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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Avichai Snir (Bar-Ilan University); Ronen Bar-El; Limor Hatsor |
| Abstract: | We conducted two fundraising experiments to study the effects (1) of compassion towards the beneficiary, and (2) of giving participants an opportunity to attribute small donations to luck. We find that exposing the participants to a plea to help the beneficiary increases the average donation. Giving participants an opportunity to attribute small donations to luck decreases the average donation. We find that in our setting, the latter effect dominates. |
| Keywords: | Charity, Donations, Experiment, Fundraising, Expressive Behavior, lottery |
| JEL: | C91 D64 D91 L31 |
| Date: | 2023–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:biu:wpaper:2023-01&r=exp |
| By: | Laura K. Gee; Anoushka Kiyawat; Jonathan Meer; Michael J. Schreck |
| Abstract: | We examine the combined effects of popularity and feelings of being important to reaching a goal by testing how people react to situations in which their own behavior is pivotal or not, as well as the popularity of the action. We conduct a laboratory experiment to cleanly fix beliefs about the person's likelihood of being pivotal in reaching a donation threshold that triggers a matching gift, varying both the pivotality and the number of other donors (popularity). The results are striking, with those whose action is pivotal being more than twice as likely to make a donation. We then conduct two field experiments to test these findings in real-world settings. Our results suggest that pivotality is a more important determinant of prosocial behavior. |
| JEL: | D64 H41 |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31042&r=exp |
| By: | Gessner, Johannes; Habla, Wolfgang; Wagner, Ulrich J. |
| Abstract: | In a field experiment with 341 participants, we study whether social comparisons, either in isolation or in combination with a climate-related moral appeal, can change the use of public and car-related transportation. We do so in the context of a mobility budget offered to employees of a large German company as an alternative to a company car. The budget can be used to pay for both leisure and commuting trips, and for various modes of transport. Behavioral interventions in this setting are of particular interest, since companies are constrained to significantly alter financial benefits to employees yet strive to lower carbon emissions via a shift to low-emission transport modes. We find strong evidence for a reduction in car-related mobility in response to the combined treatment, driven by reduced expenditures for taxi and UBER rides. This is accompanied by substitution towards micromobility, but not towards public transport. Furthermore, we do not find any effects of the social comparison alone. Our results demonstrate that norm-based nudges are able to change transportation behavior, at least temporarily. |
| Keywords: | mobility behavior, randomized experiment, nudging, descriptive norm, injunctive norm, social norms, moral appeal, habit formation |
| JEL: | C93 D04 D91 L91 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:23003&r=exp |
| By: | De Neve, Jan-Emmanuel; Imbert, Clement; Spinnewijn, Johannes; Tsankova, Teodora; Luts, Maarten |
| Abstract: | We study the impact of simplification, deterrence and tax morale on tax compliance. We ran four natural field experiments varying the communication of the tax administration with the universe of income taxpayers in Belgium throughout the tax process. A consistent picture emerges across experiments: (i) simplifying communi- cation substantially increases compliance, (ii) deterrence messages have an additional positive effect, (iii) invoking tax morale is not effective, and often backfires. A discon- tinuity in enforcement intensity, combined with the experimental variation, allows us to compare simplification with standard enforcement measures. We find that simpli- fication is far more cost-effective, allowing for substantial savings on enforcement costs. |
| Keywords: | tax compliance; field experiments; simplification; enforcement |
| JEL: | C93 D91 H20 |
| Date: | 2021–05–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:106265&r=exp |
| By: | Thomas Dohmen (IZA (Schaumburg-Lippe-Strasse 5-9, 53113 Bonn, Germany), University of Bonn (Institute for Applied Microeconomics, Adenauerallee 24-42, 53113 Bonn, Germany), Maastricht University (Tongersestraat 53, 6211 LM Maastricht, The Netherlands).); Ingrid Rohde (Open Universiteit (Valkenburgerweg 177, 6419 AT Heerlen, The Netherlands).); Tom Stolp (Maastricht University (Tongersestraat 53, 6211 LM Maastricht, The Netherlands) and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands).) |
| Abstract: | We conduct a laboratory experiment among male participants to investigate whether rewarding schemes that depend on work performance – in particular, tournament incentives – induce more stress than schemes that are independent of performance - fixed payment scheme. Stress is measured over the entire course of the experiment at both the hormonal and psychological level. Hormonal stress responses are captured by measuring salivary cortisol levels. Psychological stress responses are measured by self-reported feelings of stress and primary appraisals. We find that tournament incentives induce a stress response whereas a fixed payment does not induce stress. This stress response does not differ significantly across situations in which winners and losers of the tournament are publically announced and situations in which this information remains private. Biological and psychological stress measures are positively correlated, i.e. increased levels of cortisol are associated with stronger feelings of stress. Nevertheless, neither perceived psychological stress nor elevated cortisol levels in a previous tournament predict a subsequent choice between tournaments and fixed payment schemes, indicating that stress induced by incentives schemes is not a relevant criterion for sorting decisions in our experiment. Finally, we find that cortisol levels are severely elevated at the beginning of the experiment, suggesting that participants experience stress in anticipation of the experiment per se, potentially due to uncertainties associated with the unknown lab situation. We call this the novelty effect. |
