|
on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Jukić, Irena; Kovač, Dejan; Vuletić Čugalj, Danijela |
| Abstract: | We conducted a field experiment in the natural setting of blood donations to test how oxytocin relates to empathy and altruism. We randomly assigned blood donors in the Croatian Institute for Transfusion Medicine to three groups with the aim to induce different levels of empathy by showing a neutral video to the donors from the control group and an emotional to the donors from the first and second treatment groups. In addition to watching the emotional video, donors from the second treatment group are given a gift which relates to the emotional story from the video. We find no effect of our treatment on induced levels of oxytocin. Null effects of our treatments could be explained by the above average baseline levels of oxytocin and inability of our treatments to provoke emotional stimuli in blood donors. Nonetheless, for our empathy measures we find the effect of gift exchange on empathic concerns, but not on perspective taking. After our experimental treatments, we followed the return of our blood donors for a whole year. We find that only variable which consistently predicts return for blood donation in stated period is the number of previous donations. From policy perspective it is an important finding. Especially for hospitals and other blood providers when faced with time and resource constraints. |
| Keywords: | altruism, blood donations, charitable giving, field experiment, oxytocin |
| JEL: | C93 D64 I10 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwhdps:42023&r=exp |
| By: | Bhaumik, Sumon; Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Dimova, Ralitza; Fromell, Hanna |
| Abstract: | We investigate experimentally the effects of information about native/immigrant identity, and the ability to communicate a self-chosen personal characteristic towards the rival on conflict behavior. In a two-player individual contest with British and Immigrant subjects in the UK we find that neither information about identity nor communicating self-characteristics significantly affect the average level of conflict. Both of those, however, significantly affect players' strategies, in the sense of the extent they involve conflict over time. Overall, the results indicate that inter-personal communication may help to mitigate high intensity conflicts when the identities are common knowledge among rivals. |
| Keywords: | Conflict, Experiment, Identity, Immigrant, Communication |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D72 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:1255&r=exp |
| By: | Wang Yijia; Wang Zhijian |
| Abstract: | The collapse process is a constitutional sub-process in the full finding Nash equilibrium process. We conducted laboratory game experiments with human subjects to study this process. We observed significant pulse signals in the collapse process. The observations from the data support the completeness and the consistency of the game dynamics paradigm. |
| Date: | 2023–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2302.09336&r=exp |
| By: | Hoffmann, Lisa (German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA)) |
| Abstract: | Honesty and orientation toward the common good are key qualities that people expect from their elected politicians. However, dishonesty in the forms of corruption, vote-buying and identity politics are not uncommon and can lead to a loss of trust in politics. This paper focuses on the cheating behavior of aspirant politicians and students in Kenya. I applied online coin flip experiments as means to detect cheating. In a between-subject design, participants could either (1) cheat to the benefit of a common good, (2) cheat to the benefit of their ethnic group, or (3) cheat to their own monetary advantage. On average, 38% of participants report the payoff-maximizing number of successful coin tosses with no difference between aspirant politicians and students. However, aspirant politicians report the payoff-maximizing outcome more readily than students when cheating benefits a common good. Perceiving corruption as justifiable is correlated with reporting higher numbers of successful coin tosses in the online experiment. |
| Date: | 2023–03–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:xnez5&r=exp |
| By: | Gabriele Camera (Chapman University); Jaehong Kim (Xiamen University); David Rojo Arjona (Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | Understanding how incentives and institutions help scaling up cooperation is important, especially when strategic uncertainty is considerable. Evidence suggests that this is challenging even when full cooperation is theoretically sustainable thanks to indefinite repetition. In a controlled social dilemma experiment, we show that adding partial cooperation choices to the usual binary choice environment can raise cooperation and efficiency. Under suitable incentives, partial cooperation choices enable individuals to cheaply signal their desire to cooperate, reducing strategic uncertainty. The insight is that richer choice sets can form the basis of a language meaningful for coordinating on cooperation. |
| Keywords: | experiments, repeated games, social dilemmas, strategy estimation |
