nep-gen New Economics Papers
on Gender
Issue of 2019‒02‒25
two papers chosen by
Jan Sauermann
Stockholms universitet

  1. Is there a motherhood penalty in academia? The gendered effect of children on academic publications By Lutter, Mark; Schröder, Martin
  2. Gender differences in an endogenous timing conflict game By Philip J. Grossman; Youngseok Park; Jean Paul Rabanal; Olga A. Rud

  1. By: Lutter, Mark; Schröder, Martin
    Abstract: Based on data that tracks CV and publication records as well as survey information from sociologists in German academia, we examine the effects of parenthood on the publication output of male and female academics. Results indicate that having children leads to a significant decline in the number of publications by women, while not affecting the number of publications by men. We also find that the gendered effect of children on productivity hardly mitigates differences in publication output between men and women, as women still publish about 20 percent less than men after controlling for the adverse effects of children on productivity. We further find that the gendered effect of childbearing depends partly on prior levels of women's academic achievements, which suggests mechanisms of performance-driven self-selection. Lower-performing women tend to suffer a stronger motherhood penalty, while the publication output of more successful women (who have been granted academic awards) is not reduced through childbirth. The results indicate that women are better at managing the 'double burden' of parenthood and career if external, award-giving committees have bestowed prestige upon them and indicated their potential for a scientific career. Overall, these findings contribute to a better understanding of how to reduce the adverse effect of children on female publication output.
    Keywords: academic career,academic publications,children,gender gap,motherhood penalty,Benachteiligung von Müttern,Geschlecht,Kinder,wissenschaftliche Karrieren,wissenschaftliche Publikationen
    Date: 2019
  2. By: Philip J. Grossman (Monash University); Youngseok Park (Colby College); Jean Paul Rabanal (Monash University); Olga A. Rud (RMIT Univeristy)
    Abstract: We conduct a laboratory experiment to study the role of gender on social welfare outcomes in a strategic commitment game of incomplete information. In our baseline treatment, players simultaneously commit to either a Hawkish action, which leads to a private payoff, or a Dovish action, which can enhance social welfare. We add a sequential and an endogenous move treatment, where in the former, the first mover is exogenously selected and in the latter, players self-select the order of play. The two additional treatments relax the commitment constraint for the second mover. We find that (i) social welfare is significantly improved in the last two treatments and (ii) the outcome in the endogenous move treatment is mainly driven by gender. Men are willing to play the risky Dovish action more often than women.
    Keywords: Gender, type uncertainty, endogenous timing, laboratory experiment
    JEL: C72 C92 D82 D91
    Date: 2019–02

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