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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Theodor Kouro |
| Abstract: | This study examines whether charitable giving increases if donors have more choice about how their donations are used. In a field experiment, employees of large Albanian companies were asked to donate to projects administered by Down Syndrome Albania. Treatments varied in whether participants were allowed (or forced) to choose between different projects, and in the amount of information they were given. Giving donors a choice substantially increased giving; information did not. Our setting allows us to consider various mechanisms that could underlie this behavior. We conclude that allocation choice mainly increases donations because donors can target projects they like. |
| Keywords: | charitable giving; allocation choice; forced allocation, preferences; increased agency; information; |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cer:papers:wp747&r=exp |
| By: | Kim L. Böhm; Sebastian J. Goerg; Lilia Wasserka-Zhurakhovska; Lilia Zhurakhovska |
| Abstract: | Using an online experiment with two distinct dishonesty games, we analyze how dishonesty in men and women is influenced by either thinking or learning about the dishonesty of others in a related, but different situation. Thinking is induced by eliciting a belief about others’ dishonesty in a different game. We find that such belief elicitation (1) increases males’ (but not females’) dishonesty and (2) has no influence on participants’ beliefs about the dishonesty of others in the game that they themselves play. Learning is induced by receiving a signal about the actual honest or dishonest choices of others in a different game. We find that the level of unethical behavior provided in such a signal (1) increases females’ (but not males’) dishonesty and (2) is positively correlated with participants’ beliefs about the dishonesty of others in the game that they themselves play. We conclude that gender matters when examining how unethical behavior spreads. Both genders update their beliefs about others’ dishonesty in the same way when presented with information about others’ choices, but dishonesty in men is triggered by merely thinking about others’ dishonesty, while women only respond to actual information on others’ dishonesty. |
| Keywords: | dishonesty, unethical behaviour, thinking and learning about other’s dishonesty, gender, experiment |
| JEL: | C90 D01 D80 D91 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10314&r=exp |
| By: | Giulia Rossello; Arianna Martinelli |
| Abstract: | This paper presents experimental evidence on the impact of opposite copyright lobbies' narratives on scholars' views toward the publishing system. We conduct the empirical analysis by running a large-scale information provision experiment on a representative population of European scholars. Scholars were individually randomized into a control group or one of two promotional videos presenting opposite lobbying interests. The first video presents the publisher's narrative, featuring publishers as innovative firms and the guardians of ethics and scientific advance. While the second presents copyright activists' narrative featuring publishers as greedy and unethical. We document scholars' general discontent towards the publishing system. However, both lobbyist narratives change perceptions towards their cause. Overall, publishers' lobbyist information has a slightly smaller persuasive effect, linked to a small part of the population that exhibits a strong emotional reaction. Additional information is accompanied by a slight increase in the probability of taking the action of being informed, especially when we control for the scholar's quality. |
| Keywords: | Scientific Publishers, Academics' Perception, Information Provision Experiment, Copyright and Knowledge Diffusion. |
| Date: | 2023–03–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2023/14&r=exp |
| By: | Fabian Gerstmeier (HU Berlin); Yigit Oezcelik (University of Liverpool); Michel Tolksdorf (TU Berlin) |
| Abstract: | We study the efficacy of rebate rules in reward-based crowdfunding, where a project is only realized when a funding goal is met, and only those who pledge at least a reservation price receive a reward from the project. We propose and experimentally test two rebate rules against the customary all-or-nothing model. Firstly, we adapt the proportional rebate rule from threshold public good games to our reward-based setting. Secondly, we develop the novel bid-cap rule. Here, pledges must only be paid up to a cap, which is determined ex-post such that the provision point is exactly met. Theoretically, the bid-cap rule induces weakly less variance in payments compared with the proportional rebate rule. In our experiment, we find that both rebate rules induce higher pledges and increase the project realization rate in comparison to the all-or-nothing model. Further, we can confirm that the variance of payments is lower under the bid-cap rule compared with the proportional rebate rule. |
| Keywords: | crowdfunding; laboratory experiment; provision point mechanism; rebates; |
| JEL: | C72 C92 H41 |
| Date: | 2023–03–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:392&r=exp |
| By: | Keigo Inukai; Yuta Shimodaira; Kohei Shiozawa |
| Abstract: | The convex time budget (CTB) method is a widely used experimental technique for eliciting an individual’s time preference in intertemporal choice problems. This paper investigates the accuracy of the estimation of the discount factor parameter and the present bias parameter in the quasi-hyperbolic discounting utility function for the CTB experiment. In this paper, we use a simulation technique called “parameter recovery.” We found that the precision of present bias parameter estimation is poor within the scope of previously reported parameter estimates, making it difficult to detect the effect of present bias. Our results recommend against using a combination of the CTB experimental task and the quasi-hyperbolic discounting utility model to explore the effect of present bias. This paper contributes to addressing the replicability issue in experimental economics and highlights the importance of auditing the accuracy of parameter estimates before conducting an experiment. |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1185r&r=exp |
