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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Ying Xue Li; Burkhard Schipper (Department of Economics, University of California Davis) |
| Abstract: | We consider a disclosure game between a seller and a buyer. The seller knows the quality of a good, while the buyer does not. Before the buyer decides how many units to purchase, the seller can disclose verifiable information about the good. The better the information, the more the buyer is inclined to buy. The information about the good is two-dimensional. We design two experimental treatments: In the unawareness treatment, the buyer is uncertain about the first dimension, but unaware of the second. Here, unawareness refers to a lack of conception rather than lack of information. In the control treatment, the buyer is aware of both dimensions, but uncertain about them. The theory predicts unraveling of information in the control treatment but not in the unawareness treatment. Our experimental findings are consistent with this prediction. However, a closer examination reveals that this outcome is driven by buyers becoming confused when sellers naively raise awareness of the second dimension. |
| Keywords: | disclosure of information, disclosure games, verifiable information, unawareness, unknown unknowns, unraveling, rationalizability, experimental games |
| JEL: | D83 C72 C92 |
| Date: | 2025–03–31 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cda:wpaper:370 |
| By: | Alice Soldà (Emlyon business school, CNRS, Université Lumière Lyon 2, Université Jean-Monnet Saint-Etienne, GATE, 69007, Lyon, France); Marie Claire Villeval (CNRS, Université Lumière Lyon 2, Université Jean-Monnet Saint-Etienne, emlyon business school, GATE, 69007, Lyon, France; IZA, Bonn, Germany) |
| Abstract: | We investigated whether individuals use narratives about the role of luck to influence decision-makers’ interpretation of noisy performance signals in a tournament setting. In an experiment, pairs of workers were either rewarded for accurately estimating their relative performance (Control treatment), persuading a manager they outperformed their competitor (Strategic treatment), or both (Trade-Off treatment). Results show that workers were most likely to adopt self-serving narratives attributing signals of lower performance to bad luck in the Strategic treatment. This tendency was reduced in the Trade-Off treatment where accuracy incentives were introduced. While self-serving narratives influenced managers’ decisions regarding the allocation of the winner’s prize, they did not change workers’ beliefs, suggesting that the narratives did not deceive them. |
| Keywords: | Narratives, persuasion, beliefs, tournament, performance evaluation, online experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D83 J33 M52 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:2505 |
| By: | Valeria Fanghella (EESC-GEM Grenoble Ecole de Management); Lisette Ibanez (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier); John Thøgersen (Aarhus University [Aarhus]) |
| Abstract: | Recent research suggests that people are willing to pay to avoid requests for prosocial behavior. However, it is unknown whether this applies to private pro-environmental requests. To study this, we conducted a preregistered, incentivized online experiment where participants played two consecutive dictator games with an environmental charity of their choice. In stage 1, we varied the type of dictator game and the information provided in a 2 × 2 factorial between-subject design: (i) a standard dictator game versus one with a costly opt-out option; (ii) with or without social information about the average donation made by participants in a previous session. All participants played a standard dictator game in stage 2, the primary aim of which was to capture temporal spillovers from stage 1. Overall, 9 % of participants opted out, leading to lower donations in the dictator game with the costly opt-out option. Providing social information decreases donations in the standard dictator game and appears to increase opt-outs when the costly opt-out option is available, but not statistically significant. Distinct spillover effects emerged depending on the options available and decisions made in stage 1, indicating that the context and motivation of the initial behavior affect the direction of the temporal spillover. |
| Keywords: | Dictator game, Opt-out option, ENGO, Temporal spillover, Social information |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:gemptp:hal-04982503 |
| By: | Francesco Berlingieri (European Commission, Joint Research Centre); Matija Kovacic (European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC); Global Labor Organization (GLO); Ca’ Foscari University of Venice); Elena Stepanova (European Commission, Joint Research Centre) |
