nep-exp New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2023‒05‒29
27 papers chosen by
Daniel Houser
George Mason University

  2. Sanction Enforcement among Third Parties:New Experimental Evidence from Two Societies By Kenju Kamei; Smriti Sharma; Matthew J. Walker
  3. Patience Is Power: Bargaining and Payoff Delay By Jeongbin Kim; Wooyoung Lim; Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch
  4. Trading and Cognition in Asset Markets: An Eye-tracking Experiment By Camille Cornand; Maria Alejandra Erazo Diaz; Adam Zylbersztejn
  5. Who’s Afraid of Policy Experiments? By Robert Dur; Arjan Non; Paul Prottung; Benedetta Ricci
  6. To request or not to request: charitable giving, social information, and spillover By Valeria Fanghella; Lisette Ibanez; John Thøgersen
  7. Free Riding, Democracy and Sacrifice in the Workplace:Evidence from a Real Effort Experiment By Kenju Kamei; Katy Tabero
  8. Elicited Time Preferences and Behavior in Long-Run Projects By AKIN, ZAFER; YAVAS, ABDULLAH
  9. Noncognitive Skills at the Time of COVID-19: An Experiment with Professional Traders and Students By Marco Angrisani; Marco Cipriani; Antonio Guarino; Ryan Kendall; Julen Ortiz de Zarate Pina
  10. Reproducibility and Robustness Replicability of Gsottbauer et al. (2022) By Akhtar, Akwaz; Ye, Hao
  11. Rankings-Dependent Preferences: A Real Goods Matching Experiment By Andrew Kloosterman; Peter Troyan
  12. To solve old problems of economics. The experimental background By Harin, Alexander
  13. Unraveling Ambiguity Aversion By Ilke Aydogan; Loïc Berger; Valentina Bosetti
  14. A Mother’s Voice: Impacts of Spousal Communication Training on Child Health Investments By Martina Bjorkman Nyqvist; Seema Jayachandran; Celine Zipfel
  15. Cooperation and Cognition in Social Networks By Edoardo Gallo; Joseph Lee; Yohanes Eko Riyanto; Erwin Wong
  16. A Randomness Device to Create the Conidtions of Uncertainty By Loïc Berger
  17. Better Strategies for Saving More Evidence from Three Interventions in Chile By Abhijit Banerjee; Claudia Martínez A; Esteban Puentes
  18. GPT Agents in Game Theory Experiments By Fulin Guo
  19. Money (Not) to Burn: Payments for Ecosystem Services to Reduce Crop Residue Burning By B. Kelsey Jack; Seema Jayachandran; Namrata Kala; Rohini Pande
  20. Transfer Estimates for Causal Effects across Heterogeneous Sites By Konrad Menzel
  21. Rate-optimal cluster-randomized designs for spatial interference By Leung, Michael P
  22. Breath, Love, Walk? The impact of mindfulness interventions on climate policy support and environmental attitudes By Julie Bayle Cordier; Loïc Berger; Rayan Elatmani; Massimo Tavoni
  23. A nation-wide experiment, part II: the introduction of a 49-Euro-per-month travel pass in Germany -- An empirical study on this fare innovation By Allister Loder; Fabienne Cantner; Lennart Adenaw; Markus B. Siewert; Sebastian Goerg; Klaus Bogenberger
  24. The Impact of Home Grown School Feeding Program(HGSFP) on Child Education and Nutrition in Nigeria. By Nwaobi, Godwin
  25. ‘Let's call a spade a spade, not a gardening tool’: How euphemisms shape moral judgement in corporate social responsibility domains By Katherine Farrow; Gilles Grolleau; Naoufel Mzoughi
  26. Social Preferences and Deliberately Stochastic Behavior By Yosuke Hashidate; Keisuke Yoshihara
  27. Learning, Sophistication, and the Returns to Advertising: Implications for Differences in Firm Performance By Steven Tadelis; Christopher Hooton; Utsav Manjeer; Daniel Deisenroth; Nils Wernerfelt; Nick Dadson; Lindsay Greenbaum

  1. By: Timo Goeschl; ; Alice Soldà (-)
    Abstract: Pledges feature in international climate cooperation since the 2015 Paris Agreement. We explore how differences in pledgers’ trustworthiness affect outcomes in a social dilemma that parallels climate change. In an online experiment, two participants interact with a randomly matched third player in a repeat maintenance game with a pledge stage. Treatments vary whether participants are matched with a player that is more or less trustworthy as revealed by behavior in a promise-keeping game; and whether they observe that trustworthiness. We find that participants knowingly matched with more trustworthy players cooperate more than participants matched with less trustworthy players (knowingly or unknowingly), but also more than participants unknowingly matched with more trustworthy players. In contrast, participants knowingly matched with less trustworthy players do not co-operate less than participants who are unknowingly so. Our findings suggest that the use of pledges, as per the Paris Agreement, can leverage the power of trustworthiness to enhance cooperation.
