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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Bobba, Matteo; Frisancho, Verónica; Pariguana, Marco |
| Abstract: | This paper explores an information intervention designed and implemented within a school assignment mechanism in Mexico City. Through a randomized experiment, we show that providing a subset of applicants with feedback about their academic performance can enhance sorting by skill across high school tracks. We embed the experimental variation into an empirical model of schooling choice and outcomes to assess the impact of the intervention for the overall population of applicants. Feedback provision is shown to increase the efficiency of the student school allocation, while congestion externalities are detrimental for the equity of downstream education outcomes. |
| Keywords: | Educación, Sector académico, Estudiantes, Docentes, Ciencia conductual, |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dbl:dblwop:2538 |
| By: | Aristotelis Epanomeritakis; Davide Viviano |
| Abstract: | Experiments deliver credible but often localized effects, tied to specific sites, populations, or mechanisms. When such estimates are insufficient to extrapolate effects for broader policy questions, such as external validity and general-equilibrium (GE) effects, researchers combine trials with external evidence from reduced-form or structural observational estimates, or prior experiments. We develop a unified framework for designing experiments in this setting: the researcher selects which parameters to identify experimentally from a feasible set (which treatment arms and/or individuals to include in the experiment), allocates sample size, and specifies how to weight experimental and observational estimators. Because observational inputs may be biased in ways unknown ex ante, we develop a minimax proportional regret objective that evaluates any candidate design relative to an oracle that knows the bias and jointly chooses the design and estimator. This yields a transparent bias-variance trade-off that requires no prespecified bias bound and depends only on information about the precision of the estimators and the estimand's sensitivity to the underlying parameters. We illustrate the framework by (i) designing small-scale cash transfer experiments aimed at estimating GE effects and (ii) optimizing site selection for microfinance interventions. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.23434 |
| By: | Taveras, Elisa (The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley); Tonguc, Ozlem (State University of New York); Zhu, Maria (Syracuse University); Miller, Nicola (Binghamton University, New York) |
| Abstract: | This study investigates whether employers in an online hiring experiment exhibit discrimination based on workers’ accents that indicate English is not their primary language. To assess accent bias, we implement a randomized treatment design in which participants acting as employers are assigned to one of two conditions: a treatment where the worker’s accent is revealed (“Accent Revealed”) or a control where it is not (“Accent Blind”). Using incentive-compatible methods, we elicit employers’ beliefs about the productivity of randomly assigned workers, providing brief demographic information and audio clips that either reveal or mask accent characteristics. We evaluate worker productivity in two skills: Mathematics and Verbal reasoning. We find that employers rate accented workers as less capable than their non-accented counterparts in both skills, and this gap persists after providing employers with a signal of a worker’s test score. Employers also display lower willingness to pay, particularly in Verbal skills tasks, even when provided with performance signals. |
| Keywords: | laboratory experiments, labor market discrimination, foreign accent |
| JEL: | C91 D90 J01 J71 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18239 |
| By: | Pablo Brañas-Garza (Universidad Loyola Andalucía); Antonio M. Espín (Universidad de Granada); Diego Jorrat (Universidad de Sevilla/Loyola Behavioral Lab) |
| Abstract: | We conducted an online Dictator Game experiment (N = 1, 195) to test three hypotheses about the role of monetary incentives in prosocial behavior. First, we examined whether real incentives reduce the dispersion of responses compared to hypothetical ones. Surprisingly, we found the opposite: hypothetical responses were less dispersed, with choices clustering around the egalitarian split. This pattern held in a replication (N = 308) with higher stakes (£5), offering no support for the first hypothesis. Second, we tested whether real incentives—by involving actual monetary consequences—lead to more selfish decisions, as they are expected to reveal true preferences. With £1 stakes, no significant differences emerged across conditions. However, when the stake was increased to £5, participants became more selfish under real incentives, supporting the second hypothesis only when the amount at stake is substantial. Third, we explored whether probabilistic payments differ behaviorally from certain ones. At low stakes, probabilistic incentives resembled real ones. But with higher stakes, real and probabilistic outcomes diverged, suggesting participants respond to expected value only when it is meaningful. Finally, in a separate study (N = 299), we found that many participants misunderstood hypothetical-payment instructions. Only explicit phrasing eliminated this confusion, underscoring the importance of precise wording in experimental design. |
| Keywords: | Monetary incentives, egalitarianism, hyper-altruism, selfishness, dictator game |
| JEL: | D64 D91 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aoz:wpaper:376 |
| By: | Kamei, Kenju; Tabero, Katy |
| Abstract: | It is well-known that efficiency often fails to improve in public goods games with peer-to-peer punishment when counter-punishment is possible. This paper experimentally demonstrates, for the first time, that the effects of sanctioning institutions are modest, regardless of the decision-making format (individual or team). In the “team” conditions, subjects are randomly assigned to teams of three, and make joint decisions through communication. Their dialogue provides valuable insights into the motivations behind (counter-)punishment, as well as the resulting behavioral effects. A coding exercise reveals that first-order punishments (and counter-punishments) are primarily emotional responses to peers’ low contributions (and first-order punishments, respectively). |
| Keywords: | C92, D01, H49 |
| JEL: | C92 D01 H41 H49 |
| Date: | 2025–09–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:126063 |
| By: | Evan M. Calford; Anujit Chakraborty |
