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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Sebastian Riedmiller (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn) |
| Abstract: | Financial student aid improves educational outcomes and reduces social inequality, yet many eligible students do not take it up. To examine whether correcting misperceptions increases take-up, I conducted an RCT with 6, 225 university students across Germany who were not receiving aid. I find that 63% of students systematically underestimate the financial benefits and overestimate repayment obligations of student aid, and 86% misperceive their eligibility. Providing combined information about the program conditions and individual eligibility significantly corrected misperceptions after six months and increased take-up by 46% after one year. This increase is particularly strong among disadvantaged students. After take-up, students report higher available income while reducing earnings and parental support. These findings suggest that correcting misperceptions can reduce social inequality by alleviating financial constraints among disadvantaged students and their parents. |
| Keywords: | student aid, misperceptions, field experiment, social inequality, BAföG |
| JEL: | C93 D14 D83 D90 H52 I22 |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2025_11 |
| By: | Pugatch, Todd; Schroeder, Elizabeth |
| Abstract: | Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) have become an essential tool for economists. The credibility revolution in empirical economics emphasizes research designs that identify casual effects, and random assignment of treatment is seen as the gold standard. Implementation can, however, be a challenge in many applications. The field of economic education is in a unique position to learn from RCTs, given the ability to test interventions in the classroom or at educational institutions. We discuss what is needed to run an RCT effectively in an educational setting, drawing from the experimental literature on topics such as student success in higher education and diversity in undergraduate economics. We additionally outline quasi-experimental approaches that can be used when treatment cannot be randomized. |
| Keywords: | randomized controlled trial, economics of education, higher education |
| JEL: | I21 I23 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:1633 |
| By: | Xiaoyue Shan; Ulf Zoelitz; Uschi Backes-Gellner |
| Abstract: | We study the impact of online instruction with a field experiment that randomly assigns 1, 344 university students to different proportions of online and in-person lectures in multiple introductory courses. Increased online instruction leaves men's exam performance unaffected but significantly lowers women's performance, particularly in math-intensive courses. Online instruction also reduces women's longer-run performance and increases their study dropout. Exploring mechanisms, we find that women exposed to more online lectures report greater difficulty in connecting with peers, less engaging instructors, and lower course satisfaction. Our findings suggest that shifting toward more online instruction may disproportionally harm women. |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iso:educat:0245 |
| By: | Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt; Vincent Eulenberg; Christoph Feldhaus; Jonas Frey; Kevin Breuer; Ben Bruske; Flynn Fehre; Penelope Hoffmann; Cederik Höfs; Nico Klocke; Lucas Schnack; Florian Strunk; Moritz Thiele; Annika Walter; Julia Weinberg; Konstantin Zörner |
| Abstract: | In social dilemmas, cooperation failures often arise due to the absence of mechanisms that prevent free-riding and enhance cooperation. Given the critical role these mechanisms play in sustaining cooperation, why are they so frequently missing? To explore this, we conducted an online experiment testing whether individuals choose to implement such cooperation-inducing mechanisms and why they might refrain from doing so. Participants were introduced to the rules of two public goods games, one of which includes a cooperation-inducing mechanism, while the other does not. Regarding the likelihood of successful cooperation, we found that participants were overly optimistic in the absence of the mechanism and overly pessimistic in its presence. As a result, a majority of subjects preferred the game without the cooperation-inducing mechanism. However, when we corrected participants' beliefs about the actual payoffs obtained in the two games, a majority shifted their preference toward the game with the cooperation-inducing mechanisms in place. |
| Keywords: | free riding, equilibrium effects, misspecified beliefs, spectator design |
| JEL: | D90 D01 C91 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11999 |
| By: | Fiala, Lenka; Fitzgerald, Jack; Kujansuu, Essi; Mikola, Derek; Valenta, David; Aparicio, Juan P.; Wiebe, Michael; Webb, Matthew D.; Brodeur, Abel |
