Abstract: |
This paper uses daily fund flow data to examine the extent of late trading in
the U.S. mutual fund industry. Trading decisions that are required by law to
have been made before 4 PM Eastern Time are correlated with market movements
from 4 to 9 PM that evening. The cross- sectional variation in this
correlation is consistent with late trading being its primary cause and
inconsistent with alternative explanations. For example, apparent late trading
ceases in September 2003 after the announcement of the investigation into
mutual fund trading practices, it is three times greater in fund families that
have been cited by regulators for allowing late trading, and it is greater in
funds and asset classes that are also receiving heavy stale price arbitrage
flows. In my sample, which includes 75 percent of non-specialized equity
mutual funds and 48 percent of assets, late trading led to average annual
shareholder dilution from 1998 to 2003 of 3.8 and 0.9 basis points in
international and U.S. equity funds, respectively. If these dilution rates
prevailed industry wide, they would imply shareholder losses of about $400
million per year. Furthermore, there is statistically significant evidence of
late trading in the funds of 39 of 66 fund families. |