| Abstract: | We propose the Validated Random Incentive Scheme (VRIS)—an enhancement of the standard Random Incentive Scheme (RIS)—that enables internal validation of RIS’s incentive compatibility (IC) without altering an experiment’s core design. The key innovation is that researchers can observe each subject under both RIS and single-choice incentives, enabling direct withinperson comparisons that form the basis for testing IC. We derive a set of testable predictions from assumptions about the structure of random noise in decision making. In an online experiment involving three risky decisions and a perception task, we use the VRIS design to compare behavior under the RIS with that under single-choice incentives. We find that the RIS distorts the marginal distribution of choices in two of the four decisions and the joint distributions in five of six decision-pairs. In contrast, our novel VRIS directly measures all four marginal distributions under single-choice incentives and enables recovery of undistorted pairwise distributions in all but one case. |
| Keywords: | Experimental Economics, Random Incentive Scheme, Incentive Compatibility, Stochastic Choice |
| JEL: | C90 D81 D90 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2025-705 |
| By: | Bohan Zhang; Jiaxuan Li; Ali Horta\c{c}su; Xiaoyang Ye; Victor Chernozhukov; Angelo Ni; Edward Huang |
| Abstract: | We introduce Agentic Economic Modeling (AEM), a framework that aligns synthetic LLM choices with small-sample human evidence for reliable econometric inference. AEM first generates task-conditioned synthetic choices via LLMs, then learns a bias-correction mapping from task features and raw LLM choices to human-aligned choices, upon which standard econometric estimators perform inference to recover demand elasticities and treatment effects.We validate AEM in two experiments. In a large scale conjoint study with millions of observations, using only 10% of the original data to fit the correction model lowers the error of the demand-parameter estimates, while uncorrected LLM choices even increase the errors. In a regional field experiment, a mixture model calibrated on 10% of geographic regions estimates an out-of-domain treatment effect of -65\pm10 bps, closely matching the full human experiment (-60\pm8 bps).Under time-wise extrapolation, training with only day-one human data yields -24 bps (95% CI: [-26, -22], p |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.25743 |
| By: | Sarah Kühn (Paderborn University); Papatya Duman (Bielefeld University); Britta Hoyer (University of Tübingen); Thomas Streck (Paderborn University); Nadja Stroh-Maraun (Paderborn University) |
| Abstract: | Preferences are central to matching markets, yet experiments typically rely on induced preferences that may not reflect real-world decisionmaking. We examine how induced versus non-induced preferences shape behavior in matching experiments, extending Chen & Sönmez (2006). Using the most frequently used school choice mechanisms (Boston, Deferred Acceptance, and Top Trading Cycles), we supplement monetary incentives with participants’ own preferences. Our results show that preference induction systematically affects truthful reporting and comprehension of mechanisms. These findings underscore that experimental design choices matter for the validity of behavioral insights and have direct implications for policy evaluation. |
| Keywords: | Non-induced Preferences, Experiments, Matching, School Choice |
| JEL: | C78 D47 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pdn:ciepap:165 |
| By: | Balgova, Maria (Bank of England); Tekleselassie, Tsegay (affiliation not available); Hensel, Lukas (Peking University); Witte, Marc J. (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | Wage information is rare in job adverts, yet crucial for search. To study this information friction, we run a field experiment with real vacancies, randomly adding or withholding wage information. Disclosing wages does not change average application volumes. Instead, it amplifies the wage elasticity of applications: higher-wage vacancies receive more applicants, while lower-wage vacancies receive fewer. Average applicant quality remains unchanged, challenging standard directed search models. We rationalize the lack of skill-based sorting with two-sided limited information about applicants’ skills. We further show that firms’ decision not to post wages can act as insurance against unproductive matches. |
| Keywords: | vacancy posting, wage posting, information, field experiment, job search |
| JEL: | J31 J62 J63 C93 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18220 |
| By: | Van Campenhout, Bjorn; Abate, Gashaw T.; Colen, Liesbeth; Kramer, Berber |
| Abstract: | Free samples are a widely used strategy to introduce new products or technologies, offering prospective users the opportunity to gain firsthand experience and potentially facilitate diffusion through social networks. However, concerns remain that giving away products for free may reduce their perceived value, increasing the risk that recipients will underutilize, repurpose, or resell the product rather than use it for its intended purpose. We explore three mechanisms through which charging a positive price may increase uptake, intended use and subsequent adoption of a new technology: (1) a signaling effect, where a positive price conveys higher product quality; (2) a screening effect, whereby payment deters users who do not value the product and targets those more likely to use it; and (3) a sunk cost effect, where paying a positive price induces a psychological commitment to use. We test how these pricing mechanisms shape uptake, use, and subsequent adoption of recently released seed varieties of staple food crops, drawing on a field experiment with smallholder farmers in Uganda and Ethiopia. We find that willingness to pay is a reliable predictor of subsequent use of seed trial packs, pointing to the value of modest prices for targeting likely adopters. At the same time, sunk cost effects are context specific and often negative, suggesting that charging farmers can reduce their ability or willingness to experiment. These findings carry important implications for how pricing strategies can be designed to promote technology adoption in low-income settings. |
| Keywords: | technology adoption; prices; crops; seeds; costs; agricultural technology; Uganda; Ethiopia; Africa; Eastern Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa |
| Date: | 2025–10–24 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:ifprid:177343 |