| Abstract: | Wang et al. (2024) report that Bangladeshi students randomly given access to lessons on a phone server saw significant learning gains during COVID- 19 school closures. We identify three sets of anomalies. First, this experiment shares participants with another experiment conducted simultaneously in the same region, but test scores for the same children systematically differ between the two experiments. Second, test scores for treated participants exhibit a uniform upward shift that is completely insensitive to the number of lessons children complete. Third, numerous documentation inconsistencies (e.g., concerning survey materials, randomization procedures, etc.) cast doubt on the study's data. |
| Keywords: | Reproduction, school closures, remote education, COVID-19, randomized controlled trial, Bangladesh |
| JEL: | B41 C12 C93 I21 I24 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:i4rdps:241 |
| By: | Maria Bigoni (University of Bologna, CEPR, and IZA); Michela Boldrini (Bocconi University, IGIER, and RFF-CMCC EIEE); Niccolò Lomys (CSEF and Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II); Emanuele Tarantino (Luiss University, EIEF, European Commission and CEPR) |
| Abstract: | When faced with unfamiliar options, people often rely on the choices of others. We examine how this reliance affects search decisions through a laboratory experiment. Participants choose between two options whose value can only be discovered through costly sequential searches. Some search in isolation; others first observe the final choice, but not the search process, of a peer. This form of social information improves efficiency, yet behavior systematically departs from theory. When selecting which option to sample first, imitation of the peer’s choice is frequent but not universal; moreover, participants often deviate from the optimal stopping rule, with both under and over-search observed. We introduce treatments that allow participants to choose whom to observe and access signals about the reliability of their peers: these interventions increase imitation and improve welfare. Our findings underscore the role of institutional design in facilitating social search, with implications for platform architecture and information diffusion. |
| Keywords: | Sequential Search; Social Information; Institutional Design. |
| JEL: | D8 C9 D1 |
| Date: | 2025–07–20 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:755 |
| By: | Gary Charness; Ramon Cobo-Reyes; Nicola Lacetera; Juan A. Lacomba; Francisco Lagos; Mario Macis; Juliette Milgram-Baleix; María José Ruiz-Martos |
| Abstract: | We conducted a large-scale field experiment in Granada, Spain, to assess the motivating effect on blood donation of matching each attempt to donate with a charitable contribution pledge for children in developing countries. The intervention involved 344 blood drives and 21, 888 participants. Compared to a control condition with no pledges, the pro-social incentives significantly increased blood donation rates by approximately 5% on average. Offering a day or a week’s worth of food for vulnerable populations led to the largest and most robust increases in donations, and repeated exposure to incentives had a reinforcing effect on subsequent donation behavior, especially for individuals who previously donated when incentivized. An auxiliary survey examining the perceived importance and motivational impact of food-related incentives corroborates our findings. Our results suggest that coordination between blood donation campaigns and humanitarian aid programs could enhance the blood supply at minimal additional cost. More broadly, policymakers and nonprofit organizations can align global and local altruism by linking humanitarian assistance with initiatives promoting civic engagement and public health. |
| JEL: | C93 D90 I12 |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34038 |
| By: | Elisa Stumpf (Friedrich Schiller University Jena); Silke Uebelmesser (Friedrich Schiller University Jena, CESifo) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates preferences for wealth redistribution through a conjoint experiment. Specifically, we explore how support for wealth redistribution depends on the social background of the taxpayer and whether their wealth is perceived as resulting from luck or hard work. Our findings reveal significantly more support for taxing individuals from rich families, an effect that is particularly pronounced among relatively poor participants and those with low trust in official statistics. Attributing wealth to luck rather than effort also increases support for taxation, though this effect is less substantial than the influence of a privileged background. When individuals are both from a wealthy family and being perceived as lucky, the combined effect on support for taxation is only marginally larger than either factor alone. |
