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on Gender |
| By: | Pikos, Anna Katharina; Straub, Alexander |
| Abstract: | There is wide evidence for gender differences in competitiveness and performance under pressure from experimental economics and single-sex professional sports. We analyze these differences in a sport with direct gender competition. Our unique data consists of over 500,000 observations from around 11,000 German ninepin bowling games of which around 15\% are from mixed-gender leagues. Men perform better against women on average but this is fully explained by differences in ability. Our results are robust to instrumenting for opposite gender using the sex composition of the opponent team. Surprisingly, gender differences in tight situations do not seem to play a role. |
| Keywords: | gender; gender competition; sports economics |
| JEL: | J16 D90 |
| Date: | 2019–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:han:dpaper:dp-652&r=all |
| By: | José García-Montalvo; Marta Reynal-Querol |
| Abstract: | In this paper we analyze the effect of loan officers' gender on the approval of loans and, in particular, on their subsequent performance. Using detailed bank information on a sample of close to half a million loans, we show that female loan officers have, conditional on the risk score, around a 15% lower delinquency rate than that of male officers. In addition to the original scoring of the loans, we also have the recommendation of the expert system. We find that the risk profile of applicants screened by male and female loan officers is very similar, but conditional on risk score, women follow the recommendations more often than men. Moreover, we find evidence of gender bias in terms of a mistake-punishment trade-off, which could explain, at least in part, women's higher compliance with the recommendations. Indeed, there is a double standard in terms of the consequences for breaking the rules: errors, in the form of delinquent loans as a result of not following the recommendation of the system, are forgiven more often for male than for female loan officers. |
| Keywords: | credit risk, gender, delinquency, Rule Compliance |
| JEL: | G21 J16 |
| Date: | 2019–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:1076&r=all |
| By: | Daniel Horn (Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Eötvös Loránd University); Hubert Janos Kiss (Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Eötvös Loránd University) |
| Abstract: | We measure risk aversion and patience in a non-incentivized way using a representative sample of the Hungarian adult population. We elicit risk aversion with a task similar to Gneezy and Potters (1997)'s investment game and find that females risk about 8.5 % less than males when we do not consider any additional controls. However, even when we add extensive controls (related to demography, region, family, education, employment, income and wealth) the difference decreases only slightly and remains significant at conventional levels. We carry out the same exercise for patience and document no significant gender differences in any specification. |
| Keywords: | gender differences, patience, representative survey, risk attitude |
| JEL: | D8 J16 |
| Date: | 2019–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:has:discpr:1901&r=all |