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on Experimental Economics |
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Issue of 2024‒04‒29
thirty papers chosen by |
| By: | Sebastian Bachler; Armando Holzknecht; Jürgen Huber; Michael Kirchler |
| Abstract: | While headline news frequently report cases of large-scale fraud, corruption, and other immoral behavior, laboratory experiments often show prosocial behavior in strategic games. To reconcile and explain these seemingly conflicting observations, Alós-Ferrer et al. (2022) introduced the Big Robber Game — an altered dictator game where one robber can take money from multiple victims. They reported low prosocial behavior among a pool of student subjects who behaved more prosocial in bilateral games than in the Big Robber Game. In our study, we employ the Big Robber Game within a 2x2 factorial design, engaging over 860 participants to examine the behaviors of financial professionals versus students. Moreover, inspired by the four-eyes principle, a common practice in the finance industry, we investigate decision-making both individually and in pairs. We find overall support for the results of Alós-Ferrer et al. (2022) and that finance professionals rob less than students. Accounting for a multitude of specifications, socio-demographic characteristics and individual preferences, we report that treatment differences disappear, indicating similar behavior across individuals, pairs, finance professionals, and students. Finally, in a series of non-pre-registered exploratory analyses, we show that victims expect finance professionals to rob significantly more than student robbers, implying that finance professionals are considered to be less pro-social than students’ peers. |
| Keywords: | Selfishness, Social Preferences, Finance Professionals, Group decisions, Experimental Finance |
| JEL: | C91 C93 D91 |
| Date: | 2024–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2024-04&r=exp |
| By: | Raphael Brade; Oliver Himmler; Robert Jaeckle; Philipp Weinschenk |
| Abstract: | To study whether a soft commitment device can help students succeed, we conduct a randomized field experiment and follow a cohort of tertiary students over six years. Students can commit to following their recommended study program structure, and they receive reminders each semester. This easily implementable, low-cost intervention is highly effective: it increases the five-year graduation rate (+15 percentage points) and reduces time to graduation (-0.42 semesters), driven by reduced dropout and an increase in credits obtained per semester. The effects are stronger for suspected procrastinators. A treatment only reminding students to follow the program structure has limited effects. |
| Keywords: | commitment device, reminders, higher education, randomized field experiment |
| JEL: | I21 I23 C93 D90 D91 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11001&r=exp |
| By: | Webb, Duncan |
| Abstract: | Individual-level discrimination is often attributed to deep-seated prejudice that is difficult to change. But at the societal level, we sometimes observe rapid reductions in discriminatory preferences, suggesting that social interactions and the communication they entail might drive such shifts. I examine whether discrimination can be reduced by two types of communication about a minority: (i) horizontal communication between majority-group members, or (ii) top-down communication from agents of authority (e.g., the legal system). I run a field experiment in urban India (N=3, 397) that measures discrimination against a marginalized community of transgender people. Participants are highly discriminatory: in a control condition, they sacrifice 1.9x their daily food expenditure to avoid hiring a transgender worker to deliver groceries to their home. But horizontal communication between cisgender participants sharply reduces discrimination: participants who were earlier involved in a group discussion with two of their neighbors no longer discriminate on average, even when making private post-discussion choices. This effect is 1.7x larger than the effect of top-down communication that informs participants about the legal rights of transgender people. The discussion’s effects are not driven by virtue signaling or correcting a misperceived norm. Instead, participants appear to persuade each other to be more pro-trans, partly because pro-trans participants are the most vocal in discussions. |
| Date: | 2024–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpm:docweb:2402&r=exp |
| By: | John List; Lina Ramirez; Julia Seither; Jaime Unda; Beatriz Vallejo |
| Abstract: | Misinformation represents a vital threat to the societal fabric of modern economies. While the supply side of the misinformation market has begun to receive increased scrutiny, the demand side has received scant attention. We explore the demand for misinformation through the lens of augmenting critical thinking skills in a field experiment during the 2022 Presidential election in Colombia. Data from roughly 2.000 individual suggest that our treatments enhance critical thinking, causing subjects to more carefully consider the truthfulness of potential misinformation. We furthermore provide evidence that reducing the demand of fake news can deliver on the dual goal of reducing the spread of fake news by encouraging reporting of misinformation. |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:framed:00786&r=exp |
