nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2005‒03‒13
five papers chosen by
Gerald Pech
NUI Galway

  1. Transfer rate rules and core selections in NTU games By Vincent Iehlé
  2. An axiomatization of minimal curb sets By Voorneveld, Mark; Kets, Willemien; Norde, Henk
  3. Pairwise-Stability and Nash Equilibria in Network Formation By Antoni Calvó-Armengol; Rahmi Ilkiliç
  4. Competitive Bargaining Equilibria By Julio Davila; Jan Eeckhout
  5. Union Formation and Bargaining Rules in the Labor Market. By Yolanda Chica; María Paz Espinosa

  1. By: Vincent Iehlé (CERMSEM)
    Abstract: Different kinds of asymmetries between players can occur in core allocations, in that case the stability of the concept is questioned. One remedy consists in selecting robust core allocations. We review, in this note, results that all select core allocations in NTU games with different concepts of robustness. Within a unified approach, we deduce the existence of allocations in : the partnered core, the social stable core, the core intersected with average prekernel, the weak inner core. We use a recent contribution of Bonnisseau and Iehlé (2003) that states the existence of core allocations whit a transfer rate rule equilibrium under a dependent balancedness assumption. It shall turn out to be manipulable tools for selecting the core.
    Keywords: Cooperative games, dependent balancedness, core selections in NTU games
    JEL: C60 C71
    Date: 2004–10
  2. By: Voorneveld, Mark (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics); Kets, Willemien (Department of Econometrics and Operations Research); Norde, Henk (Department of Econometrics and Operations Research)
    Abstract: Norde et al. [Games Econ. Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in finite strategic games satisfying existence is consistent. A transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem: there is a multiplicity of consistent set-valued solution concepts that satisfy nonemptiness and recommend utility maximization in one-player games. The minimal curb sets of Basu and Weibull [Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] constitute one such solution concept; they are axiomatized in this article.
    Keywords: Minimal curb sets; Consistency
    JEL: C72
    Date: 2005–03–04
  3. By: Antoni Calvó-Armengol (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Université de Toulouse Sciences Sociales and CEPR); Rahmi Ilkiliç (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
    Abstract: Suppose that individual payoffs depend on the network connecting them. Consider the following simultaneous move game of network formation: players announce independently the links they wish to form, and links are formed only under mutual consent. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the network link marginal payoffs such that the set of pairwise stable, pairwise-Nash and proper equilibrium networks coincide, where pairwise stable networks are robust to one-link deviations, while pairwise-Nash networks are robust to one-link creation but multi-link severance. Under these conditions, proper equilibria in pure strategies are fully characterized by one-link deviation checks.
    Keywords: Network formation, Pairwise-stability, Proper equilibrium
    JEL: C62 C72 D85 L14
    Date: 2005–03
  4. By: Julio Davila (CERMSEM et University Pennsylvania); Jan Eeckhout (University Pennsylvania)
    Abstract: We propose a simple bargaining procedure, the equilibrium of which converges to the Walrasian allocation as the agents become increasingly patient. We thus establish that the competitive outcome obtains even if agents have market power and are not price-takers. Moreover, where in other bargaining protocols the final outcome depends on bargaining power or relative impatience, the outcome here is determinate and depends only on preferences and endowments. This procedure has therefore important implications for policy applications compared to standard bargaining rules.
    Keywords: Alternating-offers bargaining; Walrasian equilibrium; price-setting; quantity constraints
    JEL: C60 C71 D41 D51
    Date: 2004–04
  5. By: Yolanda Chica (Universidad del País Vasco); María Paz Espinosa (Universidad del País Vasco)
    Keywords: Union Formation, Sequential Bargaining, Nash Bargaining, Monopoly Union
    JEL: C72 J51
    Date: 2005–03–07

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