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on Financial Development and Growth |
| By: | Karsten Staehr |
| Abstract: | This paper assesses the importance of capital flows as measured by the current account balance for the growth dynamics of the EU countries from Central and Eastern Europe. Economic growth in these countries was on average relatively high before the global financial crisis but markedly lower after the crisis. Panel data econometrics using annual data for 1997–2015 points to the contemporaneous current account balance having a sizeable negative effect on annual GDP growth. Estimations using many control variables and instrumental variables suggest that the negative effect is mainly demand driven. Counterfactual simulations show that growth rates in all CEE countries would have been lower in the absence of capital flows, and this applies particularly to the countries with the most disadvantageous starting points |
| Keywords: | business cycles, output performance, capital flows, current account balance, transition economies |
| JEL: | P17 P21 P36 |
| Date: | 2017–01–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eea:boewps:wp2016-10&r=fdg |
| By: | Grace Taylor; Rod Tyers |
| Abstract: | Larry Summers’ re-use of the phrase appears justified in the present global economic climate since many factors contribute to comparatively poor OECD economic performance and weakening macroeconomic policy instruments. Some are measurement issues and others might be seen as the downsides of globalisation, which has integrated financial markets and redirected growth from the advanced toward the emerging economies. Yet measurable rates of return on investment do appear to be impaired by rises in perceived investment risks, institutionalised risk aversion, increased ageing and dependency, declining shares of government spending in public investment and R&D with rising shares of these directed to health, the retention of trade distortions, new concentration in industrial structure and a slower rate of human capital accumulation, not to mention an unexpected global abundance of fossil fuels and a slower Chinese economy. The information and literature supporting these concerns is reviewed and implications for global and Australian policy are inferred. |
| Keywords: | Global stagnation, Technical change, Returns and risk, Public investment, Ageing |
| JEL: | E43 E44 E63 F44 H87 |
| Date: | 2017–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:een:camaaa:2017-01&r=fdg |
| By: | Georg Graetz; Guy Michaels |
| Abstract: | Since the early 1990s, recoveries from recessions in the US have been plagued by weak employment growth. One possible explanation for these "jobless" recoveries is rooted in technological change: middle-skill jobs, often involving routine tasks, are lost during recessions, and the displaced workers take time to transition into other jobs (Jaimovich and Siu, 2014). But technological replacement of middle-skill workers is not unique to the US—it also takes place in other developed countries (Goos, Manning, and Salomons, 2014). So if jobless recoveries in the US are due to technology, we might expect to also see them elsewhere in the developed world. We test this possibility using data on recoveries from 71 recessions in 28 industries and 17 countries from 1970-2011. We find that though GDP recovered more slowly after recent recessions, employment did not. Industries that used more routine tasks, and those more exposed to robotization, did not recently experience slower employment recoveries. Finally, middle-skill employment did not recover more slowly after recent recessions, and this pattern was no different in routine-intensive industries. Taken together, this evidence suggests that technology is not causing jobless recoveries in developed countries outside the US. |
| Keywords: | job polarization, jobless recoveries, routine-biased technological change, robots |
| JEL: | E32 J23 O33 |
| Date: | 2017–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1461&r=fdg |