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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Jeanne Hagenbach (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Nicolas Jacquemet (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Philipp Sternal (UZH - Universität Zürich [Zürich] = University of Zurich) |
| Abstract: | We propose a two-stage experiment in which people receive feedback about their relative intelligence. This feedback is a noisy message reminded at every stage, so that subjects cannot forget this ego-relevant information. Instead, we exogenously vary whether the informativeness of the message is reminded in the second stage. We investigate how this treatment variation affects the informativeness reported by subjects, and their posterior beliefs about their intelligence. We show that subjects report informativeness in a self-serving way: subjects with negative messages report that these messages are significantly less informative in the absence of reminder than with it. We also show that the lack of reminder about message informativeness allows subjects to keep a better image of themselves. These results are confirmed by complementary treatments in which we decrease messages informativeness: subjects tend to inflate the informativeness of positive messages that should now be interpreted as bad news. |
| Keywords: | Controlled experiment, Motivated beliefs, Overconfidence, Noisy feedback |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-05064934 |
| By: | Tsegay Tekleselassie (Wellesley College); Marc Witte (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute); Jonas Radbruch (Humboldt University Berlin); Lukas Hensel (Peking University); Ingo E. Isphording (IZA Institute of Labor Economics) |
| Abstract: | We conduct a field experiment with job seekers to investigate how feedback influences job search and labor market outcomes. Job seekers who receive feedback on their ability compared to other job seekers update their beliefs and increase their search effort. Specifically, initially underconfident individuals intensify their job search. In contrast, overconfident individuals do not adjust their behavior. Moreover, job seekers' willingness-to-pay (WTP) for feedback predicts treatment effects: only among underconfident individuals with positive WTP, we observe significant increases in both search effort and search success. We present suggestive evidence that this pattern arises from heterogeneity in how job seekers perceive the relevance of relative cognitive ability to job search returns. While the intervention appears cost-effective, job seekers' WTP remains insufficient to cover its costs. |
| Keywords: | job search, overconfidence, feedback, willingness-to-pay, field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 J22 J24 J64 |
| Date: | 2025–03–14 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20250019 |
| By: | Belot, Michèle (Cornell University); Hakimov, Rustamdjan (University of Lausanne) |
| Abstract: | This study examines the effects of structured social activities on workplace collegiality and performance in a large white-collar firm with 100 geographically dispersed offices. In a randomized controlled trial, half of the offices received subsidies to organize biweekly social events over a three-month period—including picnics, movie nights, and team games. We find that the intervention strengthens collegiality, enhances workplace friendships, and improves office-level performance. We do not detect an impact on individual productivity, but turnover appears to have fallen in the short-run, meaning that employees stayed longer in the job. We explore possible mechanisms and identify a sense of gratitude and reciprocity toward the company as the most likely mechanism driving the effects. |
| Keywords: | bonding, climate, workplace collegiality, field experiment |
| JEL: | M54 J32 C93 |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17987 |
| By: | Buschinger, Christiane; Eyting, Markus; Hett, Florian; Kessler, Judd B. |
| Abstract: | How does polarization - as measured by mistreatment of political rivals - spread? In an online experiment, participants choose between splitting financial resources equally or discriminating against a member of the opposing political party. We vary the information subjects receive about others' choices and justifications for discrimination. Exposure to extreme justifications for discrimination increases discrimination - particularly in a polarized environment, when many others are already discriminating - and it leads participants to adopt more extreme justifications themselves. Our findings suggest a self-reinforcing dynamic that may fuel polarization: Exposure to extreme statements increases polarization and the prevalence of extreme reasoning. |
| Keywords: | political polarization, peer effects, justifications, outgroup discrimination, social norms |
| JEL: | C9 D01 D9 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:safewp:320434 |
| By: | Werner Güth (Max-Planck-Institute for Research on Collective Goods); Ludivine Martin (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, LISER - Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research); Tibor Neugebauer (uni.lu - Université du Luxembourg = University of Luxembourg = Universität Luxemburg); Sotiria Xanalatou (uni.lu - Université du Luxembourg = University of Luxembourg = Universität Luxemburg) |
| Abstract: | We present an experimental test of a procedurally fair co-determination mechanism where group members reduce their value uncertainty before submitting bids for a joint project. The results suggest a relatively efficient mechanism, with unprofitable projects being largely rejected and profitable ones accepted. Repeated interactions tended to enhance the efficiency, while uncertain information reduced it. The subjects invested surprisingly little search effort to reduce the uncertainty about the costs and benefits, and appeared to trade off search costs against higher bids. JEL Classification: C92; D70; D81; J52; L20 |
| Keywords: | corporate governance, joint venture, experiment, auction, uncertainty |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05068612 |
| By: | Cubel, Maria; Sanchez-Pages, Santiago; Schwieren, Christiane; Steck, Cosima-Valerie |