| Abstract: | Using a large-scale incentivized trust game experiment conducted across all 27 EU member states, we find that sexual minorities exhibit greater prosocial behaviour toward another vulnerable group but not toward an unknown counterpart, compared to heterosexual individuals. The observed effects are both relationship- and context-specific. Specifically, bisexual individuals and those identifying with a sexual orientation other than lesbian, gay, or heterosexual demonstrate higher trusting behaviour toward counterparts who frequently experience loneliness. This effect is not attributable to higher expectations of return, differences in risk preferences, or the individual's own loneliness status. Furthermore, we find evidence that this relationship-specific prosocial behaviour among sexual minorities is more pronounced in countries with lower levels of LGBTIQ+ rights protection, suggesting that it is heightened in contexts where minorities face a greater risk of exclusion or discrimination. We do not find statistically significant differences in overall trustworthiness across sexual orientations. However, the results offer some evidence that bisexual individuals are more trustworthy than heterosexual trustees when they feel a strong connection to their counterpart. |
| Keywords: | trust game; pro-sociality; LGBTIQ+; loneliness |
| JEL: | C91 C71 D64 J15 H80 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ven:wpaper:2025:02 |
| By: | Konovalov, Arkady (University of Birmingham); Luzyanin, Daniil (University of Birmingham); Popov, Sergey V. (Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University) |
| Abstract: | Experiment participants in a social dilemma game choose cooperation over defection, even though neither is more beneficial. High levels of cooperation cannot be explained by favorable labels for actions, collusion, k-level reasoning, quantal response behavior, or misplaced optimism about others’ actions, but can be rationalized by the Charness and Rabin (2002) preference model. However, cooperation rates fall with changes in payoffs, which cannot be explained by the standard formulation; to account for these results, we introduce a generalization of the model. |
| Keywords: | cooperation; coordination; social preferences |
| JEL: | C7 C9 |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2025/10 |
| By: | Sofoklis Goulas (Economic Studies, Brookings Institution, USA, and IZA); Rigissa Megalokonomou (Department of Economics, Monash University, Australia, IZA, and CESifo); Panagiotis Sotirakopoulos (Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre, Curtin University, Australia) |
| Abstract: | We examine teachers’ perceptions toward top performing students and their role model influence on others in an online survey-based experiment. We randomly expose teachers to profiles of top performing students and inquire whether they consider the profiled top performers to be influential role models. These profiles varied by gender and field of study (STEM or Non-STEM). Our findings show that teachers perceive top-performing girls as more influential peer role models compared to top-performing boys (βˆ = 0.289; p |
| Keywords: | teacher gender stereotypes, randomized controlled trial, peer role models, STEM |
| JEL: | I21 I24 J16 D83 C90 |
| Date: | 2025–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2025-02 |
| By: | Claudio Schilter |
| Abstract: | This field experiment investigates how stressing selectivity at career information events affects the diversity, size, and quality of the applicant pool. While the total number of applications remains unaffected by stressing selectivity, it reduces the share of female participants and children of migrants in the applicant pool. A key mechanism driving this effect is that treated participants perceive their (also treated) peers as more competitive during the event. Leveraging treatment timing, I find that exposure to such peer behavior significantly contributes to the gender-specific effect of stressing selectivity. Moreover, further analysis reveals that stressing selectivity deters high-quality female participants from applying and attracts low-quality male participants. The results point to de-emphasizing selectivity as a simple way of boosting diversity, particularly when potential applicants interact with one another. |
| Keywords: | Occupational Choice, Diversity, Gender, HR Policies |
| JEL: | C93 J21 J24 M14 |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iso:educat:0236 |
| By: | Shuguang Jiang (Centre for Economic Research, Shandong University, Jinan, Shandong, 250100, China); Marie Claire Villeval (CNRS, Université Lumière Lyon 2, Université Jean-Monnet Saint-Etienne, emlyon business school, GATE, 69007 Lyon, France; IZA, Bonn, Germany); Zhengping Zhang (Centre for Economic Research, Shandong University, Jinan, Shandong, 250100, China); Jie Zheng (Centre for Economic Research, Shandong University, Jinan, Shandong, 250100, China) |
| Abstract: | How do future economic prospects influence the likelihood of cooperation or conflict between rising and established powers? Drawing on Thucydides’s Trap, we test power transitions in varying economic conditions experimentally. In a dynamic power rivalry game participants could either maintain the status quo or challenge the rival, under declining, constant, or growing economic prospects. Our results reveal that conflict rates are highest when economic prospects decline and lowest when they grow. An established power is less likely to challenge in the initial periods under growth prospects, which moderates the rising power’s subsequent challenging behavior. A behavioral model with psychological costs for challenging and reciprocity helps rationalize the observed treatment differences. A survey with a representative sample in the U.S. suggests that the dynamics observed in the game hold real-world relevance. |
