New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2005–09–02
four papers chosen by
Sylvain Béal, Université de Franche-Comté
  1. Folk Theorem with Communication By Ichiro Obara
  2. Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting By Hummel, Patrick
  3. Finite perfect information extensive games with generic payoffs By Hummel, Patrick
  4. Search in the formation of large networks: How random are socially generated networks? By Jackson, Matthew O.; Rogers, Brian W.
  1. By: Ichiro Obara
    Date: 2005–08–31
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000351
  2. By: Hummel, Patrick
    Keywords: perfect information games, extensive games, backward induction, weakly dominated strategies, iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies, binary voting agendas, sequential voting
    Date: 2005–08
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clt:sswopa:1236
  3. By: Hummel, Patrick
    Keywords: perfect information games, extensive games, backward induction, Weakly dominated strategies, iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies, generic payoffs
    Date: 2005–08
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clt:sswopa:1235
  4. By: Jackson, Matthew O.; Rogers, Brian W.
    Keywords: networks, network formation, power laws, scale-free networks, small worlds, search
    Date: 2005–03
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clt:sswopa:1216
This issue is ©2005 by Sylvain Béal. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at https://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the Griffith Business School of Griffith University in Australia.
This page is being maintained by Thomas Krichel. It was last updated on 2026‒03‒25 at 7:09.