nep-gen New Economics Papers
on Gender
Issue of 2019‒09‒02
six papers chosen by
Jan Sauermann
Stockholms universitet

  1. Gender Differences in Wage Expectations: Sorting, Children, and Negotiation Styles By Kiessling, Lukas; Pinger, Pia; Seegers, Philipp K.; Bergerhoff, Jan
  2. Roots of Gender Equality: the Persistent Effect of Beguinages on Attitudes Toward Women By Annalisa Frigo; Eric Roca Fernandez
  3. Gender Differences in Giving and the Anticipation-about-giving in Dictator Games By Subhasish M. Chowdhury; Philip J. Grossman; Joo Young Jeon
  4. The Armistice of the Sexes: Gender Complementarities in the Production Function By Espinoza, Raphael; Ostry, Jonathan D.; Papageorgiou, Chris
  5. Violently Unequal: Female Empowerment and Domestic Violence By Ericsson, Sanna
  6. Heterogeneous Earnings Effects of the Job Corps by Gender Earnings: A Translated Quantile Approach By Anthony Strittmatter

  1. By: Kiessling, Lukas (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods); Pinger, Pia (University of Cologne); Seegers, Philipp K. (Maastricht University); Bergerhoff, Jan (University of Bonn)
    Abstract: This paper presents evidence from a large-scale study on gender differences in expected wages before labor market entry. Based on data for over 15,000 students, we document a significant and large gender gap in wage expectations that closely resembles actual wage differences, prevails across subgroups, and along the entire distribution. To understand the underlying causes and determinants, we relate expected wages to sorting into majors, industries, and occupations, child-rearing plans, perceived and actual ability, personality, perceived discrimination, and negotiation styles. Our findings indicate that sorting and negotiation styles affect the gender gap in wage expectations much more than prospective child-related labor force interruptions. Given the importance of wage expectations for labor market decisions, household bargaining, and wage setting, our results provide an explanation for persistent gender inequalities.
    Keywords: subjective wage expectations, gender gap, negotiation styles
    Date: 2019–08
  2. By: Annalisa Frigo (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)); Eric Roca Fernandez (Aix-Marseille Univ., CNRS, EHESS, Centrale Marseille, AMSE, Marseille, France)
    Abstract: This paper is concerned with the historical roots of gender equality. It proposes and empirically assesses a new determinant of gender equality: gender-specific outside options in the marriage market. In particular, enlarging women's options besides marriage - even if only temporarily - increases their bargaining power with respect to men, leading to a persistent improvement in gender equality. We illustrate this mechanism focusing on Belgium, and relate gender-equality levels in the 19th century to the presence of medieval, female-only communities called beguinages that allowed women to remain single amidst a society that traditionally advocated marriage. Combining geo-referenced data on beguinal communities with 19th-century census data, we document that the presence of beguinages was instrumental in decreasing the gender gap in literacy. The reduction is sizeable, amounting to a 5.3 % drop in gender educational inequality.
    Keywords: Economic Persistence, Culture, Institutions, Religion, Gender Gap
    JEL: I25 J16 N33 O15 O43 Z12
    Date: 2019–08
  3. By: Subhasish M. Chowdhury (Department of Economics, University of Bath); Philip J. Grossman (Department of Economics, Monash University); Joo Young Jeon (Department of Economics, University of Reading)
    Abstract: Research on altruistic payoffs and the related payoff anticipation and related gender differences is limited. Using data from Chowdhury & Jeon (2014) who vary a common show-up fee and incentivize recipients to anticipate the amount given in a dictator game, we find that the show-up fee has a positive effect on dictator giving for both genders. While female dictators are more generous than males, male recipients anticipate higher amounts than the amount male dictators give. The show-up fee affects the social-type of female dictators, and the anticipation about dictator social-type by the male recipients.
    Keywords: dictator-game; altruism; anticipatory-belief; gender
    JEL: C91 D64 D84 J16
    Date: 2019–08–26
  4. By: Espinoza, Raphael; Ostry, Jonathan D.; Papageorgiou, Chris
    Abstract: Macroeconomic models have largely ignored the importance of gender diversity by assuming that male and female workers are perfectly substitutable in the aggregate production function. Whether this assumption is valid is an empirical question that this paper aims to answer by estimating the elasticity of substitution (ES) between the two types of labor. We apply linear and non-linear techniques to cross-country data at the aggregate level, to cross-country data at the sectoral level, and to firm-level data for the manufacturing sector in China. We find that women and men are far from being perfect substitutes: the ES is below 1 for the aggregate sample, between 1-2 for the sectoral sample, and between 2-3 at firm-level. We discuss why the ES may vary at different levels of aggregation and conclude on the implications of these results for growth accounting and for the gains from gender equality.
    Keywords: aggregate production function; elasticity of substitution; Female Labor Force Participation; growth
    JEL: J24 O47
    Date: 2019–06
  5. By: Ericsson, Sanna (Department of Economics, Lund University)
    Abstract: This paper studies the effect of increased female empowerment on domestic violence. I use individual level data from high-quality Swedish administrative registers on women's relative earnings and hospital visits relating to assault. With this third-party reported violence measure, I overcome the issue of selective under-reporting of violence. I first show that the raw relationship between female empowerment and domestic violence is U-shaped, and that the sign of the association differs depending on which spouse is the main breadwinner of the household. However, the U-shape does not depict a causal effect, as it does not account for selective marriage matches or endogenous earnings. To overcome the concerns of endogeneity, I derive a measure of wives' potential earnings, caused by local changes in gender-specific labour demand. I show that the causal effect of increasing wives' potential earnings on domestic violence is positive and substantial. A positive effect is consistent with a male backlash story, which, together with the noted U-shaped association that depends on breadwinner status, indicates that traditional gender norms may play an important role in determining the relationship between female empowerment and domestic violence, even in presumably gender-equal Sweden.
    Keywords: domestic violence; relative earnings; household bargaining; male backlash; local labour demand
    JEL: D13 I12 J12 J16 Z13
    Date: 2019–08–23
  6. By: Anthony Strittmatter
    Abstract: Several studies of the Job Corps tend to nd more positive earnings effects for males than for females. This effect heterogeneity favouring males contrasts with the results of the majority of other training programmes' evaluations. Applying the translated quantile approach of Bitler, Hoynes, and Domina (2014), I investigate a potential mechanism behind the surprising findings for the Job Corps. My results provide suggestive evidence that the effect of heterogeneity by gender operates through existing gender earnings inequality rather than Job Corps trainability differences.
    Date: 2019–08

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