| Keywords: | wealth inequality, preferences for redistribution, wealth tax, conjoint experiment |
| JEL: | C90 D31 D63 |
| Date: | 2025–08–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2025-0008 |
| By: | McKenzie, David |
| Abstract: | This paper offers practical advice on how to improve statistical power in randomized experiments through choices and actions researchers can take at the design, implementation, and analysis stages. At the design stage, the choice of estimand, choice of treatment, and decisions that affect the residual variance and intra-cluster correlation can all affect power for a given sample size. At the implementation stage, researchers can boost power through increasing compliance with treatment, reducing attrition, and improving outcome measurement. At the analysis stage, power can be increased through using different test statistics or estimands, through the choice of control variables, and through incorporating informative priors in a Bayesian analysis. A key message is that it does not make sense to talk of “the” power of an experiment. A study can be well-powered for one outcome or estimand, but not others, and a fixed sample size can yield very different levels of power depending on researcher decisions. |
| Date: | 2025–07–21 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:11176 |
| By: | Soetevent, Adriaan; Stangenberg, Lennart (University of Groningen) |
| Abstract: | Individual consumption often creates negative group externalities, the cost of which accumulate over time. Technological progress may reduce the future abatement cost. We show that the mere prospect of such progress has a pernicious effect on a group’s ability to coordinate on actions that are individually and socially optimal. Our 2x2 experimental design extends the game in Walker et al. (2000) to a multi-period setting with a voting stage. We introduce treatment variation in the possibility of exogenous reductions in the abatement cost and in how group members divide the accrued cost: equally or in proportion to each person’s consumption share.We find that, independent of which cost-sharing mechanism is in place, introducing the chance of technological progress reduces social welfare because less participants vote for settlement in the present: The hope for technological breakthroughs causes costly inaction. |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gro:rugfeb:2024003-eef |
| By: | Romensen, Gert-Jan; Soetevent, Adriaan (University of Groningen) |
| Abstract: | An often-voiced concern with relative performance feedback is that it may not improve workplace productivity if workers become demotivated and see no way to improve. Targeting feedback at specific productivity measures over which workers have direct control may in such cases prevent demotivation and focus attention. Does targeting improve worker productivity? We partner with a large bus company and experimentally vary the nature and number of peer-comparison messages which 409 bus drivers receive in their monthly feedback report. Messages are targeted at concrete driving behaviors and aimed at improving comfort and fuel efficiency. Using over 800, 000 trip-level observations, we find that these targeted peercomparison messages do not improve aggregate (fuel economy) or disaggregate measures (such as acceleration) of driving behavior. Further analyses also reveal no temporal orheterogeneous effects of the targeted messages. |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gro:rugfeb:2025006-eef |
| By: | Bradley J. Ruffle; William B. Zhang |
| Abstract: | Social dilemmas with a shared resource pool and privately observed entitlements are susceptible to overclaiming. A dishonest claim that exceeds one’s true entitlement imposes a negative externality on others. To explore such social dilemmas, we introduce a novel four-player game where each player rolls a die in private and earns their die report, subject to budget availability. We vary the timing of players’ reporting (simultaneous vs sequential moves) and the available budget (limited vs excess). When resources are limited, mean reports do not differ significantly between simultaneous and sequential treatments. However, simultaneous reporting promotes greater equity under scarcity and reduces dishonesty when resources are plentiful. Frequent displays of virtue signaling take place whereby Player 4 chooses to earn zero by reporting more than the remaining budget. Our results demonstrate that these social dilemmas can be better managed by promoting simultaneous reporting structures, which obscure in formation about individual claims. |
| Keywords: | experimental economics; cheating externalities; budget constraint; virtue signaling |
| JEL: | C90 D91 H80 |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2025-05 |
| By: | Aparicio, Juan P.; Cook, Nikolai; Mikola, Derek; Rogeberg, Ole; Valenta, David; Wiebe, Michael; Bonander, Carl; Brodeur, Abel |