| Abstract: | Extensive research has documented gender differences in the willingness to compete against others. Less attention has been given to situations where individuals must meet a standard of excellence to obtain rewards, such as promotions, grants, and publications. This paper investigates gender differences in competing against such standards through a laboratory experiment. Participants completed two rounds of a multiple-choice test. After the first round, they received feedback on whether they met a top-quartile performance threshold set by a reference group. Before the second round, they had to choose between a piece rate payment or a higher rate contingent upon surpassing the threshold. We compared choices across a control treatment with no feedback and three feedback conditions with varying standards: objective peer performance, peer expectations, and expert expectations. Results show that without feedback, women are less likely than men to benchmark against the standard. Feedback closes this gap when the standard is set by peers, but not when set by experts. A theoretical model and an out-of-experiment study suggest these differences stem from gendered priors about ability and asymmetric belief updating. These findings offer insights into gender differences in self-promotion and suggest ways feedback might mitigate these differences. |
| Keywords: | gender; competitive behavior; experiment; information provision |
| Date: | 2025–07–16 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:awi:wpaper:0764 |
| By: | Giunti, Sara (University of Milan); Guariso, Andrea (University of Milan Bicocca); Mendola, Mariapia (University of Milan Bicocca); Solmone, Irene (Bocconi University) |
| Abstract: | In advanced economies, increasing population diversity often fuels hostile attitudes toward immigrants and political polarization. We study a short educational program for high-school students aimed at promoting cultural diversity and improving attitudes toward immigration through active learning. To identify the impact of the program, we designed a randomized controlled trial involving 4, 500 students from 252 classes across 40 schools in northern Italy. The program led to more positive attitudes and behaviors toward immigrants, especially in more mixed classes. In terms of mechanisms, the intervention reduced students’ misperception and changed their perceived norms toward immigration, while it had no impact on implicit bias, empathy, or social contacts. Our findings suggest that anti-immigrant attitudes are primarily driven by sociotropic concerns rather than individual intergroup experience, and that educational programs combining critical thinking with cross-group discussion can correct them. |
| Keywords: | social inclusion policy, ethnic stereotypes, immigration attitudes, impact evaluation |
| JEL: | F22 J15 F68 H53 |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17978 |
| By: | Armin Falk; Luca Henkel; Thomas Neuber; Philipp Strack |
| Abstract: | We study response behavior in surveys and propose a method to identify and improve the informativeness of survey evidence. First, we develop a choice model of survey response behavior under the assumption that responses imperfectly reveal respondents' characteristics due to limited self-knowledge, inattention, or lack of engagement. Respondents receive individual-specific signals about their characteristics and choose their responses accordingly. We identify the conditions under which this process leads to biased inference from survey evidence and demonstrate how focusing on respondents with high signal precision mitigates bias. Importantly, we show that a respondent's signal precision can be inferred from observed response patterns. Second, based on these insights, we develop a consistent and unbiased estimator for a respondent's signal precision. Third, we provide experimental and survey evidence concerning the performance of the model and estimator. We experimentally test the model's key predictions in a context where the researcher knows the true characteristics. The data confirm both the model's predictions and the estimator's validity. Using a large survey, we show how our estimator can be used to improve survey evidence. Our estimator significantly increases the explanatory power of self-assessments and their association with behavior, and performs well relative to alternative methods proposed in the literature. |
| Keywords: | survey research, rational inattention, online experiment, non-cognitive skills, preferences |
| JEL: | C83 D83 C91 D91 J24 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11968 |
| By: | Pierluigi Conzo; Gianmarco Daniele; Andrea F.M. Martinangeli; Willem Sas |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates how institutional and social trust respond to crisis situations, and to what extent different kinds of trust interact in such a context. In an online survey experiment on 4, 400 representative respondents from Italy, participants are exposed to a real-world flooding scenario and randomly assigned to information treatments portraying institutions as effective, ineffective, or neither of the two. When institutions are framed as effective, institutional trust and donations to a grassroots environmental NGO increase, while social trust and cooperation norms remain stable. When institutions are seen as unprepared, participants do not compensate by trusting others or stressing cooperation. Instead, they increase support for the NGO as well, suggesting crisis management delegation to motivated and organised citizens. When no information is provided about institutional quality all trust indicators rise, albeit more noisily. These findings suggest delegation as a distinct response to institutional failure and point to the need to study trust in civic movements as an intermediate form between institutional and interpersonal trust. |
| Keywords: | social trust, institutional trust, external shocks, online survey experiment, climate change, cooperation, grassroot movements, delegation |
| JEL: | D91 H84 Z13 C93 D83 H11 P16 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11987 |
| By: | Boudreau, Laura; Macchiavello, Rocco; Minni, Virginia; Tanaka, Mari |
| Abstract: | Social movements are catalysts for crucial institutional changes. To succeed, they must coordinate members’ views (consensus building) and actions (mobilization). We study union leaders within Myanmar’s burgeoning labor movement. Union leaders are positively selected on both ability and personality traits that enable them to influence others, yet they earn lower wages. In group discussions about workers’ views on an upcoming national minimum wage negotiation, randomly embedded leaders build consensus around the union’s preferred policy. In an experiment that mimics individual decision-making in a collective action setup, leaders increase mobilization through coordination. |
| Keywords: | leaders; unions; consensus building; mobilization; field experiments |
| JEL: | D91 J38 J51 O15 |
| Date: | 2025–06–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:126113 |