| By: | Pietro Dall’Ara (University of Naples Federico II and CSEF) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the persuasion of a receiver who accesses information only if she exerts costly attention effort. A sender designs an experiment to persuade the receiver to take a specific action. The experiment affects the receiver’s attention effort, that is, the probability that she updates her beliefs. As an implication, persuasion has two margins: extensive (effort) and intensive (action). The receiver’s utility exhibits a supermodularity property in information and effort. By leveraging this property, we establish a general equivalence between experiments and persuasion mechanisms à la Kolotilin et al. (2017). In applications, the sender’s optimal strategy involves censoring favorable states. |
| Keywords: | persuasion, inattention, information acquisition; information design. |
| JEL: | D82 D83 D91 |
| Date: | 2025–10–27 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:766 |
| By: | Xuelin Yang; Licong Lin; Susan Athey; Michael I. Jordan; Guido W. Imbens |
| Abstract: | We develop new methods to integrate experimental and observational data in causal inference. While randomized controlled trials offer strong internal validity, they are often costly and therefore limited in sample size. Observational data, though cheaper and often with larger sample sizes, are prone to biases due to unmeasured confounders. To harness their complementary strengths, we propose a systematic framework that formulates causal estimation as an empirical risk minimization (ERM) problem. A full model containing the causal parameter is obtained by minimizing a weighted combination of experimental and observational losses--capturing the causal parameter's validity and the full model's fit, respectively. The weight is chosen through cross-validation on the causal parameter across experimental folds. Our experiments on real and synthetic data show the efficacy and reliability of our method. We also provide theoretical non-asymptotic error bounds. |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2511.00727 |
| By: | Miguel Almunia (Institute for Fiscal Studies); David Henning (Oxford University); Justine Knebelmann (Sciences Po); Dorothy Nakyambadde (Uganda Revenue Authority); Lin Tian (INSEAD) |
| Date: | 2025–10–30 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ifs:ifsewp:25/51 |
| By: | Sevgi \c{C}olak |
| Abstract: | This study analyzes whether subtle variations in the survey questionnaire phrasing influence participant engagement and whether these effects differ by gender. Building on theories of social pressure and politeness norms, it is hypothesized that presumptive phrasing would reduce engagement compared to appreciative phrasing and baseline phrasing (H1), and this effect would be more pronounced among women (H2). Mixed-effects regression models showed no significant treatment effects on any outcome and no evidence of gender moderation for 164 participants and 492 observations. The only robust finding was a small negative baseline sentiment across all participants, independent of any treatment or gender. The findings contribute to refining theoretical expectations about the conditions in which linguistic framing and gender norms shape behaviour. |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2511.01565 |
| By: | De Paola, Maria (University of Calabria); Ordine, Patrizia; Rose, Giuseppe (University of Calabria) |
| Abstract: | This study examines whether awareness of implicit gender-science stereotypes influences university enrollment in STEM fields. We designed a randomized controlled trial involving 566 Italian high school seniors, combining surveys with an Implicit Association Test to measure unconscious biases. Before students finalized their university enrollment, a treatment group received personalized feedback on their IAT scores, while a control group received no information. Results show that revealing implicit stereotypes significantly reshapes educational choices, but with sharply contrasting gender effects. For women—who initially exhibited stronger stereotypes—feedback increased the probability of enrolling in STEM majors. Conversely, men with strong stereotypes who received feedback became less likely to choose STEM fields. These results highlight that awareness of implicit biases can be a powerful yet double-edged tool for addressing gender gaps in STEM education. |
| Keywords: | randomized control trial, gender inequality, STEM Disciplines, gender stereotypes |
| JEL: | J16 I20 I24 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18226 |
| By: | Prati, Alberto; Saucet, Charlotte |
| Abstract: | In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in motivated memory as a psychological determinant of economic outcomes. According to motivated memory, people tend to better recall pleasant information because it serves their psychological needs. Another phenomenon, however, predicts the same pattern: According to mood congruence, pleasant information is easier to recall for individuals in nonnegative mood, regardless of any psychological needs. Since most people tend to have some need for self-esteem and to experience more positive than negative feelings during the day, the two phenomena predict similar outcomes in most ordinary situations, but not all. To test the predictive power of these two phenomena, we collect data from a laboratory experiment and from a nationally representative survey. We study how individuals in a temporarily induced negative mood (via a video clip) or those who report a low baseline mood (relative to the population) recall negative feedback. Our results meet the predictions of motivated memory: Individuals better recall positive than negative feedback, even when they are in negative mood. Motivated memory is not just a matter of mood. |
| Keywords: | experiment; feedback; mood congruence; motivated beliefs; motivated memory; selective recall |
| JEL: | J1 |
| Date: | 2025–10–20 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:129991 |
| By: | Arnav Sood; James Best |
| Abstract: | A sender persuades a strategically naive decisionmaker (DM) by committing privately to an experiment. Sender's choice of experiment is unknown to the DM, who must form her posterior beliefs nonparametrically by applying some learning rule to an IID sample of (state, message) realizations. We show that, given mild regularity conditions, the empirical payoff functions hypo-converge to the full-information counterpart. This is sufficient to ensure that payoffs and optimal signals converge to the Bayesian benchmark. For finite sample sizes, the force of this "sampling friction" is nonmonotonic: it can induce more informative experiments than the Bayesian benchmark in settings like the classic Prosecutor-Judge game, and less revelation even in situations with perfectly aligned preferences. For many problems with state-independent preferences, we show that there is an optimal finite sample size for the DM. Although the DM would always prefer a larger sample for a fixed experiment, this result holds because the sample size affects sender's choice of experiment. Our results are robust to imperfectly informative feedback and the choice of learning rule. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.25066 |