| By: | Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha; Deb, Moumita; Lohse, Johannes; McDonald, Rebecca |
| Abstract: | Majority voting is considered an efficient information aggregation mechanism in committee decision-making. We examine if this holds in environments where voters first need to acquire information from sources of varied quality and cost. In such environments, efficiency may depend on free-riding incentives and the ‘transparency’ regime - the knowledge voters have about other voters’ acquired information. Intuitively, more transparent regimes should improve efficiency. Our theoretical model instead demonstrates that under some conditions, less transparent regimes can match the rate of efficient information aggregation in more transparent regimes if all members cast a vote based on the information they hold. However, a Pareto inferior swing voter’s curse (SVC) equilibrium arises in less transparent regimes if less informed members abstain. We test this proposition in a lab experiment, randomly assigning participants to different transparency regimes. Results in less transparent regimes are consistent with the SVC equilibrium, leading to less favourable outcomes than in more transparent regimes. We thus offer the first experimental evidence on the effects of different transparency regimes on information acquisition, voting, and overall efficiency. |
| Keywords: | Information acquisition; Voting; Transparency; Swing voter |
| Date: | 2024–03–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:awi:wpaper:0744&r=exp |
| By: | Amoozadeh Mahdiraji, Hanif |
| Abstract: | The culture of cynicism expresses that problems in sustainable financial resource security could come from the historical distrust of society members and the government. This study uses a simulated experiment to evaluate this claim while analyzing possible solutions to escape this non-cooperation trap. Therefore, it analyzes the “reasons behind this non-cooperation” while evaluating effective methods to get out of it with an experimental approach using the gaming method as a simulation tool. In this experiment, more than 1, 200 people participated in the game through a telegram robot. The experiment results show that people’s cooperation with the government is affected by the government's performance more than the cooperation between other society members or their previous experiences. Finally, a logistic regression model is presented to predict the behavior of participants in the future. |
| Date: | 2024–03–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:jx4h9&r=exp |
| By: | Jeworrek, Sabrina; Tonzer, Lena |
| Abstract: | Promoting green product consumption is one important element in building a sustainable society. Yet green products are usually more costly. In times of high inflation, not only budget constraints but also the fear that prices will continue to rise might dampen green product consumption and, hence, limit the effectiveness of exerted efforts to promote sustainable behaviors. To test this suggestion, we conducted a Germany-wide survey with almost 1, 200 respondents, followed by a framed field experiment (N=500) to confirm causality. In the survey, respondents' stated "green" purchasing behavior is, as to be expected, positively correlated with concerns about climate change. It is also negatively correlated with concerns about future inflation and energy costs, but after controlling for observable characteristics such as income and educational level only the correlation with concerns about future prices remains significant. This result is driven by individuals with below-median environmental attitude. In the framed field experiment, we use the priming method to manipulate the saliency of inflation concerns. Whereas sizably relaxing the budget constraint (i.e., by 50 percent) has no impact on the share of organic products in participants' baskets, the priming significantly decreases the share of organic products for individuals with below-median environmental attitude, similar to the survey data. |
| Keywords: | consumption behavior, inflation concerns, online shopping experiment, organic food, sustainability |
| JEL: | C93 D12 D84 D91 E31 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwhdps:287754&r=exp |
| By: | Cui, Chi; Dai, Ming; Schwieren, Christiane |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we experimentally investigate how sending a signal of following social norms impacts people’s cooperative behavior in a repeated public goods game, where we disentangle the effect of strategy and internalization of social norms on cooperation. We find that under the signaling mechanism, less cooperative players disguise themselves in the rule-following game, but this does not decrease cooperation overall. More importantly, the signaling mechanism has a heterogeneous effect on cooperation in rule-following and rule-breaking groups: It increases cooperation in rule-following groups but decreases cooperation in rule-breaking groups. Finally, the signaling mechanism tends to offset the decline of contributions among participants in rule-breaking groups rather than rule-following groups. Overall, this paper provides a feasible way to improve social cooperation and enriches the literature on cooperation in the public goods game. |
| Keywords: | public goods game; cooperation; signaling; internalization of social norms |
| Date: | 2024–04–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:awi:wpaper:0746&r=exp |
