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on Experimental Economics |
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Issue of 2023‒11‒20
24 papers chosen by |
| By: | Mira Fischer; Elisabeth Grewenig; Philipp Lergetporer; Katharina Werner; Helen Zeidler |
| Abstract: | Randomized experiments are often viewed as the “gold standard” of scientific evidence, but people’s scepticism towards experiments has compromised their viability in the past. We study preferences for experimental policy evaluations in a representative survey in Germany (N>1, 900). We find that a majority of 75% supports the idea of small-scale evaluations of policies before enacting them at a large scale. Experimentally varying whether the evaluations are explicitly described as “experiments” has a precisely estimated overall zero effect on public support. Our results indicate political leeway for experimental policy evaluation, a practice that is still uncommon in Germany. |
| Keywords: | experiment aversion, policy experimentation, education |
| JEL: | I28 H40 C93 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10707&r=exp |
| By: | Matthew Embrey (Department of Economics, University of Sussex, BN1 9SL Falmer, United Kingdom); Christian Seel; J. Philipp Reiss |
| Abstract: | This paper experimentally investigates excessive risk taking in contest schemes by implementing a stopping task based on Seel and Strack (2013). In this stylized setting, managers with contest payoffs have an incentive to delay halting projects with a negative expectation, with the induced inefficiency being highest for a moderately negative drift. The experiment systematically varies the negative drift (between-subjects) and the payoff incentives (within-subject). We find evidence for excessive risk taking in all our treatment conditions, with the non-monotonicity at least as problematic as predicted. Contrary to the theoretical predictions, this aggregate pattern of behaviour is seen even without contest incentives. Further analysis suggests that many subjects display behaviour consistent with some intrinsic motivation for taking risk. This intrinsic motive and the strategic motive for excessive risk taking reinforce the non-monotonicity. The experiment uncovers a behavioural nuance where contest incentives crowd out an intrinsic inclination to gamble. |
| Keywords: | Contests, Relative performance pay, Risk-taking behaviour, Laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D81 |
| Date: | 2023–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sus:susewp:0623&r=exp |
| By: | Gayane Baghumyan |
| Abstract: | Understanding what drives discriminatory behavior is important in order to identify the best strategy to combat it. In this study, I exogenously manipulate participants’ beliefs about the origins of sexual orientation by providing evidence that supports biological causes of homosexuality. I employ money allocation tasks to measure discrimination. This allows me to causally identify the impact of information on discriminatory behavior. I first document the prevalence of discrimination against individuals with same-sex partners in Russia. On average, roughly 54% of participants exhibit discriminatory behavior against profiles with same-sex partners by allocating 16 percentage points less money to them. Further, the results suggest that exposure to evidence on the biological causes of homosexuality negatively affects discriminatory behavior. Participants in the treatment group allocate less money to profiles with same-sex partners, relative to participants in the baseline group. Potential rationales for this behavior could include the following: (i) the provision of information that contradicts existing beliefs might cause cognitive dissonance, triggering irritation and intensifying discriminatory tendencies; (ii) the information might foster beliefs that individuals in same-sex partnerships are fundamentally ’other’ - even at a biological level - thereby widening the perceived social gap between participants and these sexual minority groups and fostering discrimination further. |
| Keywords: | discrimination, information, sexual minorities, online experiment |
| JEL: | C99 D83 D91 J15 J71 |
| Date: | 2023–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cer:papers:wp762&r=exp |
| By: | Giovanni Montanari; Salvatore Nunnari |
| Abstract: | We report the results of an experiment on selective exposure to information. A decision maker interested in learning about an uncertain state of the world can acquire information from one of two sources which have opposite biases: when informed on the state, they report it truthfully; when uninformed, they report their favorite state. A Bayesian decision maker is better off seeking confirmatory information unless the source biased against the prior is sufficiently more reliable. In line with the theory, subjects are more likely to seek confirmatory information when sources are symmetrically reliable. On the other hand, when sources are asymmetrically reliable, subjects are more likely to consult the more reliable source even when prior beliefs are strongly unbalanced and this source is less informative. Our experiment suggests that base rate neglect and simple heuristics (e.g., listen to the most reliable source) are important drivers of the endogenous acquisition of information. |