    Keywords: Social dilemmas; cooperation; pre-play communication; credibility;pledges; group formation
    JEL: C72 C92 D83 D91
    Date: 2023–05
  2. By: Kenju Kamei (Faculty of Economics, Keio University); Smriti Sharma (Business School, Newcastle University); Matthew J. Walker (Business School, Newcastle University)
    Abstract: Sanction enforcement offers the potential to mitigate free riding on punishment among multiple third parties. This paper experimentally studies third-party enforcement of social norms in a prisoner fs dilemma game with and without opportunities for higher-order punishment. Based on insights from the literature on cooperation, kinship and moral systems, we compare people fs sanction enforcement across student subjects in two societies: India and the United Kingdom. The experiment results show that, in both societies, third parties f first-order punishment is most severe for defectors and that a third party fs failure to punish a defector invites higher-order punishment from their fellow third parties. These findings are consistent with a model of social preferences and literature from anthropology and theoretical biology. Further, third-party punishment is stronger in the UK than in India, consistent with the conjecture that people in a society with relatively looser ancestral kinship ties are more willing to engage in pro-social punishment. However, in contrast to the theory or conjecture, there is clear difference in the group size effects between the two research sites: whereas third parties free ride on others f punitive acts in the UK, they punish more when in the presence of other third parties in India.
    Keywords: Experiment, Third-party punishment, Higher-order, Cross-societal variation, Public Goods
    JEL: C92 H41 D01 D91
    Date: 2023–04–26
  3. By: Jeongbin Kim; Wooyoung Lim; Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch
    Abstract: We provide causal evidence that patience is a significant source of bargaining power. Generalizing the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model to arbitrarily non-stationary discounting, we first show that dynamic consistency across bargaining rounds is sufficient for a unique equilibrium, which we characterize. We then experimentally implement a version of this game where bargaining delay is negligible (frequent offers, so dynamic consistency holds by design), while payoff delay is significant (a week or month per round of disagreement, with or without front-end delay). Our treatments induce different time preferences between subjects by randomly assigning individuals different public payoff delay profiles. The leading treatment allows to test for a general patience advantage, predicted independent of the shape of discounting, and it receives strong behavioral support. Additional treatments show that this advantage hinges on the availability of immediate payoffs and reject exponential discounting in favor of present-biased discounting.
    Keywords: Alternating-Offers Bargaining, Time Preferences, Present Bias, Laboratory Experiments
    JEL: C78 C91 D03
    Date: 2023–05–09
  4. By: Camille Cornand (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Maria Alejandra Erazo Diaz (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Adam Zylbersztejn (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: We use an experimental asset market with eye-tracker measurements for a novel exploration of the cognitive validity of a classic heterogeneous trader taxonomy. Following a top-down approach, we assume that the patterns of attention and information acquisition are governed by one of the three trading strategies, either feedback, passive, or speculative. In line with our first hypothesis, speculators seek information about market expectations. Notwithstanding the two other hypotheses, feedback traders reveal patterns of attention and information acquisition that could ex ante be expected from passive traders, and vice versa.
    Keywords: Experiment, Asset market, Attention, Information acquisition, Eye-tracking
    Date: 2023–04–19
  5. By: Robert Dur (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Arjan Non (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Paul Prottung; Benedetta Ricci
    Abstract: In many public policy areas, randomized policy experiments can greatly contribute to our knowledge of the effects of policies and can thus help to improve public policy. However, policy experiments are not very common. This paper studies whether a lack of appreciation of policy experiments among voters may be the reason for this. Using unique survey data representative of the Dutch electorate, we find clear evidence contradicting this view. Voters strongly support policy experimentation and, in line with theory, particularly so when they do not hold a strong opinion about the policy. In a subsequent survey experiment among Dutch politicians, we find that politicians conform their expressed opinion about policy experiments to what we tell them the actual opinion of voters is. We conclude that voters are not afraid of policy experiments and neither are politicians when we tell them that voters are not.