| By: | Kamei, Kenju; Sharma, Smriti; Walker, Matthew |
| Abstract: | This paper presents the first experimental study on how higher-order punishment affects third-party sanction enforcement in the presence of multiple third parties. The design varies across treatments the number of third parties witnessing a norm violation and the opportunities available for third parties to costly punish each other after observing their peers’ enforcement actions. To test generalizability of higher-order enforcement effects, the experiment is conducted across two contrasting societies – India and the United Kingdom – using a prisoner’s dilemma game. These societies are selected for their positions at opposite ends of the tight-loose ancestral kinship spectrum. In both societies, third parties punish defectors who exploit their paired cooperators more strongly than any other person, consistent with prior research. However, punitive patterns differ. In the UK, third parties punish defectors less frequently and less strongly when other third parties are present. However, when higher-order punishments are available among third parties, their failure to punish defectors and acts of anti-social punishment invite strong higher-order punishment from their peers, which encourages their pro-social first-order punishments and makes mutual cooperation a Nash equilibrium outcome in the primary cooperation dilemma. However, in India, overall punishment levels are lower, group size and incentive structure changes have no discernible effects, and higher-order punishments are not better disciplined. These findings support a model of norm conformity for the UK and do not contradict such a model for India. |
| Keywords: | Experiment; Cross-societal variation; Public Goods; Third-party punishment; Higher-order |
| JEL: | C92 D01 H41 |
| Date: | 2025–04–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:125206 |
| By: | Rémi Suchon; Vincent Théroude |
| Abstract: | Cooperation has many economic and social benefits, yet it is vulnerable to inequality. This study examines how the magnitude of inequality affects cooperation, focusing on differences in behavior between individuals randomly assigned to high (i.e. the rich) and low endowments (i.e. the poor). To do so, we use a novel dataset that pools individual-level observations from 24 published experimental linear public good games with unequal endowments. Pooling many studies allows us to study the causal effect of inequality at the participant level, with a substantial variation in levels of inequality. Such a variation would be very hard to get with a single, properly powered experiment. We start by confirming that inequality reduces overall contributions, and that the rich contribute a lower share (“relative contribution”) of their endowment than the poor on average. We further identify a striking asymmetry: as inequality grows, the relative contributions of the rich decrease significantly, while the relative contributions of the poor are not significantly impacted. Therefore, the gap in contributions across statuses increases as inequality gets stronger. We provide a simple model of conditional cooperation that is compatible with our empirical findings. These results may inform the design of policies addressing inequality and social cohesion. |
| Keywords: | Public good game, contribution gap, inequality, meta-analysis. |
| JEL: | C92 H41 D91 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2025-15 |
| By: | Geissler, Dominique; Maarouf, Abdurahman; Bär, Dominik; Pröllochs, Nicolas; Feuerriegel, Stefan |
| Abstract: | Aggarwal et al. (2023) analyze the effects of an 8-month-long advertising program on voter turnout in the 2020 US presidential election. Therein, 2 million voters were exposed to pro-Biden and anti-Trump advertisements on social media in five battleground states. The study finds no average treatment effect on voter turnout but differential effects when modeling by Trump support: Biden supporters are 0.4 percentage points more likely to vote while Trump supporters are 0.3 percentage points less likely to vote (t = −2.09 with p-value |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:i4rdps:237 |
| By: | Jiakun Zheng (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Ling Zhou (School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics) |
| Abstract: | Narrow bracketers who are myopic in specific decisions would fail to consider preexisting risks in investment and neglect hedging opportunities. Growing evidence has demonstrated the relevance of narrow bracketing. We take a step further in empirical investigation and study individual heterogeneity in narrow bracketing. Specifically, we use a lab experiment in investment and hedging that elicits subjects' preferences on rich occasions to uncover the individual degree of narrow bracketing without imposing distributional assumptions. Combining prospect theory and narrow bracketing can explain our findings: Subjects who invest more also insure more, and subjects insure significantly less in the loss domain than in the gain domain. More importantly, we show that the distribution of the individual degree of narrow bracketing is skewed at two extremes, yet with a substantial share of people in the middle who partially suffer from narrow bracketing. Neglecting this aspect, we would overestimate the severity of narrow bracketing and misinterpret its relation with individual characteristics. |
| Keywords: | Hedging, Narrow bracketing, Prospect theory, Subject heterogeneity |
| Date: | 2025–04–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05063379 |
| By: | Sara Lowes; Nathan Nunn |
| Abstract: | Lab-in-the-field experiments, in which lab experiments are conducted in more naturalistic settings, are increasingly being implemented in developing country contexts. In this chapter, we outline the conceptual and logistical challenges typically associated with lab-in-the-field experiments in non-Western settings. We describe the importance of worldviews and how researcher preconceptions may inadvertently shape the types of research questions that are asked. We emphasize the importance of increasing diversity of subject pools and researchers. We also suggest a set of best practices when implementing lab-in-the-field experiments in developing countries. |
| JEL: | C9 N01 N10 Z1 |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33981 |
| By: | Vojtech Bartos; Urlich Glogowsky; Johannes Rincke |