| By: | Darova, Ornella; Duchene, Anne |
| Abstract: | We run two field experiments on team diversity in a large undergraduate economics class. Small groups with random compositions are generated and assigned team tasks. In the first experiment, tasks are creative and complex, while in the second one they are more standard. We use a multidimensional measure of diversity based on gender, race, and migration status. We estimate its impact on teamwork quality and group performance. We find a significant U-shaped effect on teamwork quality in both experiments. However, the impact on performance depends on the type of task: it is positive for creative tasks, but negative for standard ones. We interpret these results as the consequence of two conflicting forces: diversity is a source of creativity, but it can hamper communication and coordination between team members. When tasks are creative, the first (positive) force dominates; for standard tasks, instead, communication challenges do. The U-shaped impact on teamwork quality suggests that faultlines – dividing lines that split a group into subgroups based on demographic characteristics – can cause inter-subgroup cohesion to break down, while very homogeneous or very heterogeneous groups collaborate better. These results allow us to build a comprehensive framework to better understand the impact of diversity on teamwork. |
| Keywords: | Diversity, Knowledge Production, Creativity, Teamwork, Education |
| JEL: | A22 I21 J15 |
| Date: | 2024–01–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:120519&r=exp |
| By: | Darova, Ornella; Duchene, Anne |
| Abstract: | We run two field experiments on team diversity in a large undergraduate economics class. Small groups with random compositions are generated and assigned team tasks. In the first experiment, tasks are creative and complex, while in the second one they are more standard. We use a multidimensional measure of diversity based on gender, race, and migration status. We estimate its impact on teamwork quality and group performance. We find a significant U-shaped effect on teamwork quality in both experiments. However, the impact on performance depends on the type of task: it is positive for creative tasks, but negative for standard ones. We interpret these results as the consequence of two conflicting forces: diversity is a source of creativity, but it can hamper communication and coordination between team members. When tasks are creative, the first (positive) force dominates; for standard tasks, instead, communication challenges do. The U-shaped impact on teamwork quality suggests that faultlines – dividing lines that split a group into subgroups based on demographic characteristics – can cause inter-subgroup cohesion to break down, while very homogeneous or very heterogeneous groups collaborate better. These results allow us to build a comprehensive framework to better understand the impact of diversity on teamwork. |
| Keywords: | Diversity, Knowledge Production, Creativity, Teamwork, Education |
| JEL: | A22 I21 J15 |
| Date: | 2024–01–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:120375&r=exp |
| By: | Brun, Martín; De Vera, Micole; Kadriu, Valon; Mierisch, Fabian |
| Abstract: | This paper is a replication study of Brouwer, T., Galeotti, F., & Villeval, M. C. (2023), using the original data. The study explores how social norms are transmitted from one generation to another, specifically from parents to children. The authors conducted a field experiment involving 601 parents of children aged 3 to 12 in Lyon, France, to examine whether parents engage more in norm enforcement in the presence of their child, and whether the nature of punishment changes in the presence of the child. The study found that parents do engage more in norm enforcement in the presence of their child, and tend to use more indirect punishment when their child is present. This study highlights the role that parents play in transmitting social norms to their children. The replication analysis was successful, with the results of the original study being robust to changes in the model specification. |
| Keywords: | replication, experiment, information provision, inequality, field experiment |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:i4rdps:106&r=exp |
| By: | Roberto Galbiati (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Emeric Henry (Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Paris); Nicolas Jacquemet (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Formal enforcement punishing defectors can sustain cooperation by changing incentives. In this paper, we introduce a second effect of enforcement: it can also affect the capacity to learn about the group's cooperativeness. Indeed, in contexts with strong enforcement, it is difficult to tell apart those who cooperate because of the threat of fines from those who are intrinsically cooperative types. Whenever a group is intrinsically cooperative, enforcement will thus have a negative dynamic effect on cooperation because it slows down learning about prevalent values in the group that would occur under a weaker enforcement. We provide theoretical and experimental evidence in support of this mechanism. Using a lab experiment with independent interactions and random rematching, we observe that, in early interactions, having faced an environment with fines in the past decreases current cooperation. We further show that this results from the interaction between enforcement and learning: the effect of having met cooperative partners has a stronger effect on current cooperation when this happened in an environment with no enforcement. Replacing one signal of deviation without fine by a signal of cooperation without fine in a player's history increases current cooperation by 10%; while replacing it by a signal of cooperation with fine increases current cooperation by only 5%. |
