nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2005‒02‒27
three papers chosen by
Gerald Pech
NUI Galway
  1. A Note on the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Discontinuous Payoffs By J. Rupert J. Gatti
  2. Bargaining and markets By Martin J. Osborne; Ariel Rubinstein
  3. The Effect of Group Identity in an Investment Game By Werner Güth; Matteo Ploner; Vittoria Levati
  1. By: J. Rupert J. Gatti
    Abstract: This paper generalises the approach taken by Dasgupta & Maskin (1986) and Simon (1989) and provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in games with continuous strategy spaces and discontinuous payoff functions. The conditions can be applied widely, and examples for existence of pure strategy and monotonic equilibria in First-Price auctions are provided. The conditions are also appropriate for ensuring that computer generated equilibrium solutions can be extended to continuous strategy spaces.
    Keywords: Nash Equilibrium, Discontinuous Payoff Function, First-price Auctions
    JEL: C70 D44
    Date: 2005–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:0510&r=gth
  2. By: Martin J. Osborne; Ariel Rubinstein
    Date: 2005–02–21
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000515&r=gth
  3. By: Werner Güth; Matteo Ploner; Vittoria Levati
    Abstract: The present research experimentally examines the influence of group identity on trust behavior in an investment game. In one treatment, group identity is manipulated only through the creation of artificial (minimal) groups. In other treatments group members are additionally related by outcome interdependence established in a prior public goods game. In moving from the standard investment game (where no group identity is prompted) to minimal group identity to two-dimensional group identity, we find no significant differences in trust decisions. However, trust is significantly positively correlated with contribution decisions. This suggests that cooperative attitudes are idiosyncratic preferences, which are not affected by the creation of an arbitrary group identity.
    Keywords: trust, group identity, outcome interdependence, experiment
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esi:discus:2005-06&r=gth
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