| Keywords: | information acquisition, biased information sources, selective exposure, echo chambers, confirmation bias, base rate neglect, laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D81 D83 D91 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10699&r=exp |
| By: | Pëllumb Reshidi (Duke University); Alessandro Lizzeri (Princeton University); Leeat Yariv (Princeton University); Jimmy Chan (National Taiwan University and The Chinese University of Hong Kong); Wing Suen (University of Hong Kong) |
| Abstract: | Many committees—juries, political task forces, etc.—spend time gathering costly information before reaching a decision. We report results from lab experiments focused on such information collection processes. We consider decisions governed by individuals and groups and compare how voting rules affect outcomes. We also contrast static information collection, as in classical hypothesis testing, with dynamic collection, as in sequential hypothesis testing. Several insights emerge. Static information collection is excessive, and sequential information collection is non-stationary, producing declining decision accuracies over time. Furthermore, groups using majority rule yield especially hasty and inaccurate decisions. Nonetheless, sequential information collection is welfare enhancing relative to static collection, particularly when unanimous rules are used. |
| Keywords: | Collective Choice, Experiments, Information Acquisition |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D72 D83 D87 |
| Date: | 2022–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:cepsud:312&r=exp |
| By: | Kinnl, Klara; Möller, Jakob; Walter, Anna |
| Abstract: | We investigate gender differences in individual credit claiming for teamwork. In a large-scale online experiment, participants work on an interactive task in teams of two and subsequently report their subjective contribution to the teamwork. In three between-subject treatments, we incentivize participants to either i) state their beliefs about their contribution truthfully, ii) to exaggerate their contribution, or iii) to exaggerate and thereby harm the other team member. Our setup allows us to distinguish between overconfidence and exaggeration with and without negative externalities, and to test whether there is a gender gap in credit claiming. We find that men and women both equally overestimate their contributions, but men exaggerate more than women: As soon as there is an incentive to exaggerate, men claim to have contributed more than women, even when exaggeration harms the team member. This gender gap in credit claiming is particularly pronounced among very large claims and for high-contributors. Strategic misrepresentations of contributions to teamwork can thus have sizeable equity consequences on the labor market. |
| Keywords: | Experiment, Gender differences, Incentives, Team work, Overconfidence, Beliefs |
| Date: | 2023–08–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wus055:46675449&r=exp |
| By: | Julia E. Tobias; Sudarno Sumarto; Habib Moody |
| Keywords: | conditional cash transfer, political behavior, Indonesia |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:agg:wpaper:262&r=exp |
| By: | Yiwei Qian; Naveen Sunder; Adnan M. S. Fakir (Department of Economics, University of Sussex, BN1 9SL Falmer, United Kingdom); Rakesh Banerjee; Tushar Bharati |
| Abstract: | We conduct an experiment on a major international online freelancing labor market platform to study the impact of greater flexibility in choosing work hours within a day on female participation. We post identical job advertisements (for 320 jobs) covering a wide range of tasks (80 distinct tasks) that differ only in flexibility and the fee offered. Comparing application numbers across these jobs, we find that though both men and women prefer flexibility, the elasticity of response for women is twice as large as for men. Flexible jobs receive 24 percent more female applications and 12 percent more male applications compared to inflexible jobs. Our findings have important implications in explaining gender differences in labor market outcomes and for firms interested in attracting more women employees. |
| Keywords: | workplace flexibility, online freelancing jobs, female labour force participation |
| JEL: | J22 O14 J16 L86 |
| Date: | 2023–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sus:susewp:0723&r=exp |
| By: | Haeckl, Simone; Möller, Jakob; Zednik, Anita |
| Abstract: | We investigate the fairness views of impartial spectators towards workers who act or communicate competitively but are unsuccessful in a winner-take-all real-effort task. In an online experiment with over 5, 800 participants, spectators show significantly less concern toward unsuccessful workers who voluntarily entered a competition for pay, behaved selfishly, or communicated in a dominant tone. There are two main drivers behind the spectators’ changes in financial redistributions towards low earners: firstly, spectators hold workers more accountable when they behave competitively, and secondly, spectators dislike if a worker communicates in a dominant style. We further find that unsuccessful male workers are treated harsher than female workers when workers’ displayed competitiveness is low. However, this gender gap is diminished when workers acted competitively, and both genders are shown equally low concern. |