| Keywords: | Enforcement, social values, cooperation, learning, spillovers, repeated games, experiments |
| Date: | 2024–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04511257&r=exp |
| By: | Kai Barron; Ruth K. Ditlmann; Stefan Gehrig; Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch |
| Abstract: | This paper studies a key element of discrimination, namely when stereotypes translate into discriminatory actions. Using a hiring experiment, we rule out taste-based discrimination by design and test for the presence of two types of belief-based gender discrimination. We document evidence of explicit discriminators—individuals who are willing to discriminate even when their hiring choices are highly revealing of their gender-biased beliefs. Crucially, we also identify implicit discriminators—individuals who do not discriminate against women when taking a discriminatory action is highly revealing of their biased beliefs, but do discriminate against women when their biased motive is obscured. Our analysis highlights the central role played by features of the choice environment in determining whether and how discrimination will manifest. We conclude by discussing the implications for policy design. |
| Keywords: | Discrimination, Hiring Decisions, Gender, Beliefs, Experiment, Aversive Sexism |
| JEL: | D90 J71 D83 |
| Date: | 2024–03–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdp:dpaper:0035&r=exp |
| By: | Choi, S.; Goyal, S.; Guo, F.; Moisan, F. |
| Abstract: | This paper presents experimental evidence on games where individuals can unilaterally decide on their links with each other. Linking decisions give rise to directed graphs. We consider two classes of situations: one, benefits flow along the direction of the network paths (one-way flow), and two, when the benefits flow on network paths without regard to the direction of links (two-way flow). Our experiments reveal that in the one-way flow model subjects create sparse networks whose distance grows and efficiency falls as group size grows; by contrast, in the two-way flow model subjects create sparse and small world networks whose efficiency remains high in both small and large groups. We show that a bounded rational model that combines myopic best response with targeting a most connected individual provides a coherent account of our experimental data. |
| Keywords: | Data, Group Size, Network Formation, Network Games, Networks |
| Date: | 2024–03–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:2417&r=exp |
| By: | Choi, S.; Goyal, S.; Guo, F.; Moisan, F. |
| Abstract: | This paper presents experimental evidence on games where individuals can unilaterally decide on their links with each other. Linking decisions give rise to directed graphs. We consider two classes of situations: one, benefits flow along the direction of the network paths (one-way flow), and two, when the benefits flow on network paths without regard to the direction of links (two-way flow). Our experiments reveal that in the one-way flow model subjects create sparse networks whose distance grows and efficiency falls as group size grows; by contrast, in the two-way flow model subjects create sparse and small world networks whose efficiency remains high in both small and large groups. We show that a bounded rational model that combines myopic best response with targeting a most connected individual provides a coherent account of our experimental data. |
| Keywords: | Data, Group Size, Network Formation, Network Games, Networks |
| Date: | 2024–03–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camjip:2412&r=exp |
| By: | Supriya Tiwari; Pallavi Basu |
| Abstract: | Many classical inferential approaches fail to hold when interference exists among the population units. This amounts to the treatment status of one unit affecting the potential outcome of other units in the population. Testing for such spillover effects in this setting makes the null hypothesis non-sharp. An interesting approach to tackling the non-sharp nature of the null hypothesis in this setup is constructing conditional randomization tests such that the null is sharp on the restricted population. In randomized experiments, conditional randomized tests hold finite sample validity. Such approaches can pose computational challenges as finding these appropriate sub-populations based on experimental design can involve solving an NP-hard problem. In this paper, we view the network amongst the population as a random variable instead of being fixed. We propose a new approach that builds a conditional quasi-randomization test. Our main idea is to build the (non-sharp) null distribution of no spillover effects using random graph null models. We show that our method is exactly valid in finite-samples under mild assumptions. Our method displays enhanced power over other methods, with substantial improvement in complex experimental designs. We highlight that the method reduces to a simple permutation test, making it easy to implement in practice. We conduct a simulation study to verify the finite-sample validity of our approach and illustrate our methodology to test for interference in a weather insurance adoption experiment run in rural China. |
