nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2005‒02‒20
nine papers chosen by
Gerald Pech
NUI Galway

  1. Stochastic dominance equilibria in two-person noncooperative games By Perea,Andres; Peters,Hans; Schulteis,Tim; Vermeulen,Dries
  2. Efficient Bidding with Externalities By Inés Macho-Stadler; David Pérez-Castrillo; David Wettstein
  3. The Bird core for minimum cost spanning tree problems revisited: monotonicity and additivity aspects By Tijs,Stef; Moretti,Stefano; Branzei,Rodica; Norde,Henk
  4. Computing integral solutions of complementarity problems By Laan,Gerard van der; Talman,Dolf; Yang,Zaifu
  5. Group Formation and Voter Participation By Helios Herrera; César Martinelli
  6. Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment By James Andreoni; Yeon-Koo Che; Jinwoo Kim
  7. Experiments on Auction Valuation and Endogenous Entry By Elena Katok; Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans
  8. Innovation Strategies in a Competitive Dynamic Setting By Ruslan Lukach; Joseph Plasmans; Peter M. Kort
  9. Financial Intermediation and Credit Market Equilibrium: A Model of Matching Market By Kaniska Dam

  1. By: Perea,Andres; Peters,Hans; Schulteis,Tim; Vermeulen,Dries (METEOR)
    Abstract: Two-person noncooperative games with finitely many pure strategies and ordinal preferences over pure outcomes are considered, in which probability distributions resulting from mixed strategies are evaluated according to t-degree stochastic dominance. A t-best reply is a strategy that induces a t-degree stochastically undominated distribution, and a t-equilibrium is a pair of t-best replies. The paper provides a characterization and existence proofs of t-equilibria in terms of representing utility functions, and shows that for t becoming large-which can be interpreted as the players becoming more risk averse-behavior converges to a specific form of max-min play. More precisely, this means that in the limit each player puts all weight on a strategy that maximizes the worst outcome for the opponent, within the supports of the strategies in the limiting sequenceof t-equilibria.
    Keywords: microeconomics ;
    Date: 2005
  2. By: Inés Macho-Stadler; David Pérez-Castrillo; David Wettstein
    Abstract: We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the externalities are averaged. We construct two slightly different mechanisms: one for environments with negative externalities and the other for positive externalities. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these mechanisms coincide with the sharing proposals.
    Keywords: Implementation, Externalities, Bidding, Shapley Value.
    JEL: D62 C71
    Date: 2005–02–10
  3. By: Tijs,Stef; Moretti,Stefano; Branzei,Rodica; Norde,Henk (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: A new way is presented to de¯ne for minimum cost spanning tree (mcst-) games the irreducible core, which is introduced by Bird in 1976. The Bird core correspondence turns out to have interesting monotonicity and additivity properties and each stable cost monotonic allocation rule for mcst-problems is a selection of the Bird core correspondence. Using the additivity property an axiomatic characterization of the Bird core correspondence is obtained.
    JEL: C71
    Date: 2005
  4. By: Laan,Gerard van der; Talman,Dolf; Yang,Zaifu (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: In this paper an algorithm is proposed to find an integral solution of (nonlinear) complementarity problems. The algorithm starts with a nonnegative integral point and generates a unique sequence of adjacent integral simplices of varying dimension. Conditions are stated under which the algorithm terminates with a simplex one of whose vertices is an integral solution of the complementarity problem under consideration.
    JEL: C61 C62 C68 C72
    Date: 2005
  5. By: Helios Herrera; César Martinelli
    Date: 2005–02–10
  6. By: James Andreoni; Yeon-Koo Che; Jinwoo Kim
    Date: 2005–02–10
  7. By: Elena Katok (Laboratory for Economic Management and Auctions, Penn State University); Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans (College of Business, University of Illinois)
    Abstract: We present results of several experiments that deal with endogenous entry in auctions and auction valuation. One observation that is constant across all of the experiments we report is that laboratory subjects have a difficult time evaluating potential gains from auctions. Even after they are given some experience with particular auctions, the uncertainty inherent in the auctions (the probability of winning as well as the potential gains from winning) makes it difficult for subjects to compare different auction mechanisms. This highlights the need for new experimental procedures to be used for testing theories that involve endogenous auction entry in the laboratory.
    Keywords: Experiments on Auction Valuation and Endogenous Entry
    JEL: C72 D83 D44 C91
    Date: 2004–10–01
  8. By: Ruslan Lukach; Joseph Plasmans; Peter M. Kort
    Abstract: This paper presents a dynamic model of a competitive R&D and production duopoly subject to knowledge spillovers. Two asymmetric firms operate for a limited period of time and dispose their knowledge capital in the end. Both firms and the social planner prefer the R&D-cooperative strategy over the competitive one regardless of the intensity of knowledge spillovers. Accumulation of knowledge capital results allows the monopolist to have lower marginal cost of production and charge a lower market price than a fully competitive duopoly. Being able to define the degree of knowledge exchange when creating a research joint venture, the firms do not necessary choose the highest degree of cooperation available.
    Keywords: innovation, R&D, spillovers, cooperation
    JEL: C72 D21 O31
    Date: 2005
  9. By: Kaniska Dam (School of Economics, Universidad de Guanajuato / UCL-CORE)
    Keywords: Financial Intermediation, Moral Hazard, Negatively Assorted Matching
    JEL: C78 D82 E44 G24

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