| By: | Friedson-Ridenour, Sophia; Chang, Wei; Ebrahim, Menaal Fatima; Jose, Anu; Bedi, Tara; King, Michael; Obbie, Musama; Samuyachi, Kahilu; Barrantes, Carla Z Glave; Garcia, Yenny Chavarria |
| Abstract: | School-related gender-based violence remains widespread in low- and middle-income countries, yet rigorous evidence on effective prevention strategies is limited. This study evaluates the Empowerment Pilot, a multi-component program designed to address school-related gender-based violence in Zambian secondary schools. Employing a mixed- methods approach, the study draws on quantitative data from a cluster randomized controlled trial involving more than 4, 467 students across 90 schools, alongside qualitative research. The findings show that violence is prevalent, gendered, and normalized in schools. Although the program increased student discussions about violence, it did not reduce overall levels of violence. Implementation challenges and limited diffusion beyond club participants further limited program impact. The study highlights significant institutional and cultural barriers to reducing school-related gender-based violence and underscores the need for comprehensive, schoolwide strategies that strengthen accountability and address underlying social norms perpetuating violence in resource-constrained contexts. |
| Date: | 2025–10–29 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:11245 |
| By: | Anahit Matinyan (Central Bank of Armenia); Ardash Kilejian (Central Bank of Armenia); Gevorg Minasyan (Central Bank of Armenia); Aleksandr Shirkhanyan (Central Bank of Armenia) |
| Abstract: | Central banks increasingly rely on communication to anchor inflation expectations, yet evidence from developing economies is limited. This paper uses a randomized survey experiment in Armenia to examine how central bank communication affects inflation perceptions and expectations. The experiment tests three treatments: actual inflation, the Central Bank of Armenia’s (CBA) 4 percent target, and an unrelated numerical cue. Information on actual inflation improves perceptions and expectations, aligning them with observed inflation, while the CBA’s target influences expectations indirectly through perceptions. In contrast, the irrelevant numerical cue has no effect, underscoring the role of context and informational relevance. Comparing results with similar survey data from Armenia’s high-inflation episode in 2023 shows that target communication is more effective when inflation is elevated. Taken together, these findings offer new evidence on the effectiveness of central bank communication, emphasizing the importance of informational relevance and its dependence on the prevailing inflationary environment. The paper also contributes to the literature by showing how personal inflation experiences – anchored in salient “marker products†– shape perceptions and expectations in a developing economy context. |
| Keywords: | Monetary Policy, Inflation Expectations, Inflation Perceptions, Central Bank Communication, Randomized Controlled Trial, Anchoring |
| JEL: | E31 E52 D84 C93 E58 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ara:wpaper:wp-2025-02 |
| By: | Eduard Br\"ull; Samuel M\"aurer; Davud Rostam-Afschar |
| Abstract: | We provide experimental evidence on how employers adjust expectations to automation risk in high-skill, white-collar work. Using a randomized information intervention among tax advisors in Germany, we show that firms systematically underestimate automatability. Information provision raises risk perceptions, especially for routine-intensive roles. Yet, it leaves short-run hiring plans unchanged. Instead, updated beliefs increase productivity and financial expectations with minor wage adjustments, implying within-firm inequality like limited rent-sharing. Employers also anticipate new tasks in legal tech, compliance, and AI interaction, and report higher training and adoption intentions. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.21959 |
| By: | Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt; Hans-Theo Normann; Jan-Niklas Tiede; Tobias Werner |
| Abstract: | Consumers often face products sold as lotteries rather than fixed outcomes. A prominent case is the loot box in video games, where players pay for randomized rewards. We investigate how presentation formats shape consumer beliefs and willingness to pay. In an online experiment with 802 participants, sellers could frame lotteries using two common manipulations: censoring outcome probabilities and selectively highlighting rare successes. More than 80\% of sellers adopted such deceptive frames, particularly when both manipulations were available. These choices substantially inflated buyer beliefs and increased willingness to pay of up to six times the expected value. Sellers anticipated this effect and raised prices accordingly. Our results show how deceptive framing systematically shifts consumer beliefs and enables firms to extract additional surplus. For marketing practice, this highlights the strategic value of framing tools in probabilistic selling models; for policy, it underscores the importance of transparency requirements in protecting consumers. |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2511.01597 |
| By: | Brüll, Eduard (ZEW); Mäurer, Samuel (University of Mannheim); Rostam-Afschar, Davud (University of Mannheim) |
| Abstract: | We provide experimental evidence on how employers adjust expectations to automation risk in high-skill, white-collar work. Using a randomized information intervention among tax advisors in Germany, we show that firms systematically underestimate automatability. Information provision raises risk perceptions, especially for routine-intensive roles. Yet, it leaves short-run hiring plans unchanged. Instead, updated beliefs increase productivity and financial expectations with minor wage adjustments, implying within-firm inequality like limited rent-sharing. Employers also anticipate new tasks in legal tech, compliance, and AI interaction, and report higher training and adoption intentions. |
| Keywords: | belief updating, firm expectations, technology adoption, innovation, technological change, automation, artificial intelligence, expertise, labor demand, white collar jobs, training |
| JEL: | J23 J24 D22 D84 O33 C93 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18225 |
| By: | Akinsete, Ebun; Velias, Alina; Papadaki, Lydia; Chatzilazarou, Lazaros-Antonios; Koundouri, Phoebe |