| Abstract: | Hassan et al. (2024) describe a randomized controlled trial conducted in Bangladesh during COVID-19. This comment identifies data irregularities from the original paper's replication package and notes its connection to other published papers. Critically, Hassan et al. (2024) andWang et al. (2024) have 132 individuals matched on CHILD_ID, VILLAGE_ID, and FAMILY_ID in both studies, suggesting contamination of the educational interventions of both studies. Although the endline tests were identical and occurred within weeks of each other, some individual scores and item responses vary considerably, while others have identical answers across all questions. Importantly, the sample that is both control in Hassan et al. (2024) and treated in Wang et al. (2024) appear to systematically score higher in the data of Wang et al. (2024). A statistical comparison of endline data across studies also reveals concerning discrepancies where anomalies in response patterns and total questions answered correctly are consistent with potential data integrity issues. Furthermore, we find that being assigned to treatment in Guo et al. (2024) has large, statistically significant effects in the opposite direction when using educational outcomes in Hassan et al. (2024). We further raise concerns about the connections to other studies, timeline inconsistencies and inexplicable changes of respondent demographics and reported grades. |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:i4rdps:240 |
| By: | Chiara Farronato; Andrey Fradkin; Tesary Lin |
| Abstract: | We study the welfare consequences of choice architecture for online privacy using a field experiment that randomizes cookie consent banners. We study three ways in which firms or policymakers can influence choices: (1) nudging users through banner design to encourage acceptance of cookie tracking; (2) setting defaults when users dismiss banners; and (3) implementing consent decisions at the website versus browser level. Absent design manipulation, users accept all cookies more than half of the time. Placing cookie options behind extra clicks strongly influences choices, shifting users toward more easily accessible alternatives. Many users dismiss banners without making an explicit choice, underscoring the importance of default settings. Survey evidence further reveals substantial confusion about default settings. Using a structural model, we find that among consent policies requiring site-specific decisions, consumer surplus is maximized when consent interfaces clearly display all options and default to acceptance in the absence of an explicit choice. However, the welfare gains from optimizing banner design are much smaller than those from adopting browser-level consent, which eliminates the time costs of repeated decisions. |
| JEL: | C93 D18 D83 D91 K20 L51 L86 |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34025 |
| By: | Edmundo Molina-Perez (School of Government and Public Transformation, Tecnológico de Monterrey); Pedro Cortes (Tecnológico de Monterrey); Isaac Molina (Tecnológico de Monterrey); Fernanda Sobrino (Tecnológico de Monterrey); Mario Tellez (Tecnológico de Monterrey); Yessica Orozco (Tecnológico de Monterrey); Mitzi Castellón (Tecnológico de Monterrey); Steven Popper (Tecnológico de Monterrey); Luis Serra (Tecnológico de Monterrey) |
| Abstract: | Decision-making is a multifaceted cognitive process influenced by task complexity, information availability, individual cognitive strategies, and environmental settings. Yet, the neural mechanisms guiding everyday choices remain incompletely understood. This gap intensifies when integrating real-time aids, such as artificial intelligence tools (AIT), as cognitive decisionsupport especially for complex and ambiguous problems. This study explores the neural mechanisms of decision-making and examines how AIT influences these processes. Combining behavioral assessments and neurophysiological measurements, we investigate the dynamic interplay between human cognition and AIT through behavioral execution and electroencephalogram (EEG) activity. Experimental data from 54 participants suggest that in low-complexity decision-making, AIT is largely ignored in favor of heuristics. In high-complexity contexts, AIT positively influences decision-making outcomes while also increasing capacity for engagement with a challenging task as registered by EEG cortical activity. This suggests a non-linear effect of AIT in decision-making strategies highlighting its role as a complement to —rather than a replacement of—human cognitive processes. |
| Keywords: | artificial intelligence, decision-making, EEG, neuroeconomics, cognitive support tools |
| JEL: | C91 D83 D89 |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gnt:wpaper:8 |
| By: | Robin Musolff (University of Bonn, IZA); Florian Zimmermann (University of Bonn, IZA & Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods) |
