nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2005‒09‒02
four papers chosen by
László Á. Kóczy
Universiteit Maastricht

  1. Folk Theorem with Communication By Ichiro Obara
  2. Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting By Hummel, Patrick
  3. Finite perfect information extensive games with generic payoffs By Hummel, Patrick
  4. Search in the formation of large networks: How random are socially generated networks? By Jackson, Matthew O.; Rogers, Brian W.

  1. By: Ichiro Obara
    Date: 2005–08–31
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000351&r=gth
  2. By: Hummel, Patrick
    Keywords: perfect information games, extensive games, backward induction, weakly dominated strategies, iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies, binary voting agendas, sequential voting
    Date: 2005–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clt:sswopa:1236&r=gth
  3. By: Hummel, Patrick
    Keywords: perfect information games, extensive games, backward induction, Weakly dominated strategies, iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies, generic payoffs
    Date: 2005–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clt:sswopa:1235&r=gth
  4. By: Jackson, Matthew O.; Rogers, Brian W.
    Keywords: networks, network formation, power laws, scale-free networks, small worlds, search
    Date: 2005–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clt:sswopa:1216&r=gth

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