| Keywords: | Gender; Competition; Backlash; Experiment |
| Date: | 2023–10–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wus055:46676606&r=exp |
| By: | Anna Bartczak (University of Warsaw, Faculty of Economic Sciences); Wiktor Budziński (University of Warsaw, Faculty of Economic Sciences); Ulf Liebe (University of Warwick, Departement of Sociology); Jurgen Meyerhoff (Berlin School of Economics and Law) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we investigate the effect of respondents’ attitudes concerning distributive justice in payments on their stated preferences for programmes reducing ambient air pollution in four cities in Poland. By combining two multi-factorial survey experiments, we propose a novel approach of incorporating justice attitudes into non-market valuation. In the first experiment – a factorial survey experiment (FSE) – we record justice attitudes towards payments. In the second experiment – a choice experiment (CE) – we elicit stated preferences for air pollution reduction programmes. As a modelling framework, we employ a hybrid choice model. The same respondents undertook both experiments in separate surveys one to two weeks apart, minimising the likelihood of biased estimates of the effect of justice attitudes on stated preferences. The results indicate a substantial effect of the justice attitude on the stated willingness to pay. The proposed approach could be used for joint modelling of justice attitudes and preferences in a wide range of fields, contributing further insights into their interactions. |
| Keywords: | air pollution, choice experiment, distributive justice attitude, factorial survey experiment, hybrid choice model, willingness to pay |
| JEL: | D63 I18 Q51 Q53 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:war:wpaper:2023-26&r=exp |
| By: | Vojtech Bartos; Silvia Castro; Kristina Czura; Timm Opitz |
| Abstract: | We analyze gender discrimination in entrepreneurship finance. Access to finance is crucial for entrepreneurial success, yet constraints for women are particularly pronounced. We structurally unpack whether loan officers evaluate business ideas and implementation constraints differently for male and female entrepreneurs, both as individual entrepreneurs or in entrepreneurial teams. In a lab-in-the-field experiment with Ugandan loan officers, we document gender discrimination of individual female entrepreneurs, but no gender bias in the evaluation of entrepreneurial teams. Our results suggest that the observed bias is not driven by animus against female entrepreneurs but rather by differential beliefs about women’s entrepreneurial ability or implementation constraints in running a business. Policies aimed at team creation for start-up enterprises may have an additional benefit of equalizing access to finance and ultimately stimulating growth. |
| Keywords: | access to finance, gender bias, entrepreneurship, lab-in-the-field |
| JEL: | C93 G21 J16 L25 L26 O16 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10719&r=exp |
| By: | Lara Berger (University of Cologne); Anna Kerkhof (University of Munich, ifo Institute for Economic Research, and CESifo); Felix Mindl (University of Cologne and iwp Institute for Economic Policy); Johannes Münster (University of Cologne) |
| Abstract: | We conduct a randomized survey experiment to compare the short-term and longer-term effects of fact checking to a brief media literacy intervention. We show that the impact of fact checking is limited to the corrected fake news, whereas media literacy helps to distinguish between false and correct information more generally, both immediately and two weeks after the intervention. A plausible mechanism is that media literacy enables participants to critically evaluate social media postings, while fact checking fails to enhance their skills. Our results promote media literacy as an effective tool to fight fake news, that is cheap, scalable, and easy-to-implement. |
| Keywords: | Covid, Facebook, fact checking, fake news, media literacy, misinformation, nutrition, social media, supplements, survey experiment, vaccine |
| JEL: | L51 L82 Z18 |
| Date: | 2023–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:262&r=exp |
| By: | Tobias König (Linnaeus University); Dorothea Kübler (WZB Berlin, TU Berlin); Lydia Mechtenberg (University of Hamburg); Renke Schmacker (WZB Berlin, DIW Berlin) |
| Abstract: | We investigate fairness preferences in matching mechanisms using a spectator design. Participants choose between the Boston mechanism or the serial dictatorship mechanism (SD) played by others. In our setup, the Boston mechanism generates justified envy, while the strategy-proof SD ensures envy-freeness. When priorities are merit-based, many spectators prefer the Boston mechanism, and this preference increases when priorities are determined by luck. At the same time, there is support for SD, but mainly when priorities are merit-based. Stated voting motives indicate that choosing SD is driven by concerns for envy-freeness rather than strategy-proofness, while support for the Boston mechanism stems from the belief that strategic choices create entitlements. |