| JEL: | C70 C90 D03 E02 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:23-05&r=exp |
| By: | Sumon Bhaumik (Management School, University of Sheffield); Subhasish M. Chowdhury (Department of Economics, University of Sheffield); Ralitza Dimova (Global Development Institute, University of Manchester); Hanna Fromell (Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University) |
| Abstract: | We investigate experimentally the effects of information about native/immigrant identity, and the ability to communicate a self-chosen personal characteristic towards the rival on conflict behavior. In a two-player individual contest with British and Immigrant subjects in the UK we find that neither information about identity nor communicating self-characteristics significantly affect the average level of conflict. Both of those, however, significantly affect players’ strategies, in the sense of the extent they involve conflict over time. Overall, the results indicate that inter-personal communication may help to mitigate high intensity conflicts when the identities are common knowledge among rivals. |
| Keywords: | Conflict, Experiment, Identity, Immigrant, Communication |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D72 |
| Date: | 2023–03–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aah:aarhec:2023-02&r=exp |
| By: | Marvin Deversi; Lisa Spantig |
| Abstract: | Economists and management scholars have argued that the scope of incentives to increase cooperation in organizations is limited as their use signals the prevalence of free-riding among employees. This paper tests this hypothesis experimentally, using a sample of managers and employees from a large company. We exogenously vary whether managers are informed about prevailing cooperation levels among employees before they can set incentives to promote cooperation. In addition, employees matched to informed managers learn that the manager could base their incentive choice on cooperation levels. We find no evidence for the hypothesized signaling effect. Having an informed manager set the incentive does not change employees’ be-liefs about the cooperativeness of others. Incentives hence have strong positive effects on cooperative beliefs, irrespective of information. The absence of the signaling effect seems related to the perception of managers’ intentions, a mitigating but understudied factor. |
| Keywords: | cooperation, incentives, signalling, crowding out, experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D83 D91 D01 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10302&r=exp |
| By: | Mylène Lagarde (London School of Economics and Political Science); Carlos Riumallo Herl (Erasmus University Rotterdam) |
| Abstract: | We study the power of social incentives to increase individuals' investment in preventive health using small financial incentives with group conditionality. In a field experiment in El Salvador, we compare those to equivalent individual incentives. Despite the uncertainty about others’ behavior, group incentives are as effective as individual ones and double the demand for prevention. They achieve these effects by increasing communication, peer pressure, and coordination between members to reduce information asymmetry and address behavioral barriers that limit prevention take-up. Incentives leveraging social interactions may act on both present bias and inaccurate beliefs that limit investment in health services. |
| JEL: | C93 D91 I12 |
| Date: | 2023–03–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20230010&r=exp |
| By: | Paolo Crosetto; Thomas De Haan |
| Abstract: | We develop an intuitive, Click-and-Drag interface to elicit continuous belief distributions of any shape. We test this interface against the state of the art in the experimental literature – a text-based interface and multiple sliders – and in the online forecasting industry – a distribution-manipulation interface similar to the one used at Metaculus, a crowd-forecasting website. By means of a pre-registered experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk we collect quantitative data on the convergence speed and accuracy of reported beliefs in a series of induced-value scenarios varying by granularity, shape, and time constraints. We also collect subjective data on ease of use, frustration and understanding. Results show that the click-and-drag interface outperforms all others by accuracy and speed, and is self-reported as being more intuitive and less frustrating than other interfaces, confirming our pre-registered hypothesis. Besides pre-registration, we report that the click-and-drag interface generates the least drop-out rate from the task, and scores best in a sentiment analysis of an open-ended general question. Further, we use the interfaces to collect homegrown beliefs on temperature in New York City in 2022 and 2042. On average, all subjects overshoot the real temperature for 2022 by about 2°F, and all anticipate further global warming in the order of 2.3°F; these forecasts are by and large not impacted by the interface used to elicit them. We provide a free and open source, ready to use oTree and Qualtrics plugin of our click-and-drag and all other tested interfaces available at https://beliefelicitation.github.io/. |
| Keywords: | Belief Elicitation, Forecasting, Scoring Rules, Interfaces |
