nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2005‒05‒23
three papers chosen by
Gerald Pech
NUI Galway

  1. The V L value for network games By Hendrickx,Ruud; Borm,Peter; Brink,Rene van den; Owen,Guillermo
  2. Core Convergence with Asymmetric Information By Richard McLean; Andrew Postlewaite
  3. Dynamic Psychological Games By Pierpaolo Battigalli; Martin Dufwenberg

  1. By: Hendrickx,Ruud; Borm,Peter; Brink,Rene van den; Owen,Guillermo (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: In this paper we consider a proper Shapley value (the V L value) for cooperative network games. This value turns out to have a nice interpretation. We compute the V L value for various kinds of networks and relate this value to optimal strategies in an associated matrix game.
    JEL: C71
    Date: 2005
  2. By: Richard McLean (Department of Economics, Rutgers University); Andrew Postlewaite (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)
    Abstract: We analyze the ex ante incentive compatible core for replicated private information economies. We show that any allocation in the core when the economy is replicated sufficiently often is approximately Walrasian for the associated Arrow-Debreu economy.
    Keywords: Core, Asymmetric Information, Incentive Compatibility, Exchange Economy
    JEL: C71 D82 D51
    Date: 2003–11–01
  3. By: Pierpaolo Battigalli; Martin Dufwenberg
    Date: 2005–05–14

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