| Abstract: | The increasing pressure on global water supplies from overexploitation, drought, and pollution necessitates efficient and sustainable water management. Integrated water resource management strategies have shown effectiveness in decision support, but a deeper integration of economic and participative methodologies is needed. This research reviews the core characteristics and directions of experimental economics and living labs (LLs) and aims to address three research questions, namely, how the participatory, real-world environment of living laboratories can be incorporated into the controlled, hypothesis-driven nature of experimental economics; what is the significance of behavioral insights that are derived from experimental economics in the design and implementation of living labs; and how these two approaches can be merged under one framework. The focus of this review is the improvement of water resource management through collaborative and stakeholder-driven innovation. LLs provide authentic environments for cocreation, allowing scientists and stakeholders to address water-related issues such as supply, demand, and shortage. These environments connect controlled experimental conditions with real applications, providing comprehensive insights into behavioral reactions and policy formulation. LLs can enhance and be strengthened by economic methodologies, particularly in water valuation through integrated frameworks accounting for environmental externalities and opportunity costs. Finally, this article shows that integrating behavioral insights and experimental approaches within LLs improves the external validity of experimental economics by putting interventions in real-world settings. |
| Keywords: | behavioral microeconomics; field experiments; water resource management; water supply and demand; analysis of collective decision-making |
| JEL: | C92 C93 D70 D90 Q25 Q53 |
| Date: | 2025–10–31 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:129901 |
| By: | Zikai Li |
| Abstract: | To increase statistical efficiency in a randomized experiment, researchers often use stratification (i.e., blocking) in the design stage. However, conventional practices of stratification fail to exploit valuable information about the predictive relationship between covariates and potential outcomes. In this paper, I introduce an adaptive stratification procedure for increasing statistical efficiency when some information is available about the relationship between covariates and potential outcomes. I show that, in a paired design, researchers can rematch observations across different batches. For inference, I propose a stratified estimator that allows for nonparametric covariate adjustment. I then discuss the conditions under which researchers should expect gains in efficiency from stratification. I show that stratification complements rather than substitutes for regression adjustment, insuring against adjustment error even when researchers plan to use covariate adjustment. To evaluate the performance of the method relative to common alternatives, I conduct simulations using both synthetic data and more realistic data derived from a political science experiment. Results demonstrate that the gains in precision and efficiency can be substantial. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.22908 |
| By: | Sumit Goel; Yiqing Yan; Jeffrey Zeidel |
| Abstract: | We study the effect of interim feedback policies in a dynamic all-pay auction where two players bid over two stages to win a common-value prize. We show that sequential equilibrium outcomes are characterized by Cheapest Signal Equilibria, wherein stage 1 bids are such that one player bids zero while the other chooses a cheapest bid consistent with some signal. Equilibrium payoffs for both players are always zero, and the sum of expected total bids equals the value of the prize. We conduct an experiment with four natural feedback policy treatments -- full, rank, and two cutoff policies -- and while the bidding behavior deviates from equilibrium, we fail to reject the hypothesis of no treatment effect on total bids. Further, stage 1 bids induce sunk costs and head starts, and we test for the resulting sunk cost and discouragement effects in stage 2 bidding. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.23178 |
| By: | Volker Benndorf; Dorothea Kübler; Hans-Theo Normann |
| Abstract: | Information unraveling is an elegant theoretical argument suggesting that private information is voluntarily and fully revealed in many circumstances. However, the experimental literature has documented many cases of incomplete unraveling and has suggested limited depth of reasoning on the part of senders as a behavioral explanation. To test this explanation, we modify the design of existing unraveling games along two dimensions. In contrast to the baseline setting with simultaneous moves, we introduce a variant where decision-making is essentially sequential. Second, we vary the cost of disclosure, resulting in a 2x2 treatment design. Both sequential decision-making and low disclosure costs are suitable for reducing the demands on subjects' level-k reasoning. The data confirm that sequential decision-making and low disclosure costs lead to more disclosure, and there is virtually full disclosure in the treatment that combines both. A calibrated level-k model makes quantitative predictions, including precise treatment level and player-specific revelation rates, and these predictions organize the data well. The timing of decisions provides further insights into the treatment-specific unraveling process. |
| Keywords: | information revelation, level-k reasoning, sequential decisions, calibration |
| JEL: | C72 C90 C91 |
| Date: | 2025–10–20 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdp:dpaper:0078 |
| By: | Elliott Ash; Soumitra Shukla; Jason Sockin |
| Abstract: | Interviews allow employers to learn about workers, but do they also enable workers to learn about firms? Studying 500, 000 interview reports from Glassdoor, we find candidates for high-paying jobs are more likely to reject a job offer if they believe the interview was easy. Easy interviews appear to convey poor ``fit'' as those who accept offers after easy interviews are two-fifths of a standard deviation less satisfied with their jobs and 10 percent less likely to remain with their employer for at least one year. Analysis of interview narratives using large language models reveals difficult interviews signal colleague ability whereas easy interviews convey a nonselective process. In a small-scale randomized field experiment, an exogenous increase in difficulty elevated perceived difficulty and boosted applicant engagement with the vacancy. Interviews offer workers a preview of match quality, highlighting a channel through which labor markets may become less efficient if firms automate hiring with AI. |
