nep-exp New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2023‒02‒27
27 papers chosen by

  1. An Experimental Test of Algorithmic Dismissals By Brice Corgnet
  2. The Adventure of Running Experiments with Teenagers By Antonio Alfonso-Costillo; Pablo Brañas-Garza; Diego Jorrat; Pablo Lomas; Benjamin Prissé; Mónica Vasco
  3. How Does Opt-in Work? A Field Experiment on Financial Incentives for Physical Activity By Hirofumi Kurokawa; Shusaku Sasaki
  4. The Social Construction of Ignorance: Experimental Evidence By Ivan Soraperra; Joël van der Weele; Marie Claire Villeval; Shaul Shalvi
  5. Trust and social preferences in times of acute health crisis By Fortuna Casoria; Fabio Galeotti; Marie Claire Villeval
  6. Mind the framing when studying social preferences in the domain of losses By Armenak Antinyan; Luca Corazzini; Miloš Fišar; Tommaso Reggiani
  7. Scapegoating of ethnic minorities: Experimental evidence By Tomáš Želinský; Gerard Roland; Jana Cahlíková; Julie Chytilová; Michal Bauer
  8. How group deliberation affects individual distributional preferences: An experimental study By João V. Ferreira; Erik Schokkaert; Benoît Tarroux
  9. Norms, Emotions, and Culture in Human Cooperation and Punishment: Theory and Evidence By Sanjit Dhami; Mengxing Wei
  10. Algorithmic advice as a credence good By Biermann, Jan; Horton, John J.; Walter, Johannes
  12. Honesty Nudges: Effect Varies with Content but Not with Timing By Benoît Le Maux; Sarah Necker
  13. Regression adjustment in randomized controlled trials with many covariates By Harold D Chiang; Yukitoshi Matsushita; Taisuke Otsu
  14. Improving Transparency and Verifiability in School Admissions: Theory and Experiment By Rustamdjan Hakimov; Madhav Raghavan
  15. Willingness to Accept, Willingness to Pay, and Loss Aversion By Jonathan Chapman; Mark Dean; Pietro Ortoleva; Erik Snowberg; Colin Camerer
  16. Academic writing and AI: Day-4 experiment with mindsponge theory By Quang-Loc, Nguyen; Nguyen, Minh-Hoang; La, Viet-Phuong
  17. Discrimination in the Formation of Academic Networks: A Field Experiment on #EconTwitter By Ajzenman, Nicolas; Ferman, Bruno; Sant’Anna, Pedro C.
  18. Choosing an Electoral Rule: Values and Self-Interest in the Lab By Damien Bol; André Blais; Maxime Coulombe; Jean François Laslier; Jean-Benoît Pilet
  19. Algorithmic Writing Assistance on Jobseekers' Resumes Increases Hires By Emma van Inwegen; Zanele Munyikwa; John J. Horton
  20. Addressing Vaccine Hesitancy Using Local Ambassadors: A Randomized Controlled Trial in Indonesia By Islam, Asad; Kusnadi, Gita; Rezki, Jahen; Sim, Armand; van Empel, Giovanni; Vlassopoulos, Michael; Zenou, Yves
  21. Narrative Persuasion By Kai Barron; Tilman Fries
  22. Shopping with Voice Assistants: How Empathy Affects Individual and Family Decision-Making Outcomes By Alex Mari; Andreina Mandelli; René Algesheimer
  23. Social preferences or sacred values? Theory and evidence of deontological motivations By Daniel L. Chen; Martin Schonger
  24. Turning worries into cognitive performance: Results from an online experiment during Covid By Timothée Demont; Daniela Horta Sáenz; Eva Raiber
  25. Three layers of uncertainty By Ilke AYDOGAN; Loïc BERGER; Valentina BOSETTI; Ning LIU
  26. Can You Spot a Scam? Measuring and Improving Scam Identification Ability By Elif Kubilayⓡ; Eva Raiberⓡ; Lisa Spantigⓡ; Jana Cahlíkováⓡ; Lucy Kaariaⓡ; Lisa Spantig
  27. Improved menstrual health and the workplace: an RCT with female Bangladeshi garment workers By Czura, Kristina; Menzel, Andreas; Miotto, Martina

  1. By: Brice Corgnet (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University)
    Abstract: We design a laboratory experiment in which a human or an algorithm decides which of two workers to dismiss. The algorithm automatically dismisses the least productive worker whereas human bosses have full discretion over their decisions. Using performance metrics and questionnaires, we find that fired workers react more negatively to human than to algorithmic decisions in a broad range of tasks. We show that spitefulness exacerbated this negative reaction. Our findings suggest algorithms could help tame negative reactions to dismissals.