| Keywords: | matching markets; school choice; voting; Boston mechanism; sincere agents; justified envy; |
| JEL: | D47 C92 I24 D74 |
| Date: | 2023–11–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:442&r=exp |
| By: | Davide Viviano; Lihua Lei; Guido Imbens; Brian Karrer; Okke Schrijvers; Liang Shi |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the design of cluster experiments to estimate the global treatment effect in the presence of spillovers on a single network. We provide an econometric framework to choose the clustering that minimizes the worst-case mean-squared error of the estimated global treatment effect. We show that the optimal clustering can be approximated as the solution of a novel penalized min-cut optimization problem computed via off-the-shelf semi-definite programming algorithms. Our analysis also characterizes easy-to-check conditions to choose between a cluster or individual-level randomization. We illustrate the method's properties using unique network data from the universe of Facebook's users and existing network data from a field experiment. |
| Date: | 2023–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2310.14983&r=exp |
| By: | John List; Fatemeh Momeni; Michael Vlassopoulos; Yves Zenou |
| Abstract: | This study explores the role of neighborhoods on human capital formation at an early age. We do so by estimating the spillover effects of an early childhood intervention on the educational attainment of a large sample of disadvantaged children in the United States. We document large spillover effects on the cognitive skills of children living near treated children, which amount to approximately 40% of the direct treatment effects. Interestingly, these spillover effects are localized and decrease with the spatial distance to treated neighbors. We do not find evidence of spillover effects on non-cognitive skills. Perhaps our most novel insight is the underlying mechanisms at work: the spillover effect on cognitive scores is very localized and seems to operate through the child's social network, mostly between treated kids. We do not find evidence that parents' or children's social networks are effective for non-cognitive skills. Overall, our results reveal the importance of public programs and neighborhoods on human capital formation at an early age, highlighting that human capital accumulation is fundamentally a social activity. |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:framed:00722&r=exp |
| By: | Francisco Scott |
| Abstract: | The size and distribution of surplus in markets where credence quality attributes of food (e.g., organic, non-GMO) are conveyed through some informational mechanism (typically labels) crucially depend on 1) how information changes consumers’ perception of quality and 2) producers’ strategic choice of quality provision in response to changes in consumers’ perception of quality. This paper examines the hypothesis that consumers’ misperception of quality information can provide incentives to sellers to increase quality and offset the lower quality that exists in markets where firms imperfectly compete in quality and prices. Using previously derived theoretical predictions of a two-stage game in which firms sequentially choose qualities—which are misperceived by consumers—to then simultaneously choose prices, I conduct a laboratory experiment that emulates changes in consumers’ perception of quality and examines their effects on producers’ provision of quality and market surplus. My results indicate that total surplus increases mainly with overvaluation of the high-quality product, confirming theoretical predictions. But contrary to the theory, I find that low-quality sellers try to compete by raising their quality levels too much when low quality is overvalued, dampening their quality-adjusted prices. As a result, welfare approaches first-best only when the high-quality product produced by the market leader is overvalued. These results highlight the importance of examining the market structure when designing informational policies. |
| Keywords: | agriculture; consumer behavior; Food industry and trade |
| JEL: | C9 Q18 |
| Date: | 2023–10–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedkrw:97202&r=exp |
| By: | Bansak, Kirk; Paulson, Elisabeth |
| Abstract: | This study explores the public's preferences between algorithmic and human decision-makers (DMs) in high-stakes contexts, how these preferences are impacted by performance metrics, and whether the public's evaluation of performance differs when considering algorithmic versus human DMs. Leveraging a conjoint experimental design, respondents (n = 9, 030) chose between pairs of DM profiles in two scenarios: pre-trial release decisions and bank loan decisions. DM profiles varied on the DM’s type (human v. algorithm) and on three metrics—defendant crime rate/loan default rate, false positive rate (FPR) among white defendants/applicants, and FPR among minority defendants/applicants—as well as an implicit fairness metric defined by the absolute difference between the two FPRs. Controlling for performance, we observe a general tendency to favor human DMs, though this is driven by a subset of respondents who expect human DMs to perform better in the real world. In addition, although a large portion of respondents claimed to prioritize fairness, we find that the impact of fairness on respondents' actual choices is limited. We also find that the relative importance of the four performance metrics remains consistent across DM type, suggesting that the public's preferences related to DM performance do not vary fundamentally between algorithmic and human DMs. Taken together, our analysis suggests that the public as a whole does not hold algorithmic DMs to a stricter fairness or efficiency standard, which has important implications as policymakers and technologists grapple with the integration of AI into pivotal societal functions. |