| Keywords: | interviews, peer effects, job satisfaction, large language models |
| JEL: | J24 M50 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12229 |
| By: | Paul J. Christian; Felipe A. Dunsch; Jonas Heirman; Erin M. Kelley; Florence Kondylis; Gregory Lane; Jennifer Waidler; Nidhila Adusumalli; Odbayar Batmunkh; Kriti Malhotra |
| Abstract: | As increasingly frequent extreme weather events disrupt lives, institutions are turning to early-warning systems and advance preparation to accelerate aid delivery. We present evidence from a randomized controlled trial in Bangladesh and Nepal testing whether providing cash within days of a flood leads to greater benefits than delivering the same assistance months later—or if it simply shifts the timing of benefits without improving overall welfare. Results suggest that timely cash assistance leads to overall gains in food security and psychosocial well-being. This evidence supports efforts to forecast crises and release disaster relief quickly. |
| JEL: | O10 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34414 |
| By: | Christian, Paul J.; Dunsch, Felipe; Heirman, Jonas; Kelley, Erin; Kondylis, Florence; Lane, Gregory; Waidler, Jennifer; Adusumalli, Nidhila; Batmunkh, Odbayar; Malhotra, Kriti |
| Abstract: | As increasingly frequent extreme weather events disrupt lives, institutions are turning to early-warning systems and advance preparation to accelerate aid delivery. A randomized controlled trial in Bangladesh and Nepal tested whether providing cash within days of a flood leads to greater benefits than delivering the same assistance months later—or if it simply shifts the timing of benefits without improving overall welfare. The results suggest that timely cash assistance leads to overall gains in food security and psychosocial well-being. This evidence supports efforts to forecast crises and release disaster relief quickly. |
| Date: | 2025–10–29 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:11244 |
| By: | Ferrando, Mery (Tilburg University); Katzkowicz, Noemi (Universidad de la Republica); Le Barbanchon, Thomas (Bocconi University); Ubfal, Diego (World Bank) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides the first experimental evidence on the long-term effects of work-study programs, leveraging a randomized lottery design from a national program in Uruguay. Participation leads to a persistent 11 percent increase in formal labor earnings seven years after the program, driven by a 4 percent increase in the monthly probability of being employed and a 6 percent increase in monthly wages. Effects are significantly larger for men, while remaining positive for women. The program is highly cost-effective, outperforming most job training programs and reaching levels comparable to early childhood investments. |
| Keywords: | school-to-work transition, youth employment, work-study program, long-term effects |
| JEL: | I21 I26 J13 J24 J31 O15 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18238 |
| By: | Georgy Egorov; Sergei Guriev; Maxim Mironov; Ekaterina Zhuravskaya |
| Abstract: | Why do political campaigns so often yield unexpected results? We address this question by separately estimating the direct effect of a campaign on targeted voters and the indirect effect on others in the same social environment. Partnering with a local NGO during Argentina’s 2023 presidential election, we randomized the distribution of leaflets providing an expert assessment of the likely consequences of certain proposals by the outsider candidate Javier Milei. Exploiting Argentina’s unique sub-precinct election reporting system, we show that the campaign reduced Milei’s support among directly treated voters, as expected, but increased his support among untreated voters in treated precincts, producing a backfiring, net-positive effect for Milei. A pre-registered replication confirmed these opposite-signed effects. Using theory and a survey experiment, we show that the minority of voters who disbelieved the campaign were more motivated to discuss it with peers, convincing them to support Milei. This mobilization effect appears especially likely when campaigns criticize outsider candidates. Our results highlight how campaigns aimed at anti-elite candidates can unintentionally mobilize support for them. |
| JEL: | C93 D72 P00 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34430 |
| By: | Haoyi Zhang; Tianyi Zhu |
| Abstract: | This paper makes the opaque data market in the AI economy empirically legible for the first time, constructing a computational testbed to address a core epistemic failure: regulators governing a market defined by structural opacity, fragile price discovery, and brittle technical safeguards that have paralyzed traditional empirics and fragmented policy. The pipeline begins with multi-year fieldwork to extract the market's hidden logic, and then embeds these grounded behaviors into a high-fidelity ABM, parameterized via a novel LLM-based discrete-choice experiment that captures the preferences of unsurveyable populations. The pipeline is validated against reality, reproducing observed trade patterns. This policy laboratory delivers clear, counter-intuitive results. First, property-style relief is a false promise: ''anonymous-data'' carve-outs expand trade but ignore risk, causing aggregate welfare to collapse once external harms are priced in. Second, social welfare peaks when the downstream buyer internalizes the full substantive risk. This least-cost avoider approach induces efficient safeguards, simultaneously raising welfare and sustaining trade, and provides a robust empirical foundation for the legal drift toward two-sided reachability. The contribution is a reproducible pipeline designed to end the reliance on intuition. It converts qualitative insight into testable, comparative policy experiments, obsoleting armchair conjecture by replacing it with controlled evidence on how legal rules actually shift risk and surplus. This is the forward-looking engine that moves the field from competing intuitions to direct, computational analysis. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.26727 |
| By: | Johanna Arlinghaus; Théo Konc; Linus Mattauch; Stephan Sommer |
| Abstract: | Do citizens support policy instruments because they appreciate their effects or because they are convinced by their objectives? We administered a large-scale representative survey with randomised video treatments to test how different policy frames - time savings, health and environment - affect citizens' attitudes towards urban tolls in two large European metropolitan areas, Berlin-Brandenburg and Paris-Ile de France. Presenting urban tolls as a solution to air pollution increases support by up to 11.4 percentage points, presenting them as a climate change or congestion relief measure increases support by 7.1 and 6.5 percentage points, respectively. We demonstrate via a causal mediation analysis that the observed changes in policy support are mainly framing effects; changes in beliefs about policy effects play a secondary role. Thus, we uncover a new mechanism shaping public opinion on economic policies: the stated objectives of an identical policy design can shape citizens' views in distinct ways. |
