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on Game Theory |
| By: | Pranab Bardhan (Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley); Nirvikar Singh (University of California, Santa Cruz) |
| Abstract: | In a model where cooperation is beneficial, but subject to cheating, and is supported by trigger strategy punishments in a repeated game, we explore the relationship between the nature of cooperation (size and composition of coalitions) and underlying inequality in the distribution of private productive assets. |
| Keywords: | inequality, self-enforcing, collective action, infrastructure, |
| Date: | 2004–05–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:ucscec:1011&r=gth |
| By: | Vincenzo Scalzo |
| Abstract: | In this paper, a concept of approximate social Nash equilibria is considered and an existence result is given when the strategic spaces of the players are not compact. These have been obtained using an approximate fixed point theorem. As an application of the existence of such approximate social Nash equilibria, sufficient conditions for the existence of a suitable approximate walrasian equilibrium in finite economies are obtained. Among others things, it is shown that the approximate walrasian equilibrium here considered is approximatively weakly efficient. |
| Keywords: | Abstract economy, approximate social Nash equilibrium, finite economy, approximate walrasian equilibrium, approximate fixed point theorems. |
| JEL: | C72 D51 |
| Date: | 2005–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ufg:qdsems:03-2005&r=gth |
| By: | Susana Cabrera; C. Mónica Capra; Rosario Gómez |
| Abstract: | We report results of one-shot traveler’s dilemma game experiments to test the predictions of a model of introspection. The model describes a noisy out-of-equilibrium process by which players reach a decision of what to do in one-shot strategic interactions. To test the robustness of the model and to compare it to other models of introspection without noise, we introduce non-binding advice. Advice has the effect of coordinating all players’ beliefs onto a common strategy. Experimentally, advice is implemented by asking subjects who participated in a repeated traveler’s dilemma game to recommend an action to subjects playing one-shot games with identical parameters. In contrast to observations, models based on best-response dynamics would predict lower claims than the advised. We show that our model’s predictions with and without advice are consistent with the data. |
| Date: | 2005–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:emo:wp2003:0504&r=gth |
| By: | Luis G. Gonzalez |
| Abstract: | The Nash Bargaining problem in the context of a random utility model yields a stochastic demand for each player, conditional on his or her beliefs regarding the other player's behavior. We derive a symmetric logit equilibrium under naive expectations that converges to the Nash axiomatic solution as noise in utility vanishes. A numerical approximation to the symmetric logit equilibrium under rational expectations (Quantal Response Equilibrium) solution is also computed. |
| Date: | 2005–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esi:discus:2005-01&r=gth |
| By: | Aitor Ciarreta (Universidad del País Vasco (Spain)); Carlos Gutierrez-Hita (Universitat Jaume I Castellón) |
| Keywords: | collusion, repeated games, electricity market |
| JEL: | L11 L13 L51 |
| Date: | 2005–01–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehu:dfaeii:200502&r=gth |
| By: | Ambec, S. |
| Abstract: | The paper examines the implementation of Bayesian allocation rules that satisfy non-negative ex post payoffs for one player in a two-players bilateral asymmetric information setting. It focuses on sequential mechanisms in which players communicate in turn among themselves. First, it shows that, under general conditions, any such allocation rule can be equivalently implemented by a sequential mechanism. Second, when allocation rules are negotiated ex ante, the order matters. The player who communicates first must have bargaining power of unbouded ex post payoffs. ...French Abstract : L'article examine l'implémentation des règles d'allocation Bayesiennes qui satisfont la contrainte de gains ex post non-négatifs pour un joueur dans le cadre d'un modèle de deux joueurs avec information asymétrique bilatérale. Nous montrons que, sous des conditions générales, ces allocations peuvent être implémentées par un mécanisme séquentiel dans lequel les joueurs se communiquent leur information l'un après l'autre. De plus, lorsque les règles d'allocation sont négociées ex ante, l'ordre est important : le joueur qui communique le premier doit avoir le pouvoir de négociation ou des gains ex post non-bornées. |
| Keywords: | IMPLEMENTATION; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; CONTRACT; PRINCIPAL AGENT |
| JEL: | D23 D82 |
| Date: | 2004 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rea:gaelwp:200415&r=gth |