nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2005‒02‒06
two papers chosen by
Gerald Pech
NUI Galway

  1. Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Stable Matchings By Dipjyoti Majumdar
  2. Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains By Michel Le Breton; John A. Weymark

  1. By: Dipjyoti Majumdar (Department of Economics, Concordia University)
    Abstract: We study incentive issues related to two-sided one-to-one stable matching problem after weakening the notion of strategy-proofness to Ordinal Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (OBIC). Under OBIC, truthtelling is required to maximize the expected utility of every agent, expected utility being computed with respect to the agent’s prior beliefs and under the assumption that everybody else is also telling the truth. We show that when preferences are unrestricted there exists no matching procedure that is both stable and OBIC. Next preferences are restricted to the case where remaining single is the worst alternative for every agent. We show that in this case, if agents have uniform priors then the stable matchings generated by “deferred acceptance algorithms” are OBIC. However, for generic priors there are no matching procedures that are both stable and OBIC even with restricted preferences.
    Keywords: stable matching, incentives, strategy-proofness
    JEL: C72 D72
    Date: 2003–08
  2. By: Michel Le Breton (GREMAQ and IDEI, Universite de Toulouse 1); John A. Weymark (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University)
    Abstract: This article surveys the literature that investigates the consistency of Arrow's social choice axioms when his unrestricted domain assumptions are replaced by domain conditions that incorporate the restrictions on agendas and preferences encountered in economic environments. Both social welfare functions and social choice correspondences are considered.
    Keywords: Social choice, Arrow's Theorem, restricted domains
    JEL: D71
    Date: 2002–04

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