| Keywords: | political |
| Date: | 2025–10–20 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdp:dpaper:0077 |
| By: | Priya Manwaring; Tanner Regan |
| Abstract: | Public disclosure of tax behavior is potentially promising for raising compliance in low-capacity states. This paper provides evidence on the social determinants of tax compliance through two cross-randomized experiments in Kampala, Uganda. We estimate effects of reporting delinquents and recognizing compliers. Compliance increases 17% for those subject to reporting but falls 16% for those promised recognition. Results support a model where being publicly known as tax-liable is costly but social sanctions for delinquency are limited. Further, disseminating tax behavior causes recipients to update compliance beliefs downward and reduces actual compliance by 20%. Overall, simple enforcement reminders raise more revenue. |
| Keywords: | property tax; tax morale; public disclosure; social image; Africa. |
| JEL: | H26 H30 D91 O18 |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gwc:wpaper:2025-010 |
| By: | Mariano Bosch (Inter American Development Bank); Guillermo Cruces (Universidad de San Andrés-CONICET, University of Nottingham); Stephanie González (CEDLAS-FCE-UNLP); María Teresa Silva-Porto (Inter American Development Bank) |
| Abstract: | In developing countries, informal labor is not only employed by illegal or unregistered firms but also by legal firms that hire workers informally, known as the intensive margin of labor informality. Reducing this type of work may have ambiguous effects on formal employment, depending on factors such as firm size and productivity. In collaboration with Peru’s labor inspection authority, we conducted a randomized mailing experiment targeting large firms with a high propensity for employing workers informally. The authority sent letters with either deterrence messages detailing fines for non-compliance or social norms messages highlighting the positive impacts of formality. We analyzed the impact of this intervention on formal employment levels over the following two years using monthly administrative data. The treated firms (particularly those in the deterrence treatment arm) and larger firms increased their formal employment levels. However, these increases followed a seasonal pattern coinciding with the high labor demand during the tourist season, suggesting that prior to the intervention, firms were employing temporary workers informally. The higher perceived cost of non-compliance led them to formalize some of these workers. The informal hiring of seasonal workers by these firms appears to have been motivated by basic tax evasion, and the absence of a negative effect on firm-level formal employment indicates that the firms were exploiting rents from low enforcement of regulations. |
| Keywords: | Randomized Controlled Trial, Social Security, Tax Audit, Tax Evasion, Mailing, Informality, Labor formalization |
| JEL: | C93 D91 H55 J46 O17 |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sad:wpaper:172 |
| By: | Florence Arestoff (Universit´e Paris-Dauphine, Universit´e PSL, LEDa, CNRS, IRD, [DIAL], 75016 Paris, France); Olivia Bertelli (Universit´e Paris-Dauphine, Universit´e PSL, LEDa, CNRS, IRD, [DIAL], 75016 Paris, France); Elodie Djemai (Universit´e Paris-Dauphine, Universit´e PSL, LEDa, CNRS, IRD, [DIAL], 75016 Paris, France); Dirgha Ghimire (University of Michigan, US; ISER-N, Nepal); Uttam Sharma (Institute for Social and Environmental Research, Nepal (ISER-N), Nepal) |
| Abstract: | This study assesses the impacts of a parental education community training on child development in Nepal. Relying on a sample of approximately 1, 000 households, we randomly vary the access to the intervention. A few months after the end of the intervention, children in the treatment group exhibit significantly higher scores on early childhood development indicators—both overall and across linguistic, motor, and cognitive domains. In turn, the intervention has no sizable effects on anthropometric outcomes. Mechanism analysis reveals that the program improves parental knowledge about child development and enhances the quality of parent-child interactions. |
| Keywords: | Early Childhood Development, Impact evaluation, Randomized Control Trial, Nepal |
| JEL: | I26 J13 O22 O53 |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dia:wpaper:dt202507 |
| By: | Albornoz, Facundo; Almeyda, Gonzalo; Lombardi, María; Oubiña, Victoria; Zoido, Pablo |
| Abstract: | We study the effect of a randomized one-on-one remote phone tutoring program implemented between 2021 and 2023. The intervention reached more than seven thousand students in seven Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay and Peru. The program targeted students with low initial learning levels and focused on foundational numeracy skills using a differentiated instruction approach. We find that assignment to tutoring increased student test scores by 0.2 SD. Tutoring benefited all students, with no differential effects by gender, age, socioeconomic status, or baseline scores. Students who initially reported having difficulty with concentration or memory experienced larger average effects. Finally, we find that students with lower initial performance exhibited larger improvements in more basic mathematical operations, whereas those with better performance at baseline saw larger gains in more complex operations. This underscores the importance of offering differentiated instruction based on students initial performance. |
| Keywords: | remote tutoring;Foundational skills;Differentiated instruction;learning outcomes;Educational disparities |
| JEL: | I20 I24 O15 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:idb:brikps:14342 |
| By: | Pau Juan-Bartroli; Jos\'e Ignacio Rivero-Wildemauwe |
