nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2005‒04‒09
seven papers chosen by
Gerald Pech
NUI Galway

  1. On the sensitivity matrix of the Nash bargaining solution By Engwerda,Jacob; Douven,Rudy C.
  2. Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium By Goeree, Jacob; Holt, Charles; Palfrey, Thomas
  3. Uncertainty in a fisherey management game By Engwerda,Jacob
  4. Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability By Maus,Stefan; Peters,Hans; Storcken,Ton
  5. A Note on Instability and Indeterminacy in Search and Matching Models By Thomas Lubik; Michael Krause
  6. Quantum Games and Programmable Quantum Systems By Katarzyna Miakisz; Edward W. Piotrowski; Jan Sladkowski
  7. Adaptive build-up and breakdown of trust : an agent based computational approach By Gorobets,Alexander; Nooteboom,Bart

  1. By: Engwerda,Jacob; Douven,Rudy C. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: In this note we derive the sensitivity matrix of the Nash bargaining solution w.r.t. the disagreement point d. This first order derivative is completely specified in terms of the Pareto frontier function. We show that whenever one player increases his threatpoint always at least one player will loose utility: i.e. the dual result of Pareto optimality. Furthermore,the dmonotonicity property is easily re-established from this matrix. This matrix also enables us to consider the concept of local strong d-monotonicity. That is,under which conditions on the Pareto frontier function . an infinitesimal increase of di,while for each j = i, dj remains constant,it happens that agent i is the only one who s payoff increases. We show that for the Nash bargaining solution this question is closely related to non-negativity of the Hamiltonian matrix of . at the solution.
    JEL: C61 C72 C73
    Date: 2005
  2. By: Goeree, Jacob; Holt, Charles; Palfrey, Thomas
    Abstract: The structural Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) generalizes the Nash equilibrium by augmenting payoffs with random elements that are not removed in some limit. This approach has been widely used both as a theoretical framework to study comparative statics of games and as an econometric framework to analyze experimental and field data. The framework of structural QRE is flexible: it can be applied to arbitrary finite games and incorporate very general error structures. Restrictions on the error structure are needed, however, to place testable restrictions on the data (Haile et al., 2004). This paper proposes a reduced-form approach, based on quantal response functions that replace the best-response functions underlying the Nash equilibrium. We define a {\em regular} QRE as a fixed point of quantal response functions that satisfies four axioms: continuity, interiority, responsiveness, and monotonicity. We show that these conditions are not vacuous and demonstrate with an example that they imply economically sensible restrictions on data consistent with laboratory observations. The reduced-form approach allows for a richer set of regular quantal response functions, which has proven useful for estimation purposes.
    Keywords: Quantal response equilibrium, discrete choice models, reduced-form approach
    Date: 2005–03
  3. By: Engwerda,Jacob (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: In this paper we analyze the consequences of taking noise into account in a simple twoperson fishery management game. Both a stochastic and deterministic formulation are considered. Compared to the noise-free model it is shown that the used stochastic frameworkhas no implications for the equilibrium actions, whereas in the deterministic formulation as well the number of as the equilibrium actions themselves depend on the model parameters. The various equilibrium actions predicted using the deterministic frameworkseem to be quite plausible.
    JEL: C61 C72 C73
    Date: 2005
  4. By: Maus,Stefan; Peters,Hans; Storcken,Ton (METEOR)
    Abstract: We compare the manipulability of different choice rules by considering the number of manipulable profiles. We establish the minimal number of such profiles for tops-only, anonymous, and surjective choice rules, and show that this number is attained by unanimity rules with status quo.
    Keywords: public economics ;
    Date: 2005
  5. By: Thomas Lubik; Michael Krause
    Abstract: We demonstrate the possibility of indeterminacy and non-existence of equilibrium dynamics in a standard business cycle model with search and matching frictions in the labor market. Our results arise for empirically plausible parametrizations and do not rely upon a mechanism such as increasing returns.
    Date: 2004–11
  6. By: Katarzyna Miakisz; Edward W. Piotrowski; Jan Sladkowski
    Abstract: Attention to the very physical aspects of information characterizes the current research in quantum computation, quantum cryptography and quantum communication. In most of the cases quantum description of the system provides advantages over the classical approach. Game theory, the study of decision making in conflict situation has already been extended to the quantum domain. We would like to review the latest development in quantum game theory that is relevant to information processing. We will begin by illustrating the general idea of a quantum game and methods of gaining an advantage over "classical opponent". Then we review the most important game theoretical aspects of quantum information processing. On grounds of the discussed material, we reason about possible future development of quantum game theory and its impact on information processing and the emerging information society. The idea of quantum artificial intelligence is explained.
  7. By: Gorobets,Alexander; Nooteboom,Bart (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: This article employs Agent-Based Computational Economics (ACE) to investigate whether, and under what conditions, trust is viable in markets. The emergence and breakdown of trust is modeled in a context of multiple buyers and suppliers. Agents develop trust in a partner as a function of observed loyalty. They select partners on the basis of their trust in the partner and potential profit. On the basis of realized profits, they adapt the weight they attach to trust relative to profitability, and their own trustworthiness, modeled as a threshold of defection. Trust turns out to be viable under fairly general conditions.
    JEL: C63 D23 L14 L22 L24
    Date: 2005

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