| Keywords: | Incentives, stress, cortisol, sorting, laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | D23 D87 D91 M52 |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:225&r=exp |
| By: | Lucas Gortazar; Claudia Hupkau; Antonio Roldan |
| Abstract: | We provide evidence from a randomized controlled trial on the effectiveness of a novel, 100-percent online math tutoring program, targeted at secondary school students from highly disadvantaged neighborhoods. The intensive, eight-week-long program was delivered by qualified math teachers in groups of two students during after-school hours. The intervention significantly increased standardized test scores (+0.26 SD) and end-of-year math grades (+0.48 SD), while reducing the probability of repeating the school year. The intervention also raised aspirations, as well as self-reported effort at school. |
| Keywords: | Schools, online tutoring, mentoring, RCT, mathematics, child outcomes |
| Date: | 2023–03–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1908&r=exp |
| By: | Andrzej Baranski; Ernesto Reuben (Division of Social Science) |
| Abstract: | Competition for positions of power is a common practice in most organizations where decisions are reached through negotiations. We study theoretically and experimentally how different voting rules affect the incentives to compete for the right to propose a distribution of benefits in a sequential bargaining game. Under the majority rule, players with a high chance of proposing are also more likely to be excluded from a coalition when not proposing, which dampens incentives to compete for proposal rights relative to the unanimity case where no one can be excluded from a coalition. However, when rent-seeking efforts affect proposal rights only in the first bargaining round, equilibrium efforts to secure proposal rights are higher under the majority rule because they no longer affect the likelihood of coalition exclusion. Our experimental findings uncover a novel efficiency trade-off absent in theory: While gridlock is stronger under unanimity, majoritarian bargaining elicits higher competition costs regardless of the durability of efforts in affecting proposal rights, rendering both rules equally efficient. The distribution of benefits is affected by the endogeneity of proposal rights contrary to behavioral expectations as subjects gravitate towards equitable sharing and proposers often do not keep the lion’s share. Further experiments reveal that subject behavior is consistent with myopic reasoning and that our results hold robustly in distinct subject samples. |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nad:wpaper:20220085&r=exp |
| By: | Ngoc Thao NOET (GRANEM - Groupe de Recherche Angevin en Economie et Management - UA - Université d'Angers - Institut Agro Rennes Angers - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement); Marianne Lefebvre (GRANEM - Groupe de Recherche Angevin en Economie et Management - UA - Université d'Angers - Institut Agro Rennes Angers - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement); Serge Blondel (LIRAES (URP_ 4470) - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de Recherche Appliquée en Economie de la Santé - UPCité - Université Paris Cité, GRANEM - Groupe de Recherche Angevin en Economie et Management - UA - Université d'Angers - Institut Agro Rennes Angers - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement) |
| Abstract: | Through a field experiment based on the prisoner's dilemma, we analyze the determinants of cooperative behavior in the horticultural sector, specifically on the effect of group membership. We focus on the Flowers for Bees Week initiative, a collective action in the supply chain (in particular producers and landscapers). We compare the behaviors of professionals in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game over 5 days, in two treatments: in-group (the players have the same role in the sector) and out-group (one player is a producer and the other a landscaper). The results are threefold. First, cooperation is higher in the in-group treatment compared to the out-group treatment. Second, when they cooperate, it is because they believe that the other will also cooperate. Lastly, the two sectors share the same views on collective actions and cooperation. We suggest levers to encourage collective actions in the sector. |
| Keywords: | Cooperation, Field experiment, In-group Out-group effect, Horticulture, Prisoner's dilemma |
| Date: | 2023–02–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04004727&r=exp |
| By: | Wladislaw Mill; Jonathan Stäbler |
| Abstract: | This paper studies how litigation and settlement behavior is affected by agents motivated by spiteful preferences under the American and the English fee-shifting rule. We conduct an experiment and find that litigation expenditures and settlement requests are higher for more spiteful participants. The relative increase in litigation expenditures due to spite is more pronounced under the American fee-shifting rule. We further find that the expected payoff for more spiteful societies is lower than for less spiteful societies. This effect is particularly pronounced for low-merit cases under the English rule compared to a constant cost under the American rule. |
