nep-ger New Economics Papers
on German Papers
Issue of 2010‒08‒06
three papers chosen by
Roberto Cruccolini
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitat Munchen

  1. Ökonomische Aspekte der Entlohnung und Regulierung unabhängiger Versicherungsvermittler By Schiller, Jörg
  2. Die Gewerbesteuer seit der Unternehmensteuerreform 2008: Steigt die Steuerbelastung und die Gefahr der Substanzbesteuerung? Eine empirische Analyse By Kerstin Schneider; Claudia Wesselbaum-Neugebauer
  3. „Geschäftsmodell Deutschland“ und außenwirtschaftliche Ungleichgewichte in der EU By Renate Ohr; Götz Zeddies

  1. By: Schiller, Jörg
    Abstract: Die Entlohnung und Regulierung unabhängiger Versicherungsvermittler, wird aktuell vor allem vor dem Hintergrund der Bedeutung und Zukunft der Honorarberatung und -vermittlung intensiv diskutiert. Im Rahmen des vorliegenden Beitrags werden zunächst wichtige ökonomische Erkenntnisse zur Vertriebswegewahl von Versicherungsunternehmen dargestellt. Aufbauend auf zentrale betriebs- und gesamtwirtschaftliche Funktionen unabhängiger Versicherungsvermittler wird untersucht, wie durch unterschiedliche Entlohnungsformen Vermittlern effiziente Anreize gesetzt werden können. In diesem Zusammenhang wird auch der Frage nachgegangen, ob und inwieweit Regulierungsmaßnahmen, wie zum Beispiel ein generelles Verbot oder die Offenlegung von Provisionszahlungen sowie das sogenannte 'Provisionsabgabeverbot', notwendig und geeignet sind, die Effizienz von Versicherungsmärkten zu erhöhen. -- The compensation and regulation of independent intermediaries is an important issue in insurance markets. With this respect, the profitability and importance of fee-for-service and commission compensation of intermediaries is lively discussed in academia and in the insurance industry. This paper summarizes economic rationales why and in which lines of business insurance companies sell their products via independent intermediaries. With this respect, it is analyzed how different forms of compensation affect important market functions of independent intermediaries. Finally, the economic impact of certain regulatory interventions, like a mandatory disclosure or a general ban of any commissions and the German ban for intermediaries to share commission with policyholders, on market efficiency is discussed.
    Date: 2010
  2. By: Kerstin Schneider (Schumpeter School of Business and Economics, University of Wuppertal, Germany); Claudia Wesselbaum-Neugebauer (Schumpeter School of Business and Economics, University of Wuppertal, Germany)
    Abstract: The German corporate tax reform of 2008 has brought significant changes for determining the tax base of the trade tax. The paper simulates the new rules and shows how the tax burden is affected. Simulation is based on representative cost data of the manufacturing sector in 2006. The results show that the goals of the corporate tax reform are missed. The total tax burden for incorporated enterprises exceeds 30 % because of the new add-back regulations and is now even slightly progressive in employment. Taxation in case of losses has become more prevalent, regardless of the legal form. In particular in the scenario of an economic crisis, the new regulations are problematic for the firms and trade tax revenue neither increases, nor is it a less volatile source of tax revenue for the communities.
    Keywords: taxation, microsimulation, tax reform, trade trax
    JEL: H25 H71 K34 C15
    Date: 2010–07
  3. By: Renate Ohr; Götz Zeddies
    Abstract: During the last decades, current account imbalances increased all over the world. In this context, countries with current account surpluses, in the European Union especially Germany, are increasingly blamed for their modest wage policies, which are seen as the main reason for global imbalances. On the basis of a panel data model, the present paper indentifies the determinants of current account imbalances of EU Member States. As the results show, price competitiveness is, although significant, only one out of many explanatory variables. Instead, current account imbalances are substantially caused by divergent propensities to save. This does not only relate to public, but also to private savings. Accordingly, demands addressed to Germany and other countries for higher wage agreements alone would be unrewarding. Instead, domestic demand in surplus countries should be increased by other means. On the other hand, in countries with current account deficits, existing savings potentials should be adequately exploited.
    JEL: E2 F3
    Date: 2010–07–23

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