nep-fmk New Economics Papers
on Financial Markets
Issue of 2005‒08‒03
six papers chosen by
Carolina Valiente
London South Bank University

  1. Do we really know how inflation targeters set interest rates? By Marcela Meirelles-Aurelio
  2. Financial Structure Change and Banking Income: a Canada-U.S. Comparison By Christian Calmès; Ying Liu
  3. Evolucion de la relacion banca-industria en España By Miguel A. Garcia Cestona; Jordi Surroca; Josep A. Tribo
  4. The interdealer market and the central bank intervention By Paula Albuquerque
  5. Liquidity risk in securities settlement By Johan Devriese; Janet Mitchell
  6. Financial intermediation theory and implications for the sources of value in structured finance markets By Janet Mitchell

  1. By: Marcela Meirelles-Aurelio
    Abstract: In inflation targeting (IT) regimes, the Monetary Authority announces an explicit objective, the target for inflation. However, other objectives that possibly conflict with the inflation goal are present, such as keeping output close to its potential level and the stability of financial markets. This multiplicity of objectives has spurred a debate on whether inflation targeting really provides a transparent framework for monetary policy. This question is addressed in this paper, focusing on the experience of six countries that adopted IT. The empirical investigation is based on a variety of data sets (including real time data and Central Bank's forecasts), as well as on alternative forward-looking reaction functions. The main finding is that, if transparency is interpreted as the short run predictability of policy actions, consistent with the announced inflation goal, then most of the IT regimes here examined are remarkably transparent. However, this is not necessarily true if a more broad interpretation of transparency is required. The data also reveals a certain degree of heterogeneity across countries and time, and therefore recommends caution with respect to general statements regarding the properties of IT regimes.
    Keywords: Monetary policy ; Inflation (Finance)
    Date: 2005
  2. By: Christian Calmès (Département des sciences administratives, Université du Québec en Outaouais et LRSP); Ying Liu (Bank of Canada)
    Abstract: Data suggest that the Canadian financial structure, and particularly indirect finance (e.g., banking), have become more market-oriented. we associate this financiel trend in part with the regulatory changes that have occured in Canada since the 1980s. Financial intermediaries are increasingly involved with financial market activities --e.g. off-balance sheet (OBS) activities such as underwriting securities. For this reason, we analyze the noninterest income attributable to financial market activities. We find that the variance of Canadian banks' aggregate operating-income growth is rising because of the increased contribution of noninterest income. This component is by nature quite volatile compared to interest income. Consequently, our analysis corroborates the U.S. finding of Stiroh (2004), and Stiroh and Rumble (2005): By contributing to banking income volatility, market-oriented activities do not necessarily yield straightforward diversification benefits to Canadian banks.
    Keywords: Regulatory changes, indirect finance, noninterest income, diversification
    JEL: G20 G21
    Date: 2005–07–26
  3. By: Miguel A. Garcia Cestona; Jordi Surroca; Josep A. Tribo
    Abstract: Definir el papel que juega el sistema financiero en general, y los bancos en particular, a la hora de facilitar las inversiones y crecimiento de las empresas, impulsar la adopc ión de innovaciones tecnológicas y las mejoras en la productividad, o en la mejor supervisión de la actuación de los directivos ha sido siempre un tema que ha generado encendidos debates y para el que se han elaborado numerosas comparaciones internacionale s. Se observan dos soluciones extremas a este problema: por un lado, el modelo anglo-americano, con mercados financieros importantes e instituciones financieras no tan involucradas en la propiedad o financiación de las empresas; y por otro lado el modelo germano-japonés, con un número reducido de bancos, de tamaño importante y que han jugado un papel más activo en la supervisión y control de las entidades no financieras con las que colaboran. El caso español correspondía, tradicionalmente, a una situación intermedia con bancos importantes pero no excesivamente involucrados y con la presencia de mecanismos de mercado de una cierta importancia, especialmente cuando lo comparábamos con la situación presente en otros países europeos. En este trabajo intentamos ver hasta qué punto los bancos siguen siendo importantes en la financiación de las empresas, analizando sus participaciones accionariales y determinando hasta qué punto son accionistas activos y alternativos al mercado. En este sentido, una de las preguntas claves consiste en entender qué ha pasado con la estructura de propiedad de las empresas españolas y, en particular, de aquellas que cotizan en bolsa. Este es un elemento crucial ya que en la mayoría de países europeos es habitual una estructura de propiedad altamente concentrada y donde la caracterización de los grandes accionistas resulta relevante. Otra cuestión que merece nuestra atención es la evolución de las grandes empresas de propiedad estatal, que durante la última década han experimentado importantes procesos de privatización, por otro lado generalizados en todas las economías. Los sectores de la energía, telecomunicaciones y transporte, entre otros, han visto cambios dramáticos en su propiedad. Dado su importante peso específico en la economía y mercados nacionales, analizaremos cómo ha afectado dicha privatización a los diferentes mecanismos de gobierno, la eficiencia y el valor de las empresas.