| Date: | 2023–10–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:pghmx&r=exp |
| By: | Belguise, Margot (Department of Economics, Warwick University); Huang, Yuchen (Paris School of Economics); Mo, Zhexun (Paris School of Economics & the World Inequality Lab) |
| Abstract: | Recent empirical evidence contends that meritocratic ideals are mainly a Western phenomenon. Intriguingly, the Chinese people appear to not differentiate between merit- and luck-based inequalities, despite their rich historical legacy of meritocratic institutions. We propose that this phenomenon might be due to the Chinese public’s greater adherence towards the status quo. In order to test this hypothesis, we run an incentivized redistribution experiment with elite university students in China and France, by varying the initial split of payoffs between two real-life workers to redistribute from. We show that Chinese respondents consistently and significantly choose more non-redistribution (playing the status quo) across both highly unequal and relatively equal status quo scenarios than our French respondents. Additionally, we also show that the Chinese sample does differentiate between merit- and luck-based inequalities, and does not redistribute less than the French absent status quo conformity. Ultimately, we contend that such a phenomenon is indicative of low political agency rather than apathy, inattention, or libertarian beliefs among the Chinese. Notably, our findings show that Chinese individuals’ conformity to the status quo is particularly pronounced among those from families of working-class and farming backgrounds, while it is conspicuously absent among individuals whose families have closer ties to the private sector. JEL Codes: D31 ; D63 ; D73 ; D83 ; H23 ; H24 ; P26 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1476&r=exp |
| By: | Rahul Ladhania; Jann Spiess; Lyle Ungar; Wenbo Wu |
| Abstract: | We consider learning personalized assignments to one of many treatment arms from a randomized controlled trial. Standard methods that estimate heterogeneous treatment effects separately for each arm may perform poorly in this case due to excess variance. We instead propose methods that pool information across treatment arms: First, we consider a regularized forest-based assignment algorithm based on greedy recursive partitioning that shrinks effect estimates across arms. Second, we augment our algorithm by a clustering scheme that combines treatment arms with consistently similar outcomes. In a simulation study, we compare the performance of these approaches to predicting arm-wise outcomes separately, and document gains of directly optimizing the treatment assignment with regularization and clustering. In a theoretical model, we illustrate how a high number of treatment arms makes finding the best arm hard, while we can achieve sizable utility gains from personalization by regularized optimization. |
| Date: | 2023–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2311.00577&r=exp |
| By: | Luis Alvarez; Ciro Biderman |
| Abstract: | Can temporary subsidies to bundles induce long-run changes in demand due to learning about the relative quality of one of its constituent goods? This paper provides theoretical and experimental evidence on the role of this mechanism. Theoretically, we introduce a model where an agent learns about the quality of an innovation on an essential good through consumption. Our results show that the contemporaneous effect of a one-off subsidy to a bundle that contains the innovation may be decomposed into a direct price effect, and an indirect learning motive, whereby an agent leverages the discount to increase the informational bequest left to her future selves. We then assess the predictions of our theory in a randomised experiment in a ridesharing platform. The experiment provided two-week discounts for car trips integrating with a train or metro station (a bundle). Given the heavy-tailed nature of our data, we follow \cite{Athey2023} and, motivated by our theory, propose a semiparametric model for treatment effects that enables the construction of more efficient estimators. We introduce a statistically efficient estimator for our model by relying on L-moments, a robust alternative to standard moments. Our estimator immediately yields a specification test for the semiparametric model; moreover, in our adopted parametrisation, it can be easily computed through generalized least squares. Our empirical results indicate that a two-week 50\% discount on car trips integrating with train/metro leads to a contemporaneous increase in the demand for integrated rides, and, consistent with our learning model, persistent changes in the mean and dispersion of nonintegrated rides. These effects persist for over four months after the discount. A simple calibration of our model shows that around 40\% to 50\% of the estimated contemporaneous increase in integrated rides may be attributed to a learning motive. |