| Date: | 2024–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2403.16673&r=exp |
| By: | Christopher Roth; Peter Schwardmann; Egon Tripodi |
| Abstract: | Throughout history, people with mental illness have been discriminated against and stigmatized. Our experiment provides a new measure of perceived depression stigma and then investigates the causal effect of perceived stigma on help-seeking in a sample of 1, 844 Americans suffering from depression. A large majority of our participants overestimate the extent of stigma associated with depression. In contrast to prior correlational evidence, lowering perceived social stigma through an information intervention leads to a reduction in the demand for psychotherapy. A mechanism experiment reveals that this information increases optimism about future mental health, thereby reducing the perceived need for therapy. |
| Keywords: | depression, stigma, information, psychotherapy |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11012&r=exp |
| By: | Erika Domotor; Adrien Fillon; Kenzo Nera; Zacharias Maniadis |
| Abstract: | The prevalence of conspiracy theories is a concern in western countries, yet the phenomenon is rarely addressed in experimental economics. In two preregistered online studies (NStudy 1 = 97, NStudy 2 = 203) we examine the relationship between exposure to conspiracy modes of thinking, self-reported conspiracy mentality, and behaviour in an economic game that measures strategic sophistication. Part of our design was based on Balafoutas, Libman, Selamis, and Vollan (2021), who found a positive relationship between exposure to conspiracy modes of thinking and strategic sophistication. Our results did not corroborate their findings in an online setting. Our measures of conspiracy mentality were modestly correlated with strategic sophistication in Study 2, but not in Study 1. Conspiracy mentality was also correlated with manipulativeness. |
| Keywords: | Conspiracy theory, k-level reasoning, trust, strategic sophistication |
| JEL: | D91 C90 C72 |
| Date: | 2024–03–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ucy:cypeua:01-2024&r=exp |
| By: | Mallory Avery; Andreas Leibbrandt; Joseph Vecci |
| Abstract: | The use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in recruitment is rapidly increasing and drastically changing how people apply to jobs and how applications are reviewed. In this paper, we use two field experiments to study how AI recruitment tools can impact gender diversity in the male-dominated technology sector, both overall and separately for labor supply and demand. We find that the use of AI in recruitment changes the gender distribution of potential hires, in some cases more than doubling the fraction of top applicants that are women. This change is generated by better outcomes for women in both supply and demand. On the supply side, we observe that the use of AI reduces the gender gap in application completion rates. Complementary survey evidence suggests that anticipated bias is a driver of increased female application completion when assessed by AI instead of human evaluators. On the demand side, we find that providing evaluators with applicants’ AI scores closes the gender gap in assessments that otherwise disadvantage female applicants. Finally, we show that the AI tool would have to be substantially biased against women to result in a lower level of gender diversity than found without AI. |
| Keywords: | artificial intelligence, gender, diversity, field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 J23 J71 J78 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10996&r=exp |
| By: | Reitmann, Ann-Kristin; Sievert, Maximiliane |
| Abstract: | Many policy interventions in the environmental sector aim at changing environmental preferences, because these provide the basis for adopting environmental conservation behavior or technologies. To evaluate these changes, standard measurement tools in survey-based impact evaluations have their limitations. We discuss the potential of framed field experiments as an alternative to attain unbiased outcome measures, and present a case study from an impact evaluation in the Colombian coffee sector. While clear advantages exist, we show that indicators from framed field experiments require substantial sample sizes to provide well-powered results. Moreover, preference indicators are highly context specific, which calls for an elaborated framing to attain the intended kind of preferences. |
| Abstract: | Viele Politikmaßnahmen im Umweltsektor zielen auf die Veränderung von Präferenzen ab, da diese die Grundlage für umweltfreundliches Verhalten und Nutzung umweltfreundlicher Technologien bilden. Um solche Veränderungen zu bewerten, stoßen die Standardmessinstrumente der umfragebasierten Wirkungsevaluierung an ihre Grenzen. Wir erörtern das Potenzial von Feldexperimenten als Alternative, um unverzerrte Ergebnisindikatoren zu erhalten, und stellen die Fallstudie einer Wirkungsevaluierung im kolumbianischen Kaffeesektor vor. Wir zeigen, dass die Indikatoren aus Feldexperimenten erhebliche Stichprobengrößen erfordern, um aussagekräftige Ergebnisse zu erzielen. Darüber hinaus sind die Indikatoren sehr kontextspezifisch, was ein ausgefeiltes Framing erfordert, um die beabsichtigte Art von Präferenzen zu messen. |