| Abstract: | Mental models help people navigate complex environments. This paper studies how people deal with model uncertainty. In an experiment, participants estimate a company’s value, facing uncertainty about which one of two models correctly determines its true value. Using a between-subjects design, we vary the degree of model complexity. Results show that in high-complexity conditions people fully neglect model uncertainty in their actions. However, their beliefs continue to reflect model uncertainty. This disconnect between beliefs and actions suggests that complexity leads to biased decision-making, while beliefs remain more nuanced. Furthermore, we show that complexity, via full uncertainty neglect, leads to higher confidence in the optimality of own actions. |
| Keywords: | Mental Models, Beliefs, Attention, Confidence, Representations |
| JEL: | D01 D83 |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:369 |
| By: | M. Trabandt (Audencia Business School); W. Lasarov (Audencia Business School); R. Mai; S. Hoffmann |
| Abstract: | Access-based consumption, such as car sharing or ride-hailing, is often promoted as a more sustainable alternative to ownership-based models, combining both society-related (e.g., sustainability) and self-related (e.g., cost savings) benefits. However, this promise of sustainability can backfire when consumers substitute lower-emission alternatives—such as biking or public transportation—with access-based services, a phenomenon we define as overconsumption. Across two laboratory experiments (n = 351; n = 388) and a field study (n = 167) in different mobility contexts, we demonstrate that communication strategies activating both self-related and society-related benefits—although effective in increasing participation—can unintentionally foster overconsumption. In contrast, activating society-related benefits alone significantly curbs this effect. We identify self-enhancement as the central underlying mechanism driving these effects in a dual role. While self-enhancement increases both participation and overconsumption, its impact is contingent on consumers' environmental identity. Specifically, self-enhancement promotes sustainable participation among individuals with higher environmental identity but encourages overconsumption among those with lower environmental identity. Our findings offer actionable insights for marketers, policymakers, and nonprofits by outlining communication strategies that maximize engagement while minimizing environmental harm in the promotion of access-based consumption. |
| Keywords: | access-based consumption environmental identity overconsumption self-enhancement self-related benefits sharing society-related benefits |
| Date: | 2025–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05145211 |
| By: | Maria Bigoni (University of Bologna); Gabriele Camera (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University); Edoardo Gallo (University of Cambridge) |
| Abstract: | Globalization offers unparalleled opportunities to expand welfare through cooperation across large networks of unrelated individuals. Social exclusion – permanent or temporary – and monetary exchange are institutions that in theory can incentivize cooperation. In an experiment, we evaluate their relative performance and interaction in anonymous networks of different sizes. Permanent social exclusion (ostracism) reduces long-run economic potential by leading to sparse networks. Monetary exchange and temporary social exclusion perform similarly well in small networks. In large networks, however, monetary exchange is the only institution that promotes full cooperation by crowding out ostracism and keeping the network complete. An insight is that monetary systems outperform social exclusion mechanisms in promoting cooperation in globalized social and economic networks. |
| Keywords: | cooperation, experiment, money, network, social exclusion |
| JEL: | C92 E40 D85 C73 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:25-06 |
| By: | Victor Klockmann (JMU - Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg = University of Würzburg [Würsburg, Germany], Goethe University Frankfurt = Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Max Planck Institute for Human Development - Max-Planck-Gesellschaft); Alicia von Schenk (JMU - Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg = University of Würzburg [Würsburg, Germany], Goethe University Frankfurt = Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Max Planck Institute for Human Development - Max-Planck-Gesellschaft); Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - EM - EMLyon Business School - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | In the field of machine learning, the decisions of algorithms depend on extensive training data contributed by numerous, often human, sources. How does this property affect the social nature of human decisions that serve to train these algorithms? By experimentally manipulating the pivotality of individual decisions for a supervised machine learning algorithm, we show that the diffusion of responsibility weakened revealed social preferences, leading to algorithmic models favoring selfish decisions. Importantly, this phenomenon cannot be attributed to shifts in incentive structures or the presence of externalities. Rather, our results suggest that the expansive nature of Big Data fosters a sense of diminished responsibility and serves as an excuse for selfish behavior that impacts individuals and the whole society. |