| Date: | 2023–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2311.01217&r=exp |
| By: | Christos Genakos; Costas Roumanias; Tommaso Valletti |
| Abstract: | We present novel evidence from a large panel of UK consumers who receive personalized reminders from a specialist price-comparison website about the precise amount they could save by switching to their best-suited alternative mobile telephony plan. We document three phenomena. First, even self-registered consumers with positive savings exhibit inertia. Second, we show that being informed about potential savings has a positive and significant effect on switching. Third, controlling for savings, the effect of incurring overage payments is significant and similar in magnitude to the effect of savings: paying an amount that exceeds the recurrent monthly fee weighs more on the switching decision than being informed that one can save that same amount by switching to a less inclusive plan. We interpret this asymmetric reaction on switching behavior as potential evidence of loss aversion. In other words, when facing complex and recurrent tariff plan choices, consumers care about savings but also seem to be willing to pay upfront fees in order to get "peace of mind". |
| Keywords: | tariff/plan choice, inertia, switching, loss aversion, mobile telephony |
| Date: | 2023–07–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1939&r=exp |
| By: | Jenny S Kim; Kyungmin Kim; Richard Van Weelden |
| Abstract: | We consider the classic veto bargaining model but allow the agenda setter to engage in persuasion to convince the veto player to approve her proposal. We fully characterize the optimal proposal and experiment when Vetoer has quadratic loss, and show that the proposer-optimal can be achieved either by providing no information or with a simple binary experiment. Proposer chooses to reveal partial information when there is sufficient expected misalignment with Vetoer. In this case the opportunity to engage in persuasion strictly benefits Proposer and increases the scope to exercise agenda power. |
| Date: | 2023–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2310.13148&r=exp |
| By: | Laura Boudreau (Columbia University); Sylvain Chassang (Princeton University); Ada González-Torre (Ben Gurion University); Rachel Heath (University of Washington) |
| Abstract: | We evaluate secure survey methods designed for the ongoing monitoring of harassment in organizations. To do so, we partner with a large Bangladeshi garment manufacturer and experiment with different designs of phone-based worker surveys. “Hard†garbling (HG) responses to sensitive questions, i.e., automatically recording a random subset as complaints, increases reporting of physical harassment by 290%, sexual harassment by 271%, and threatening behavior by 45%, from reporting rates of 1.5%, 1.8%, and 9.9%, respectively, under the status quo of direct elicitation. Rapport-building and removing team identifiers from responses do not significantly increase reporting. We show that garbled reports can be used to consistently estimate policy-relevant statistics of harassment, including: How prevalent is it? What share of managers is responsible for the misbehavior? and, How isolated are its victims? In our data, harassment is widespread, the problem is not restricted to a minority of managers, and victims are often isolated within teams. |
| Keywords: | Harassment, whistleblowing, garbling, secure survey design, gender, garments, Bangladesh |
| JEL: | C42 D82 J70 J71 J81 J83 M54 |
| Date: | 2023–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:cepsud:311&r=exp |
| By: | ENDO Yuya; ONO Yoshikuni |
| Abstract: | Do male and female candidates equally benefit from disclosing their political ambitions during electoral campaigns? Generally, candidates for elective office are politically ambitious individuals vying for positions of power. There is a pervasive stereotype of women that sees them as ideally modest and reserved, which is potentially contradictory to the seemingly masculine nature of political office. Voters swayed by this stereotype may not reward female candidates for openly expressing their political ambitions to the same extent they would male candidates. To investigate this issue, we conducted a vignette experiment where both the candidate’s gender and their stated motivation for seeking office were randomly manipulated. Our findings reveal that respondents favored candidates—regardless of gender—who were transparent about their political ambition. Nevertheless, male candidates who openly displayed ambition were perceived as more favorable among voters, whereas female candidates did not receive a comparable boost to their image. These results indicate that the electoral benefits garnered from revealing political ambitions are not equally distributed between men and women. |
| Date: | 2023–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:23074&r=exp |