| Abstract: | We demonstrate that racial biases against tutors hinder learning. In e-learning experiments, U.S. conservatives are more likely to disregard advice from Black tutors, resulting in reduced performance compared to learners taught by white tutors. We show that the bias is unconscious and, consequently, does not skew tutor selection. In line with our theory, the bias disappears when the stakes are high. In contrast, liberals favor Black tutors without experiencing learning disparities. Methodologically, we contribute by using video post-production techniques to manipulate tutor race without introducing typical confounds. Additionally, we develop a novel two-stage design that simultaneously measures tutor selection, learning, and productivity. |
| Keywords: | Discrimination; racial bias; advice-seeking; online experiment |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jku:econwp:2025-08 |
| By: | Wicker, Till (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management); Dalton, Patricio (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management); van Soest, Daan (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management) |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiutis:a92dc757-d6b5-4802-8639-c1cbc6523a93 |
| By: | Cristina Figueroa (University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute); Jantsje Mol (University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute); Ivan Soraperra (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Joël Van der Weele (University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute) |
| Abstract: | Social preferences depend on emotional states like compassion and anger. Since emotions are fleeting and subject to manipulation, they may generate demand for commitment. We investigate the use of commitment strategies in an online experiment (n=1, 400), where subjects decide to watch or avoid videos before engaging in a charitable giving task. We find that a video with emotional content increases giving, but is also avoided more than non-emotional videos. We estimate a structural model of state-dependent social preferences, and show evidence for sophisticated commitment to selfishness and altruism. We argue that giving can be fruitfully analyzed as a self-control problem. |
| Date: | 2025–03–28 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20250023 |
| By: | de Varda, Andrea Gregor; Saponaro, Chiara; Marelli, Marco |
| Abstract: | Webb, Holyoak & Lu (2023) compared human reasoners and GPT-3 on several tasks involving analogy resolution, documenting human-level or superhuman performance in most conditions. In this direct replication, we tested a different, open-weights language model (Mixtral-8x7B) on the same materials (Experiments 1 and 2, "Digit Matrices" and "Letter String" problems) or on an augmented dataset to obtain the desired statistical power (Experiment 4, "Story Analogies"). Our replication confirmed the sign and statistical significance of the reported effects in the Digit Matrices and Story Analogies problems, whereas the model did not surpass the human baseline in the Letter String problems. |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:i4rdps:239 |
| By: | Natalia I. Valdez-Gonzalez (Universitat de Barcelona); Adriana Gaviria (Universidad Loyola); Antonio M. Espin (Universidad de Granada; Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | The gender gap in willingness to compete is thought to underlie enduring inequalities in education, career choice, and labor market outcomes. Yet it remains unclear whether the gap reflects true preference differences or results from confounding factors such as task stereotypes, overconfidence, or risk aversion. We test gender differences in competition entry across eight pre-registered studies in seven countries spanning four continents (Dominican Republic, Ivory Coast, El Salvador, Madagascar, Spain, The Philippines, and Uruguay; total n = 1, 833), using an experimental design that systematically minimizes these confounds: (i) based on a non-male-stereotyped task (the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test); (ii) matching participants with an opponent of identical baseline, piece-rate performance to remove strategic uncertainty and the role of beliefs; and (iii) reducing the riskiness of competition. Despite these features—and no consistent gender gap in performance—we find that women enter competition significantly less than men (meta-analytic difference = 6–7 %), with no cross-country heterogeneity. Overconfidence is higher among men and predicts competition entry, but it does not explain the gender gap. Risk preferences play no role. Thus, in a setting designed to equalize opportunity and eliminate known drivers of the gap, gender differences in competition persist. This suggests that a residual preference for competition difference may contribute to gender disparities in high-stakes economic environments across cultures. |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:25-04 |
| By: | Daniela Di Cagno; Werner Güth; Francesca Marazzi; Luca Panaccione |
| Abstract: | We analyze a public goods game with linearly increasing marginal returns to contributions, leading to a non-monotonic group payoff. By allowing the incentive to freeride to persist at all contribution levels, we preserve the usual social dilemma of voluntary public goods provision. We compare two conditions in which both let participants face the voluntary contribution task over a finite number of rounds: one implements it as a static game (Baseline condition), and the other implements it as a dynamic game with four successive stages of simultaneous contribution choices within each round (Milestone condition). Our data show that cooperation in the Baseline condition is rare and mostly limited to the first few rounds. The evidence for the Milestone condition is much more encouraging: contributions beyond suffering are substantial and fairly stable across rounds, although full contributions remain rare. This evidence suggests that the Milestone protocol is a promising institutional device for enhancing voluntary cooperation. |
| Keywords: | experiments, public goods, increasing marginal incentives to contribute, freeriding |
| JEL: | C72 C92 H41 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11988 |
| By: | Brice Corgnet (EM - EMLyon Business School); Simon Gächter; Roberto Hernán-González |
