nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2004‒12‒20
eight papers chosen by
Gerald Pech
NUI Galway

  1. A superadditive solution By Pallaschke,D.; Rosenmueller,J.
  2. Feasible beliefs in noncooperative games By Albers,L.
  3. Bargaining Sets of Voting Games By Bezalel Peleg; Peter Sudholter
  4. An Ordinal Shapley Value for Economic Environments (Revised Version) By David Perez-Castrillo; David Wettstein
  5. Core-equivalence for the Nash bargaining solution By Trockel,W.
  6. On the meaning of the Nash product By Trockel,W.
  7. Trading bargaining weights By Ervig,U.; Haake,C.
  8. Network Externalities, Demand Inertia and Dynamic Pricing in an Experimental Oligopoly Market By Ralph C Bayer; Mickey Chan

  1. By: Pallaschke,D.; Rosenmueller,J. (University of Bielefeld, Institute of Mathematical Economics)
    Date: 2004
  2. By: Albers,L. (University of Bielefeld, Institute of Mathematical Economics)
    Date: 2004
  3. By: Bezalel Peleg; Peter Sudholter
    Abstract: Let A be a finite set of m <FONT FACE="Symbol">&#179;</FONT> 3 alternatives, let N be a finite set of n <FONT FACE="Symbol">&#179;</FONT> 3 players and let R<SUP>n</SUP> be a profile of linear preference orderings on A of the players. Throughout most of the paper the considered voting system is the majority rule. Let u<SUP>N</SUP> be a profile of utility functions for R<SUP>N</SUP>. Using <FONT FACE="Symbol">a</FONT>-effectiveness we define the NTU game V<SUB>u<SUP>N</SUP></SUB> and investigate its Aumann-Davis-Maschler and Mas-Colell bargaining sets. The first bargaining set is nonempty for m = 3 and it may be empty for m <FONT FACE="Symbol">&#179;</FONT> 4. Moreover, in a simple probabilistic model, for fixed m, the probability that the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set is nonempty tends to one if n tends to infinity. The Mas-Colell bargaining set is nonempty for m <FONT FACE="Symbol">&#163;</FONT> 5 and it may be empty for m <FONT FACE="Symbol">&#179;</FONT> 6. Moreover, we prove the following startling result: The Mas-Colell bargaining set of any simple majority voting game derived from the k-th replication of R<SUP>N</SUP> is nonempty, provided that k <FONT FACE="Symbol">&#179;</FONT> n + 2. We also compute the NTU games which are derived from choice by plurality voting and approval voting, and we analyze some interesting examples.
    Keywords: NTU game; bargaining set; majority rule; plurality voting; approval voting
    JEL: D71
    Date: 2004–12
  4. By: David Perez-Castrillo; David Wettstein
    Abstract: We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapely value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.
    Keywords: Non-Transferable utility games, Shapley value, Ordinal Shapley value, consistency, fairness.
    JEL: C72 D50 D63
    Date: 2004–12–14
  5. By: Trockel,W. (University of Bielefeld, Institute of Mathematical Economics)
    Date: 2004
  6. By: Trockel,W. (University of Bielefeld, Institute of Mathematical Economics)
    Date: 2004
  7. By: Ervig,U.; Haake,C. (University of Bielefeld, Institute of Mathematical Economics)
    Date: 2004
  8. By: Ralph C Bayer (University of Adelaide); Mickey Chan (University of Adelaide)
    Abstract: This paper analyses dynamic pricing in markets with network externalities. Network externalities imply demand inertia, because the size of a network increases the usefulness of the product for consumers. Since past sales increase current demand, firms have an incentive to set low introductory prices to be able to increase prices as their networks grow. However, in reality we observe decreasing prices. This could be due to other factors dominating the network e¤ects. We use an experimental duopoly market with demand inertia to isolate the effect of network externalities. We find that experimental price dynamics are rather consistent with real world observations than with theoretical predictions.
    Keywords: Network Externalities, Demand Inertia, Experiments, Oligopoly
    JEL: L13 C92
    Date: 2004–12–14

This nep-gth issue is ©2004 by Gerald Pech. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.