| Keywords: | Conflict, Economic prospects, Thucydides’s Trap, Power shift, Experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D74 D92 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:2506 |
| By: | Wilms, Rafael (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam); Oostrom, Janneke Karina (Tilburg University); van Garderen, Emma |
| Abstract: | Women are often discriminated against in leader selection contexts. The goal of the present study is to examine the role of the rhetorical charisma signal, voice pitch and their interaction in female leader selection (i.e., perceptions of [incentivized] hirability, competence and warmth). We derive our hypotheses based on the charisma signaling theory and the evolutionary perspective on charisma. Based on two pre-registered experiments (total N = 1316), we found that the rhetorical charisma signal increases the applicant’s hirability, while the results were mixed for competence and warmth. Study 1 showed that small changes in voice pitch of ±20Hz did not affect any of the outcomes. In Study 2, we altered the actress’s voice to a low, average, and high female pitch. The results revealed that only a low (vs. baseline) but not a high voice (vs. baseline) pitch increased perceived hirability and competence (while perceived warmth remained unaffected). Furthermore, the interaction between the rhetorical charisma signal and voice pitch did not predict any of the outcomes. Theoretical contributions, practical implications and limitations are discussed. |
| Date: | 2023–08–29 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:bz6qg_v1 |
| By: | Catia Batista; David M. Costa; Pedro Freitas; Goncalo Lima; Ana Balcao Reis |
| Abstract: | Study abroad migration is the fastest growing international migration flow. However, the college completion rates of students from low-income countries are often modest in OECD countries, raising the hypothesis that these migrants are poorly informed about the costs and benefits of their decision. Our work tests this hypothesis by running a lab-in-the-field experiment where graduating high school students in Cape Verde are faced with incentivized decisions to apply for college studies abroad. Our results show that potential migrants react strongly to information about the availability of financial support and about college completion rates. Since subjects’ prior beliefs on availability of financial support are overestimated, it is likely that study migrants need to shift their time from study to work after uninformed migration, which likely harms their scholar performance. Policies that inform potential migrants of actual study funding possibilities should decrease study migration flows but may improve successful graduation. |
| Keywords: | International study migration, Lab-in-the-field experiment, Education, Information, Uncertainty |
| JEL: | O15 F22 J61 C91 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unl:novafr:wp2401 |
| By: | Chiara Aina (Universitat Pompeu Fabra); Florian H. Schneider (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen) |
| Abstract: | We study how individuals update their beliefs in the presence of competing datagenerating processes, or models, that could explain observed data. Through experiments, we identify the weights participants assign to different models and find that the most common updating rule gives full weight to the model that best fits the data. While some participants assign positive weights to multiple models—consistent with Bayesian updating—they often do so in a systematically biased manner. Moreover, these biases in model weighting frequently lead participants to become more certain about a state regardless of the data, violating a core property of Bayesian updating. |
| Keywords: | Belief Updating, Narratives, Mental Models, Experiments |
| JEL: | D83 D9 C90 |
| Date: | 2025–03–17 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kucebi:2504 |
| By: | Thami, Prakriti (Department of Economics, Lund University) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the impact of truth-telling preferences on aggregate consumer welfare within a priority pricing (PP) mechanism. Traditional models assume individuals always misrepresent private information to maximize payoffs, yet recent evidence suggests there may be an innate preference for truth-telling. By incorporating these preferences into a theoretical framework, I show that PP enhances welfare over uniform pricing only when the probability of non-truthful individuals surpasses a critical threshold, suggesting that PP may benefit populations with low truth-telling tendencies but reduce welfare when this tendency is high. To empirically test this, I conducted an online experiment, finding that while PP incentivized truth-telling, its impact did not vary significantly across groups with differing truth-telling tendencies. Instead, participants’ beliefs about others' truthfulness emerged as key in shaping behavior. These findings underscore that PP’s welfare-enhancing potential depends not only on incentives created by the pricing structure but also on the population's truth-telling tendencies and beliefs, offering valuable insight for designing effective pricing mechanisms. |