| Keywords: | Field experiment, environmental preferences, impact evaluation, lessons learned, behavioral economics |
| JEL: | C83 C93 O13 O22 Q20 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:rwirep:287767&r=exp |
| By: | Miguel Ángel Borrella-Mas (Universidad de Navarra); Jaime Millán-Quijano (Universidad de Navarra & CEMR); Anastasia Terskaya (Universitat de Barcelona & IEB) |
| Abstract: | We implemented a randomized control trial in Georgia to study how labels and food vouchers affect household expenditure among low-income recipients of unconditional cash transfers. Households were randomly assigned to receive only an unconditional cash transfer, a label indicating an amount intended for children’s expenses in addition to the transfer, or a portion of the transfer as a food voucher usable exclusively at designated stores. We find that labelling increases the share of expenditure on children. Meanwhile, food vouchers reduce total consumption, this being likely due to the increased cost associated with shopping at voucher-accepting shops. |
| Keywords: | Cash transfers, Labeling effect, Food vouchers, Randomized control trial |
| JEL: | D04 I24 I38 O12 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2023-09&r=exp |
| By: | Ricardo Santos; Sam Jones; Gimelgo Xirinda |
| Abstract: | High youth unemployment rates and long school-to-work transition times pose a threat to low-income countries' sustainable growth prospects. Using a randomized control trial experiment conducted in Mozambique, we find strong evidence that providing information on wages and unemployment reduces the time that university graduate job-seekers take to become employed, with different levels of efficacy depending on the type of information provided. |
| Keywords: | School-to-Work, Labour, Information, Randomized controlled trial |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2024-16&r=exp |
| By: | Evan K. Rose; Yotam Shem-Tov |
| Abstract: | Researchers using instrumental variables to investigate ordered treatments often recode treatment into an indicator for any exposure. We investigate this estimand under the assumption that the instruments shift compliers from no treatment to some but not from some treatment to more. We show that when there are extensive margin compliers only (EMCO) this estimand captures a weighted average of treatment effects that can be partially unbundled into each complier group's potential outcome means. We also establish an equivalence between EMCO and a two-factor selection model and apply our results to study treatment heterogeneity in the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment. |
| JEL: | C01 C26 |
| Date: | 2024–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32234&r=exp |
| By: | Haihao Lu; Luyang Zhang |
| Abstract: | Sponsored listing is one of the major revenue sources for many prominent online marketplaces, such as Amazon, Walmart, and Alibaba. When consumers visit a marketplace's webpage for a specific item, in addition to that item, the marketplace might also display a ranked listing of sponsored items from various third-party sellers. These sellers are charged an advertisement fee if a user purchases any of the sponsored items from this listing. Determining how to rank these sponsored items for each incoming visit is a crucial challenge for online marketplaces, a problem known as sponsored listings ranking (SLR). The major difficulty of SLR lies in balancing the trade-off between maximizing the overall revenue and recommending high-quality and relevant ranked listings. While a more relevant ranking may result in more purchases and consumer engagement, the marketplace also needs to take account of the potential revenue when making ranking decisions. Due to the latency requirement and historical reasons, many online marketplaces use score-based ranking algorithms for SLR optimization. Alternatively, recent research also discusses obtaining the ranking by solving linear programming (LP). In this paper, we collaborate with a leading online global marketplace and conduct a series of field experiments to compare the performance of the score-based ranking algorithms and the LP-based algorithms. The field experiment lasted for $19$ days, which included $329.3$ million visits in total. We observed that the LP-based approach improved all major metrics by $1.80\%$ of revenue, $1.55\%$ of purchase, and $1.39\%$ of the gross merchandise value (GMV), compared to an extremely-tuned score-based algorithm that was previously used in production by the marketplace. |
| Date: | 2024–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2403.14862&r=exp |
| By: | Jules Gazeaud (CERDI - Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCA - Université Clermont Auvergne); Nausheen Khan (World Bank Group); Eric Mvukiyehe (Duke University [Durham]); Olivier Sterck (UA - University of Antwerp, University of Oxford) |
| Abstract: | Strong gender and social norms limit women's opportunities and labor market outcomes in the Middle East and North Africa. Empowering women in these settings is a key priority, and one typical policy response involves using cash grants and training programs to improve women's situation. In a recent paper (Gazeaud et al. 2023), we set up a randomized experiment in Tunisia to explore whether inviting women to bring their partners to financial training, combined with an unrestricted cash grant, changed the program's impacts. |
