nep-exp New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2023‒06‒26
25 papers chosen by
Daniel Houser
George Mason University

  1. Peer Effects on Academic Self-concept: A Large Randomized Field Experiment By Tamás Keller; Jinho Kim; Felix Elwert
  2. Image Concerns and the Dynamics of Prosocial Behavior By Jana Hofmeier; Louis Strang
  3. Experimental Evidence on the Acceptance of Males Falling Behind By Cappelen, Alexander W.; Falch, Ranveig; Tungodden, Bertil
  4. Betting on the Lord: lotteries and religiosity in Haiti By Emmanuelle Auriol; Diego Delissaint; Maleke Fourati; Josepa Miquel-Florensa; Paul Seabright
  5. Free to Fail? Paternalistic Preferences in the United States By Björn Bartling; Alexander W. Cappelen; Henning Hermes; Marit Skivenes; Bertil Tungodden
  6. Free to fail? Paternalistic preferences in the United States By Bartling, Björn; Cappelen, Alexander W.; Hermes, Henning; Skivenes, Marit; Tungodden, Bertil
  7. A Behaviorally-Validated Warm Glow Questionnaire By Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Lyford, Alex; Zhang, Mingfang
  8. Free to Fail? Paternalistic Preferences in the United States By Bartling, Björn; Cappelen, Alexander W.; Hermes, Henning; Skivenes, Marit; Tungodden, Bertil
  9. Free to Fail? Paternalistic Preferences in the United States By Bartling, Björn; Cappelen, Alexander W.; Hermes, Henning; Skivenes, Marit; Tungodden, Bertil
  10. Skewness-seeking behavior and financial investments By Matteo Benuzzi; Matteo Ploner
  11. A Group Public Goods Game with Position Uncertainty By Anwar, Sakib; Bruno, Jorge; SenGupta, Sonali
  12. Discrimination on the child care market: A nationwide field experiment By Hermes, Henning; Lergetporer, Philipp; Mierisch, Fabian; Peter, Frauke
  13. Social Preferences: Fundamental Characteristics and Economic Consequences By Fehr, Ernst; Charness, Gary
  14. Discrimination on the child care market: A nationwide field experiment By Hermes, Henning; Lergetporer, Philipp; Mierisch, Fabian; Peter, Frauke; Wiederhold, Simon
  15. Good or Bad News First? The Effect of Feedback Order on Motivation and Performance By Lavinia Kinne
  16. Is Mobile Money Changing Rural Africa? Evidence from a Field Experiment By Batista, Catia; Vicente, Pedro C.
  17. Time for Tea: Measuring Discounting for Money and Consumption without the Utility Confound By Abdellaoui, Mohammed; Kemel, Emmanuel; Panin, Amma; Vieider, Ferdinand M.
  18. Improving Health and Safety in the Informal Sector: Evidence from a Randomized Trial in Bangladesh By Islam, Asad; Lee, Wang-Sheng; Triyana, Margaret; Xia, Xing
  19. Does access to citizenship confer socio-economic returns? Evidence from a randomized control design By Hainmueller, Jens; Cascardi, Elisa; Hotard, Michael; Koslowski, Rey; Lawrence, Duncan; Yasenov, Vasil; Laitin, David
  20. Technological Change, Task Complexity, and Preferences for Redistribution By David Hope; Julian Limberg; Nina Weber
  21. Estimating the carbon footprint of the GRAND project, a multi-decade astrophysics experiment By Clarisse Aujoux; Kumiko Kotera; Odile Blanchard
  22. Prosocial Risk-Taking: Growing the Pie or Increasing your Slice? By Nina Weber
  23. Central bank communication and trust: an experimental study on the European Central Bank and the general public By Mochhoury, Sarah
  24. Getting ahead of the game: Experiential learning for groundwater governance in Ethiopia By ElDidi, Hagar; Zhang, Wei; Gelaw, Fekadu; De Petris, Caterina; Blackmore, Ivy; Teka, Natnael; Yimam, Seid; Mekonnen, Dawit Kelemework; Ringler, Claudia; Meinzen-Dick, Ruth Suseela
  25. Modeling Interference Using Experiment Roll-out By Ariel Boyarsky; Hongseok Namkoong; Jean Pouget-Abadie

  1. By: Tamás Keller (KRTK KTI; Computational Social Science - Research Center for Educational and Network Studies, Centre for Social Sciences; and TÁRKI Social Research Institute); Jinho Kim (Department of Health Policy and Management, Korea University and Interdisciplinary Program in Precision Public Health, Korea University); Felix Elwert (Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin-Madison and Department of Biostatistics and Medical Informatics)
