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on Economic Growth |
By: | Irmen, Andreas |
JEL: | D91 J22 O33 O41 |
Date: | 2023 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc23:277568&r=gro |
By: | Cristiano Ricci |
Abstract: | This paper deals with the positivity condition of an infinite-dimensional evolutionary equation, associated with a control problem for the optimal consumption over space. We consider a spatial growth model for capital, with production generating endogenous growth and technology of the form AK. We show that for certain initial data, even in the case of heterogeneous spatial distribution of technology and population, the solution to an auxiliary control problem that is commonly used as a candidate for the original problem is not admissible. In particular, we show that initial conditions that are non-negative, under the auxiliary optimal consumption strategy, may lead to negative capital allocations over time. |
Date: | 2023–11 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2311.06811&r=gro |
By: | Njoya, Loudi; Ngouhouo, Ibrahim; Asongu, Simplice; Schneider, Friedrich |
Abstract: | This paper is interested in explaining the causes of the simultaneous evolution between economic growth and informality. Using a large annual panel of African countries with a time series of 25 years, ours results show that when the corruption rate is above (below) a threshold of 1.3577, economic growth reduces (increases) informal economic sector. The corruption proxy is measured as a decreasing function of corruption such that higher levels of the corruption proxy translate lower levels of corruption. It is therefore desirable for policymakers to improve the transparency of interactions between firms, public and private agents to fight corruption, in view of decreasing the informal economic sector through economic growth. |
Keywords: | Informal sector, Growth, Corruption, African countries |
JEL: | D73 F47 J46 O10 O17 O47 |
Date: | 2022–01 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:119059&r=gro |
By: | Ben J. Heijdra; Pim Heijnen |
Abstract: | We study the effects of time-using rent-seeking activities on the macroeconomic allocation and the economic growth rate. We formulate a highly stylized three-sector general equilibrium model with overlapping generations of individuals. The production side features one sector producing the capital good and two consumption goods sectors. All sectors operate under constant returns to scale technology with human and physical capital as inputs. One of the consumption goods sectors is a monopoly, where a continuum of agents compete for a share of monopoly profits. Agents are heterogeneous in their (intrinsically useless) rent-seeking ability. In the benchmark model each agent decides during youth on how much time to spend on lobbying activities, education, and production work. An intergenerational human capital externality of the ‘shoulders of giants’ type ensures that the model features endogenous growth. The rewards to rent-seeking accrue during youth and part of the additional income is saved. Interestingly, a move from a perfectly competitive economy to one involving monopolization and rent-seeking increases the steady-state economic growth rate in the benchmark model. We identify three main mechanisms affecting the growth rate under monopoly and rent-seeking, namely (a) the phase of life at which the rent-seeking booty is received (youth or old-age), (b) the kind of inputs used in the rent-seeking competition (raw time or education level), and (c) the type of growth engine (human or physical capital externality). The conclusions for the benchmark model are robust to changes in the mechanisms for (b) and (c) but not for (a). If rent-seeking rewards accrue during old-age then the move from a perfectly competitive economy to one involving monopolization and rent-seeking decreases the steady-state economic growth rate. |
Keywords: | rent seeking, economic growth, capital accumulation, monopolization, wasteful competition |
JEL: | D72 E24 L12 O41 O43 |
Date: | 2023 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10771&r=gro |
By: | Gries, Thomas; Fritz, Marlon; Wiechers, Lukas |
JEL: | C33 C36 O40 O47 |
Date: | 2023 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc23:277660&r=gro |
By: | Mara Leticia Rojas (UNS-CONICET); María María Ibáñez Martín (UNS-CONICET); Carlos Dabús (UNS-CONICET) |
Abstract: | The debate on damage risks of high levels of debt on long run economic performance is not new. Nonetheless, this has achieved increasing interest during the last decades because of several countries and regions have acquired high indebtedness, particularly those with doubtful capacity of repayment. The study of a non-linear relationship between both macroeconomic variables and the value (or values) at which the incidence of debt could change sign at said threshold are relevant issues for the performance of economies, the economic policy and, even, the debt payment. This paper uses a panel threshold regression model, with initial real per capita GDP and debt-to-exports ratio as threshold variables, in order to prove heterogeneous effects of debt on growth in developing countries. The results show that the effect of debt depends on both threshold variables. Higher levels of initial GDP are related to negative effects of debt on growth, the relation between debt and growth tends to be insignificant for medium values and exhibits a positive relation to low values of product. Furthermore, debt-to-exports ratio exhibits a single turning point beyond which debt seems to be harmed for economic growth. The level of those thresholds is also estimated. |
Keywords: | DEBT, ECONOMIC GROWTH, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, NON-LINIARITIES |
JEL: | O5 E60 |
Date: | 2023–12 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aoz:wpaper:292&r=gro |
By: | Mircea Epure; Victor Martin-Sanchez; Sebastian Aparicio; David Urbano |
Abstract: | We argue that the positive relationship between pro-market institutions and entrepreneurial growth aspirations is dampened for individuals with general human capital (higher education), but augmented for those with specific human capital (experience in the marketplace). However, during a crisis, the differential effect of pro-market institutions on growth aspirations manifests only for entrepreneurs with specific human capital, with stronger effects than in good economic times. We run our empirical analysis on a dataset of individual- and country-level characteristics during 2005– 2020, thus exploiting variation from the Global Financial Crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic. We confirm our predictions and show stronger results for early stage (compared to nascent) entrepreneurs, and potential complementarities between human capital types. Altogether, our work paves the way to institutional adaptive policymaking. |
