nep-gen New Economics Papers
on Gender
Issue of 2017‒07‒23
seven papers chosen by
Jan Sauermann
Stockholms universitet

  1. Gender and bargaining: Experimental evidence from rural Uganda By Ben D’Exelle; Christine Gutekunst; Arno Riedl
  2. Experimental estimates of men's and women's willingness to compete: Does the gender of the partner matter? By SeEun Jung; Radu Vranceanu
  3. Can Gender Quotas in Candidate Lists Empower Women? Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design By Bagues, Manuel; Campa, Pamela
  4. Where Women Make The Difference. The Effects of Corporate Board Gender Quotas on Firms’ Performance across Europe By Simona, Comi; Mara, Grasseni; Federica, Origo; Laura, Pagani;
  5. Gender Wage Gaps and Risky vs. Secure Employment: An Experimental Analysis By SeEun Jung; Chung Choe; Ronald L. Oaxaca
  6. The Global Gender Gap in Labor Income By Tewodros Makonnen Gebrewolde; James Rockey
  7. The Impact of Economic Inequality and Gender Parity on Educational Assortative Mating: Evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study By David Monaghan

  1. By: Ben D’Exelle; Christine Gutekunst; Arno Riedl
    Abstract: We study gender differences in bilateral bargaining using an artefactual field experiment in rural Uganda, through variation in gender composition of bargaining pairs and in disclosure of identities. Disagreement is common independently of disclosure condition, but less frequent among female-only pairs. When paired with a man who is informed about their identity, women tend to demand less than men in the same situation. The influence of beliefs on demands is stronger for men than for women, and this difference is larger under anonymity than when identities are disclosed. These results identify important mechanisms that induce gender inequality in resource access.
    Date: 2017
  2. By: SeEun Jung (Department of Economics, Inha University); Radu Vranceanu (ESSEC Business School)
    Abstract: In a classical experiment, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) used the dichotomous choice of individuals between a piece rate and a tournament payment scheme as an indication of their propensity to compete. This paper reports results from a two person interaction of a similar type to analyze whether the preference for competition is dependent on the gender of the partner. It introduces a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism to elicit individual willingness to compete (WTC), defined as the amount of money that makes an individual indifferent between the two compensation schemes. Even when controlling for risk aversion, past performance and over-confidence, the male WTC is e3.30 larger than the female WTC. The WTC instrument allows for a more precise analysis of the impact of the partner's gender on the taste for competition. WTC data confirm that in this experiment the partner's gender has not a significant impact on the propensity to compete.
    Keywords: Willingness to Compete, Gender, BDM mechanism
    JEL: C91 D03
    Date: 2017–07
  3. By: Bagues, Manuel; Campa, Pamela
    Abstract: We provide a comprehensive analysis of the short- and medium-term effects of gender quotas in candidate lists using evidence from Spain, where quotas were introduced in 2007 in municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants, and were extended in 2011 to municipalities with more than 3,000 inhabitants. Using a Regression Discontinuity Design, we find that quotas raise the share of women among council members but they do not affect the quality of politicians, as measured by their education attainment and by the number of votes obtained. Moreover, within three rounds of elections, women fail to reach powerful positions such as party leader or mayor, and we do not observe any statistically or economically significant changes in the size and composition of public finances.
    Keywords: gender quotas in candidate lists; regression discontinuity design
    JEL: D72 H72 J16
    Date: 2017–07
  4. By: Simona, Comi; Mara, Grasseni; Federica, Origo; Laura, Pagani;
    Abstract: We study the effect of corporate board gender quotas on firm performance in Belgium, France, Italy and Spain. The empirical analysis is based on accounting panel data from Bureau Van Dijk’s Amadeus. Our identification strategy relies on both double and triple difference estimators with ex-ante matching. We find that gender quotas had either a negative or an insignificant effect on firm performance in the countries considered with the exception of Italy, where we find a positive impact on productivity. We then focus on Italy and offer possible explanations for the positive effect of gender quotas using detailed information on board members’ characteristics.
    Keywords: Gender quotas, corporate governance, firm performance, productivity
    JEL: G30 G38 J3
    Date: 2017–07–12
  5. By: SeEun Jung (Department of Economics, Inha University); Chung Choe (Hanyang University); Ronald L. Oaxaca (University of Arizona)
    Abstract: In addition to discrimination, market power, and human capital, gender differences in risk preferences might also contribute to observed gender wage gaps. We conduct laboratory experiments in which subjects choose between a risky (in terms of exposure to unemployment) and a secure job after being assigned in early rounds to both types of jobs. Both jobs involve the same typing task. The risky job adds the element of a known probability that the typing opportunity will not be available in any given period. Subjects were informed of the exogenous risk premium being offered for the risky job. Women were more likely than men to select the secure job, and these job choices accounted for between 40% and 77% of the gender wage gap in the experiments. That women were more risk averse than men was also manifest in the Pratt-Arrow Constant Absolute Risk Aversion parameters estimated from a random utility model adaptation of the mean-variance portfolio model.
    Keywords: Occupational Choice, Gender Wage Differentials, Risk Aversion, Lab Experiment
    JEL: J16 J24 J31 C91 D81
    Date: 2017–07
  6. By: Tewodros Makonnen Gebrewolde; James Rockey
    Abstract: This paper introduces a new measure of economic gender inequality (EGI) based on the ratio of women’s share of national labor income to men’s. This measure captures both the principles of equal pay for equal work and non-discrimination. Importantly, it can be calculated from existing data and is comparable across countries and time. We show that EGI has only been improving slowly and that current aggregate EGI is equivalent to 1.2 billion women working for nothing. Moreover, this gap is expected to increase in coming decades. Instrumental variable estimates suggest that while increases in income reduce EGI, living standards will have to triple for equality to be achieved in countries such as Mexico or Turkey.
    Keywords: Economic Gender Inequality, Global Distribution of Income, Modernization Hypothesis
    JEL: J16 J71 D33 O15
    Date: 2017–07
  7. By: David Monaghan
    Abstract: Though extensive research has described the prevalence of educational assortative mating, the causes of its variation across countries and over time is not well understood. Using data from the Luxembourg Income Study Database, I investigate the impact on marital sorting of both inequality between educational strata and increasing gender parity in the labor and educational markets. I find that in countries with greater returns to education, the odds of any sort of union that crosses educational boundaries is substantially reduced. However, there is only modest evidence of a relationship between returns to education and marital sorting within countries. I find that across countries, gender parity in educational attainment is related to reduced odds of female hypergamy and to increased odds of male hypergamy. Labor market parity between males and females appears to explain little of the variance in marital sorting by education either between or within countries.
    Keywords: assortative mating, inequality, gender parity, returns to education, crossnational research
    Date: 2017–05

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