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on Gender |
| By: | Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Capraro, Valerio; Rascon-Ramirez, Ericka |
| Abstract: | Whether or not there are gender differences in altruistic behaviour in Dictator Game experiments has attracted considerable attention in recent years. Earlier studies found women to be more altruistic than men. However, this conclusion has been challenged by more recent accounts, which have argued that gender differences in altruistic behaviour may be a peculiarity of student samples and may not extend to random samples. Here we study gender differences in altruistic behaviour and, additionally, in expectations of altruistic behaviour, in a sample of Amazon Mechanical Turk crowdworkers living in the US. In Study 1, we report a mega-analysis of more than 3,500 observations and we show that women are significantly more altruistic than men. In Study 2, we show that both women and men expect women to be more altruistic than men. |
| Keywords: | dictator game, gender differences, altruism, expectations. |
| JEL: | C93 C99 J7 J71 |
| Date: | 2018–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:86238&r=gen |
| By: | Catarina Ângelo; Ana Balcão Reis |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses the impact of grading practices on the gender gap in student achievement. We examine the gender difference in the difference between teacher grading and scores on national exams to test whether there are gender differences associated with different grading systems. We use Portuguese data on 21 subjects across humanities and sciences for the whole population of students taking exams at the end of the 6th, 9th, 11th and 12th grades from 2007 to 2016. Results show that the difference in scores between teacher grading and exams is on average positive for boys and girls, but higher for the latter. This is verified across the whole distribution of exam scores. Thus, our results indicate that a grading system based on exams favors boys while one based on classroom evaluation favors girls.JEL codes: I21, I24,J16 |
| Keywords: | student achievement; grading practices; gender gap |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp625&r=gen |
| By: | Marion Goussé (Département d'Economique, Université Laval - Université Laval); Nicolas Jacquemet (PSE - Paris School of Economics); Jean-Marc Robin (Sciences Po Paris, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We develop a search model of marriage where men and women draw utility from private consumption and leisure, and from a non-market good that is produced in the home using time resources. We condition individual decisions on wages, education, and an index of family attitudes. A match-specific, stochastic bliss shock induces variation in matching given wages, education, and family values, and triggers renegotiation and divorce. Using BHPS (1991–2008) data, we take as given changes in wages, education, and family values by gender, and study their impact on marriage decisions and intra-household resource allocation. The model allows to evaluate how much of the observed gender differences in labor supply results from wages, education, and family attitudes. We find that family attitudes are a strong determinant of comparative advantages in home production of men and women, whereas education complementarities induce assortative mating through preferences. |
| Keywords: | Search-matching,bargaining,assortative mating,collective models,time uses,social norms,gender identity,structural estimation |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01689155&r=gen |
| By: | Lise Vesterlund |
| Abstract: | Women's reluctance to negotiate is often used to explain the gender wage gap, popularizingthe push for women to "lean-in" and negotiate more. Examining an environmentwhere women achieve positive pro ts when they choose to negotiate, we fi nd that increasednegotiations are not helpful. Women know when to ask: they enter negotiations resultingin positive profi ts and avoid negotiations resulting in negative profi ts. While the findingsare similar for men, we fi nd no evidence that men are more adept than women at knowingwhen to ask. Thus, our results do not justify a greater push for women to negotiate. |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pit:wpaper:6382&r=gen |
| By: | S Anukriti (Boston College; IZA); Sungoh Kwon (University of Connecticut); Nishith Prakash (University of Connecticut) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how traditional marriage market institutions affect households’ financial decisions. We study how bride-to-groom marriage payments, i.e., dowries, influence saving behavior in rural India. Exploiting variation in firstborn gender and heterogeneity in dowry amounts across marriage markets, we find that the prospect of paying higher dowry increases household savings, which are primarily financed through increased paternal labor supply. This is the first paper that highlights this alternative motive for savings in dowry-paying societies. However, we find no impacts of dowry expectations on son-preferring fertility behaviors and investments in girls. |
| Keywords: | Household Savings, Dowry, Marriage Payments, India, Labor Supply, Fertility, Sex Ratio, Child Investments |
| JEL: | J1 D14 O15 |
| Date: | 2018–04–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boc:bocoec:949&r=gen |