    Date: 2005–07
  4. By: Paula Albuquerque
    Abstract: This paper studies the consequences of having either an interventionist or a non-interventionist central bank in the foreign exchange market, in a market microstructure framework. Although a simple one-period model is used, it allows the characterization of the effect of the central bank intervention on the behaviour of dealers. The model also identifies the conditions for the dealer that acts as the counterpart of the central bank to be better or worse than the other dealers. The price is expected to be more informative with an interventionist central bank.
    Keywords: foreign exchange market; interdealer market; central bank intervention; information; market microstructure.
    JEL: D4 D8 F3 G1
  5. By: Johan Devriese (National Bank of Belgium, Department of International Cooperation and Financial Stability); Janet Mitchell (National Bank of Belgium, Department of International Cooperation and Financial Stability)
    Abstract: This paper studies the potential impact on securities settlement systems (SSSs) of a major market disruption, caused by the default of the largest player. A multiperiod, multisecurity model with intraday credit is used to simulate direct and second-round settlement failures triggered by the default, as well as the dynamics of settlement failures, arising from a lag in settlement relative to the date of trades. The effects of the defaulter's net trade position, the numbers of securities and participants in the market, and participants' trading behavior are also analyzed. We show that in SSSs - contrary to payment systems - large and persistent settlement failures are possible even when ample liquidity is provided. Central bank liquidity support to SSSs thus cannot eliminate settlement failures due to major market disruptions. This is due to the fact that securities transactions involve a cash leg and a securities leg, and liquidity can affect only the cash side of a transaction. Whereas a broad program of securities borrowing and lending might help, it is precisely during periods of market disruption that participants will be least willing to lend securities. Settlement failures can continue to occur beyond the period corresponding to the lag in settlement. This is due to the fact that, upon observation of a default, market participants must form expectations about the impact of the default, and these expectations affect current trading behavior. If, ex post, fewer of the previous trades settle than expected, new settlement failures will occur. This result has interesting implications for financial stability. On the one hand, conservative reactions by market participants to a default - for example by limiting the volume of trades - can result in a more rapid return of the settlement system to a normal level of efficiency. On the other hand, limitation of trading by market participants can reduce market liquidity, which may have a negative impact on financial stability.
    Keywords: Securities settlement, liquity risk, contagion
    JEL: G20 G28
    Date: 2005–07
  6. By: Janet Mitchell (National Bank of Belgium, Department of International Cooperation and Financial Stability)
    Abstract: Structured finance instruments represent a form of securitization technology which can be defined by the characteristics of pooling of financial assets, delinking of the credit risk of the asset pool from the credit risk of the originating intermediary, and issuance of tranched liabilities backed by the asset pool. Tranching effectively accomplishes a "slicing" of the loss distribution of the underlying asset pool. This paper reviews the finance literature relating to security design and securitization, in order to identify the economic forces underlying the creation of SF instruments. A question addressed is under what circumstances one would expect to observe pooling alone (as with traditional securitization) versus pooling and tranching combined (as with structured finance). It is argued that asymmetric information problems between an originator and investors can lead to pooling of assets and tranching of associated liabilities, as opposed to pooling alone. The more acute the problem of adverse selection, the more likely is value to be created through issuance of tranched assetbacked securities. Structured finance instruments also help to complete incomplete financial markets, and they may also appear in response to market segmentation.
    Keywords: Structured finance, securitization
    JEL: G10 G12 G20
    Date: 2005–07

This nep-fmk issue is ©2005 by Carolina Valiente. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
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