| Keywords: | Artificial intelligence, Big data, Pivotality, Distributional fairness, Experiment |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05165240 |
| By: | Bigoni, M.; Camera, G.; Gallo, E. |
| Abstract: | Globalization offers unparalleled opportunities to expand welfare through cooperation across large networks of unrelated individuals. Social exclusion – permanent or temporary – and monetary exchange are institutions that in theory can incentivize cooperation. In an experiment, we evaluate their relative performance and interaction in anonymous networks of different sizes. Permanent social exclusion (ostracism) reduces long-run economic potential by leading to sparse networks. Monetary exchange and temporary social exclusion perform similarly well in small networks. In large networks, however, monetary exchange is the only institution that promotes full cooperation by crowding out ostracism and keeping the network complete. An insight is that monetary systems outperform social exclusion mechanisms in promoting cooperation in globalized social and economic networks. |
| Keywords: | Cooperation, Experiment, Money, Network, Social Exclusion |
| JEL: | C92 E40 D85 C73 |
| Date: | 2025–07–23 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camjip:2519 |
| By: | Bigoni, M.; Camera, G.; Gallo, E. |
| Abstract: | Globalization offers unparalleled opportunities to expand welfare through cooperation across large networks of unrelated individuals. Social exclusion – permanent or temporary – and monetary exchange are institutions that in theory can incentivize cooperation. In an experiment, we evaluate their relative performance and interaction in anonymous networks of different sizes. Permanent social exclusion (ostracism) reduces long-run economic potential by leading to sparse networks. Monetary exchange and temporary social exclusion perform similarly well in small networks. In large networks, however, monetary exchange is the only institution that promotes full cooperation by crowding out ostracism and keeping the network complete. An insight is that monetary systems outperform social exclusion mechanisms in promoting cooperation in globalized social and economic networks. |
| Keywords: | Cooperation, Experiment, Money, Network, Social Exclusion |
| JEL: | C92 E40 D85 C73 |
| Date: | 2025–07–23 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:2550 |
| By: | Barinas-Forero, Andrés Felipe; Scartascini, Carlos |
| Abstract: | While the literature extensively explores the structural enablers of corruption and its adverse effects on economic performance, less is known about how the state of the economy influences corruption and political accountability. To address this gap, we develop a theoretical model in which politicians may divert resources from public goods and citizens can respond by punishing corruption. In our model, periods of positive economic conditions increase corruption while weakening accountability. We validate these predictions through a laboratory experiment, finding that corruption rates significantly rise when economic conditions are good. However, citizens' willingness to punish corrupt politicians remains stable across the business cycle. Punishment decisions are driven by observed public good allocations; low allocations prompt significantly higher punishment rates than high allocations, even resulting in the punishment of honest politicians during bad economic times. Additionally, we assess the role of corruption expectations in shaping responses: citizens with prior beliefs that politicians are corrupt are less likely to punish than those who believe politicians are honest when public good provision is low. Accountability becomes more challenging when citizens struggle to clearly identify corruption, and citizens are more forgiving of corruption during good economic times and if they already mistrust politicians. These findings underscore the importance of robust transparency and accountability mechanisms in upholding governance standards, particularly in the face of economic fluctuations and public mistrust. |
| Keywords: | Rent Seeking;Economic Booms;corruption;Punishment;Laboratory Experiment;Downturns |
| JEL: | D72 D73 H41 C91 |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:idb:brikps:14179 |
| By: | Harrs, Sören; Sterba, Maj-Britt |
