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on Game Theory |
| By: | Velzen,Bas van; Hamers,Herbert; Norde,Henk (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we generalise marginal vectors and permutational convexity. We show that if a game is generalised permutationally convex, then the corresponding generalised marginal vector is a core element. Furthermore we refine the concept of permutational convexity and show that this refinement yields a sufficient condition for the corresponding marginal vector to be a core element. Finally, we prove that permutational convexity is equivalent to a restricted set of inequalities and that if a game is permutationally convex with respect to an order, then it is permutationally convex with respect to a related order as well. |
| Keywords: | cooperative game theory;marginal vectors;permutational convexity |
| JEL: | C71 |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200583&r=gth |
| By: | Syngjoo Choi; Douglas Gale; Shachar Kariv |
| Date: | 2005–08–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000278&r=gth |
| By: | Lorenzo-Freire,Silvia; Casa-Mendez,Balbina; Hendrickx,Ruud (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | This paper considers two-stage solutions for multi-issue allocation situations. Characterisations are provided for the two-stage constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules, based on the properties of composition and path independence. |
| Keywords: | multi-issue allocation situations;constrained equal awards;constrained equal losses;two-stage solutions |
| JEL: | C71 |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200580&r=gth |
| By: | Bellamare,Charles; Kroeger,Sabine; Soest,Arthur van (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | We combine the choice data of proposers and responders in the ultimatum game, their expectations elicited in the form of subjective probability questions, and the choice data of proposers ("dictator") in a dictator game to estimate a structural model of decision making under uncertainty. We use a large and representative sample of subjects drawn from the Dutch population. Our results indicate that there is considerable heterogeneity in preferences for equity in the population. Changes in preferences have an important impact on decisions of dictators in the dictator game and responders in the ultimatum game, but a smaller impact on decisions of proposer's in the ultimatum game, a result due to proposers subjective expectations about responders' decisions. The model which uses subjective data on expectations has better predictive power and lower noise level than a model which assumes that players have rational expectations. |
| Keywords: | ultimatum game;inquity aversion;subjective expectations |
| JEL: | C93 D63 D84 |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200582&r=gth |
| By: | Gilles,Robert P.; Sarangi,Sudipta (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | Recently a variety of link-based stability concepts have emerged in the literature on game theoretic models of social network formation. We investigate two basic formation properties that establish equivalence between some well known types of stable networks and their natural extensions. These properties can be identified as convexity conditions on the network payoff structures. |
| Keywords: | social networks;network formation;pairwise stability |
| JEL: | C72 C79 |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200584&r=gth |
| By: | Jackson, Matthew O.; Rogers, Brian W. |
| Keywords: | networks, small worlds, clustering, links, diameter |
| Date: | 2005–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clt:sswopa:1214&r=gth |