    Keywords: policy experiments, randomized controlled trials, voters, politicians, public policy, survey experiment, conformism.
    JEL: C93 D72 D78
    Date: 2023–05–08
  6. By: Valeria Fanghella (EESC-GEM Grenoble Ecole de Management); Lisette Ibanez (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier); John Thøgersen (Aarhus University [Aarhus])
    Abstract: Prosocial behavior is important for a well-functioning society, but many people try to avoid situations where they could act prosocially. This paper studies the avoidance of a prosocial request, how it is affected by social pressure, and whether request avoidance and social pressure generate spillover effects on following prosocial behaviors. To this aim, we conduct an incentivized online experiment (N=1400), where participants play two consecutive dictator games with a charity. In the first game, we vary the type of game and information provided in a 2 x 2 between-subject design: (i) standard dictator game or dictator game with costly opt-out; (ii) with or without social information (mean donation in a previous session). The second game is a standard dictator game for all and aims to capture spillover effects from the first decision. We find that the opt-out option leads to significantly lower donations, especially when social information is present (but this effect is not statistically significant). The negative effect of the opt-out option spills over to the second donation decision. We also observe a negative spillover effect after a standard dictator game. Social information reduces donations in a standard dictator game, but also allows to mitigate the negative spillover effect from the first to the second behavior.
    Keywords: prosocial behavior, opt-out option, social information, spillover, charitable giving, selfimage
    Date: 2023
  7. By: Kenju Kamei (Faculty of Economics, Keio University); Katy Tabero (Durham University Business School)
    Abstract: Teams are increasingly popular decision-making and work units in firms. This paper uses a novel real effort experiment to show that (a) some teams in the workplace reduce their members f @private benefits to achieve a group optimum in a social dilemma and (b) such endogenous choices by themselves enhance their work productivity (per work time production) ? a phenomenon called the gdividend of democracy. h In the experiment, worker subjects are randomly assigned to a team of three, and they then jointly solve a collaborative real effort task under a revenue-sharing rule in their group with two other teams, while each individual worker can privately and independently shirk by playing a Tetris game. Strikingly, teams exhibit significantly higher productivity (per-work-time production) when they can decide whether to reduce the return from shirking by voting than when the policy implementation is randomly decided from above, irrespective of the policy implementation outcome. This means that democratic culture directly affects behavior. On the other hand, the workers under democracy also increase their shirking, presumably due to enhanced fatigue owing to the stronger productivity. Despite this, democracy does not decrease overall production thanks to the enhanced work productivity.
    Keywords: workplace democracy, moral hazard, experiment, free riding, teamwork
    JEL: C92 D02 D72 H41
    Date: 2023–04–27
    Abstract: We study whether and how the experimentally elicited risk and time preferences of subjects are associated with their behavior in long-run projects. First, risk and time preferences are elicited from time-dated monetary choices to estimate a general discount and utility function at an individual level, then subjects work on a longitudinal project that requires effort in multiple periods. We find that present bias in the form of a fixed cost or variable cost (quasi-hyperbolic discounting) is not supported by monetary choices. Analyses of allocation patterns of work reveal that the estimated utility and discounting models are not compatible with the observed allocations. We find evidence of both present and future bias, although the former is more prevalent and severe, and subjects exhibit naivete in their choice reversals. Furthermore, discount rate and present bias parameters estimated based on monetary choices have predictive power on how work is allocated in the long-run project.
    Keywords: time preferences, quasi-hyperbolic discounting, experiment, long-run project
    JEL: C91 D91
    Date: 2023–04–18
  9. By: Marco Angrisani; Marco Cipriani; Antonio Guarino; Ryan Kendall; Julen Ortiz de Zarate Pina
    Abstract: We study the stability of noncognitive skills by comparing experimental results gathered before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. Using a sample of professional traders, we find a significant decrease in agreeableness and locus of control and a moderate decrease in grit. These patterns are primarily driven by those with more negative experiences of the pandemic. Other skills, such as trust, conscientiousness, and self-monitoring, are unchanged. We contrast these results with those from a sample of undergraduate students whose noncognitive skills remain constant (except conscientiousness). Our findings provide evidence against the stability of noncognitive skills, particularly among professional traders.