    Keywords: Algorithmic dismissals, laboratory experiments, distributive justice, work satisfaction, social preferences
    JEL: C92 D23 D91 M50 O33
    Date: 2023
  2. By: Antonio Alfonso-Costillo (Universidad Loyola); Pablo Brañas-Garza (Universidad Loyola); Diego Jorrat (Universidad Loyola); Pablo Lomas (Universidad Loyola); Benjamin Prissé (Universidad Loyola); Mónica Vasco (Universidad Loyola)
    Abstract: Economists are increasingly interested in how to conduct experiments with teenagers. This paper evaluates whether different methodological factors impact the answers of teenagers to standard experimental tasks on measuring time preferences, risk preferences, cognitive abilities and financial abilities, among others. Results show: i) the recruitment process matters depending on whether the school includes the experiment as an institutional activity or the teachers led the process particularly for their class; the dropout rate reduced significantly from the first to the third experimental wave, when the school was responsible for organizingthe experiment; ii) hypothetical payments elicits similar results than monetary payments; iii) adding visual elements to the experiment’s interface improves the quality of answers; and iv) the type of electronic device on which subjects answer the tasks does not influence results, while administrating the experiment by school teachers does affect the answers. We conclude by giving three suggestions to researchers interested in conducting experiments with teenagers: first, run the experiment as a school-programmed activity; second, it is not necessary the use of real payments which increases the cost and complicates the recruitment; and third, integratevisual components to the task
    Keywords: developmental decision-making; field experiments; economic preferences; teenagers
    JEL: C91 D81
    Date: 2023–02
  3. By: Hirofumi Kurokawa (School of Economics and Management, University of Hyogo); Shusaku Sasaki (Center for Infectious Disease Education and Research (CiDER), Osaka University)
    Abstract: We examined the effectiveness of two different schemes for providing financial incentives to promote physical activity. We collaborated with a local government in Japan to conduct a field experiment with 498 residents randomly assigned to participate in one of three groups: an “opt-in†group (needed to apply to receive the incentive based on their daily steps), an “opt-out†group (received the incentive by default, but could request not to receive it), and a control group (no incentive). In the opt-in group, 31.1% of the participants applied to receive the incentive, while 100% of those in the opt-out group retained the default option and received it, indicating that their take-up rates depended heavily on the default settings. Our estimation results suggest that providing financial incentives in the opt-in scheme can be effective and efficient. The opt-in group, overall, showed a statistically significant increase of approximately 710 steps per day during the first half of the treatment period, and the number of steps was estimated to increase by 2, 280 among the 31.1% of participants who opted-in to receive the incentive. The opt-out scheme did not show any significant increase in their number of daily steps.
    Keywords: field experiment, default, monetary incentive, health behavior, walking
    JEL: C93 D90 I12
    Date: 2023–02
  4. By: Ivan Soraperra; Joël van der Weele; Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Shaul Shalvi
    Abstract: We experimentally study the social transmission of "inconvenient" information about the externalities generated by one's own decision. In the laboratory, we pair uninformed decision makers with informed senders. Compared to a setting where subjects can choose their information directly, we find that social interactions increase selfish decisions. On the supply side, senders suppress almost 30 percent of "inconvenient" information, driven by their own preferences for information and their beliefs about the decision maker's preferences. On the demand side, about one-third of decision makers avoids senders who transmit inconvenient information ("shooting the messenger"), which leads to assortative matching between information-suppressing senders and information-avoiding decision makers. Having more control over information generates opposing effects on behavior: selfish decision makers remain ignorant more often and donate less, while altruistic decision makers seek out informative senders and give more. We discuss applications to information sharing in social networks and to organizational design.
    Keywords: Social interactions, Information avoidance, Assortative matching, Ethical behavior, Experiment
    Date: 2022
  5. By: Fortuna Casoria (CEREN EA 7477, Burgundy School of Business, Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté, Dijon, France); Fabio Galeotti (Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE UMR 5824, 93 Chemin des Mouilles F-69130 Ecully, France); Marie Claire Villeval (Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE UMR 5824, 93 Chemin des Mouilles F-69130 Ecully, France)
    Abstract: We combined a natural experiment (the occurrence of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020) with the tools of laboratory experiments to study whether and how an unprecedented shock on social interactions (the introduction and abrogation of a nationwide lockdown) affected the evolution of individuals’ social preferences, and willingness to trust others. In a longitudinal online incentivized experiment during the first lockdown in France, we elicited the same participants’ preferences for prosociality, trust and trustworthiness every week for three months. Despite the exposure to long-lasting social distancing, prosocial preferences and the willingness to reciprocate the trust of others remained stable during the whole period under study. In contrast, the lockdown had an immediate negative effect on trust, which remained at lower levels til after the lifting of such measures but recovered its initial level nine months later. The decline in trust was mainly driven by individuals who experienced financial hardship, a lack of outward exposure, and higher anxiety during the lockdown.