| By: | John List |
| Abstract: | In 2019, I put together a summary of data from my field experiments website that pertained to natural field experiments. Several people have asked me if I have an update. In this document I update all figures and numbers to show the details for 2022. I also include the description from the 2019 paper below. |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:natura:00770&r=exp |
| By: | Cyril Chimilila; Remidius Ruhinduka; Vincent Leyaro |
| Abstract: | Most sub-Saharan African countries are characterized by low tax compliance and low tax productivity. This study tests the effects of a tax lottery under alternative reward designs on compliance as an alternative policy option for addressing the problem of low tax receipts in Tanzania. The lab experiment involved the purchase of goods with a sample of 313 undergraduate students recruited from courses with and without tax specialization. The experiment participants were randomly assigned in control and treatment groups and thereafter assigned random endowment incomes. In the treatment groups two treatments were administered: a lottery of high probability and low rewards, and a lottery of low probability and high rewards, where eligibility for the lottery was restricted to those who paid VAT on the purchase (which would be cheaper otherwise). The results of the experiment revealed a lottery of high reward has a higher impact on compliance and revenue. Our estimates show that the net revenue effects of these lotteries differ by 27 percent. Hence, the design of a tax lottery is important. Further, tax lotteries have the potential to improve taxpayer compliance and increasing revenue collection. |
| Keywords: | VAT compliance, tax lottery experiment, rewards design, Tanzania |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcre:23/02&r=exp |
| By: | Benjamin Monnery; Alexandre Chirat |
| Abstract: | In Western democracies, the last decades are characterized by a transformation of the relationship between citizens and their representatives, towards greater accountability, transparency and anti-corruption efforts. However, such evolutions are sometimes suspected of paradoxically fueling populism and reducing political trust. In this article, we investigate to what extent a new public institution in charge of monitoring the integrity of elected officials is likely to attract popular support and restore citizens' trust in democracy. We focus on France and its main anti-corruption agency, the High Authority for the Transparency of Public Life (HATVP), launched in 2013. We run a survey among 3, 000 representative citizens and 33 experts, and augment it with an experimental treatment where we randomly provide simple, concise information on the activity and record of the HATVP. Our results first show a large divergence between the opinions of the average citizen and the much more optimistic views of experts about the state and dynamics of political integrity in France. Second, we find that citizens have highly heterogeneous beliefs and those with high political distrust are not only more likely to vote for populist candidates or abstain, but also the least informed about the anti-corruption agency. Third, our information provision experiment has meaningful, positive impacts on citizens’ perceptions of HATVP, political transparency and representative democracy. Moreover, we show that some of the largest impacts are found among initially distrustful and poorly informed citizens, stressing the potential for communication and information to change the political perceptions and attitudes of disillusioned citizens. |
| Keywords: | integrity ; corruption ; political trust ; populism ; survey experiment |
| JEL: | C99 D72 M48 P37 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:drm:wpaper:2023-11&r=exp |
| By: | Benjamin Ouvrard (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Raphaële Préget (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier); Arnaud Reynaud (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Laetitia Tuffery (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement) |
| Abstract: | We use a discrete choice experiment with treatments to test if voluntary adoption of smart water meters by French farmers can be fostered by i) a collective conditional subsidy offered to farmers who adopt a smart meter only if the rate of adoption in their geographic area is sufficiently high, and ii) informational nudges. Using a sample of 1, 272 farmers, we find contrasted results regarding our nudges, but we show that a conditional subsidy is an effective tool to foster adoption of smart meters. Interestingly, the willingness to pay for the conditional subsidy is equal to the subsidy amount and independent of the collective adoption threshold. |
| Keywords: | Choice experiment, Nudges, French farmers, Smart water meters, incentives |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04043374&r=exp |
| By: | Takashi Ui |
| Abstract: | In games with incomplete and ambiguous information, rational behavior depends not only on fundamental ambiguity (ambiguity about states) but also on strategic ambiguity (ambiguity about others' actions). We study the impact of strategic ambiguity in global games. Ambiguous-quality information makes more players choose an action yielding a constant payoff, whereas (unambiguous) low-quality information makes more players choose an ex-ante best response to the uniform belief over the opponents' actions. If the ex-ante best-response action yields a constant payoff, sufficiently ambiguous-quality information induces a unique equilibrium, whereas sufficiently low-quality information generates multiple equilibria. In applications to financial crises, we demonstrate that news of more ambiguous quality triggers a debt rollover crisis, whereas news of less ambiguous quality triggers a currency crisis. |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2303.12263&r=exp |