| Keywords: | priority pricing; consumer welfare; truth-telling behavior; incentive-compatible pricing |
| JEL: | D47 D61 D82 D90 |
| Date: | 2025–03–25 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2025_003 |
| By: | Fabien Giauque; Mehdi Farsi; Sylvain Weber; Michael Puntiroli |
| Abstract: | Using a discrete choice experiment (DCE), we analyze how social comparisons and financial information influence households' preferences and trade-offs among three sustainable electricity demand behaviors: conservation actions, efficiency investments, and purchasing a green power mix. Our results show that while a strong majority favors sustainable behaviors over inaction, both interventions significantly increase the likelihood of choosing inaction. Heterogeneity analyses reveal that this negative effect is driven by households with above-average consumption. Furthermore, our findings highlight conflicting motivational mechanisms, suggesting that financial information within normative messages may crowd out intrinsic motivation. |
| Keywords: | Electricity-saving behaviors, households' preferences, social comparisons, financial information; discrete choice experiment, mixed logit (MXL) model, crowding out effect |
| JEL: | D12 D91 Q48 |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:irn:wpaper:25-02 |
| By: | Kıbrıs, Arzu (University of Warwick, Department of Politics and International Studies.); Cesur, Resul (University of Connecticut, IZA & NBER); Uler, Neslihan (University of Maryland and University of Michigan); Yıldırım, Sadullah (Marmara University) |
| Abstract: | This research identifies the causal impact of exposure to armed conflict on risk, ambiguity and time preferences and related field behaviors for the average male randomly picked from the population. Our study builds on a natural experiment, engendered by the mandatory conscription system and the long-running civil conflict in Turkey, with a survey design that measures preferences through lab-in-he-field-experiments. The setting we explore allows us to analyze the change in preferences without confoundment by community-level effects of conflict. Results show that conflict exposure increases risk tolerance, ambiguity neutrality, patience and time consistency. Tracing the effects on real life behaviors, we find that while conflict exposure leads to an increase in entrepreneurial activity, it has no significant impacts on risky health behaviors such as being overweight, smoking, or daily drinking. Evidence highlights post-traumatic growth in the form of elevated agency as a novel explanation for the observed changes in preferences. |
| Keywords: | Political Violence ; Artefactual Field Experiment ; Risk Preferences ; Ambiguity Preferences ; Time Preferences. JEL Codes: C90 ; C93 ; D01 ; D74 ; D81 ; I01 ; O17 ; Z13 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:wqapec:27 |
| By: | Almås, Ingvild (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Cappelen, Alexander W. (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Sørensen, Erik Ø. (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Tungodden, Bertil (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides global evidence on the nature of inequality acceptance, based on a large-scale experimental study with more than 65, 000 individuals across 60 countries. We show that, across the world, the source of inequality matters substantially more for inequality acceptance than the cost of redistribution. However, fairness views vary significantly across countries, largely reflecting disagreement over whether inequality caused by luck is fair. The meritocratic fairness view is most prevalent in the Western world, but substantial support for the libertarian and egalitarian fairness views exists in many countries. Focusing on beliefs, we further show that, globally, people believe luck plays a greater role than merit in shaping inequality, while disagreement about the cost of redistribution is more pronounced. Finally, we establish that both fairness views and beliefs about the source of inequality are key to understanding policy attitudes and cross-country variation in government redistribution, whereas efficiency considerations play a less important role. |
| Keywords: | Inequality acceptance; fairness views; economic inequality |
| JEL: | J18 J71 |
| Date: | 2025–03–25 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhheco:2025_006 |
| By: | Travis Baseler (University of Rochester); Thomas Ginn (Center for Global Development); Ibrahim Kasirye (Economic Policy Research Centre); Belinda Muya (International Rescue Committee); Andrew Zeitlin (Georgetown University) |