    Abstract: Social theories posit that peers affect students’ academic self-concept (ASC). Most prominently, Big-Fish-Little-Pond, invidious comparison, and relative deprivation theories predict that exposure to academically stronger peers decreases students’ ASC, and exposure to academically weaker peers increases students’ ASC. These propositions have not yet been tested experimentally. We executed a large and pre-registered field experiment that randomized students to deskmates within 195 classrooms of 41 schools (N = 3, 022). Our primary experimental analysis found no evidence of an effect of peer achievement on ASC in either direction. Exploratory analyses hinted at a subject-specific deskmate effect on ASC in verbal skills, and that sitting next to a lower-achieving boy increased girls’ ASC (but not that sitting next to a higher-achieving boy decreased girls’ ASC). Critically, however, none of these group-specific results held up to even modest corrections for multiple hypothesis testing. Contrary to theory, our randomized field experiment thus provides no evidence for an effect of peer achievement on students’ ASC.
    Keywords: Academic self-concept, peer effects, social comparison, Big-Fish-Little-Pond, invidious comparison, relative deprivation, randomized field experiment, deskmates, Hungary
    JEL: C93 I21 I24
    Date: 2022–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:has:discpr:2225&r=exp
  2. By: Jana Hofmeier (University of Bonn); Louis Strang (University of Cologne)
    Abstract: This paper studies the dynamic effect of observability on prosocial behavior. We hypothesize a twofold positive effect. First, people should act more prosocially when being observed. Second, this increased level of prosociality should motivate an ongoing elevated altruistic attitude, in accordance with the concept of altruistic capital formation. We test our predictions running two experiments in which subjects make a first donation decision either observed or anonymously. Subsequently, all subjects face a second anonymous donation decision. In gen- eral, we observe high rates of altruistic behavior. However, we find only weak positive effects of observability on first-stage prosocial behavior and no effects on second-stage prosocial behavior.
    Keywords: Prosocial Behavior, Donation, Moral Licensing, Altruistic Capital, Social preferences, Lab experiment
    JEL: C91 D64
    Date: 2023–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:237&r=exp
  3. By: Cappelen, Alexander W. (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Falch, Ranveig (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Tungodden, Bertil (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration)
    Abstract: In recent decades, an increasing share of males struggle in the labor market and education. We show in a set of large-scale experimental studies involving more than 30, 000 Americans that people are more accepting of males falling behind than females falling behind and less supportive of government policies supporting males falling behind. We provide evidence of the underlying mechanism being statistical fairness discrimination: people consider males falling behind to be less deserving of support than females falling behind because they believe that males are more likely than females to fall behind due to lack of effort. The findings are important for understanding how society perceive and respond to the growing number of disadvantaged males.
    Keywords: inequality; statistical fairness discrimination; experiment
    JEL: C91 D63 J16
    Date: 2023–06–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhheco:2023_013&r=exp
  4. By: Emmanuelle Auriol (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Diego Delissaint; Maleke Fourati; Josepa Miquel-Florensa (IAST - Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse); Paul Seabright (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)
    Abstract: We conducted an experimental study in Haiti testing for the relationship between religious belief and individual risk taking behavior. 774 subjects played lotteries in a standard neutral protocol and subsequently with reduced endowments but in the presence of religious images of Catholic, Protestant and Voodoo tradition. Subjects chose between paying to play a lottery with an image of their choice, and saving their money to play with no image. Those who chose the former are dened as image buyers and those who chose the latter as non-buyers. Image buyers, who tend to be less educated, more rural, and to exhibit greater religiosity, bet more than non-buyers in all games. In addition, in the presence of religious images all participants took more risk, and buyers took more risk when playing in the presence of their chosen images than when playing with other images. We develop a theoretical model calibrated with our experimental data to explore the channels through which religious images might a ect risk-taking. Our results suggest that the presence of images tends to increase individuals' subjective probability of winning the lottery, and that subjects therefore believe in a god who intervenes actively in the world in response to their requests.