| Abstract: | This paper establishes three novel findings on fairness and redistribution by combining theory-driven experimental games with large-scale surveys in the U.S. and five European countries. First, individuals revealing egalitarian, libertarian, or meritocratic fairness preferences in experimental games show large differences in support for tax and transfer policies. Second, beliefs in merit strongly predict policy support among meritocrats, but are less predictive among non-meritocrats. Third, fairness concerns matter across income groups and political camps. Our findings challenge the assumptions that meritocratic preferences are homogeneous, that fairness is a luxury good, and that fairness is mainly a moral foundation of left voters. |
| Keywords: | Fairness, Redistribution, Political Ideology, Moral Foundations |
| JEL: | D31 D63 H24 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cexwps:323221 |
| By: | Francesco Berlingieri (European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC); Global Labor Organization (GLO)); Béatrice d’Hombres (European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC)); Matija Kovacic (European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC); Ca’ Foscari University of Venice; Global Labor Organization (GLO)) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores the relationship between loneliness, trust, and populist voting across both extremes of the ideological spectrum. The contribution of this research is mainly two-fold. First, it considers different dimensions of loneliness and accounts for its predetermined component stemming from social isolation in childhood and adverse childhood experiences. Second, it disentangles the effects of loneliness and trust by incorporating actual trust behaviour from a large-scale trust game experiment conducted in 27 European member states, involving more than 25, 000 individuals. The richness of the data allows to account for and disentangle the impact of competitive explanatory factors such as emotions, objective social isolation, social media use and economic preferences. The main findings suggest the following: (i) social loneliness significantly impacts populist voting, particularly on the extreme right, whereas the emotional dimension of loneliness is associated with more left-leaning, but non-populist, voting preferences; (ii) higher levels of actual trust are associated with lower support for right-wing populist parties; (iii) loneliness and trust operate through distinct channels: loneliness exerts a greater impact on women and older individuals, while trust plays a more significant role among men and middle-aged individuals, and (iv) the effect of social loneliness on support of populist parties is significantly attenuated in contexts with a history of recurrent economic crises, suggesting a potential experience-based learning mechanism. |
| Keywords: | Loneliness, interpersonal trust, political polarisation, populism |
| JEL: | D72 D91 P00 C91 Z13 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ven:wpaper:2025:11 |
| By: | Okan Akarsu; Emrehan Aktug; Kubra Yildiz Ozertas; Huzeyfe Torun |
| Abstract: | [EN] In this study, using a randomized controlled trial (RCT), we generate exogenous variation in firms’expectations in Türkiye through providing them with publicly available information regardinginflation forecasts of several parties and official inflation target. Next, we examine how the reminderof already available information influences their inflation expectations and how exogenously shapedinflation expectations affect firm outcomes. Our findings reveal that information regarding theforecasts of professionals, central bank short- and long-term forecasts, and the official inflationtarget of the CBRT reduces the inflation expectations of firms compared to non-treated ones.Findings also suggest that firms with lower inflation expectations exhibit greater optimism aboutboth the broader economy and their own prospects, while higher expectations are associated withweaker anticipated outcomes. This highlights how inflation expectations influence firms' economicsentiment, with higher expectations linked to concerns about weaker activity. Although the effects ofthe treatments diminish over time, these results underscore the potential of targeted informationdissemination in shaping expectations and improving economic sentiment. [TR] Bu calisma, firmalara kamuya acik bilgiler saglamanin yuksek enflasyon ortaminda enflasyon beklentilerini ve ekonomik gorunumlerini nasil etkiledigini incelemektedir. Turkiye'de gerceklestirilen bir randomize kontrollu deney (RCT) ile firmalarin beklentilerinde dissal bir degisim yaratilmistir. Bulgularimiz, bilgi mudahalelerinin enflasyon beklentilerini onemli olcude azalttigini ve gecmis enflasyon, merkez bankasinin kisa ve uzun vadeli tahminleri ile resmi enflasyon hedefinin guclu sabitleyici etkiler gosterdigini ortaya koymaktadir. Bulgular ayrica, daha dusuk enflasyon beklentisine sahip firmalarin hem genel ekonomi hem de kendi gelecekleri konusunda daha iyimser oldugunu, daha yuksek beklentilere sahip firmalarin ise daha zayif sonuclar ongordugunu gostermektedir. Bu durum, enflasyon beklentilerinin firmalarin ekonomik algilarini nasil etkiledigini, yuksek beklentilerin daha zayif ekonomik aktiviteye dair endiselerle baglantili oldugunu ortaya koymaktadir. Bilgi paylasiminin etkileri zamanla azalmakla birlikte, bu sonuclar, hedefe yonelik bilgi yayiliminin beklentilerin sekillendirilmesinde ve ekonomik guvenin iyilestirilmesinde onemli bir potansiyel tasidigini vurgulamaktadir. |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tcb:econot:2514 |