Keywords: | pro-market institutions, human capital, growth aspirations, entrepreneurship, crisis |
JEL: | L26 M13 I25 J24 K2 |
Date: | 2023–11 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:1414&r=gro |
By: | Thai Ha-Huy (EPEE - Centre d'Etudes des Politiques Economiques - UEVE - Université d'Évry-Val-d'Essonne); Cuong Le Van (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, VCREME - Van Xuan Center of Research in Economics, Management and Environment, IPAG Business School, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Thi-Do-Hanh Nguyen (Hai Phong University) |
Abstract: | This article establishes a growth model in which consumption takes time. The agent faces a time constraint, i.e; her/his available amount of time must be optimally share between consuming time and working time. By using a dynamic programming argument, it is proved that the optimal capital sequences are monotonic and have property that converges to steady state. We also compare this model to the one agent growth model with elastic labor. We obtain that (i) When the quantity of time to consume one unit of consumption increases, the agent devotes less time for labour. (ii) When the quantity of time to consume one unit of consumption is smaller that the threshod, it is better for the economy to spend time to consume than to enjoy leisure. We have more time for labour. This implies more output and more consumption. We reverse the situation when the quantity of time to consume one unit of consumption is larger than the threshold. We give an example to illustrate this result. Finally, if both models have the same technology which is of constant returns to scale, then they have the same ratios capital stock per head and consumption per head. |
Keywords: | time consuming model, allocation of time, elastic labour, elastic labour supply, time consuming, dynamic programming |
Date: | 2023–11–27 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-04310371&r=gro |
By: | Park, Hyungmin (University of Warwick) |
Abstract: | I investigate the motives behind economic growth under a dictatorship, exploring the tradeoff between pursuing higher future gains, which come with growing threats from the demand for democracy from the emerging middle class, and accepting lower gains for a relatively more stable regime. I propose a model where a dictator invests and acquires a rent, citizens educate their children for skilled jobs, and these children adopt democratic values through education. I find that a dictator invests in an underdeveloped economy for future gains. As the economy matures, investment decreases because more citizens get democratic values from higher education. Democracy follows an opposite investment trend: little investment is made when the economy is underdeveloped, but more investment is made as it develops. The analysis is generalised to cases where the dictator is legitimised by higher economic growth than in democracies, and where the dictator oppresses the middle class through high taxation. |
Keywords: | Dictatorship ; Growth ; Democratisation ; Middle Class ; Democratic Values JEL Codes: D02 ; D72 ; O12 ; O43 |
Date: | 2023 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1485&r=gro |
By: | Kouam, H; Mua, K |
Abstract: | This theory presents the theory of innovation in the attainment of economic sciences. It equally reviews economic literature and investigates innovation from different economic models. It first begins with the analysis of views on classical economics, including Adam Smith and David Ricardo. This is followed by discussions on theory in innovation today, as handled in the knowledge-based economy. Analyzing the achievements in economic thought outlines that innovation's importance and relevance has grown over the last decade. |
Keywords: | Innovation, Economic Growth, Progress, Economic Models |
JEL: | O11 O31 O33 O34 O4 O40 |
Date: | 2023–02–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:118020&r=gro |
By: | Nicholas Martin Ford (Lund University); Kristin Ranestad (University of Oslo); Paul Sharp (University of Southern Denmark, CAGE, CEPR) |
Abstract: | “Upper tail knowledge”, embodied by knowledge elites, has been suggested to be a driving force of industrialization and development, yet measuring it remains problematic. Despite some recent innovations, much empirical work continues to rely on measures of “average” or “non-upper tail” human capital such as literacy and years of schooling. We thus turn to per- haps unique sources from Denmark and Norway. From the early nineteenth century until after the Second World War, these countries had the tradition of publishing biographies of all high school graduates, usually 25 and 50 years after graduation. These were effectively mini-CVs covering entire careers, including work positions, travel, achievements, and more. We discuss these sources and their potential for furthering our understanding of the role of upper tail knowledge and human capital for development. Source criticism reveals strengths and weak- nesses, but importantly confirms promising perspectives for improving the measurement of upper tail knowledge. |
Keywords: | Biographies, Denmark, Norway, human capital, source criticism, upper tail knowledge |
JEL: | E24 I20 J24 N33 N34 |
Date: | 2023–11 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hes:wpaper:0242&r=gro |
By: | Elena Korchmina (University of Southern Denmark) |
Abstract: | Could we measure the contribution of women to the economy in the pre-industrial world? Yes, it is possible, particularly in the context of Russia. By analyzing archival sources, we can not only measure their contribution to the economy but also observe how the Russian Empire evolved into a more economically patriarchal society over time. Examining the distribution of female property across various regions in Russia reveals a significant increase in the share of female property the 18th century, rising from 10% to 40%. However, this growth plateaued and gradually declined. By the late 19th century, the presence of women among top landowners continued to decrease. This substantial surge in female property ownership during the 18th century occurred primarily due to the increasing frequency of women being designated heirs. Using the unique datasets, I assessed the gender gap in wealth and income, which averaged around 25% across provinces. This indicates that the equal access to property established in 1715 led to Russia becoming a relatively gender-equal country over the following century. Consequently, noblewomen in the Russian Empire gained proxy voting rights. Interestingly, the authorities granted this fundamental civil right independently, without significant societal debate on the 'female question'. |
Keywords: | Russian Empire, Gender, Wealth, Income, Pre-Industrial World |
JEL: | N00 N13 N33 J16 D63 |
Date: | 2023–11 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hes:wpaper:0243&r=gro |