    Keywords: Risk preferences, Religion, Field Experiment
    Date: 2021–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03353066&r=exp
  5. By: Björn Bartling; Alexander W. Cappelen; Henning Hermes; Marit Skivenes; Bertil Tungodden
    Abstract: We study paternalistic preferences in two large-scale experiments with participants from the general population in the United States. Spectators decide whether to intervene to prevent a stakeholder, who is mistaken about the choice set, from making a choice that is not aligned with the stakeholders’ own preferences. We find causal evidence for the nature of the intervention being of great importance for the spectators’ willingness to intervene. Only a minority of the spectators implement a hard intervention that removes the stakeholder’s freedom to choose, while a large majority implement a soft intervention that provides information without restricting the choice set. This finding holds regardless of the stakeholder’s responsibility for being mistaken about the choice set – whether the source of mistake is internal or external – and in different subgroups of the population. We introduce a theoretical framework with two paternalistic types – libertarian paternalists and welfarists – and show that the two types can account for most of the spectator behavior. We estimate that about half of the spectators are welfarists and that about a third are libertarian paternalists. Our results shed light on attitudes toward paternalistic policies and the broad support for soft interventions.
    Keywords: paternalism, libertarian paternalism, welfarism, freedom to choose
    JEL: C91 C93 D69 D91
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10441&r=exp
  6. By: Bartling, Björn; Cappelen, Alexander W.; Hermes, Henning; Skivenes, Marit; Tungodden, Bertil
    Abstract: We study paternalistic preferences in two large-scale experiments with participants from the general population in the United States. Spectators decide whether to intervene to prevent a stakeholder, who is mistaken about the choice set, from making a choice that is not aligned with the stakeholders' own preferences. We find causal evidence for the nature of the intervention being of great importance for the spectators' willingness to intervene. Only a minority of the spectators implement a hard intervention that removes the stakeholder's freedom to choose, while a large majority implement a soft intervention that provides information without restricting the choice set. This finding holds regardless of the stakeholder's responsibility for being mistaken about the choice set - whether the source of mistake is internal or external - and in different subgroups of the population. We introduce a theoretical framework with two paternalistic types - libertarian paternalists and welfarists - and show that the two types can account for most of the spectator behavior. We estimate that about half of the spectators are welfarists and that about a third are libertarian paternalists. Our results shed light on attitudes toward paternalistic policies and the broad support for soft interventions.
    Keywords: paternalism, libertarian paternalism, welfarism, freedom to choose
    JEL: C91 C93 D69 D91
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:400&r=exp
  7. By: Carpenter, Jeffrey P. (Middlebury College); Lyford, Alex (Middlebury College); Zhang, Mingfang (Middlebury College)
    Abstract: Measuring the social preferences of economic agents using experiments has become common place. This process, while incentive compatible, is costly and time consuming, making it infeasible in many settings. We combine standard altruism and warm glow choice experiments with a battery of candidate survey questions to construct behaviorally-validated questionnaires. We use machine learning to create parsimonious 3-question modules that reliably replicate existing results on general altruism and provide an alternative method for collecting warm glow preferences.
