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on Game Theory |
| By: | Francesc Llerena, Carles Rafels (Universitat de Barcelona) |
| Abstract: | We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition |
| Keywords: | Cooperatives TU-game, convex games, modular games, zero-monotonic games, lattice |
| JEL: | C71 C78 |
| Date: | 2004 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bar:bedcje:2004123&r=gth |
| By: | Gui,Hongwei; Müller,Rudolf; Vohra,Rakesh (METEOR) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a characterization of dominant strategy mechanisms with quasi-linear utilities and multi-dimensional types for a variety of preference domains. These characterizations are in terms of a monotonicity property on the underlying allocation rule. |
| Keywords: | operations research and management science; |
| Date: | 2004 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2004047&r=gth |
| By: | Flavio Menezes (Australian National University); John Quiggin (Department of Economics, University of Queensland) |
| Abstract: | We introduce the notion of an outcome space, in which strategic interactions are embedded. This allows us to investigate the idea that one strategic interaction might be an expanded version of another interaction. We then characterize the Nash equilibria arising in such extensions and demonstrate a folk-type theorem stating that any individually rational element of the outcome space is a Nash equilibrium. |
| Keywords: | game theory |
| JEL: | C71 |
| Date: | 2004–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rsm:riskun:r704&r=gth |
| By: | Dinah Rosenberg; Eilon Solan; Nicolas Vieille |
| Date: | 2004–11–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000704&r=gth |
| By: | Olivier Compte; Philippe Jehiel |
| Date: | 2004–12–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000744&r=gth |
| By: | Olivier Compte; Philippe Jehiel |
| Date: | 2004–12–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000739&r=gth |
| By: | Fabrizio Germano; Gábor Lugosi |
| Abstract: | We construct an uncoupled randomized strategy of repeated play such that, if every player follows such a strategy, then the joint mixed strategy profiles converge, almost surely, to a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. The procedure requires very little in terms of players' information about the game. In fact, players' actions are based only on their own past payoffs and, in a variant of the strategy, players need not even know that their payoffs are determined through other players' actions. The procedure works for general finite games and is based on appropriate modifications of a simple stochastic learning rule introduced by Foster and Young. |
| Keywords: | Regret testing, regret based learning, random search, stochastic dynamics, uncoupled dynamics, global convergence to Nash equilibria |
| JEL: | C72 C73 D81 D83 |
| Date: | 2004–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upf:upfgen:788&r=gth |
| By: | Nirvikar Singh (University of California, Santa Cruz) |
| Abstract: | This paper compares the NBS and market outcomes in a simple n-person economy. It shows how the two outcomes differ with respect to responsiveness to differences in risk aversion, endowments, and market positions. |
| JEL: | C78 |
| Date: | 2004–12–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0412004&r=gth |
| By: | Christopher J. Tyson (Nuffield College, Oxford University, UK) |
| Abstract: | A new game theoretic analysis of finite horizon, complete information bargaining is advanced. The extensive form reflects an attempt to model unstructured negotiations, in which the negotiants can gain no artificial advantage from the details of the bargaining protocol. Conditions are identified under which the game is dominance solvable in the sense that iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies selects a unique outcome. These conditions serve to preclude embedded static bargaining problems of the sort that have historically been deemed indeterminate, thereby ensuring that the dynamic problems analyzed will be resolvable without imposing any particular static theory. |
| Keywords: | coalition, core, iterative dominance, temporal monopoly |
| JEL: | C78 D71 D74 |
| Date: | 2004–08–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nuf:econwp:0423&r=gth |
| By: | Sushil Bikhchandani; Shurojit Chatterjee; Arunava Sen |
| Date: | 2004–12–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000750&r=gth |
| By: | Alexey Savvateev |
| Abstract: | The author models the interaction between the “Center”, represented by inspectors, and free riders in local trains (“hares” in the Russian slang). In order to characterize the optimal deterring strategy of the Center, one must look into the nature the interaction among parties in this game. After accomplishing this task, the author considers a more general class of phenomena that are intimately related to the one just described. Such phenomena will be analyzed in the framework of a “Center-offenders” model (a special case of the “Crime and Punishment” problem). The appropriate solution concept may be called a “natural Stackelberg solution”. |
| JEL: | K14 K42 |
| Date: | 2003–04–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eer:wpalle:00-103e&r=gth |
| By: | John Duffy (University of Pittsburgh) |
| Abstract: | This paper considers the relationship between agent-based modeling and economic decision-making experiments with human subjects. Both approaches exploit controlled ``laboratory'' conditions as a means of isolating the sources of aggregate phenomena. Research findings from laboratory studies of human subject behavior have inspired studies using artificial agents in ``computational laboratories'' and vice versa. In certain cases, both methods have been used to examine the same phenomenon. The focus of this paper is on the empirical validity of agent-based modeling approaches in terms of explaining data from human subject experiments. We also point out synergies between the two methodologies that have been exploited as well as promising new possibilities. |
| Keywords: | agent-based models, human subject experiments, zero- intelligence agents, learning, evolutionary algorithms |
| JEL: | C8 C9 |
| Date: | 2004–12–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpco:0412001&r=gth |
