
on Game Theory 
By:  Pallaschke,D.; Rosenmueller,J. (University of Bielefeld, Institute of Mathematical Economics) 
Date:  2004 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:att:bielme:2004361&r=gth 
By:  Albers,L. (University of Bielefeld, Institute of Mathematical Economics) 
Date:  2004 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:att:bielme:2004352&r=gth 
By:  Bezalel Peleg; Peter Sudholter 
Abstract:  Let A be a finite set of m <FONT FACE="Symbol">³</FONT> 3 alternatives, let N be a finite set of n <FONT FACE="Symbol">³</FONT> 3 players and let R<SUP>n</SUP> be a profile of linear preference orderings on A of the players. Throughout most of the paper the considered voting system is the majority rule. Let u<SUP>N</SUP> be a profile of utility functions for R<SUP>N</SUP>. Using <FONT FACE="Symbol">a</FONT>effectiveness we define the NTU game V<SUB>u<SUP>N</SUP></SUB> and investigate its AumannDavisMaschler and MasColell bargaining sets. The first bargaining set is nonempty for m = 3 and it may be empty for m <FONT FACE="Symbol">³</FONT> 4. Moreover, in a simple probabilistic model, for fixed m, the probability that the AumannDavisMaschler bargaining set is nonempty tends to one if n tends to infinity. The MasColell bargaining set is nonempty for m <FONT FACE="Symbol">£</FONT> 5 and it may be empty for m <FONT FACE="Symbol">³</FONT> 6. Moreover, we prove the following startling result: The MasColell bargaining set of any simple majority voting game derived from the kth replication of R<SUP>N</SUP> is nonempty, provided that k <FONT FACE="Symbol">³</FONT> n + 2. We also compute the NTU games which are derived from choice by plurality voting and approval voting, and we analyze some interesting examples. 
Keywords:  NTU game; bargaining set; majority rule; plurality voting; approval voting 
JEL:  D71 
Date:  2004–12 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:huj:dispap:dp376&r=gth 
By:  David PerezCastrillo; David Wettstein 
Abstract:  We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferencesendowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapely value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well. 
Keywords:  NonTransferable utility games, Shapley value, Ordinal Shapley value, consistency, fairness. 
JEL:  C72 D50 D63 
Date:  2004–12–14 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aub:autbar:634.04&r=gth 
By:  Trockel,W. (University of Bielefeld, Institute of Mathematical Economics) 
Date:  2004 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:att:bielme:2004355&r=gth 
By:  Trockel,W. (University of Bielefeld, Institute of Mathematical Economics) 
Date:  2004 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:att:bielme:2004354&r=gth 
By:  Ervig,U.; Haake,C. (University of Bielefeld, Institute of Mathematical Economics) 
Date:  2004 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:att:bielme:2004350&r=gth 
By:  Ralph C Bayer (University of Adelaide); Mickey Chan (University of Adelaide) 
Abstract:  This paper analyses dynamic pricing in markets with network externalities. Network externalities imply demand inertia, because the size of a network increases the usefulness of the product for consumers. Since past sales increase current demand, firms have an incentive to set low introductory prices to be able to increase prices as their networks grow. However, in reality we observe decreasing prices. This could be due to other factors dominating the network e¤ects. We use an experimental duopoly market with demand inertia to isolate the effect of network externalities. We find that experimental price dynamics are rather consistent with real world observations than with theoretical predictions. 
Keywords:  Network Externalities, Demand Inertia, Experiments, Oligopoly 
JEL:  L13 C92 
Date:  2004–12–14 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0412004&r=gth 