| JEL: | C88 C91 |
| Date: | 2022–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gbl:wpaper:2022-01&r=exp |
| By: | Astrid Dannenberg (University of Kassel); Eva Weingaertner (University of Kassel) |
| Abstract: | Our choice of food has major impacts on the environment. At the same time, it is visible to all people with whom we spend our daily lives. This raises the question of whether people are adapting their diets to gain a green reputation, as has been observed for other environmentally relevant consumption choices. Using an experiment in which participants can choose between vegan, vegetarian, and meat-based food vouchers, we examine how observation by others and the provision of an information nudge influence food choices. The results show that providing an information nudge reduces the likelihood of choosing meat by 12 percentage points. Observation by others does not significantly reduce the likelihood of choosing meat. Contrary to our prediction, when participants are observed and receive the information nudge, they are less inclined to choose one of the more sustainable options. We discuss the reasons for the partly surprising results and the implications for policy. |
| Keywords: | Food choice; meat consumption; information nudge; observability; experiment |
| JEL: | C9 D91 Q18 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:202301&r=exp |
| By: | Sebastian Blesse; Philipp Lergetporer; Justus Nover; Katharina Werner |
| Abstract: | A lack of transparency about policy performance can pose a major obstacle to welfare-enhancing policy competition across jurisdictions. In parallel surveys with German citizens and state parliamentarians, we document that both groups misperceive the performance of their state’s education system. Experimentally providing performance information polarizes citizens’ political satisfaction between high- and low-performing states and increases their demand for greater transparency of states’ educational performance. Parliamentarians’ support for the transparency policy is opportunistic: Performance information increases (decreases) policy support in high-performing (low-performing) states. We conclude that increasing the public salience of educational performance information may incentivize politicians to implement welfare-enhancing reforms. |
| Keywords: | yardstick competition, beliefs, information, citizens, politicians, survey experiment |
| JEL: | H11 I28 D83 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10292&r=exp |
| By: | Thomas Dohmen (University of Bonn, Lennestrasse 43, 53113 Bonn, Germany; IZA Instituteo f Labor Economics; Maastricht University); Simone Quercia (University of Verona, Via Cantarane 24, 37129 Verona, Italy); Jana Willrodt (Duesseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Universitaetsstrasse 1, 40225 Duesseldorf, Germany) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we provide an explanation for why risk taking is related to optimism. Using a laboratory experiment, we show that the degree of optimism predicts whether people tend to focus on the positive or negative outcomes of risky decisions. While optimists tend to focus on the good outcomes, pessimists focus on the bad outcomes of risk. The tendency to focus on good or bad outcomes of risk in turn affects both the self-reported willingness to take risk and actual risk taking behavior. This suggests that dispositional optimism may affect risk taking mainly by shifting attention to specific outcomes rather than causing misperception of probabilities. In line with this, in a second studywe find evidence that dispositional optimism is related to elicited parameters of rank dependent utility theory suggesting that focusing may be among the psychological determinants of decision weights. Finally, we corroborate our findings with process data related to focusing showing that optimists tend to remember more and attend more to good outcomes and this in turn affects their risk taking. |
| Keywords: | Risk taking behavior, optimism, preference measure |
| JEL: | D91 C91 D81 D01 |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:223&r=exp |
| By: | Thomas Dohmen (Institute for Applied Microeconomics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, 53113 Bonn, Germany); Elena Shvartsman (WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management, Burgplatz 2, 56179 Vallendar, Germany) |
| Abstract: | Working time autonomy is often accompanied by output-based incentives to counterbalance the loss of monitoring that comes with granting autonomy. However, in such settings, overprovision of effort could arise if workers are uncertain whether their performance suffices to secure the output-based rewards. Performance feedback can reduce or eliminate such uncertainty. We develop an experiment to show that overprovision of costly effort is more likely to occur in work environments with working time autonomy in the absence of feedback. A key feature of our design is that it allows for a clean measurement of effort overprovision by keeping performance per unit of time fixed, which we achieve by calibrating subjects’ productivity on a real effort task ex ante. This novel design can serve as a workhorse for various experiments as it allows for exogenous variation of performance certainty (i.e., by providing feedback), working time autonomy, productivity, effort costs, and the general incentive structure. We find that subjects provide significantly more costly effort beyond a level necessary to meet their performance targets in the presence of uncertainty, i.e., the absence of feedback, which suggests that feedback shields workers from overprovision of costly effort. |