| Keywords: | spite, litigation, settlement, experiment, English rule, American rule |
| JEL: | K41 C72 C91 D91 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10290&r=exp |
| By: | Julienne, Hannah; Poluektova, Olga; Robertson, Deirdre; Braiden, Aoife; Lunn, Pete |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esr:wpaper:wp741&r=exp |
| By: | David Ronayne (European School of Management and Technology (ESMT Berlin)); Roberto Veneziani (Queen Mary University of London); William R. Zame (University of California at Los Angeles) |
| Abstract: | Abstract: Anscombe and Aumann (1963) offer a definition of subjective probability in terms of comparisons with objective probabilities. That definition – which has provided the basis for much of the succeeding work on subjective probability – presumes that the subjective probability of an event is independent of the prize consequences of that event, a property we term Prize Independence. We design experiments to test Prize Independence and find that a large fraction of our subjects violate it; thus, they do not have subjective probabilities. These findings raise questions about the empirical relevance of much of the literature on subjective probability. |
| Keywords: | subjective probability, choice under uncertainty, online experiments. |
| JEL: | D01 D81 D84 |
| Date: | 2022–06–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:940&r=exp |
| By: | Natalie Struwe; Esther Blanco; James M. Walker |
| Abstract: | This research is inspired by in-kind donations that have the capacity to increase the marginal benefit (productivity) in provision of public goods, for example by providing critical infrastructure that increases the productivity of resources utilized by local public good providers. We provide experimental evidence from a two-stage decision environment where donors (outsiders), who benefit from a public good, send transfer donations to providers (insiders) of the public good, who also receive benefits. We find that that donors are willing to offer transfers at a sufficiently high level to increase the productivity (MPCR) of the public good. Public good provision by insiders, however, is neither increased significantly above levels observed in treatments with the same MPCR where outsiders’ donations are used as compensation rewards to insiders, nor in treatments without donations. Thus, whether a given MPCR is reached endogenously through donations by outsiders or exogenously does not significantly affect insiders’ public good provision. In addition, when comparing continuous to threshold endogenous changes in the MPCR, we cannot find significant differences in public good provision, despite transfer donations by outsiders are higher for threshold increases in the MPCR. |
| Keywords: | public goods, privately provided public goods, institution, externality, donation, reciprocity |
| JEL: | D70 D62 D64 H41 |
| Date: | 2023–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2023-02&r=exp |
| By: | Karine Lamiraud (ESSEC Business School - Essec Business School); Julien Patris (Alnylam Pharmaceuticals); Radu Vranceanu (ESSEC Business School - Essec Business School) |
| Abstract: | This paper reports the results from a multi-attribute market negotiation experiment to study how the structure of the negotiation process influences its efficiency. We found that, conditional on the success of the negotiation, the total value created increased with the time spent negotiating; by working one more minute, negotiators created on average 37 additional value units (1% of the maximal value). However, most of the gains were obtained in the early moments of the negotiation. Using a between-subject design, we analyzed the consequences of (1) guiding negotiations towards early wins, and (2) inviting negotiators to share information about their priority goals. In both treatments, the total value created exceeded the control value by approximately 9% of the maximal value. However, it was essentially the buyer who captured the additional value. Negotiator gender had an impact on the negotiation outcome, with women underperforming compared to men. |
| Keywords: | Structured negotiation, Communication, Information sharing, Trust |
| Date: | 2023–02–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03989514&r=exp |
| By: | Blesse, Sebastian; Lergetporer, Philipp; Nover, Justus; Werner, Katharina |
| Abstract: | A lack of transparency about policy performance can pose a major obstacle to welfare-enhancing policy competition across jurisdictions. In parallel surveys with German citizens and state parliamentarians, we document that both groups misperceive the performance of their state's education system. Experimentally providing performance information polarizes citizens' political satisfaction between high- and low-performing states and increases their demand for greater transparency of states' educational performance. Parliamentarians' support for the transparency policy is opportunistic: Performance information increases (decreases) policy support in highperforming (low-performing) states. We conclude that increasing the public salience of educational performance information may incentivize politicians to implement welfare-enhancing reforms. |
| Keywords: | yardstick competition, beliefs, information, citizens, politicians, survey experiment |
| JEL: | H11 I28 D83 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:23007&r=exp |
| By: | Denis Chetverikov; Jinyong Hahn; Zhipeng Liao; Andres Santos |