    Keywords: experiment, altruism, warm glow, survey validation
    JEL: C91 D64 D91 H41
    Date: 2023–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16205&r=exp
  8. By: Bartling, Björn (University of Zurich); Cappelen, Alexander W. (NHH Bergen, Norway); Hermes, Henning (Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)); Skivenes, Marit (University of Bergen); Tungodden, Bertil (NHH Bergen, Norway)
    Abstract: We study paternalistic preferences in two large-scale experiments with participants from the general population in the United States. Spectators decide whether to intervene to prevent a stakeholder, who is mistaken about the choice set, from making a choice that is not aligned with the stakeholders' own preferences. We find causal evidence for the nature of the intervention being of great importance for the spectators' willingness to intervene. Only a minority of the spectators implement a hard intervention that removes the stakeholder's freedom to choose, while a large majority implement a soft intervention that provides information without restricting the choice set. This finding holds regardless of the stakeholder's responsibility for being mistaken about the choice set – whether the source of mistake is internal or external – and in different subgroups of the population. We introduce a theoretical framework with two paternalistic types – libertarian paternalists and welfarists – and show that the two types can account for most of the spectator behavior. We estimate that about half of the spectators are welfarists and that about a third are libertarian paternalists. Our results shed light on attitudes toward paternalistic policies and the broad support for soft interventions.
    Keywords: paternalism, libertarian paternalism, welfarism, freedom to choose
    JEL: C91 C93 D69 D91
    Date: 2023–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16151&r=exp
  9. By: Bartling, Björn (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Cappelen, Alexander W. (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Hermes, Henning (Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics); Skivenes, Marit (University of Bergen); Tungodden, Bertil (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration)
    Abstract: We study paternalistic preferences in two large-scale experiments with participants from the general population in the United States. Spectators decide whether to intervene to prevent a stakeholder, who is mistaken about the choice set, from making a choice that is not aligned with the stakeholders’ own preferences. We find causal evidence for the nature of the intervention being of great importance for the spectators’ willingness to intervene. Only a minority of the spectators implement a hard intervention that removes the stakeholder’s freedom to choose, while a large majority implement a soft intervention that provides information without restricting the choice set. This finding holds regardless of the stakeholder’s responsibility for being mistaken about the choice set – whether the source of mistake is internal or external – and in different subgroups of the population. We introduce a theoretical framework with two paternalistic types – libertarian paternalists and welfarists – and show that the two types can account for most of the spectator behavior. We estimate that about half of the spectators are welfarists and that about a third are libertarian paternalists. Our results shed light on attitudes toward paternalistic policies and the broad support for soft interventions.
    Keywords: paternalism; libertarian paternalism; welfarism; freedom to choose
    JEL: C91 C93 D69 D91
    Date: 2023–05–16
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhheco:2023_009&r=exp
  10. By: Matteo Benuzzi; Matteo Ploner
    Abstract: Recent theoretical and empirical contributions have demonstrated the sig- nificance of higher-order moments, such as skewness, in influencing financial decisions. Most current experimental literature relies on lotteries with a lim- ited number of potential outcomes, which do not accurately represent real-life investments. To address this gap, we conducted a pre-registered experiment that examines preferences toward investment opportunities with varying skew- ness using continuous distributions. Our findings reveal several key insights. Firstly, there is an overall preference for positively skewed distributions of outcomes. Secondly, we observed a substitution effect between risk-taking, as measured by variance, and the direction of skewness. Lastly, we established a positive correlation between skewness-seeking behavior and speculative be- havior and a negative correlation between skewness-seeking behavior and risk perception of positive skewness.
    Keywords: Skewness, Risk-taking, Stochastic Dominance, Experiment
    JEL: C91 D81 G11
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trn:utwpce:2301&r=exp
  11. By: Anwar, Sakib; Bruno, Jorge; SenGupta, Sonali
    Abstract: We model a dynamic public good contribution game, where players are (naturally) formed into groups. The groups are exogenously placed in a sequence, with limited information available to players about their groups' position in the sequence. Contribution decisions are made by players simultaneously and independently, and the groups' total contribution is made sequentially. We try to capture both inter and intra-group behaviors and analyze different situations where players observe partial history about total contributions of their predecessor groups. Given this framework, we show that even when players observe a history of defection (no contribution), a cooperative outcome is achievable. This is particularly interesting in the situation when players observe only their immediate predecessor groups' contribution, where we observe that players play an important role in motivating others to contribute.