| Abstract: | In many contractual arrangements where product or service delivery occurs sometime after contracts have been concluded, conditions may change, leading to disputes that need to be resolved often by a third party (arbitrator/mediator). In this paper we introduce the Contractual Dispute Resolution Game (CDRG), which allows us to study dispute resolution through arbitration. Unlike prior research studying arbitration at impasse using zero-sum bargaining games, we analyze a situation where parties can create additional value. We introduce a novel real-effort task, the Car Assembly Real-effort Task (CART), and show in two studies how automated arbitration rules (Study 1) and human arbitrators (Study 2) affect dispute resolution and surplus creation. In Study 1, we find that high-accuracy arbitration enhances efficiency. In Study 2, we find that arbitrators who are incentivized based on the total surplus of the negotiation do also promote greater efficiency. The CDRG provides a valuable tool for examining the effects of arbitration and mediation in settings where contracts are incomplete and can be impacted by shocks. |
| Keywords: | Contractual disputes, Cooperation, Arbitration, Fairness, Risk-sharing, Laboratory experiments, Real-effort experiments, Car Assembly Real-effort Task (CART), Contractual Dispute Resolution Game (CDRG) |
| Date: | 2025–03–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05053021 |
| By: | Maria Laura Alzua (CEDLAS - Centro de Estudios Distributivos, Laborales y Sociales - UNLP - Universidad Nacional de la Plata [Argentine]); Juan Camilo Cardenas (UNIANDES - Universidad de los Andes [Bogota]); Habiba Djebbari (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Experts argue that the adoption of healthy sanitation practices, such as hand washing and latrine use, requires focusing on the entire community rather than individual behaviors. According to this view, one limiting factor in ending open defecation lies in the capacity of the community to collectively act toward this goal. Each member of a community bears the private cost of contributing by washing hands and using latrines, but the benefits through better health outcomes depend on whether other community members also opt out of open defecation. We rely on a community-based intervention carried out in Mali as an illustrative example (Community-Led Total Sanitation or CLTS). Using a series of experiments conducted in 121 villages and designed to measure the willingness of community members to contribute to a local public good, we investigate the process of participation in a collective action problem setting. Our focus is on two types of activities: (1) gathering of community members to encourage public discussion of the collective action problem, and (2) facilitation by a community champion of the adoption of individual actions to attain the socially preferred outcome. In games, communication helps raise public good provision, and both open discussion and facilitated ones have the same impact. When a community member facilitates a discussion after an open discussion session, public good contributions increase, but there are no gains from opening up the discussion after a facilitated session. Community members who choose to contribute in the no-communication treatment are not better facilitators than those who choose not to contribute. |
| Keywords: | Public good provision, Behavioral experiments, Community-based development, Sanitation |
| Date: | 2025–03–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05069062 |
| By: | DiGiuseppe, Matthew (Leiden University); Paula, Katrin; Rommel, Tobias |
| Abstract: | Under which conditions are citizens willing to delegate government responsibilities to artificial intelligence? We hypothesize that the identity of incumbent policymakers impacts public support for delegating decisions to AI. In highly polarized societies, AI has the potential to be perceived as a decision maker with apolitical or less partisan motivations in governance decisions. We thus reason that individuals will prefer co-partisans to AI or algorithmic decision making. However, a switch to AI decision making will have more public support when out-partisans hold policy control. To test our hypothesis, we fielded a survey experiment in the summer of 2024 that asked about 2500 respondents in the US to register their support for AI making the most important economic decision in the world -- the setting of the base interest rate by the US Federal Reserve. The basis of our experimental treatments is the fact that Jerome Powell, the current chair of the Fed, was appointed first by President Trump, a Republican, and later re-appointed by President Biden, a Democrat. We find that when we inform respondents that Powell was appointed by a president from another party, support for delegation to AI increases compared to the condition when the Fed chair is appointed by a co-partisan. The complier average causal effect (CACE) indicates that change perception of the Fed Chair to an outpartisan increases support for delegating to AI by over 45%. |
| Date: | 2025–07–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:rnj5h_v2 |
| By: | Jing Cai; Sai Luo; Shing-Yi Wang |
| Abstract: | Higher compensation and increased monitoring are two common strategies for addressing the moral hazard problem between firms and workers. In a field experiment with new hires at an automobile manufacturing firm in China, we randomly varied both signing bonuses and monitoring intensity. Both interventions increased worker output but through different channels: signing bonuses led to longer working hours without significant gains in performance, while enhanced monitoring improved performance as evaluated by managers. Additionally, bonuses reduced quit rates, whereas monitoring raised them. These results suggest that firms should carefully consider their primary objectives and weigh these trade-offs when designing optimal labor contracts. |
| JEL: | C93 J24 J30 M52 O15 |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33977 |
| By: | Listo, Ariel (University of Maryland); Muñoz, Ercio A. (Inter-American Development Bank); Sansone, Dario (University of Exeter) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how attitudes among supervisors, co-workers, and customers are related to discrimination against sexual minority individuals in the workplace. Participants from a large, nationally representative online sample in Chile took part in double list experiments – which reduce social desirability bias when eliciting views on sensitive topics – followed by direct questions on attitudes toward sexual minority individuals. The findings reveal a discrepancy between reported and actual levels of comfort with gay individuals in the labor market. The respondents underreported their discomfort by 15-23 percentage points, with the largest bias and lowest comfort levels observed when they were asked about supervising gay employees. These attitudinal patterns were mirrored in incentivized donation behavior: individuals who chose not to donate any amount from a lottery to a local LGBTQ-related nonprofit reported lower comfort levels and exhibited greater misreporting. Finally, the respondents consistently underestimated the broader societal support for gay employees and co-workers. |
