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on Game Theory |
| By: | Stefano Vannucci |
| Abstract: | This paper contributes to the task of classifying game forms from a structural point of view by studying properties of their concept-or Galoislattices. A characterization of those coalitional game forms that have topological closure systems is provided.It is also shown that CGFs with topological closure systems include additive effectivity functions and simple effectivity functions, but do not reduce to them, and that the resulting topologies are T0 only if the underlying CGF is ‘purified’ |
| JEL: | O2 |
| Date: | 2004–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usi:wpaper:443&r=gth |
| By: | Vihang Patel (Indian Institute of Technology,Kharagpur) |
| Abstract: | The Flexible Mechanisms articulated in the Kyoto Protocol provide a robust framework for emission reduction issue in a manner that is not just economically efficient, but is also pro-growth for trade. In the presence of liquid or illiquid markets, to attain higher value from the emission trading, we have shown that coalition strategies provide a pertinent alternative to production optimization measures which may not be feasible at times. The whole game is analyzed taking a resource based view of the strategic factor markets. We have also illustrated the measures needed to provide stability to the coalitions and hence the coalition strategies. |
| Keywords: | coalition, strategy, game theory, emission, environment, resource based view, strategic factor market |
| JEL: | C7 D8 |
| Date: | 2005–01–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0501002&r=gth |
| By: | David Perez-Castrillo; Robert F. Veszteg |
| Abstract: | Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) and Veszteg (2004) propose the use of a multibidding mechanism for situations where agents have to choose a common project. Examples are decisions involving public goods (or public "bads"). We report experimental results to test the practical tractability and effectiveness of the multibidding mechanisms in environments where agents hold private information concerning their valuation of the projects. The mechanism performed quite well in the laboratory: it provided the ex post efficient outcome in roughly three quarters of the cases across the treatments; moreover, the largest part of the subject pool formed their bids according to the theoretical bidding behavior. |
| Keywords: | experiments, mechanisms, uncertainty |
| JEL: | C91 C72 |
| Date: | 2005–01–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aub:autbar:638.05&r=gth |
| By: | Philipp C. Wichardt |
| Abstract: | In a first attempt to apply the global games methodology to signalling games, Ewerhart and Wichardt (2004) analyse a beer-quiche type signalling game with additional imperfect information about the preferences of the receiver. Their approach allows them to dismiss the unreasonable pooling on quiche equilibrium. This paper revisits their example and discusses how an extension of the set of strategies for the sender affects the analysis. For an extended beer-quiche game, a unique equilibrium is selected while two equilibria are consistent with the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987). Thus, a global games approach to signalling games will in general not be equivalent to the Intuitive Criterion. Furthermore, we provied some intuition for why the global games approach to this type of signalling games should be more selective than the Intuitive Criterion. |
| Keywords: | Global Games, Signalling, Equilibrium Selection, Intuitive Criterion, Limit Pricing |
| JEL: | C72 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:iewwpx:223&r=gth |
| By: | Barbieri, Stefano; Mattozzi, Andrea |
| Abstract: | We address the coordination problem of individuals deciding to join an association that provides a public good and selective benefits to its members, when ability of the association to fulfill its purposes depends on membership size. In a global game formulation, we show that a unique equilibrium with non-trivial membership exists, and we perform meaningful comparative statics. A unique equilibrium also obtains when agents are heterogeneous, and we show that heterogeneity decreases membership size. In a two-period setting, where seniority of membership entails additional benefits, we provide conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium, and show that the presence of seniority benefits increases membership in both periods. |
| Keywords: | public goods, associations, dynamic global games, heterogeneous commuities |
| Date: | 2004–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clt:sswopa:1206&r=gth |
| By: | Eguia, Jon X. |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the advantages that a coalition of agents in a larger electorate can obtain by forming a voting bloc to pool their votes and cast them all in one direction. We show under which conditions an agent will benefit from the formation of the voting bloc, whether being part of it or stepping out is most advantageous for an individual agent and what are the different optimal internal voting rules to aggregate preferences within the coalition. |
| Keywords: | voting bloc, coalition formation, voting rule |
| Date: | 2004–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clt:sswopa:1208&r=gth |