    Keywords: Social Dilemmas, Public Goods, Position Uncertainty, Voluntary Contributions, Fundraising, Groups
    JEL: C72 D82 H41
    Date: 2022
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:qmsrps:202207&r=exp
  12. By: Hermes, Henning; Lergetporer, Philipp; Mierisch, Fabian; Peter, Frauke
    Abstract: We provide the first causal evidence of discrimination against migrants seeking child care. We send emails from fictitious parents to > 18, 000 early child care centers across Germany, asking if there is a slot available and how to apply. Randomly varying names to signal migration background, we find that migrants receive 4.4 percentage points fewer responses. Responses to migrants also contain substantially fewer slot offers, are shorter, and less encouraging. Exploring channels, discrimination against migrants does not differ by the perceived educational background of the email sender. However, it does differ by regional characteristics, being stronger in areas with lower shares of migrants in child care, higher right-wing vote shares, and lower financial resources. Discrimination on the child care market likely perpetuates existing inequalities of opportunities for disadvantaged children.
    Keywords: child care, discrimination, information provision, inequality, field experiment
    JEL: J13 J18 J22 C93
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:398&r=exp
  13. By: Fehr, Ernst (University of Zurich); Charness, Gary (University of California, Santa Barbara)
    Abstract: We review the vast literature on social preferences by assessing what is known about their fundamental properties, their distribution in the broader population, and their consequences for important economic and political behaviors. We provide, in particular, an overview of the empirically identified characteristics of distributional preferences and how they are affected by merit, luck, and risk considerations as well as by concerns for equality of opportunity. In addition, we identify what is known about belief-dependent social preferences such as reciprocity and guilt aversion. The evidence indicates that the big majority of individuals have some sort of social preference while purely self- interested subjects are a minority. Our review also shows how the findings from laboratory experiments involving social preferences provide a deeper understanding of important field phenomena such as the consequences of wage inequality on work morale, employees' resistance to wage cuts, individuals' self-selection into occupations and sectors that are more or less prone to morally problematic behaviors, as well as issues of distributive politics. However, although a lot has been learned in recent decades about social preferences, there are still many important, unresolved, yet exciting, questions waiting to be tackled.
    Keywords: social preferences, altruism, inequality aversion, image concerns, reciprocity
    JEL: D0 D2 D9 H0 J0 P0
    Date: 2023–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16200&r=exp
  14. By: Hermes, Henning; Lergetporer, Philipp; Mierisch, Fabian; Peter, Frauke; Wiederhold, Simon
    Abstract: We provide the first causal evidence of discrimination against migrants seeking child care. We send emails from fictitious parents to > 18, 000 early child care centers across Germany, asking if there is a slot available and how to apply. Randomly varying names to signal migration background, we find that migrants receive 4.4 percentage points fewer responses. Responses to migrants also contain substantially fewer slot offers, are shorter, and less encouraging. Exploring channels, discrimination against migrants does not differ by the perceived educational background of the email sender. However, it does differ by regional characteristics, being stronger in areas with lower shares of migrants in child care, higher right-wing vote shares, and lower financial resources. Discrimination on the child care market likely perpetuates existing inequalities of opportunities for disadvantaged children.
    Keywords: child care, discrimination, field experiment, inequality, informationprovision
    JEL: C93 J13 J18 J22
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwhdps:122023&r=exp
  15. By: Lavinia Kinne
    Abstract: How to give feedback in learning environments is a widely discussed topic. I design a field experiment to understand whether the ordering of feedback elements matters for motivation and performance. In random order, university students get one positive and one negative feedback element on their performance in exam practice questions. Students who first receive positive feedback are more motivated to study for the exam compared to those receiving negative feedback first. This effect is driven by a drop in motivation after negative feedback when receiving it first, but not when receiving it second. Furthermore, students adjust their study content to the feedback topics. I find no significant effects of feedback ordering on exam performance overall, but students who first receive the positive feedback perform better if their negative-feedback topic is covered in the exam.