    Keywords: Non-cognitive skills; COVID-19; professional traders
    JEL: G40 D91 C93
    Date: 2023–02–01
  10. By: Akhtar, Akwaz; Ye, Hao
    Abstract: The relationship between social status and ethical behavior is a widely debated topic in research. In their study, Gsottbauer et al. (2022b) investigate whether higher socio-economic status is linked to lower ethical behavior, using data from two large survey experiments involving over 11, 000 participants. In this replication project, we test the computational reproducibility and robustness to the replication of their study, using the provided data and code from the replication package (Gsottbauer et al., 2022a). Nearly all the figures and tables were reproducible-in the process of reproducing the results, some minor rounding or transcription errors were discovered. In testing the robustness replicability, we find consistent results for our extensions. The effort for the replication was manageable, even though the authors treat categorical variables as numeric, or use manually-coded interaction variables (i.e. in regression models). In summary, we applaud the transparency of Gsottbauer et al. (2022b) in facilitating replications, and make some general recommendations for further improvements for data-analysis studies.
    Keywords: Replication, Experiment, information provision, inequality, field experiment
    Date: 2023
  11. By: Andrew Kloosterman; Peter Troyan
    Abstract: We investigate whether preferences for objects received via a matching mechanism are influenced by how highly agents rank them in their reported rank order list. We hypothesize that all else equal, agents receive greater utility for the same object when they rank it higher. The addition of rankings-dependent utility implies that it may not be a dominant strategy to submit truthful preferences to a strategyproof mechanism, and that non-strategyproof mechanisms that give more agents objects they report as higher ranked may increase market welfare. We test these hypotheses with a matching experiment in a strategyproof mechanism, the random serial dictatorship, and a non-strategyproof mechanism, the Boston mechanism. A novel feature of our experimental design is that the objects allocated in the matching markets are real goods, which allows us to directly measure rankings-dependence by eliciting values for goods both inside and outside of the mechanism. Our experimental results confirm that the elicited differences in values do decrease for lower-ranked goods. We find no differences between the two mechanisms for the rates of truth-telling and the final welfare.
    Date: 2023–05
  12. By: Harin, Alexander
    Abstract: Old problems of the mathematical description of the economical behavior of a man are briefly reviewed. They are a comparison of choices of a man between uncertain and sure games and the radically different behavior of a man in different domains. The proposed solution of the problems consists in purely mathematical method and models and is briefly reviewed in the Appendix. The main attention is paid to the analysis of the experimental support of this possible solution. The generally accepted random incentive experimental procedures are discussed. A “certain-uncertain” inconsistency between the certain type of the choices and the uncertain type of the incentives is revealed and analyzed.
    Keywords: behavior; decision; prospect theory; utility; experiment; incentive; economics;
    JEL: C1 C9 C91 C93 D8 D81
    Date: 2023–04–26
  13. By: Ilke Aydogan (IÉSEG School Of Management [Puteaux]); Loïc Berger (CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, IÉSEG School Of Management [Puteaux], EIEE - European Institute on Economics and the Environment, CMCC - Centro Euro-Mediterraneo per i Cambiamenti Climatici [Bologna]); Valentina Bosetti (Bocconi University [Milan, Italy], EIEE - European Institute on Economics and the Environment, CMCC - Centro Euro-Mediterraneo per i Cambiamenti Climatici [Bologna])
    Abstract: We report the results of two experiments designed to better understand the mechanisms driving decision-making under ambiguity. We elicit individual preferences over different sources of uncertainty (risk, compound risk, model ambiguity, and Ellsberg ambiguity), which entail different degrees of complexity, from subjects with different sophistication levels. We show that (1) ambiguity aversion is robust to sophistication, but the strong relationship that has been previously reported between attitudes toward ambiguity and compound risk is not. (2) Ellsberg ambiguity attitude can be partly explained by attitudes toward complexity for less sophisticated subjects, but not for more sophisticated ones. Overall, and regardless of the subject's sophistication level, the main driver of Ellsberg ambiguity attitude is a specific treatment of unknown probabilities. These results leave room for using ambiguity models in applications with prescriptive purposes.