| By: | Abele, Susanne (Universitaet Mannheim, Fakultaet fuer Sozialwissenschaften); Ehrhart, Karl-Martin (Universitaet Karlsruhe) |
| Abstract: | In public good situations, expectations concerning other persons’ moves are important and subtle cues can affect these expectations. In Experiment 1, participants in a public good game who moved simultaneously made high contributions and expected their opponents to make high contributions. However, participants who moved pseudo-sequentially (one after the other, but without knowledge of the other’s decision) expected their opponents to make medium-sized contributions, but made almost no contribution themselves. In Experiment 2, we manipulated expectations experimentally. Participants who moved simultaneously reciprocated what they expected their partners to do. Participants who moved pseudo-sequentially defected, regardless of what they expected from their opponents. Furthermore, we found that simultaneous movers were more likely than pseudo-sequential movers to conceptualize themselves and the other player as a group. This sense of groupness seemed to account partly for their inclination to reciprocate anticipated behavior. |
| Date: | 2004–12–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:04-56&r=gth |
| By: | Sang-Chul Suh (Department of Economics, University of Windsor); Quan Wen (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University) |
| Abstract: | This paper measures the housing market impact of state-level anti-discrimination laws in the 1960s using household-level and census-tract data. State-level "fair-housing" laws attempted to bar discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and national origin in the sale, rental, and financing of housing, and they were the direct antecedents of the federal Fair Housing Act of 1968. Their influence on the housing market outcomes of African Americans has not been assessed in previous work by economists, but policy variation across states during the 1960s provides an opportunity to pursue such estimates. During the 1960s, blacks' housing market outcomes improved relative to whites', and the proportion of exclusively white census tracts declined markedly. But I find little evidence that the fair-housing laws contributed to those changes. Rather, the bulk of the evidence indicates that the laws' effects on blacks' housing market outcomes, on residential segregation, and on the value of property in predominantly nonwhite neighborhoods were negligible. |
| Keywords: | Multilateral bargaining, subgame perfect equilibrium |
| JEL: | C72 C78 |
| Date: | 2003–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:van:wpaper:0305&r=gth |
| By: | Sang-Chul Suh (Department of Economics, University of Windsor); Quan Wen (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies a bargaining model where n players play a sequence of (n-1) bilateral bargaining sessions. In each bilateral bargaining session, two players follow the same bargaining process as in Rubinstein's (1982). A partial agreement between two players is reached in the session and one player effectively leaves the game with a share agreed upon in the partial agreement and the other moves on to the next session. Such a (multi-agent) bilateral bargaining model admits a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Depending on who exits and who stays, we consider two bargaining procedures. The equilibrium outcomes under the two bargaining procedures converge to the Nash (1950) bargaining solution of the corresponding bargaining problem as the players' discount factor goes to one. Thus, the bilateral bargaining model studied in this paper provides a non-cooperative foundation for the Nash cooperative bargaining solution in the multilateral case. |
| Keywords: | Multilateral bargaining, subgame perfect equilibrium, Nash bargaining solution |
| JEL: | C72 C78 |
| Date: | 2003–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:van:wpaper:0306&r=gth |
| By: | Berninghaus, Siegfried K. (Universität Karlsruhe); Vogt, Bodo (Universität Magdeburg) |
| Abstract: | A population of players is considered in which each agent can select her neighbors in order to play a symmetric 2x2 game with each of them. The result of the simultaneous neighborhood choice of each agent is a network on the population from. We analyze all types of 2x2 games and show how the payoff structure in the 2x2 games affects the resulting equilibrium networks. Depending on the size of the communication costs the resulting equilibrium networks may be characterized by bipartite graphs if the coordination game is of the Hawk/Dove type while networks show a tendency to build complete or disconnected graphs if agents play a pure coordination game. Furthermore, for each 2x2 game we determine the equilibrium strategy distribution which is realized in the equilibrium networks. |
| Date: | 2004–11–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:04-50&r=gth |
| By: | Nizar Allouch (University of London, Queen Mary et CERMSEM); Myrna Wooders (Warwick University) |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a model of an economy with clubs where individuals may belong to multiple clubs and where there may be ever increasing returns to club size. Clubs may be large, as large as the total agent set. The main condition required is that sufficient wealth can compensate for memberships in larger and larger clubs. Notions of price taking equilibrium and the core, both with communication costs, are introduced. These notions require that there is a small cost, called a communication cost, of deviating from a given outcome. With some additional standard sorts of assumptions on preferences, we demonstrate that for all sufficiently large economies, the core is non-empty and contains states of the economy that are in the core of the replicated economy for all replications (Edgeworth states of the economy). Moreover, for any given economy, every state of the economy that is in the core for all replications of that economy can be supported as a price-taking equilibrium with communication costs. Together these two results imply that, given the communication costs, for all sufficiently large economies there exists Edgeworth states of the economy and every Edgeworth state can be supported as a price-taking equilibrium. |
| Keywords: | Congestion, clubs, equilibrium |
| JEL: | C62 D71 H41 |
| Date: | 2004–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:wpsorb:b04109&r=gth |