| Keywords: | working time autonomy, performance uncertainty, feedback provision, incentives, effort, subjective stress |
| JEL: | C91 D90 I10 J81 |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:222&r=exp |
| By: | Patrick Dylong; Paul Setzepfand; Silke Uebelmesser |
| Abstract: | Using data from two representative and large-scale population surveys with more than 4000 participants, we investigate the effect of randomized priming interventions on attitudes towards immigrants. We document robust null effects of these interventions under two experimental settings, across two surveys and for a range of specifications. Our results suggest that (economic) attitudes towards immigrants are less sensitive to priming than previous research indicates. We thus provide (i) a reference point for settings in which intentional priming interventions are ineffective, and (ii) an upper bound for unintended priming effects. We argue that researchers should not be overly concerned about confounding priming effects when designing surveys to elicit attitudes towards immigrants. |
| Keywords: | attitudes towards immigration, priming, experimental design |
| JEL: | C83 C90 J15 F22 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10306&r=exp |
| By: | Gustafson, Christopher R. (University of Nebraska-Lincoln); Meerza, Syed Imran Ali |
| Abstract: | Experimental auctions are an important technique for measuring preferences for products, product attributes, and the impact of information. While these techniques are widely used, there is a paucity of evidence about an important design decision available to guide researchers: the choice of a between-subject vs. within-subject design. Within-subject designs offer clear value in terms of providing multiple observations per participant, which increases statistical power, but there are long-standing concerns about properties that could decrease the external validity of results generated in within-subject experiments. In this paper, we examine the impact of information on the economically motivated mislabeling of extra virgin olive oil (EVOO) on consumer valuation of EVOOs produced in the country that has experienced mislabeling scandals, along with EVOOs from two unimplicated countries, in between-subject and within-subject designs. Our findings show that the significance and relative impacts on valuation are identical between the two conditions. In fact, the valuation of the implicated EVOO differs only by a few cents ($3.53 vs. $3.60) after participants received information about mislabeling. There were larger differences in valuation of the two unimplicated EVOOs post-information, though the relative preferences implied by the results and the statistical significance did not differ between the conditions. The impacts of information on the product “targeted” by the information are measured consistently in both between-subjects and within-subjects designs, while we observe more variation in off-target products, suggesting that the researchers who are interested in informational spillovers may need to be more careful in design choice than those who want to estimate the impact of information on the target products. |
| Date: | 2023–03–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:3g4m5&r=exp |
| By: | Francesca Barigozzi; Natalia Montinari |
| Abstract: | In Experimental Economics, coordination games are used to elicit social norms as incentivized beliefs about others’ beliefs. Conversely, representative surveys like the World Values Survey elicit social norms as personal attitudes and values that are independent of others’ beliefs. Using a representative survey of the Italian population (N = 1, 501), we compare the two ways of measuring social norms with gender roles as a working example and find the following results. At the aggregated level, appropriateness ratings obtained under the two elicitation methods follow the same pattern but differ significantly in magnitude, with the incentivized social norm elicitation depicting a more conservative view on gender roles than the unincentivized one. The analysis carried out at the individual level allows us to explain the previous result. Most respondents report personal values as more progressive than the perceived norm, which may be consistent with a desirability and/or a self-image bias. This occurs irrespectively of whether respondents correctly perceive the social norm or not. We conclude that analyses based on personal values lead to a proxy of gender norms significantly more progressive than the norms elicited in coordination games. |
| JEL: | A13 C90 D01 J16 |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp1182&r=exp |
| By: | Charles N Noussair (University of Arizona); Steven Tucker (University of Waikato); Yilong Xu (Utrecht University); Adriana Breaban (Erasmus University Rotterdam) |