    Keywords: Ambiguity aversion, complexity, reduction of compound risk, model uncertainty
    Date: 2023–04–17
  14. By: Martina Bjorkman Nyqvist (Stockholm School of Economics); Seema Jayachandran (Princeton University); Celine Zipfel (Stockholm School of Economics)
    Abstract: Building on prior evidence that mothers often have a stronger preference for spending on children than fathers do, we use a randomized experiment to evaluate the impacts of a communication training program for mothers on child health in Uganda. The hypothesis is that the training will enable women to better convey their knowledge and preferences to their husbands and, thereby, boost investments in children’s health. We find that the program increases spousal discussion about the family’s health, nutrition, and finances. However, this does not increase overall adoption of health-promoting behaviors or improve child anthropometrics. One exception is that the communication training increases women’s and children’s intake of protein-rich foods as well as household spending on these foods.
    Keywords: Spousal Communication, Children's Health, Uganda
    JEL: D10 I12 O12
    Date: 2023–02
  15. By: Edoardo Gallo; Joseph Lee; Yohanes Eko Riyanto; Erwin Wong
    Abstract: Social networks can sustain cooperation by amplifying the consequences of a single defection through a cascade of relationship losses. Building on Jackson et al. (2012), we introduce a novel robustness notion to characterize low cognitive complexity (LCC) networks - a subset of equilibrium networks that imposes a minimal cognitive burden to calculate and comprehend the consequences of defection. We test our theory in a laboratory experiment and find that cooperation is higher in equilibrium than in non-equilibrium networks. Within equilibrium networks, LCC networks exhibit higher levels of cooperation than non-LCC networks. Learning is essential for the emergence of equilibrium play.
    Date: 2023–05
  16. By: Loïc Berger (IÉSEG School Of Management [Puteaux], EIEE - European Institute on Economics and the Environment, CMCC - Centro Euro-Mediterraneo per i Cambiamenti Climatici [Bologna], LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221 - UA - Université d'Artois - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: The experimental study of decision-making under uncertainty typically builds on Ellsberg's (1961) setting. Yet, as the total number of balls is known in standard Ellsberg's urns, an implicit constraint is put on the specification of the probability models to consider. In practice, this restricts the ability of Ellsberg's urns to characterize situations going beyond those of model ambiguity. In this note, I present a simple and easy-to-implement device that creates the initial conditions of uncertainty, which constitute a critical prerequisite for the study of model misspecification.
    Keywords: Ambiguity aversion, experiment, Ellsberg paradox, model uncertainty
    Date: 2023–04–17
  17. By: Abhijit Banerjee; Claudia Martínez A; Esteban Puentes
    Abstract: Individual behavioral biases can affect savings behavior. We conduct an experiment to evaluate different strategies to increase savings. We compare an automatic savings plan (or default rule), monthly reminders, and a rule-of-thumb savings package that appeals to careful spending. We find that rule-of-thumb and default rules can increase savings for one year after the intervention. In contrast, reminders can reduce account balances and debt levels. The increase in savings under the default rule is produced by a (mechanical) increase in deposits, but savings is later decreased by an increase in withdrawals.
    Date: 2023–04
  18. By: Fulin Guo
    Abstract: This paper explores the potential of using Generative Pre-trained Transformer (GPT)-based agents as participants in strategic game experiments. Specifically, I focus on the finitely repeated ultimatum and prisoner's dilemma games, two well-studied games in economics. I develop prompts to enable GPT agents to understand the game rules and play the games. The results indicate that, given well-crafted prompts, GPT can generate realistic outcomes and exhibit behavior consistent with human behavior in certain important aspects, such as positive relationship between acceptance rates and offered amounts in the ultimatum game and positive cooperation rates in the prisoner's dilemma game. Some differences between the behavior of GPT and humans are observed in aspects like the evolution of choices over rounds. I also study two treatments in which the GPT agents are prompted to either have social preferences or not. The treatment effects are evident in both games. This preliminary exploration indicates that GPT agents can exhibit realistic performance in simple strategic games and shows the potential of using GPT as a valuable tool in social science research.
