market entry; mixed strategy equilibrium; Nash equilibrium
    JEL: C72 D43 L13
    Date: 2005–09
  2. By: Lorenzo-Freire,Silvia; Casas-Mendez,Balbina (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: In this paper we define a new family of solutions for the class of cooperative games with transferable utility, in which the set of players exhibits a structure of a priori unions. This family is deeply connected with the Shapley value for games with transferable utility but, moreover, we assume a solidarity strong connection among all the components of each union. As a consequence of this, they are disposed to delegate one coalition of members of the union to negotiate with the other unions, and, therefore, each union will have a representative coalition. Furthermore, three interesting solutions that belong to this family of values are studied, as well as the non cooperative selection of the best representative coalition for each union.
    Keywords: TU-games with unions;Shapley value;representative coalition
    JEL: C71 C72
    Date: 2005
  3. By: Anirban Kar; Manipushpak Mitra; Suresh Mutuswami
    Abstract: We identify a sufficient class of coalitional form games with transferable utility for which prenucleolus coincides with the Shapley value. We then apply our result to simple games and to generalized queueing games.
    Date: 2005–09–28
  4. By: Moretti,Stefano; Tijs,Stef; Branzei,Rodica (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: The special class of conservative charge systems for minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) situations is introduced. These conservative charge systems lead to single-valued rules for mcst situations, which can also be described with the aid of obligation functions and are, consequently, cost monotonic. A value-theoretic interpretation of these rules is also provided.
    Keywords: minimum cost spanning tree situations;cost monotonicity;sharing values; cost allocation
    JEL: C71
    Date: 2005
  5. By: Pradeep Dubey (Center for Game Theory, Dept. of Economics, SUNY at Stony Brook and Cowles Foundation, Yale University); Dieter Sondermann (Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Bonn)
    Abstract: We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. In particular, Nash equilibria are Walrasian even in a bilateral monopoly.
    Keywords: Limit orders, double auction, Nash equilibria, Walras equilibria, perfect competition, bilateral monopoly, mechanism design
    JEL: C72 D41 D42 D44 D61
    Date: 2005–09
  6. By: Mike Felgenhauer (University of Mannheim.); Hans Peter Grüner (University of Mannheim, IZA, Bonn, and CEPR, London. Correspondence address: Hans Peter Grüner, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics, D-68131 Mannheim, Germany.)
    Abstract: Some committees convene behind closed doors while others publicly discuss issues and make their decisions. This paper studies the role of open and closed committee decision making in presence of external influence. We show that restricting the information of interest groups may reduce the bias towards special interest politics. Moreover, there are cases where benefits from increasing the number of decision makers can only be reaped if the committee's sessions are not public. In open committees benefits from voting insincerely accrue not only when a decision maker's vote is pivotal. As the number of voters increases, the cost of voting insincerely declines in an open committee because the probability of being pivotal declines. This is not the case in a closed committee where costs and benefits of insincere voting only arise when a voter is pivotal.
    Keywords: Committees; interest groups; voting; common agency.
    JEL: D71 D72 D73
    Date: 2003–11
  7. By: Jacobsson, Adam (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University)
    Abstract: This paper demonstrates how the analysis can differ dramatically between two common modeling approaches to conflict. The first approach uses a one-period setup and associates positive investments in arms with conflict, see, for example, Skaperdas[1992]. The second approach has two periods, where arming decisions are taken in the first period, and the decision on wheter to go to war is taken separately in the second, see, for example, Brito and Intriligator [1985]. The second approach is then used to suggest a new possible explanation for the outbreak of war by showing how myopic players may end up in (Edgeworth) cycles of war and peace.
    Keywords: Armed conflict; Edgeworth cycles
    JEL: C72 D74
    Date: 2005–09–30

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