    Keywords: Education, feedback, motivation, performance
    JEL: D83 I20 I23
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ifowps:_396&r=exp
  16. By: Batista, Catia (Nova School of Business and Economics); Vicente, Pedro C. (Nova School of Business and Economics)
    Abstract: Rural areas in Sub-Saharan Africa are typically underserved by financial services. Mobile money brings a substantial reduction in the transaction costs of remittances. We follow the introduction of mobile money for the first time in rural villages of Mozambique using a randomized field experiment. We find that mobile money increased migration out of these villages, where we observe lower agricultural activity and investment. At the same time, remittances received and welfare of rural households increased, particularly when facing geo-referenced village-level floods and household-level idiosyncratic shocks. Our work suggests that mobile money can accelerate urbanization and structural change in Sub-Saharan Africa.
    Keywords: mobile money, migration, remittances, investment, agriculture, structural change, technology adoption, insurance, Mozambique, Africa
    JEL: O12 O15 O16 O33 G20 R23
    Date: 2023–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16101&r=exp
  17. By: Abdellaoui, Mohammed; Kemel, Emmanuel; Panin, Amma (Université catholique de Louvain, LIDAM/CORE, Belgium); Vieider, Ferdinand M.
    Abstract: We present a novel method—called risk equivalents—that uses a single measure to elicit discount rates while avoiding concerns about the shape of the utility function. The method is valid under discounted expected utility (DEU), and also under several of its behavioral extensions including more general models that account for a biased perception of time and risk (such as time- or likelihood-insensitivity). We implement the method in a field experiment in India measuring inter-temporal discount rates for money and the consumption of tea.We empirically observe that discount rates elicited by traditional methods are related to utility curvature, whereas discount rates elicited by risk equivalents are not. Risk equivalents also mitigate differences in discount rates measured for money and for tea, suggesting that unaddressed utility curvature may play a role in results that demonstrate good-specific discounting. Risk equivalents are general, fast and tractable, three features that are particularly useful in field studies.
    Keywords: Time discounting ; money vs consumption ; utility confound
    JEL: D03 D81 D91
    Date: 2023–02–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2023007&r=exp
  18. By: Islam, Asad (Monash University); Lee, Wang-Sheng (Monash University); Triyana, Margaret (Nanyang Technological University, Singapore); Xia, Xing (affiliation not available)
    Abstract: Workers in small businesses in low- and middle-income countries are exposed to significant risks of occupational accidents and illnesses. A safe and healthy workplace could improve the productivity and sustainability of the business. In this paper, we conduct a randomized controlled trial in Bangladesh that provides informal firms with information on occupational health and safety (OHS) to improve their workplace practices. The intervention comprised two treatment arms: one focused solely on OHS training (the OHS arm), while the other offered business training and access to financing in addition to OHS training (the OHS+Biz arm). After two years, treated firms showed improvements in business practices, particularly those related to safety and a decent work environment. Moreover, both treatment arms experienced increased output and sales revenue. The OHS+Biz arm generally had no additional impact on firm outcomes compared to the OHS arm, suggesting that OHS information is the primary factor driving safer and healthier workplaces, which consequently can lead to better firm outcomes.
    Keywords: occupational health and safety, enterprise training, randomized controlled trial, informal economy, information, credit access
    JEL: J28 C93 J81 I15 M53 J24 O14
    Date: 2023–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16150&r=exp
  19. By: Hainmueller, Jens; Cascardi, Elisa (Stanford University); Hotard, Michael; Koslowski, Rey; Lawrence, Duncan; Yasenov, Vasil; Laitin, David
    Abstract: Based on observational studies, conventional wisdom suggests that citizenship carries economic benefits. We leverage a randomized experiment from New York where low-income registrants who wanted to become citizens entered a lottery to receive fee vouchers to naturalize. Voucher recipients were about 36 p.p. more likely to naturalize. Yet, we find no discernible effects of access to citizenship on several economic outcomes, including income, credit scores, access to credit, financial distress, and employment. Leveraging a multi-dimensional immigrant integration index, we similarly find no measurable effects on non-economic integration. However, we do find that citizenship reduces fears of deportation. Explaining our divergence from past studies, our results also reveal evidence of positive selection into citizenship, suggesting that observational studies of citizenship are susceptible to selection bias.