    Date: 2023–05
  19. By: B. Kelsey Jack (University of California at Santa Barbara); Seema Jayachandran (Princeton University); Namrata Kala (MIT Sloan School of Management); Rohini Pande (Yale University)
    Abstract: Particulate matter significantly reduces life expectancy in India. We use a randomized controlled trial in the state of Punjab to evaluate the effectiveness of conditional cash transfers (also known as payments for ecosystem services, or PES) in reducing crop residue burning, which is a major contributor to the region’s poor air quality. Credit constraints and distrust may make farmers less likely to comply with standard PES contracts, which only pay the participant after verification of compliance. We randomize paying a portion of the money upfront and unconditionally. Despite receiving a lower reward for compliance, farmers offered partial upfront payment are 8-12 percentage points more likely to comply than are farmers offered the standard contract. Burning measures based on satellite imagery indicate that PES with upfront payments significantly reduced burning, while standard PES payments were inframarginal. We also show that PES with an upfront component is a cost-effective way to improve India’s air quality.
    Keywords: India, Life Expectancy, Payments for Ecosystem Services, PES
    JEL: O13 Q01 Q56
    Date: 2023–03
  20. By: Konrad Menzel
    Abstract: We consider the problem of extrapolating treatment effects across heterogeneous populations (``sites"/``contexts"). We consider an idealized scenario in which the researcher observes cross-sectional data for a large number of units across several ``experimental" sites in which an intervention has already been implemented to a new ``target" site for which a baseline survey of unit-specific, pre-treatment outcomes and relevant attributes is available. We propose a transfer estimator that exploits cross-sectional variation between individuals and sites to predict treatment outcomes using baseline outcome data for the target location. We consider the problem of obtaining a predictor of conditional average treatment effects at the target site that is MSE optimal within a certain class and subject to data constraints. Our approach is design-based in the sense that the performance of the predictor is evaluated given the specific, finite selection of experimental and target sites. Our approach is nonparametric, and our formal results concern the construction of an optimal basis of predictors as well as convergence rates for the estimated conditional average treatment effect relative to the constrained-optimal population predictor for the target site. We illustrate our approach using a combined data set of five multi-site randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to evaluate the effect of conditional cash transfers on school attendance.
    Date: 2023–05
  21. By: Leung, Michael P
    Keywords: Causal inference, interference, experimental design, spatial dependence, Applied Mathematics, Statistics, Econometrics, Statistics & Probability
    Date: 2022–10–01
  22. By: Julie Bayle Cordier (IÉSEG School Of Management [Puteaux]); Loïc Berger (CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, IÉSEG School Of Management [Puteaux], EIEE - European Institute on Economics and the Environment, CMCC - Centro Euro-Mediterraneo per i Cambiamenti Climatici [Bologna]); Rayan Elatmani (IÉSEG School Of Management [Puteaux]); Massimo Tavoni (POLIMI - Politecnico di Milano [Milan], EIEE - European Institute on Economics and the Environment, CMCC - Centro Euro-Mediterraneo per i Cambiamenti Climatici [Bologna])
    Abstract: Mindfulness practices have the potential to induce the cognitive and behavioral changes needed to foster proenvironmental behavior and increase support toward sustainable and climate-oriented policies. However, the empirical evidence of the effectiveness of meditation on sustainable behavior is limited and mostly confined to correlational studies, often based on the same type of mindfulness interventions. In this paper, we report the results of an online experiment (n=1000) comparing the impact of three different short-term mindfulness interventions on various (self-reported and incentivized) measures of mindfulness state and sustainable behavior. While only one of our interventions is found to impact environmental attitude and climate policy support directly, we show that the three meditation practices indirectly foster sustainable behavior through preidentified mediators. These results are relevant for organizations and policymakers who seek to foster climate policy support and environmental attitudes in their stakeholders.
    Keywords: Mindfulness, climate policy support, Pro-environmental behavior, interventions, meditation
    Date: 2023–04–17
  23. By: Allister Loder; Fabienne Cantner; Lennart Adenaw; Markus B. Siewert; Sebastian Goerg; Klaus Bogenberger
    Abstract: In a response to the 2022 cost-of-living crisis in Europe, the German government implemented a three-month fuel excise tax cut and a public transport travel pass for 9 Euro per month valid on all local and regional services. Following this period, a public debate immediately emerged on a successor to the so-called "9-Euro-Ticket", leading to the political decision of introducing a similar ticket priced at 49 Euro per month in May 2023, the so-called "Deutschlandticket". We observe this introduction of the new public transport ticket with a sample of 818 participants using a smartphone-based travel diary with passive tracking and a two-wave survey. The sample comprises 510 remaining participants of our initial "9-Euro-Ticket study from 2022 and 308 participants recruited in March and early April 2023. In this report we report on the status of the panel before the introduction of the "Deutschlandticket".