| Abstract: | L'autonomisation des femmes est une priorité au Moyen-Orient et en Afrique du Nord. De nombreux travaux académiques suggèrent qu'une approche efficace est l'utilisation de subventions monétaires et de formations financières. Dans un récent article (Gazeaud et al. 2023), nous utilisons une expérience randomisée en Tunisie pour tester si l'implication des conjoints est bénéfique. |
| Keywords: | Cash Transfers, Financial Training, Gender Roles, Employment |
| Date: | 2024–03–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04523672&r=exp |
| By: | Assenza, Tiziana; Cardaci, Alberto; Huber, Stefanie |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates and quantifies citizens’ susceptibility to fake news and assesses, using a randomized control trial, the effectiveness of a policy intervention to raise awareness. We find that the average citizen lacks proficiency in identifying fake news and harbors an inflated perception of his/her ability to differentiate between true and fake news content. Increasing awareness by providing information about personal susceptibility to fall for fake news causally adjusts individuals’ beliefs about their fake news detection ability. Most importantly, we show that the simple intervention of informing citizens about their personal susceptibility to fall for fake news causally increases their willingness to pay for the fact-checking service. |
| Keywords: | Fake news; misinformation; disinformation; fact checking; information provision experiments; belief updating; willingness to pay |
| JEL: | C83 D83 D84 D91 |
| Date: | 2024–03–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:129250&r=exp |
| By: | Sergiu Burlacu; Davide Azzolini; Federico Podestà |
| Abstract: | We evaluate a multi-faceted intervention aimed at improving social inclusion and reducing prejudice against individuals with visual impairment. The intervention, randomly assigned to upper-secondary school students, consists of an awareness-raising activity and a simulationbased inter-group contact activity. While we find positive effects on knowledge of visual impairment, perspective-taking and empathic concerns, and general societal attitudes toward persons with visual impairment, no improvements are observed in terms of implicit attitudes or multidimensional attitudes. Moreover, the intervention does not improve outcomes measured through incentivized choices, such as the willingness to pay for social interaction with persons with visual impairment, beliefs regarding their performance and outcomes in various domains, and altruism towards them. The evidence suggests that assessing impacts only on knowledge and general attitudes, as is commonly done in the literature, may not suffice to determine the extent to which such interventions are successful at improving social inclusion for persons with visual or other forms of impairment. |
| Keywords: | Disability, Social Inclusion, Discrimination, Inter-group contact |
| JEL: | I24 I31 J14 J18 P36 |
| Date: | 2024–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fbk:wpaper:2024-03&r=exp |
| By: | Lelys Dinarte-Diaz |
| Abstract: | Globally, 150 million adolescents report being victims of or engaging in peer-to-peer violence in and around school. One strategy to reduce this risk is to occupy youth in after-school programs (ASP). Yet, the question remains: how does peer group composition affect the effectiveness of an ASP? I address this question by randomly assigning youths to either a control, homogeneous, or heterogeneous peer group within an ASP implemented in El Salvador. I find that, unlike homo-geneous groups, heterogeneous peer groups do help students avoid violence. These results are relevant to public policy discussions on optimal group composition for violence reduction programs |
| Keywords: | peer effects, violence, integration, tracking, after-school programs |
| JEL: | I29 K42 Z13 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10975&r=exp |
| By: | Te Bao; John Duffy; Nobuyuki Hanaki |
| Abstract: | In the digital age, privacy in economic activities is increasingly threatened. In considering policies to address this threat, it is useful to consider what value, if any, that people attach to privacy in economic activities. We study this question by eliciting individuals’ willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid detection in an economic experiment involving a coin-flipping task. We collect data from Japan, China, and the U.S.A. to examine whether there are cross-country differences. Our findings reveal that people’s WTP to “avoid the spotlight” is positive and economically sizable across all three countries and is the largest in Japan. |
| Date: | 2024–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1238&r=exp |
| By: | Mark Whitmeyer |
| Abstract: | We explore the connection between an agent's decision problem and her ranking of information structures. We find that a finite amount of ordinal data on the agent's ranking of experiments is enough to identify her (finite) set of undominated actions (up to relabeling and duplication) and the beliefs rendering each such action optimal. An additional smattering of cardinal data, comparing the relative value to the agent of finitely many pairs of experiments, identifies her utility function up to an action-independent payoff. |
| Date: | 2024–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2403.06344&r=exp |