nep-gen New Economics Papers
on Gender
Issue of 2018‒02‒19
five papers chosen by
Jan Sauermann
Stockholms universitet

  1. Children and Gender Inequality: Evidence from Denmark By Henrik Kleven; Camille Landais; Jakob Egholt Søgaard
  2. 'A Theory of Social Norms, Women's Time Allocation, and Gender Inequality in the Process of Development' By Pierre-Richard Agénor
  3. Compensation, diversity and inclusion at the World Bank Group By Das,Jishnu; Joubert,Clement Jean Edouard; Tordoir,Sander Florian
  4. How Can We Induce More Women to Competitions? By Masayuki Yagasaki; Mitsunosuke Morishita
  5. Reducing Discrimination through Norms or Information: Evidence from a Field Experiment on Student Evaluations of Teaching By Boring, Anne; Philippe, Arnaud

  1. By: Henrik Kleven; Camille Landais; Jakob Egholt Søgaard
    Abstract: Despite considerable gender convergence over time, substantial gender inequality persists in all countries. Using Danish administrative data from 1980-2013 and an event study approach, we show that most of the remaining gender inequality in earnings is due to children. The arrival of children creates a gender gap in earnings of around 20% in the long run, driven in roughly equal proportions by labor force participation, hours of work, and wage rates. Underlying these “child penalties”, we find clear dynamic impacts on occupation, promotion to manager, sector, and the family friendliness of the firm for women relative to men. Based on a dynamic decomposition framework, we show that the fraction of gender inequality caused by child penalties has increased dramatically over time, from about 40% in 1980 to about 80% in 2013. As a possible explanation for the persistence of child penalties, we show that they are transmitted through generations, from parents to daughters (but not sons), consistent with an influence of childhood environment in the formation of women’s preferences over family and career.
    JEL: J13 J16 J21 J22 J31
    Date: 2018–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24219&r=gen
  2. By: Pierre-Richard Agénor
    Abstract: This paper studies how social norms influence gender bias in the workplace and in the family, how these two forms of discrimination interact among themselves and with intra-household bargaining, and how gender norms evolve in the course of development. The presence of women in the labor market is a key determinant of the degree of gender bias in the workplace. Household preferences towards girls' education depend on women's bargaining power which, through the male-female wage gap, depends itself on gender bias in the labor market. Experiments with a calibrated version of the model for a stylized low-income country show that interactions between social norms, women's time allocation, and gender gaps are a critical source of growth dynamics. Initial measures aimed at mitigating the influence of discriminatory norms regarding gender roles in the workplace and in the family can magnify over time the benefits of standard policy prescriptions (aimed for instance at fostering childhood education) in promoting development and gender equality.
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:man:cgbcrp:237&r=gen
  3. By: Das,Jishnu; Joubert,Clement Jean Edouard; Tordoir,Sander Florian
    Abstract: This paper examines salary gaps by gender and nationality at the World Bank Group between 1987 and 2015 using a unique panel of all employees over this period. The paper develops and implements a dynamic simulation approach that models existing gaps as arising from differences in job composition at entry, entry salaries, salary growth and attrition. There are three main findings. First, 76 percent of the $27,400 salary gap across the average male and female staff at the World Bank Group can be attributed to composition effects, whereby men entered the World Bank Group at higher paid positions, particularly in the earlier half of the sample. Second, salary gaps 15 years after joining the World Bank Group can favor either men or women depending on their entry position. Third, for the most common entry-level professional position (known as Grade GF at the World Bank Group) there is a gender gap of 3.5 percent in favor of males 15 years after entry. The majority of this gap (84 percent) is due to differences in salary growth rather than differences in entry salaries or attrition. The pattern of these gaps is similar for staff from different nationalities. The dynamic decomposition method developed here thus identifies specific areas of concern and can be widely applied to the analysis of salary gaps within firms.
    Keywords: Gender and Economic Policy,Public Sector Administrative and Civil Service Reform,Democratic Government,Gender and Economics,Gender and Poverty,Administrative&Civil Service Reform,Economics and Gender,Public Sector Administrative&Civil Service Reform,De Facto Governments
    Date: 2017–05–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:8058&r=gen
  4. By: Masayuki Yagasaki; Mitsunosuke Morishita
    Abstract: Why women avoid participating in a competition and how can we encourage them to participate in it? In this paper, we investigate how social image concerns affect women's decision to compete. We first construct a theoretical model and show that participating in a competition, even under affirmative action policies favoring women, is costly for women under public observability since it deviates from traditional female gender norms, resulting in women's low appearance in competitive environments. We propose and theoretically show that introducing prosocial incentives in the competitive environment is effective and robust to public observability since (i) it induces women who are intrinsically motivated by prosocial incentives to the competitive environment and (ii) it makes participating in a competition not costly for women from social image point of view. We conduct a laboratory experiment where we randomly manipulate the public observability of decisions to compete and test our theoretical predictions. The results of the experiment are fairly consistent with our theoretical predictions. We suggest that when designing policies to promote gender equality in competitive environments, using prosocial incentives through company philanthropy or other social responsibility policies, either as substitutes or as complements to traditional affirmative action policies, could be promising.
    Date: 2018–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1801.10518&r=gen
  5. By: Boring, Anne; Philippe, Arnaud
    Abstract: We conduct a field experiment to assess the impact of two different interventions designed to reduce gender biases in student evaluations of teaching (SET). In the first intervention, students received a normative statement by email, essentially reminding them that they should not discriminate in SETs. In the second intervention, the normative statement was augmented with precise information on how other students in the exact same situation had discriminated against female teachers in the past. While the pure normative statement had no significant impact on SETs, the informative statement appears to have reduced gender biases against female teachers. This effect mainly comes from a change in male students’ evaluation of female teachers.
    JEL: C93 I23 J71
    Date: 2017–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:iastwp:32204&r=gen

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