    Date: 2023–05
  24. By: Nwaobi, Godwin
    Abstract: As a lower income country with extreme poverty status, Nigeria is characterized by very large informal sector. Consequently, National Social investment programme (NSIP) of the Nigerian government were created to enshrine the value and vision for graduating Nigerian citizens from poverty circles through capacity building, investment and direct support. Specifically, the National Home Grown school feeding program (NHGSFP) is a government – led (cost effective) school feeding programme that uses food grown locally by small holding farmers to tackle critical poverty issues. However, school program and their evaluation is complex. Yet, there is relatively little evidence on the mechanisms through which they operate as well as their effects on desirable outcomes. Thus, using detailed administrative records for program participants, follow-up surveys and field experiments; we shall construct Randomized Control Trial (RCT) models that will allow us to establish the effects of the NHGSF programme on primary education and welfare in the selected states of Nigeria.
    Keywords: Nigeria, poverty education, welfare, RCT models, impact evaluation, Nigerian States, Randomized Control, primary education, Randomization, field experiment, retention, academic performance, class attendance, hunger health.
    JEL: C83 C90 C91 C92 C93 I0 I25 I28 J43 L66 O15 Q18
    Date: 2023–04–29
  25. By: Katherine Farrow (EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Gilles Grolleau (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement); Naoufel Mzoughi (ECODEVELOPPEMENT - Unité de recherche d'Écodéveloppement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)
    Abstract: Many organizations, especially businesses, make heavy use of euphemisms when communicating on sensitive issues. We explore whether the use of euphemisms, as opposed to equivalent plain terms, influences the moral judgments made by recipients of these messages, notably pertaining to (un)ethical behaviors in corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices. Using six ethical and unethical scenarios in a between-subjects experiment, we find four main results. First, individuals judge ethical actions more favorably when they are presented in euphemistic terms versus in plain terms. Second, euphemisms increase the acceptability of unethical CSR practices, which are judged to be significantly less unethical when described using euphemistic terms relative to plain terms. Third, most examined euphemisms are found to increase (respectively, decrease) the likelihood of stated willingness to sign a petition supporting (respectively, denouncing) the considered practices. Fourth, euphemisms remain effective for respondents who view firms as hypocritical.
    Keywords: CSR, Ethics, Euphemism, Moral judgement
    Date: 2021–07
  26. By: Yosuke Hashidate; Keisuke Yoshihara
    Abstract: This study proposes a tractable stochastic choice model to identify motivations for prosocial behavior, and to explore alternative motivations of deliberate randomization beyond ex-ante fairness concerns. To represent social preferences, we employ an additively perturbed utility model consisting of the sum of expected utility and a nonlinear cost function, where the utility function is purely selfish while the cost function depends on social preferences. Using the cost function, we study stochastic choice patterns to distinguish between stochastic inequity-averse behavior and stochastic shame-mitigating behavior. Moreover, we discuss how our model can complement recent experimental evidence of ex-post and ex-ante fairness concerns.
    Date: 2023–04
  27. By: Steven Tadelis; Christopher Hooton; Utsav Manjeer; Daniel Deisenroth; Nils Wernerfelt; Nick Dadson; Lindsay Greenbaum
    Abstract: Why do establishments exhibit wide variation in their productivity and profitability? Can variation in returns to advertising help answer this question? We present results from a large field experiment on Facebook and Instagram that documents variance in advertisers’ ability to generate returns to advertising. We focus on campaigns aimed at boosting sales and tie advertising expenses to revenues for each advertiser. We find that spending on advertising led to significant increases in revenues, number of purchases, number of purchasers, and number of conversions. The heterogeneity in these results by expenditure, age, and engagement documents patterns consistent with learning by doing and variance in how sophisticated advertisers are. Advertisers who engage in more learning activities and more sophisticated data collection exhibit the highest returns and are more likely to continue their activities over time, suggesting that differences in advertising effectiveness may account for some of the variance in productivity across firms.
    JEL: D24 E22 L25 M37
    Date: 2023–04

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