| Abstract: | We examine asymptotic properties of the OLS estimator when the values of the regressor of interest are assigned randomly and independently of other regressors. We find that the OLS variance formula in this case is often simplified, sometimes substantially. In particular, when the regressor of interest is independent not only of other regressors but also of the error term, the textbook homoskedastic variance formula is valid even if the error term and auxiliary regressors exhibit a general dependence structure. In the context of randomized controlled trials, this conclusion holds in completely randomized experiments with constant treatment effects. When the error term is heteroscedastic with respect to the regressor of interest, the variance formula has to be adjusted not only for heteroscedasticity but also for correlation structure of the error term. However, even in the latter case, some simplifications are possible as only a part of the correlation structure of the error term should be taken into account. In the context of randomized control trials, this implies that the textbook homoscedastic variance formula is typically not valid if treatment effects are heterogenous but heteroscedasticity-robust variance formulas are valid if treatment effects are independent across units, even if the error term exhibits a general dependence structure. In addition, we extend the results to the case when the regressor of interest is assigned randomly at a group level, such as in randomized control trials with treatment assignment determined at a group (e.g., school/village) level. |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2303.10306&r=exp |
| By: | Tito Boeri; Matteo Gamalerio; Massimo Morelli; Margherita Negri |
| Abstract: | We study whether a better knowledge of the functioning of pay-as-you-go pension systems and recent demographic trends in the hosting country affects natives' attitudes towards immigration. In two online experiments in Italy and Spain, we randomly treated participants with a video explaining how, in pay-as-you-go pension systems, the payment of current pensions depends on the contributions paid by current workers. The video also explains that the ratio between the number of pensioners and the number of workers in their countries will grow substantially in the future. We find that the treatment improves participants' knowledge about how a pay-as-you-go system works and the future demographic trends in their country. However, we find that only treated participants who support non-populist parties display more positive attitudes towards migrants, even though the treatment increases knowledge of pension systems and demographic trends for all participants. |
| Keywords: | information provision, experiment, immigration, pay-as-you-go pension systems, population ageing, populism |
| Date: | 2023–03–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1907&r=exp |
| By: | Palaash Bhargava (Columbia University); Daniel L. Chen (Toulouse School of Economics); Matthias Sutter (Max-Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Bonn, University of Cologne and University of Innsbruck IZA Bonn, CESifoMunich); Camille Terrier (Queen Mary University London) |
| Abstract: | Social networks are segmented on gender, ethnicity, and other demographic characteristics. We present evidence on an understudied source of homophily: behavioral traits. Based on unique data from incentivized experiments with more than 2, 500 French high-school students, we find high levels of homophily across ten behavioral traits. Notably, homophily depends on similarities in demographic characteristics, in particular gender. Using network econometrics, we show that homophily is not only an outcome of endogenous network formation, but also driven by peer effects. The latter are larger when students share demographic characteristics, have longer periods of friendship, or are friends with more popular individuals. |
| Keywords: | Homophily, social networks, behavioral traits, peer effects, experiments |
| JEL: | D85 C91 D01 D90 |
| Date: | 2023–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:227&r=exp |
| By: | Timmons, Shane; Andersson, Ylva; Lunn, Pete |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esr:wpaper:wp731&r=exp |
| By: | Benjamin Enke; Thomas Graeber; Ryan Oprea |
| Abstract: | We provide experimental evidence that core intertemporal choice anomalies -- including extreme short-run impatience, structural estimates of present bias, hyperbolicity and transitivity violations -- are driven by complexity rather than time or risk preferences. First, all anomalies also arise in structurally similar atemporal decision problems involving valuation of iteratively discounted (but immediately paid) rewards. These computational errors are strongly predictive of intertemporal decisions. Second, intertemporal choice anomalies are highly correlated with indices of complexity responses including cognitive uncertainty and choice inconsistency. We show that model misspecification resulting from ignoring behavioral responses to complexity severely inflates structural estimates of present bias. |
| JEL: | D03 |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31047&r=exp |
| By: | Gonzalo Ballestero |
| Keywords: | Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Collusion, Competition Policy |
| JEL: | D43 L23 |
| Date: | 2021–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aep:anales:4433&r=exp |
| By: | Sandro Ambuehl; Sebastian Blesse; Philipp Doerrenberg; Christoph Feldhaus; Axel Ockenfels |