    Date: 2023–05–18
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:8u3yv&r=exp
  20. By: David Hope; Julian Limberg; Nina Weber
    Abstract: Technological change has fundamentally transformed the US labour market in recent decades, with high-earning jobs becoming increasingly focused on nonroutine, complex tasks. We provide a first experimental test of whether fairness perceptions and preferences for redistribution differ when top earners gain their incomes through luck, routine work, or complex work. We find that the desired tax rate on top earners is up to 5.3 percentage points lower for the complex work treatment compared to the routine work treatment. Interestingly, performance on complex tasks is also more likely to be seen as the result of inherited intelligence.
    Keywords: Top income tax, technological change, redistribution, distributive preferences, fairness
    JEL: D31 D63 D91 H24
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ifowps:_398&r=exp
  21. By: Clarisse Aujoux (IAP - Institut d'Astrophysique de Paris - INSU - CNRS - Institut national des sciences de l'Univers - SU - Sorbonne Université - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Kumiko Kotera (VUB - Vrije Universiteit Brussel, IAP - Institut d'Astrophysique de Paris - INSU - CNRS - Institut national des sciences de l'Univers - SU - Sorbonne Université - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Odile Blanchard (GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes)
    Abstract: We present a pioneering estimate of the global yearly greenhouse gas emissions of a large-scale Astrophysics experiment over several decades: the Giant Array for Neutrino Detection (GRAND). The project aims at detecting ultra-high energy neutrinos with a 200, 000 radio antenna array over 200, 000 km as of the 2030s. With a fully transparent methodology based on open source data, we calculate the emissions related to three unavoidable sources: travel, digital technologies and hardware equipment. We find that these emission sources have a different impact depending on the stages of the experiment. Digital technologies and travel prevail for the small-scale prototyping phase (GRANDProto300), whereas hardware equipment (material production and transportation) and data transfer/storage largely outweigh the other emission sources in the large-scale phase (GRAND200k). In the mid-scale phase (GRAND10k), the three sources contribute equally. This study highlights the considerable carbon footprint of a large-scale astrophysics experiment, but also shows that there is room for improvement. We discuss various lines of actions that could be implemented. The GRAND project being still in its prototyping stage, our results provide guidance to the future collaborative practices and instrumental design in order to reduce its carbon footprint.
    Keywords: Greenhouse gas emission, Carbon footprint, Climate change, Large-scale astrophysics experiment, Radio-detection
    Date: 2021–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03228304&r=exp
  22. By: Nina Weber
    Abstract: Many personally risky decisions, such as innovation and entrepreneurship, have the potential to increase overall welfare by creating positive externalities for society. Rewarding such prosocial risk-taking may be an important strategy in addressing societal challenges like, for example, the climate emergency, by promoting innovation that has positive externalities for the environment. A fundamental constraint for policy makers in rewarding such behaviour are however individuals’ distributive preferences. In this paper, I provide a theoretical framework and a first experimental test of how distributive preferences are affected by potential positive externalities of risky behaviour.