| By: | Heijmans, Roweno; Suetens, Sigrid (University of Groningen) |
| Abstract: | We use experiments to systematically test the performance of subsidies aimed atinducing efficient coordination in a coordination game. We consider two classesof policies: those based on divide-and-conquer (i.e. iterated dominance) and thosemaking the efficient Nash equilibrium of the game risk dominant. Cost-efficientpolicies from both classes are equally expensive but differ in the distribution ofsubsidies among agents. Our results show that risk dominance subsidies increasecoordination more effectively or at a lower cost than divide-and-conquer subsidies. |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gro:rugfeb:2025004-eef |
| By: | Peter Haan; Chen Sun; Felix Weinhardt; Georg Weizsäcker |
| Abstract: | Different methods of eliciting long-run expectations yield data that predict economic choices differently well. We ask members of a wide population sample to make a 10-year investment decision and to forecast stock market returns in one of two formats: they either predict the average of annual growth rates over the next 10 years, or they predict the total, cumulative growth that occurs over the 10-year period. Results show that total 10- year forecasts are more pessimistic than average annual forecasts, but they better predict experimental portfolio choices and real-world stock market participation. |
| Keywords: | Household finance, long-run predictions, survey experiments |
| JEL: | D01 D14 D84 D9 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp2130 |
| By: | Turkoglu, Oguzhan; Firestone, Berenike; Čehajić-Clancy, Sabina; Ditlmann, Ruth K. |
| Abstract: | Informing people about historical atrocities and injustice is considered critical for sustaining democracies and preventing similar atrocities in the future. Yet, what remains unknown is whether exposure to factual information about ingroups' historical injustices, such as genocide, slavery, or colonial crimes, leads to increased willingness to address those injustices? In the first study to systematically assess the impact of such exposure in five countries (Canada, France, Germany, Spain, United States), using large samples (n> 1500 per country) and a comprehensive battery of outcomes, we find limited impact of exposure to factual information. Participants in the experimental condition reported increased acknowledgment of the injustice and intentions to dismantle it in some but not all countries. Across all countries, we find that exposure led to self-reported learning, which predicted all measured outcomes. These findings suggest that whilst factual information is important, other ingredients are needed to facilitate broader dismantling of past injustice. |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbtod:323590 |
| By: | Amelia Ahles; Joanna Lahey; Marco A. Palma |
| Abstract: | This study investigates the effectiveness of donation matching gift schemes using lotteries for increasing charitable giving relative to deterministic matches of equivalent or higher expected value and a no-match control. We recruit 1, 402 online participants and randomly assign them to one of seven conditions: No Match (Control), and two sets of matching schemes of varying equivalent expected values: EV=1 (1:1 Deterministic Match, 1:10% of 10 tokens, and 1:1% of 100) and EV=0.5 (2:1 Deterministic Match, 1:1% of 50 tokens and 1:0.5% of 100), where one token is $0.50. Participants complete three 10-token allocation decisions for hunger-related charities with one allocation randomly selected for realization. The 1:1 Match significantly increases giving by 15.7% compared to No Match. We find that matching schemes with a small probability of a very large amount (1% and 0.5% of 100) elicit significantly higher rates of giving compared to No Match (Mann-Whitney p=0.019 and p=0.096 respectively) and do not statistically differ from the 1:1 Match (Mann-Whitney p=0.976 and p=0.622 respectively). Our results suggest nonprofits can use matching gift donations more efficiently through lottery matching donation schemes while increasing downstream donations. |
| JEL: | C90 D64 H41 L3 L30 L31 |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34022 |