| Abstract: | Much economic analysis derives policy recommendations based on social welfare criteria intended to model the preferences of a policy maker. Yet, little is known about policy maker's normative views in a way amenable to this use. In a behavioral experiment, we elicit German legislators' social welfare criteria unconfounded by political economy constraints. When resolving preference conflicts across individuals, politicians place substantially more importance on least-favored than on most-favored alternatives, contrasting with both common aggregation mechanisms and the equal weighting inherent in utilitarianism and the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. When resolving preference conflicts within individuals, we find no support for the commonly used "long-run criterion" which insists that choices merit intervention only if the lure of immediacy may bias intertemporal choice. Politicians' and the public's social welfare criteria largely coincide. |
| Keywords: | Positive welfare economics, politicians, preference aggregation, paternalism |
| JEL: | C90 D60 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ifowps:_391&r=exp |
| By: | Gonzalo Ballestero (Department of Economics, Universidad de San Andres) |
| Abstract: | Firms increasingly delegate their strategic decisions to algorithms. A potential con- cern is that algorithms may undermine competition by leading to pricing outcomes that are collusive, even without having been designed to do so. This paper investigates whether Q-learning algorithms can learn to collude in a setting with sequential price competition and stochastic marginal costs adapted from Maskin and Tirole (1988). By extending a previous model developed in Klein (2021), I find that sequential Q-learning algorithms leads to supracompetitive profits despite they compete under uncertainty and this finding is robust to various extensions. The algorithms can coordinate on focal price equilibria or an Edgeworth cycle provided that uncertainty is not too large. However, as the market environment becomes more uncertain, price wars emerge as the only possible pricing pattern. Even though sequential Q-learning algorithms gain supracompetitive profits, uncertainty tends to make collusive outcomes more difficult to achieve. |
| Keywords: | Competition Policy |
| Date: | 2021–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sad:ypaper:1&r=exp |
| By: | Sakib Anwar, Chowdhury Mohammad (BLDT, University of Winchester); Bruno, Jorge (BLDT, University of Winchester); Foucart, Renaud (Department of Economics, Lancaster University.); SenGupta, Sonali (Queens Management School, Queen’s University Belfast.) |
| Abstract: | We model a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their observation of an incomplete sample of past contributions. We show that full cooperation between and within groups is possible with self-interested players on a fixed horizon. Position uncertainty implies the existence of an equilibrium where groups of players conditionally cooperate in the hope of influencing further groups. Conditional cooperation implies that each group member is pivotal, so that efficient simultaneous provision within groups is an equilibrium. |
| Keywords: | Public Goods ; Groups ; Position Uncertainty ; Voluntary Contributions JEL codes: C72 ; D82 ; H41 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:wcreta:77&r=exp |
| By: | Primbs, Maximilian; dudda, leonie; Andresen, Pia K. (Utrecht University); Buchanan, Erin Michelle (Harrisburg University of Science and Technology); Peetz, Hannah Katharina; Silan, Miguel Alejandro A.; Lakens, Daniel (Eindhoven University of Technology) |
| Abstract: | We expect that consensus meetings, where researchers come together to discuss their theoretical viewpoints, prioritize the factors they agree are important to study, standardize their measures, and determine a smallest effect size of interest, will prove to be a more efficient solution to the lack of coordination and integration of claims in science than integrative experiments. |
| Date: | 2023–03–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:metaar:3ks6r&r=exp |
| By: | Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar; Jorge Bruno; Renaud Foucart; Sonali SenGupta |
| Abstract: | We model a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their observation of an incomplete sample of past contributions. We show that full cooperation between and within groups is possible with self-interested players on a fixed horizon. Position uncertainty implies the existence of an equilibrium where groups of players conditionally cooperate in the hope of influencing further groups. Conditional cooperation implies that each group member is pivotal, so that efficient simultaneous provision within groups is an equilibrium. |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2303.10514&r=exp |
| By: | Fiala, Lenka; Fleisje, Erlend M.; Reiremo, Tore Adam |
| Abstract: | Dhar et al. (2022) examine the effect of a gender attitude change program in secondary schools in India. In their preferred specification, the authors show that the program made the students report more gender-egalitarian attitudes by 0.18 of a standard deviation, and shifted self-reported behaviors to be more aligned with gender-progressive norms by 0.20 standard deviations (both significant at 1% level). In contrast, they found no effect on girls' aspirations, as these were already high before the intervention. The effects did not attenuate between the first end-line (right after the programme was completed) and the second (two years later). To put the paper's results in perspective, we first comment on the authors' deviations from their pre-registration and pre-analysis plans, provide detailed power calculations, and add multiple-hypothesis-testing-adjusted standard errors. Second, we show that the paper's results are perfectly reproducible. Third, we show that the results are robust to excluding control variables, and alternative ways of constructing indices and dealing with non-response. |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:i4rdps:24&r=exp |