| Keywords: | discrimination, Chile, LGBTQ+ |
| JEL: | C93 D91 J15 J71 Z13 |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17976 |
| By: | Roberto Hernán González (BSB Dijon); Praveen Kujal (Middlesex University Business School; Chapman University); Miguel Angel Ropero-García (Universidad de Málaga); Román Fossati (Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, UNICEN) |
| Abstract: | List-pricing and discounting is common in both retail and wholesale markets. Its interpretation amongst competition authorities varies from being procompetitive to collusion facilitating. We experimentally test how list pricing and discounting impact prices in a capacity constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly with symmetric and asymmetric firms facing constant marginal costs. We find that, relative to the symmetric baseline experiments, list pricing and discounting generate higher equilibrium prices for (symmetric) firms. Prices in the asymmetric-list price duopoly are also higher, however, the effect is much smaller than under symmetry. The introduction of asymmetry results in higher prices. The smaller firms gain more from list pricing and use it to signal price commitment. We also find that the announcement of exactly the same list prices signals sellers´ intentions to set the same market prices. When list prices are different, then the minimum of the list prices works as a coordination device in the market prices stage. Setting the same list prices in the first stage leads to coordination in market prices and to significantly higher prices. |
| Keywords: | List pricing, Discounts, Capacity Constraints, Mixed Strategies, Pure Strategies |
| JEL: | C9 L0 L1 L4 L11 L13 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:25-03 |
| By: | Angel-Urdinola, Diego; Chinen, Marjorie H |
| Abstract: | This study evaluates the impact of incorporating mixed reality—including both augmented and virtual reality—into auto-mechanics training for students enrolled in selected public technical technological institutes in Ecuador. The intervention aims to enhance students' understanding of automotive mechanics by teaching the fundamental principles of internal combustion engine operation through nine competency-based learning modules delivered over one academic semester. The study employed a stratified randomized controlled trial at the class level, assigning auto-mechanic classes within each institute to either the mixed reality–enhanced training laboratory (treatment) or the standard curriculum (control). To measure learning outcomes, students completed pre- and post-intervention cognitive tests, complemented by student surveys assessing technology usability, motivation, and engagement. This comprehensive approach enabled the study to quantify the effects of the training on student learning and identify mechanisms through which learning occurred. The results indicate that students exposed to mixed reality–based instruction scored, on average, 0.37 standard deviation higher on post-tests than those in the control group—a statistically significant effect at the 1 percent level. These findings are consistent with effect sizes observed in training programs aimed at college students in high-income countries. The evidence also points to increased engagement and motivation as key channels through which mixed reality enhanced learning, underscoring the potential of immersive technologies to improve vocational training outcomes in low- and middle-income settings. |
| Date: | 2025–06–16 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:11146 |
| By: | Julien Senn; Jan Schmitz; Christian Zehnder |
| Abstract: | Using a large-scale real effort experiment, we explore whether and how different peer assignment mechanisms affect worker performance and stress. Letting individuals choose whom to compare to increases productivity to the same extent as a targeted exogenous matching policy designed to maximize motivational spillovers. These effects are significantly larger than those obtained through random assignment and their magnitude is comparable to the impact of an increase in pay of about 10 percent. A downside of targeted peer assignment is that, unlike endogenous peer selection, it leads to a large increase in stress. The key advantage of letting workers choose whom to compare to is that it allows those workers who want to be motivated to compare to a motivating peer while also permitting those for whom social comparisons have little benefits or are too stressful to avoid them. Finally, we show that social comparisons yield stronger motivational effects than comparable non-social goals. |
| Keywords: | social comparisons, productivity, stress, incentives, real effort |
| JEL: | C93 J24 M54 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11972 |
| By: | Steven Gjerstad (Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | One principal capability of markets is the coordination of information distributed among market participants who typically have competing incentives. Despite distributed information and conflicting incentives, competition among market participants often leads to socially desirable resource allocation. In this sense a market is a distributed multi-agent mechanism that, in effect, finds an optimal solution to a computational problem that is not known to any individual market participant. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that capacity of markets by defining automated agents that interact with one another in a distributed system that implements a socially desirable resource allocation. In this sense, market agents extend in several meaningful directions our concept of the function and capabilities of artificial intelligence. Market agents have been developed for single (partial equilibrium) markets going back over thirty-five years. This paper extends that research strategy in two directions. The paper reports results of simulations with automated agents in a general equilibrium market and, in addition, those agents interact in their market with human subjects in a market experiment that includes both human subjects and automated agents, so that we can better assess the bargaining capacity of the agents relative to human capabilities. |
| Keywords: | Artificial intelligence, agent-based economy, bargaining, bounded rationality, competitive equilibrium, double auction, experimental economics, general equilibrium, perfect competition |
| JEL: | C78 C92 D41 D44 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:25-05 |