| Abstract: | Rejections of positive offers in the Ultimatum Game have been attributed to different motivations. We show that a model combining social preferences and moral concerns provides a unifying explanation for these rejections while accounting for additional evidence. Under the preferences considered, a positive degree of spite is a necessary and sufficient condition for rejecting positive offers. This indicates that social preferences, rather than moral concerns, drive rejection behavior. This does not imply that moral concerns do not matter. We show that rejection thresholds increase with individuals' moral concerns, suggesting that morality acts as an amplifier of social preferences. Using data from van Leeuwen and Alger (2024), we estimate individuals' social preferences and moral concerns using a finite mixture approach. Consistent with previous evidence, we identify two types of individuals who reject positive offers in the Ultimatum Game, but that differ in their Dictator Game behavior. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.22086 |
| By: | Shuige Liu; Gabriel Ziegler |
| Abstract: | Interactive decision-making relies on strategic reasoning. Two prominent frameworks capture this idea. One follows a structural perspective, exemplified by level-k and Cognitive Hierarchy models, which represent reasoning as an algorithmic process. The other adopts an epistemic perspective, formalizing reasoning through beliefs and higher-order beliefs. We connect these approaches by "Lifting" static complete-information games into incomplete-information settings where payoff types reflect players' levels. Within this unified framework, reasoning is represented through mathematically explicit and transparent belief restrictions. We analyze three instances: downward rationalizability, a robust benchmark concept; and two refinements, L-rationalizability and CH-rationalizability, which provide epistemic foundations---albeit with a nuance---for the classic level-k and Cognitive Hierarchy models, respectively. Our results clarify how reasoning depth relates to behavioral predictions, distinguish cognitive limits from belief restrictions, and connect bounded reasoning to robustness principles from mechanism design. The framework thus offers a transparent and tractable bridge between structural and epistemic approaches to reasoning in games. |
| Keywords: | bounded reasoning, behavioral game theory, level-k, cognitive hierarchy, epistemic game theory, belief restrictions, Δ-rationalizability, robustness |
| JEL: | C72 D82 D83 D90 |
| Date: | 2025–10–20 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdp:dpaper:0079 |
| By: | Caroline Graf (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Faculty of Social Sciences, Netherlands); Andreas Pondorfer (TU Munich, TUM Campus Straubing for Biotechnology and Sustainablity & TUM School of Management, Germany); Jonathan Schulz (George Mason University, Economics, USA) |
| Abstract: | Gender differences in preferences play a crucial role in shaping economic outcomes. This study examines cross-societal variation in gender differences in honesty, testing whether they reflect innate traits or are shaped by social norms. Using global experimental and survey data, we find that gender differences in honesty emerge primarily in Western societies, where women report stronger honesty norms than men, while such differences are absent in non-Western societies. Additional evidence shows that gender differences in honesty norms are transmitted across generations and narrow as countries become wealthier. These patterns suggest that gender differences in honesty are better explained by socialization rather than innate traits. |
| Keywords: | honesty, gender differences, socialization |
| JEL: | C90 D91 Z10 |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aiw:wpaper:45 |
| By: | Seth Benzell; Kyle Myers |
| Abstract: | An increasingly large number of experiments study the labor productivity effects of automation technologies such as generative algorithms. A popular question in these experiments relates to inequality: does the technology increase output more for high- or low-skill workers? The answer is often used to anticipate the distributional effects of the technology as it continues to improve. In this paper, we formalize the theoretical content of this empirical test, focusing on automation experiments as commonly designed. Worker-level output depends on a task-level production function, and workers are heterogeneous in their task-level skills. Workers perform a task themselves, or they delegate it to the automation technology. The inequality effect of improved automation depends on the interaction of two factors: ($i$) the correlation in task-level skills across workers, and ($ii$) workers' skills relative to the technology's capability. Importantly, the sign of the inequality effect is often non-monotonic -- as technologies improve, inequality may decrease then increase, or vice versa. Finally, we use data and theory to highlight cases when skills are likely to be positively or negatively correlated. The model generally suggests that the diversity of automation technologies will play an important role in the evolution of inequality. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.24923 |
| By: | Daniel Ting; Kenneth Hung |
| Abstract: | As we exhaust methods that reduces variance without introducing bias, reducing variance in experiments often requires accepting some bias, using methods like winsorization or surrogate metrics. While this bias-variance tradeoff can be optimized for individual experiments, bias may accumulate over time, raising concerns for long-term optimization. We analyze whether bias is ever acceptable when it can accumulate, and show that a bias-variance tradeoff persists in long-term settings. Improving signal-to-noise remains beneficial, even if it introduces bias. This implies we should shift from thinking there is a single ``correct'', unbiased metric to thinking about how to make the best estimates and decisions when better precision can be achieved at the expense of bias. Furthermore, our model adds nuance to previous findings that suggest less stringent launch criterion leads to improved gains. We show while this is beneficial when the system is far from the optimum, more stringent launch criterion is preferable as the system matures. |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2511.02792 |
| By: | Duaa Abdullah; Jasem Hamoud |
| Abstract: | In this paper we provide a good overview of the problems and the background of mathematics education in Syrian schools. We aimed to study the effect of using popular mathematical puzzles on the mathematical thinking of schoolchildren, by conducting a paired experimental study (pre-test and post-test control group design) of the data we obtained through a sample taken from students of sixth-grade primary school students in Syria the Lady Mary School in Syria, in order to evaluate the extent of the impact of popular mathematical puzzles on students' ability to solve problems and mathematical skills, and then the skills were measured and the results were analyzed using a t-test as a tool for statistical analysis. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.26263 |