| Abstract: | We consider the emotional correlates of activity in the Public Good game when monetary and non-monetary punishments are available, and when no punishment is possible. In our experiment, emotions are measured using Face Reading software that tracks the emotional content of facial expressions in real time. When no punishment is possible, greater anger and more negative emotional valence correlate with learning that one has contributed more than others. Lower valence and happiness, in turn, is associated with reducing one’s cooperation in the next period. When non-monetary punishment in the form of expressed disapproval is possible, positive emotional valence is associated with cooperation, punishment of free-riders, and an increase in cooperation from one period to the next. Negative valence, on the other hand, is associated with the receipt of punishment, suggesting that the expression of disapproval inherent in the non-monetary punishment was well understood and had an effect on the emotions of the recipient. The data support the conjecture that the reinforcement that positive emotion provides is what allows non-monetary punishment to increase cooperation. In contrast, when monetary punishment is available, emotional correlates are less consistent, suggesting that monetary punishment is less reliant on emotions to be effective. Instead, it appears to increase cooperation solely by reducing the monetary incentives to free-ride. |
| Keywords: | Public Goods, Sanctions, Emotions |
| JEL: | D91 H41 C91 |
| Date: | 2023–03–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wai:econwp:23/01&r=exp |
| By: | Boeri, Tito (Bocconi University); Gamalerio, Matteo (University of Barcelona); Morelli, Massimo (Bocconi University); Negri, Margherita (University of St. Andrews) |
| Abstract: | We study whether a better knowledge of the functioning of pay-as-you-go pension systems and recent demographic trends in the hosting country affects natives' attitudes towards immigration. In two online experiments in Italy and Spain, we randomly treated participants with a video explaining how, in pay-as-you-go pension systems, the payment of current pensions depends on the contributions paid by current workers. The video also explains that the ratio between the number of pensioners and the number of workers in their countries will grow substantially in the future. We find that the treatment improves participants' knowledge about how a pay-as-you-go system works and the future demographic trends in their country. However, we find that only treated participants who do not support populist and anti-immigrant parties display more positive attitudes towards migrants, even though the treatment increases knowledge of pension systems and demographic trends for all participants. |
| Keywords: | information provision, experiment, immigration, pay-as-you-go pension systems, population ageing, populism |
| JEL: | C90 D83 H55 J15 F22 |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp15989&r=exp |
| By: | Shane Byrne; Kenneth Devine; Michael King; Yvonne McCarthy; Christopher Palmer |
| Abstract: | Under-refinancing limits the transmission of accommodative monetary policy to the household sector and costs mortgage holders in many countries a significant fraction of income annually. We test whether targeted communication can reduce the attention frictions that inhibit transmission by partnering with a large bank to analyze a field experiment testing messages sent to 12, 000 Irish households. While we find only small effects of disclosure design improvements, a reminder letter increases refinancing by 76%, from 8.9% to 15.7%. To interpret this reminder effect, we extend and estimate a mixture model of inattentive financial decision-making to allow for disclosure treatment effects on attention. We find that reminders increase the likelihood mortgage holders are attentive by over 60%, from 24% to 39%. A conservative back-of-the-envelope cost-effectiveness calculation implies that the average reminder letter generated €42 of mortgagor consumption (€605 per refinancing household). Our results illustrate that targeted central bank communication such as refinancing reminders could have a larger effect on refinancing than a standard policy rate cut. Reminders could further strengthen the refinancing channel and stimulate local consumption even when policy rates are at the zero-lower bound or set in a monetary union. |
| JEL: | D83 E58 G21 G28 G51 |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31043&r=exp |
| By: | Anujit Chakraborty; Evan Calford (Department of Economics, University of California Davis) |
| Abstract: | Do experimental subjects have consistent first and higher-order beliefs about others? How does any inconsistency affect strategic decisions? We introduce a simple four-player sequential social dilemma where actions reveal first and higher-order beliefs. The unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is observed less than 5% of the time, even though our diagnostic treatments show that a majority of our subjects are self-interested, higher-order rational and have accurate first-order beliefs. In our data, strategic play deviates substantially from Nash predictions because first-order and higher-order beliefs are inconsistent for most subjects. We construct and operationalize an epistemic model of belief hierarchies to estimate that less than 10% of subjects have consistent first and higher-order beliefs. |