    Keywords: Prosocial risk-taking, distributive preferences, fairness
    JEL: D63 D62 D81 C91
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ifowps:_399&r=exp
  23. By: Mochhoury, Sarah
    Abstract: While it has become clear that communication is a monetary policy tool for central banks, and extensive research has been conducted on central bank communication with financial markets, little is known so far on central bank communication with the general public. My research provides new insights into this field, confirming that the efforts of central banks to connect with a wider public are not in vain. In a randomised controlled trial, I focus on the determinants of trust in the European Central Bank (ECB) and on understanding of its communication about the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme, which was set up as part of the ECB’s response to the COVID-19 crisis. I find that the ECB’s simplified and relatable communication leads to greater trust in the central bank among the general public, as it has a positive impact on perceptions of the ECB among laypeople. The simplified content also proves to contribute to increased understanding of the central bank’s messages among the wider public. JEL Classification: C83, C93, D83, E52, E58
    Keywords: Behavioural economics, Central bank communication, European Central Bank, Experimental economics, Trust
    Date: 2023–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20232824&r=exp
  24. By: ElDidi, Hagar; Zhang, Wei; Gelaw, Fekadu; De Petris, Caterina; Blackmore, Ivy; Teka, Natnael; Yimam, Seid; Mekonnen, Dawit Kelemework; Ringler, Claudia; Meinzen-Dick, Ruth Suseela
    Abstract: The goal of this study is to assess the potential of game-based experiential learning in raising awareness and stimulating discussions about groundwater resource systems, the social dilemma in groundwater management, and the need for institutional arrangements (rules) governing this shared resource, as well as whether such awareness and community discussions lead to actual change in groundwater governance in Ethiopia. Groundwater management is highly complex, with many users sharing the same resource often without realizing their interconnectedness. Behavioral experiments (games) that simulate real-life common-pool resource use have shown promise as an experiential learning tool for improving resource governance. This study pilots an experiential learning intervention in Ethiopia using a groundwater gameto help raise awareness of groundwater over-extraction and improve understanding of the importance of collective action in governance. The Meki River catchment in rural Ethiopia is a unique context where small-scale irrigation is expanding, but overextraction and competition over groundwater have not yet reached alarming levels. The groundwater game, adapted from Meinzen-Dick et al. (2016 and 2018), was played in 15 villages, accompanied by community-wide debriefing discussions in each village after the game to reflect on the process and lessons learned, and to stimulate discussions around groundwater governance. We carried out participant surveys to capture individual mental models regarding groundwater use and management, as well as any immediate learning effects. Focus group discussions were held in each village prior to the intervention to establish a baseline and again six months after the intervention to assess possible lasting effects. The findings indicate cognitive, normative and relational learning, including increased understanding of groundwater dynamics (such as the joint effect of diverse water uses and users), the importance of collective action in resource management, and the benefits of communication. We find gendered differences in decision-making about resource extraction in the game and evolvement of group-level resource management across no-communication, communication, and rule-making rounds of the game. We discuss community-wide learning and institutions-building, and considerations for future intervention designs. We recommend embedding experiential learning, facilitated by local extension officers or other community engagement practitioners, in intervention packages that include both technical assistance on water-conserving technologies and management approaches and support in building communities’ institutional capacity.
    Keywords: ETHIOPIA; EAST AFRICA; AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA; AFRICA; governance; groundwater; irrigation; resources; experiential learning; resource management; collective action; decision making; gender; communication; extension; games; common-pool resource; Meki River
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:ifprid:2189&r=exp
  25. By: Ariel Boyarsky; Hongseok Namkoong; Jean Pouget-Abadie
    Abstract: Experiments on online marketplaces and social networks suffer from interference, where the outcome of a unit is impacted by the treatment status of other units. We propose a framework for modeling interference using a ubiquitous deployment mechanism for experiments, staggered roll-out designs, which slowly increase the fraction of units exposed to the treatment to mitigate any unanticipated adverse side effects. Our main idea is to leverage the temporal variations in treatment assignments introduced by roll-outs to model the interference structure. We first present a set of model identification conditions under which the estimation of common estimands is possible and show how these conditions are aided by roll-out designs. Since there are often multiple competing models of interference in practice, we then develop a model selection method that evaluates models based on their ability to explain outcome variation observed along the roll-out. Through simulations, we show that our heuristic model selection method, Leave-One-Period-Out, outperforms other baselines. We conclude with a set of considerations, robustness checks, and potential limitations for practitioners wishing to use our framework.
    Date: 2023–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2305.10728&r=exp

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