nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2005‒09‒17
seven papers chosen by
László Á. Kóczy
Universiteit Maastricht
  1. On the Geometry of Nash Equilibria and Correlated Equilibria By Robert Nau; Sabrina G Canovas; Pierre Hansen
  2. On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games By GAUDET, Gérard; LOHOUES, Hervé
  3. On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games By Philip J Reny
  4. (Non-)Existence and Scope of Nash Networks By Sudipta Sarangi; Hans Haller; Jurjen Kamphorst
  5. Stable Networks and Convex Payoffs By Sudipta Sarangi; Robert P. Gilles
  6. The Role of Beliefs and Confidence in Building Social Networks By Sudipta Sarangi; Robert P. Gilles
  7. Strategic Experimentation in Networks By Yann Bramoulle; Rachel Kranton
  1. By: Robert Nau; Sabrina G Canovas; Pierre Hansen
    Date: 2005–09–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:618897000000000961&r=gth
  2. By: GAUDET, Gérard; LOHOUES, Hervé
    Abstract: We derive conditions that must be satisfied by the primitives of the problem in order for an equilibrium in linear Markov strategies to exist in some common property natural resource differential games. These conditions impose restrictions on the admissible form of the natural growth function, given a benefit function, or on the admissible form of the benefit function, given a natural growth function.
    Keywords: common orty, natural resources, differential games, linear Markov strategies
    JEL: C73 D90 Q20
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mtl:montde:2005-15&r=gth
  3. By: Philip J Reny
    Date: 2005–09–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:najeco:784828000000000413&r=gth
  4. By: Sudipta Sarangi; Hans Haller; Jurjen Kamphorst
    Abstract: For the connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way flow of information and without information decay, specific parameter configurations are given for which Nash networks do not exist. Moreover, existence and the scope of Nash network architectures are briefly discussed.
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2005-14&r=gth
  5. By: Sudipta Sarangi; Robert P. Gilles
    Abstract: Recently a variety of link-based stability concepts have emerged in the literature on game theoretic models of social network formation. We investigate two basic formation properties that establish equivalence between some well known types of stable networks and their natural extensions. These properties can be identified as convexity conditions on the network payoff structures.
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2005-13&r=gth
  6. By: Sudipta Sarangi; Robert P. Gilles
    Abstract: We examine the process of building social relationships in a non-cooperative game where such link formation is costly and requires mutual consent. We provide a noncooperative foundation for several link-based network stability concepts that have been studied in the literature on network formation. In our model players form myopic beliefs about the feasibility of building direct relationships with their acquaintances. These beliefs represent how each neighbor of a player is expected to respond to the initiation of a link by that player. We introduce a stability concept called “monadic stability” where agents play a best response to their formed myopic beliefs such that these beliefs are self-confirming. The resulting equilibrium networks form a class of networks that are shown to have some very appealing properties.
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2005-15&r=gth
  7. By: Yann Bramoulle; Rachel Kranton
    Date: 2005–09–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:najeco:784828000000000417&r=gth
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