| Date: | 2023–03–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cda:wpaper:356&r=exp |
| By: | Alexia GAUDEUL; Caterina GIANNETTI |
| Abstract: | We investigate trade-offs when trying to encourage adoption of stock-trading algorithms. We organize an artificial stock market experiment over three weeks where investors experience trading on their own and with the help of a financial algorithm.They then choose whether to adopt it. We vary the algorithm in terms of its trading strategy and whether its decisions can be overriden or not. We find that adoption rates are low, but investors are more likely to adopt an algorithm that trades actively and that they can override. The investor’s trading preferences, as revealed by their own trading decisions, does not consistently affect algorithm take-up. Rather, algorithm adoption depends mainly on how succesful a trader was when trading on their own vs. when an algorithm was trading in their place. Analysis of an exit questionnaire matches those observations with the reasons given by individuals for rejecting or adopting a financial algorithm. |
| Keywords: | algorithm aversion, disposition effect, robo-advisers, sophisticated investors, stocktrading |
| JEL: | G11 G40 |
| Date: | 2023–03–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pie:dsedps:2023/288&r=exp |
| By: | Thomas Dohmen; Elena Shvartsman |
| Abstract: | Working time autonomy is often accompanied by output-based incentives to counterbalance the loss of monitoring that comes with granting autonomy. However, in such settings, overprovision of effort could arise if workers are uncertain whether their performance suffices to secure the output-based rewards. Perfor-mance feedback can reduce or eliminate such uncertainty. We develop an exper-iment to show that overprovision of costly effort is more likely to occur in work environments with working time autonomy in the absence of feedback. A key fea-ture of our design is that it allows for a clean measurement of effort overprovision by keeping performance per unit of time fixed, which we achieve by calibrating subjects’ productivity on a real effort task ex ante. This novel design can serve as a workhorse for various experiments as it allows for exogenous variation of perfor-mance certainty (i.e., by providing feedback), working time autonomy, productivity, effort costs, and the general incentive structure. We find that subjects provide significantly more costly effort beyond a level necessary to meet their performance targets in the presence of uncertainty, i.e., the absence of feedback, which suggests that feedback shields workers from overprovision of costly effort. |
| Keywords: | working time autonomy, performance uncertainty, feedback provision, incentives, effort, subjective stress |
| JEL: | C91 D90 I10 J81 |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2023_398&r=exp |
| By: | Kristina Czura; Andreas Menzel; Martina Miotto |
| Abstract: | Menstruation can limit female labor force participation, especially in low-income countries, where menstrual hygiene practices are constrained by lack of finances and information. In a randomized controlled trial with around 1, 900 female workers from four Bangladeshi garment factories, we relax both constraints individually and jointly by providing free sanitary pads and information on hygienic menstrual practices. Both access to sanitary pads and information improve menstrual practices, either by the adoption of new products, or by knowledge gains and improved use of traditional materials, and both interventions improve health outcomes. However, these positive effects do not translate to better labor outcomes, such as earnings and work attendance. |
| Keywords: | menstrual health, health behaviour, labor force participation, export manufacturing |
| JEL: | O14 O15 O35 M54 J32 J81 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10289&r=exp |
| By: | Anujit Chakraborty; Evan Calford (Department of Economics, University of California Davis) |
| Abstract: | We study the value of and the demand for instrumentally-valuable information in a simple decision environment where signals are transparently polarized. We find that in both information aggregation and acquisition, subjects use sophisticated heuristics to counter the polarization in signals. Even though the number of precise Bayesian reports are small, most subjects (64%) generate unpolarized reports even when faced with polarized signals. Subjects placed in a market place of information rarely end up buying polarized signals and instead overwhelmingly opt for diverse information. The demand for diverse information increases as diverse information becomes more valuable and decreases as it becomes more expensive. |
| JEL: | D90 D91 D81 |
| Date: | 2023–03–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cda:wpaper:355&r=exp |
| By: | Emmanuel Jose Vazquez; Francisco Haimovich; Melissa Adelman |
| Keywords: | Dropout prevention, Early Warning, Impact Evaluation, School Management, Guatemala |
| JEL: | I2 I3 |
| Date: | 2021–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aep:anales:4529&r=exp |
| By: | Leonardo Becchetti; Gianluigi Conzo; Francesco Salustri |