| By: | Wohlschlegel, Julian; Jussupow, Ekaterina |
| Abstract: | In algorithm augmented decision-making, humans must successfully judge when to follow or reject algorithmic advice. Here, research showed that humans tend to reject algorithmic advice after experiencing algorithmic errors. This more severe response to incorrect algorithmic advice compared to incorrect human advice gave rise to the definition of, and research on, the phenomenon of algorithm aversion. However, empirical findings on algorithm aversion are conflicting and mostly focused on the decision itself while neglecting the cognitive processes from receiving incorrect advice to deciding. Using a multi-trial mouse tracking experiment, we aim to better understand the emergence of algorithm aversion by investigating decisional conflicts reflected in cognitive process data. Through our research, we mainly aim to contribute to research on algorithm aversion and the IS community’s methodological toolkit while our insights on decisional conflicts can further inform practitioners on how to responsibly enable and onboard users of algorithms. |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dar:wpaper:155418 |
| By: | Winder, Philipp (University of St.Gallen); Hildebrand, Christian (University of St. Gallen) |
| Abstract: | The rise of cryptocurrencies is transforming how consumers trade, purchase, and pay for products. The current work explores how cryptocurrencies used as a payment method shape consumer-firm interactions. Through one large-scale pilot study, four experiments, and one field experiment, we demonstrate that consumers perceive cryptocurrencies as a riskier payment method compared to traditional payment methods. We introduce the Payment Method Technology Risk Transfer and demonstrate how this heightened risk perception, induced by a payment option, subsequently increases consumers’ perceived interaction risk when engaging with the same firm. These risk dynamics negatively impact and ultimately erode consumers’ evaluation of the firm offering the payment method. We further demonstrate two essential boundary conditions: When firms actively communicate the privacy benefits of cryptocurrencies as a payment method or when the firm has a higher baseline trust with consumers, the adverse effects of cryptocurrencies as a payment method are reduced. Our findings highlight the unintended risks associated with crypto payments and the importance of effectively managing consumer risk perceptions of digital currencies when used as a means of payment for products and services. This research offers novel insights into how digital currencies and innovative payment technologies influence the psychology of consumer-firm relationships, as well as strategies that firms can employ to manage consumer expectations and mitigate risk effectively. |
| Date: | 2025–06–18 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:up6k3_v1 |
| By: | Nikhil Agarwal; Alex Moehring; Alexander Wolitzky |
| Abstract: | We propose a sufficient statistic for designing AI information-disclosure and selective automation policies. The approach allows for endogenous and biased beliefs, and effort crowd-out, without using a structural model of human decision-making. We deploy and validate our approach in a fact-checking experiment. Humans under-respond to AI predictions and reduce effort when presented with confident AI predictions. Overconfidence in own-signal rather than under-confidence in AI drives AI under-response. The optimal policy automates decisions where the AI is confident and delegates the other decisions while fully disclosing the AI prediction. Although automation is valuable, the benefit of assisting humans with AI is negligible. |
| JEL: | C91 D47 D83 D89 |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33949 |
| By: | Gangadharan, Lata (Monash Univ); Rabanal, Jean Paul (University of Stavanger); Riyanto, Eko (Nanyang Technological University;); Rud, Olga (University of Stavanger); Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (University of Stavanger) |
| Abstract: | We examine whether shareholders' responses to risky investment decisions are influenced by the gender of the firm's manager, particularly when these decisions directly affect the fundamental value per share. Our findings indicate that male and female managers make similar investment choices, that shareholder beliefs about the managers' choices are generally accurate, and that market prices do not differ by manager gender. These findings suggest that gender diversity in leadership does not negatively affect shareholder valuation. However, when subjects are explicitly asked to compare the investment of male and female managers, strong gender stereotypes emerge, and most expect male managers to take on more risk. A similar bias is evident in share price comparisons, with male-led firms slightly favored, although the effect is weaker than that observed in the beliefs about investment decisions. This pattern suggests that, while individual judgments may be biased, market mechanisms can partially alleviate such biases. |
| Keywords: | Gender; Risk Aversion; Corporate decisions; Experimental Finance |
| JEL: | C90 D81 G11 G35 G41 G51 |
| Date: | 2025–07–13 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:stavef:2025_002 |
| By: | Daniela Grieco; Patrick Llerena; Anne-Gaëlle Maltese |
| Abstract: | This paper explores how individuals perceive open versus closed tasks in creative contexts and how this perception influences their choice between these tasks. We find that perceptions of task openness align with existing assumptions in the creativity literature regarding goal clarity and the freedom to explore. Additionally, we show that the likelihood of choosing an open task increases with the perceived freedom to explore, while it decreases with goal clarity, particularly when incentives are present. The effects of self-selection on creative performance are then investigated. |
| Keywords: | creativity; openness; perception; constraints; self-selection. |
| JEL: | C91 D91 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2025-16 |
| By: | Nadia Ali; Giacomo De Giorgi; Aminur Rahman; Eric Verhoogen |
| Abstract: | Many countries seek to promote exports by subsidizing market access, but evidence on such efforts has been mixed. We present the first randomized evaluation of a government financial-support program explicitly targeting exports, the Tasdir+ program in Tunisia. The program offered matching grants for fixed market-access costs but not variable costs. Tracking outcomes in administrative data, we find positive effects on exports on average. We find limited impacts on the number of destinations or exported products, which were stated policy targets. The finding that the fixed-cost subsidies expanded exports on the intensive margin but not the extensive margins of destinations or products stands in contrast to the predictions of several workhorse trade models. |