| Abstract: | Constraints that inhibit small business growth are potentially amplified for groups with limited access to existing business networks like refugees and women. Programs that facilitate intergroup contact, in addition to capital, could potentially raise welfare, especially if incentives are aligned for participants to share information and invest effort in each other's outcomes. In a randomized trial with microentrepreneurs, we vary business grants, inclusion in a mentorship group, the gender and nationality composition of groups, and a "shared fate" component that compensates group members for the success of other members’ businesses. We find that grants substantially improve business outcomes for men, women, refugees, and hosts. Combining mentorship with cash has an additional positive effect for refugee men, but a negative effect relative to cash alone for women who run higher-profit firms. Mentors with higher baseline profits significantly improve mentees' business outcomes, while differences across group gender and nationality compositions are small. The shared fate addition worsens early outcomes in aligned groups but does not affect mixed groups. |
| Keywords: | Microentrepreneurship, Networks, Mentorship, Refugees |
| JEL: | D22 D74 D83 L14 L26 O12 O15 |
| Date: | 2025–03–31 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cgd:wpaper:716 |
| By: | Antonio Cabrales (Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III Madrid); Lorenzo Ductor (Department of Economics Theory and History, Universidad de Granada); Ericka Rascon-Ramirez (Department of Economics, CIDE and Middlesex University London); Ismael Rodriguez-Lara (Department of Economics, Universidad de Malaga, and Economic Science Institute, Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | Women often find themselves in teams that hinder their productivity and earnings. We analyze the role of homophily and gender stereotypes in preferences for team formation and examine the effect of information on changing these preferences. We find that women are expected to perform better in female-type tasks (such as text and emotion-recognition). However, people prefer forming teams with their same gender. Our findings suggest that information can mitigate -but it does not eliminate- the influence of homophily on team formation. |
| Keywords: | gender differences, expectations, collaboration, network formation, team production |
| JEL: | C91 D03 D60 D81 |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:emc:wpaper:dte648 |
| By: | Melek Hilal Eroglu (University of Pittsburgh); Steven Finkel (University of Pittsburgh); Anja Neundorf (University of Glasgow); Aykut Ozturk (University of Glasgow); Ericka G. Rascon-Ramirez (Department of Economics, CIDE and Middlesex University London) |
| Abstract: | How can the negative effects of partisan polarization on democratic attitudes be mitigated? Can polarized individuals be persuaded to choose democracy over party, i.e., support a candidate from an opposing party who upholds democratic norms when their co-partisan candidate fails to do so? We tested the effect of an online civic education intervention conducted on over 41, 000 individuals in 33 countries that was designed to promote the choice for "democracy" by emphasizing the benefits of democratic versus autocratic regimes. The results are striking: exposure to civic education messages significantly dampens the negative effect of partisan polarization on anti-democratic co-partisan candidate choice. Civic education also has a small positive effect on polarization itself, with further exploration showing that this is the result of increased evaluations of parties that uphold democratic norms and practices, resulting in greater differences between democratic and antidemocratic parties. |
| Keywords: | Civic education, partisan polarization, democratization, online experiments |
| Date: | 2025–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:emc:wpaper:dte647 |
| By: | Michele Garagnani; Petra Schweinhardt; Philippe N. Tobler; Carlos Alos Ferrer |
| Abstract: | Numerical self-report scales are extensively used in economics, psychology, and even medicine to quantify subjective feelings, ranging from life satisfaction to the experience of pain. These scales are often criticized for lacking an objective foundation, and defended on the grounds of empirical performance. We focus on the case of pain measurement, where existing self-reported measures are the workhorse but known to be inaccurate and difficult to compare across individuals. We provide a new measure, inspired by standard economic elicitation methods, that quantifies the negative value of acute pain in monetary terms, making it comparable across individuals. In three preregistered studies, 330 healthy participants were randomly allocated to receive either only a high- or only a low-pain stimulus or a high-pain stimulus after having double-blindly received a topical analgesic or a placebo. In all three studies, the new measure greatly outperformed the existing self-report scales at distinguishing whether participants were in the more or the less painful condition, as confirmed by effect sizes, Bayesian factor analysis, and regression-based predictions. |
| Keywords: | Self-Reported Scales, Preference Elicitation, Pain |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lan:wpaper:421926304 |