| Abstract: | Climate challenge can be modelled as a multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma where ecological action – e.g., purchasing an electric car or adopting sustainable life-styles – is costly in terms of economic resources, time, and effort. Even though social benefit is maximised with everyone taking ecological actions, no actions from all players is a Nash equilibrium assuming players are self-interested. In this paper we analyse how this ecological dilemma is affected by people’s perception. Using the European Social Survey, we study how urgent the climate threat is perceived by respondents and their beliefs about other countries’ actions. Theoretical predictions suggest that the former increases, while the latter does not affect individual willingness to act ecologically. Our empirical findings however show that both factors positively affect willingness to act. We interpret the positive effect of country action on responsibility to act as conditional cooperation and show that the effect is weaker as social capital increases. |
| Keywords: | climate change, perception, ecological actions, social dilemma, conditional cooperation |
| JEL: | H41 Q54 Q58 |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtr:wpaper:0274&r=exp |
| By: | Laura E. Boudreau; Sylvain Chassang; Ada Gonzalez-Torres; Rachel M. Heath |
| Abstract: | We evaluate secure survey methods designed for the ongoing monitoring of harassment in organizations. We use the resulting data to answer policy relevant questions about the nature of harassment: How prevalent is it? What share of managers is responsible for the misbehavior? How isolated are its victims? To do so, we partner with a large Bangladeshi garment manufacturer to experiment with different designs of phone-based worker surveys. Garbling responses to sensitive questions by automatically recording a random subset as complaints increases reporting of physical harassment by 288%, sexual harassment by 269%, and threatening behavior by 46%. A rapport-building treatment has an insignificant aggregate effect, but may affect men and women differently. Removing team identifiers from survey responses does not significantly increase reporting and prevents the computation of policy-relevant team-level statistics. The resulting data shows that harassment is widespread, that the problem is not restricted to a minority of managers, and that victims are often isolated in teams. |
| JEL: | C42 D82 J70 J71 J81 J83 M54 |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31011&r=exp |
| By: | Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar; Jorge Bruno; Renaud Foucart; Sonali Sen Gupta |
| Abstract: | We model a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their observation of an incomplete sample of past contributions. We show that full cooperation between and within groups is possible with self-interested players on a fixed horizon. Position uncertainty implies the existence of an equilibrium where groups of players conditionally cooperate in the hope of influencing further groups. Conditional cooperation implies that each group member is pivotal, so that efficient simultaneous provision within groups is an equilibrium. |
| Keywords: | Public Goods, Groups, Position Uncertainty, Voluntary Contributions |
| JEL: | C72 D82 H41 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lan:wpaper:377534420&r=exp |
| By: | Gabriel Montes Rojas; Luciano De Castro; Antonio Galvao; José Olmo; Kim Jeong Yeol |
| Keywords: | Optimal Asset Allocation, Quantile Preferences, Portfolio Theory, Risk Attitude, Predictive Ability Tests |
| JEL: | D81 G11 |
| Date: | 2021–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aep:anales:4494&r=exp |
| By: | Bellani, Luna (University of Konstanz); Biswas, Kumar (World Bank); Fehrler, Sebastian (University of Bremen); Marx, Paul (University of Bonn); Sabarwal, Shwetlena (World Bank); Al-Zayed Josh, Syed Rashed (World Bank) |
| Abstract: | About 50% of Bangladesh's female youth working-age population is not in employment, education, or training (NEET). Reducing this number is an important policy goal. However, there is a broad consensus that pervasive gender norms hamper this goal in Bangladesh and other countries from the Global South. In this study, we analyze the social basis of support for young working women. It departs from a theoretical understanding of norms as conditional upon expectations in one's reference network. Based on vignette experiments, we show that manipulating expectations about acceptance of female employment by others influences personal support for women taking up work. Moreover, we address the question of whose views matter. Manipulating the expectation that fathers (or husbands in the case of married NEETs) support the employment of their daughters (wives) has a particularly strong effect on respondents' support. In contrast, the stance of religious authorities and peers has surprisingly little relevance. Our evidence suggests that (expectations about) traditional views of fathers and husbands regarding the role of females are a key obstacle to a higher labor force participation of young women in Bangladesh. |
| Keywords: | Bangladesh, female labor force participation, gender norms, social expectations, survey experiments |
| JEL: | D91 J22 J16 Z10 |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16006&r=exp |