| JEL: | F14 O14 |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33985 |
| By: | Barbara Biasi; Zoë B. Cullen; Julia H. Gilman; Nina Roussille |
| Abstract: | This paper provides the first causal evidence on how occupational wage inequality affects the labor movement, using three complementary research designs: a vignette experiment with union organizers, an information intervention during the 2023 Writers Guild of America strike, and a natural experiment following a Wisconsin reform that increased wage inequality among public school teachers. Across all studies, we find that occupational inequality undermines union strength, through multiple channels. First, workers with high individual bargaining power are more likely to withdraw support in unequal environments, preferring individual over collective bargaining. Second, union organizers strategically respond to inequality in ways that may preserve membership but limit redistribution. For instance, they shift away from campaigning on wages and choose smaller, more homogeneous bargaining units. Taken together, our findings highlight the potential for “inequality traps”, where rising inequality erodes the very institutions designed to counteract it. |
| JEL: | C93 D83 D84 J31 J5 |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33978 |
| By: | Max Coveney (Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute); Pilar Garcia-Gomez (Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute); Teresa Marreiros Bago d'Uva (Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute) |
| Abstract: | Should gender composition be taken into account when forming teams? This paper examines how the output of teams completing tasks similar to those performed in many workplaces is influenced by their gender composition. Leveraging an economics bachelor course in which students are randomly paired together, we document large differences in performance grades by the gender make-up of the team. All-male teams are significantly outperformed by both mixed and all-female teams. These differences remain even when comprehensively controlling for the individual task aptitude of each of the group members, as well as other characteristics potentially relevant for teamwork that may vary by gender. Exploring mechanisms, we find suggestive evidence that women have greater preferences for cooperation, and - even when controlling for individual ability - exert higher effort levels in teams compared to men. This asymmetry appears to lead to members of mixed-gender teams reporting the worst team experiences. |
| Date: | 2025–05–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20250032 |
| By: | Zhao, Kai; Kamil, Nurul Liyana Mohd |
| Abstract: | This study examines the effects of paradoxical leadership on innovative work behaviours, with a focus on the mediating roles of self-leadership and work engagement and the moderating role of leader-member exchange (LMX). Utilizing a 2 × 2 between-groups quasi-experimental design, the research involved manipulating participants’ perceptions through scenario experiments related to paradoxical leadership and LMX. A sample of 288 service sector employees was randomly distributed across 4 different scenarios, with subsequent survey completion post-scenario exposure. Our findings reveal that paradoxical leadership indirectly influences innovative behaviours through enhancing followers’ self-leadership and engagement. Significantly, the impact varies with the quality of LMX: in paradoxical scenarios, higher LMX levels notably increase self-leadership and engagement, an effect absents in non-paradoxical contexts. However, LMX does not directly moderate the relationship between paradoxical leadership and innovative work behaviours. This research underscores the complex interplay between leadership styles and interpersonal dynamics, emphasizing the essential role of cultivating followers’ self-leadership and robust leader-member exchanges to enhance organisational innovation. |
| Keywords: | innovative work behaviour; work engagement; paradoxical leadership; self-leadership; leader-member exchange |
| JEL: | J50 |
| Date: | 2025–06–25 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:128602 |
| By: | Eleonora Alabrese; Francesco Capozza; Prashant Garg |
| Abstract: | As social media is increasingly popular, we examine the reputational costs of its increased centrality among academics. Analyzing posts of 98, 000 scientists on Twitter (2016–2022) reveals substantial and varied political discourse. We assess the impact of such online political expression with online experiments on a representative sample of 3, 700 U.S. respondents and 135 journalists who rate vignettes of synthetic academic profiles with varied political affiliations. Politically neutral scientists are viewed as the most credible. Strikingly, on both the ’left’ and ’right’ sides of politically neutral, there is a monotonic penalty for scientists displaying political affiliations: the stronger their posts, the less credible their profile and research are perceived, and the lower the public’s will¬ingness to read their content, especially among oppositely aligned respondents. A survey of 128 scientists shows awareness of this penalty and a consensus on avoiding political expression outside their expertise. |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notnic:2025-09 |
| By: | Sandra Bohmann; Susann Fiedler; Maximilian Kasy; Jürgen Schupp; Frederik Schwerter |
| Abstract: | Mental health and wellbeing are unequally distributed in high-income countries, disadvantaging low-income individuals. Unconditional, regular, and guaranteed cash transfers may help address this inequality by promoting financial security and agency. We conducted a preregistered RCT in Germany, where treated participants received monthly payments of EUR 1, 200 for three years. Cash transfers improve mental health and wellbeing. These effects are substantively large and robust. Cash transfers also improve perceived autonomy, savings, prosocial giving, time with friends, and sleep. Our findings suggest that cash transfers improve mental health and wellbeing if they empower agency and meaningful life changes. |
| Keywords: | cash transfers, mental health, life satisfaction, purpose in life, agency, autonomy, life changes |
| JEL: | C93 I31 D10 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11989 |