    Keywords: Social preferences, Trust, Trustworthiness, Pandemic, COVID-19, Social distancing
    JEL: C92 D91 I18
    Date: 2023
  6. By: Armenak Antinyan (Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom and Wenlan School of Business, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan, China); Luca Corazzini (Department of Economics and VERA, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Venezia, Italy and MUEEL, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic); Miloš Fišar (Competence Center for Experimental Research, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna, Austria, MUEEL, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic, and Department of Economics, Ca’ Foscari, University of Venice, Venezia, Italy); Tommaso Reggiani (Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, United Kingdom and MUEEL, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic, and IZA)
    Abstract: There has been an increasing interest in altruistic behaviour in the domain of losses recently. Nevertheless, there is no consensus in whether the monetary losses make individuals more generous or more selfish. Although almost all relevant studies rely on a dictator game to study altruistic behaviour, the experimental designs of these studies differ in how the losses are framed, which may explain the diverging findings. Utilizing a dictator game, this paper studies the impact of loss framing on altruism. The main methodological result is that the dictators’ prosocial behaviour is sensitive to the loss frame they are embedded in. More specifically, in a dictator game in which the dictators have to share a loss between themselves and a recipient, the monetary allocations of the dictators are more benevolent than in a standard setting without a loss and in a dictator game in which the dictators have to share what remains of their endowments after a loss. These differences are explained by the different social norms that the respective loss frames invoke.
    Keywords: loss, framing, altruism, dictator game, experiment, social norms
    JEL: C91 D02 D64
    Date: 2022–10
  7. By: Tomáš Želinský (Technical University of Košice); Gerard Roland (University of California, Berkeley); Jana Cahlíková (Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance); Julie Chytilová (Charles University); Michal Bauer (Institute of Economic Studies, Charles University)
    Abstract: Scapegoating refers to a social phenomenon whereby members of an aggrieved majority group retaliate against innocent third parties, usually members of vulnerable minority groups. This column uses an experiment set up between May and September 2017 in Eastern Slovakia – where a large Roma minority regularly suffers from discrimination – to measure how an injustice that affects a member of one’s own group shapes the punishment of an unconnected bystander (or scapegoat). The experiment shows that members of a majority group will systematically shift punishment onto innocent members of an ethnic minority.
    Date: 2023–01
  8. By: João V. Ferreira (University of Southampton, UK); Erik Schokkaert (Department of Economics, KU Leuven, Belgium); Benoît Tarroux (University Lumière Lyon 2 and GATE Lyon-Saint-Etienne, France)
    Abstract: We study experimentally the impact of group deliberation on individual distributional preferences. We elicit subjects' distributional preferences before and after group deliberation and estimate the relative weight of persuasion, social identity, and social comparison on the effect of deliberation. We find that 10 minutes of non-binding written group deliberation has a large effect on individual (private) distributional preferences. First, post-deliberation distributional preferences are more egalitarian than pre-deliberation preferences. Second, group polarization decreases after group deliberation. Finally, we find that social identity is the main but not unique driver of this effect. Persuasion and social comparison also impact individual preferences, particularly for subjects who are not monetarily affected by the distributive outcome. Our results bring novel insights for the elicitation of distributional preferences and the design of deliberative institutions.
    Keywords: Group deliberation; Distributional preferences; Social identity; Persuasion; Social comparison
    Date: 2023
  9. By: Sanjit Dhami; Mengxing Wei
    Abstract: We consider the psychological and social foundations of human contributions and punishments in a voluntary contributions mechanism with punishment (VCMP). We eliminate ‘dynamic economic linkages’ between the two stages of our ‘modified’ VCMP to rule out other potential explanations. We use a beliefs-based model, rooted in psychological game theory, to derive rigorous theoretical predictions that are then tested with pre-registered experiments in China and the UK. Social norms, culture, and endogenous emotions are the key determinants of contributions and punishments. The emotions of shame, frustration, and anger, play a key role in our theoretical and empirical analysis through ‘dynamic psychological linkages’. We provide potential microfoundations for the inherent human tendency to follow social norms and punish norm violators, while respecting boundedly rational strategic decision making.
    Keywords: cooperation and punishment, emotions-shame, frustration, anger, social norms, culture, bounded rationality
    JEL: C91 C92 D01 D91
    Date: 2023
  10. By: Biermann, Jan; Horton, John J.; Walter, Johannes
    Abstract: Actors in various settings have been increasingly relying on algorithmic tools to support their decision-making. Much of the public debate concerning algorithms - especially the associated regulation of new technologies - rests on the assumption that humans can assess the quality of algorithms. We test this assumption by conducting an online experiment with 1263 participants. Subjects perform an estimation task and are supported by algorithmic advice. Our first finding is that, in our setting, humans cannot verify the algorithm's quality. We, therefore, argue that algorithms exhibit traits of a credence good - decision-makers cannot verify the quality of such goods, even after "consuming" them. Based on this finding, we test two interventions to improve the individual's ability to make good decisions in algorithmically supported situations. In the first intervention, we explain the way the algorithm functions. We find that while explanation helps participants recognize bias in the algorithm, it remarkably decreases human decision-making performance. In the second treatment, we reveal the task's correct answer after every round and find that this intervention improves human decision-making performance. Our findings have implications for policy initiatives and managerial practice.
    Keywords: Human-algorithm decision making, algorithmic advice, credence goods
    JEL: C91 D79 D80 M21 O30
    Date: 2022
  11. By: Ilke AYDOGAN (IESEG School of Management, Univ. Lille, CNRS, UMR 9221 - LEM - Lille Economie Management, F-59000 Lille, France; and iRisk Research Center on Risk and Uncertainty); Loïc BERGER (CNRS, Univ. Lille, IESEG School of Management, UMR 9221 - LEM - Lille Economie Management, F-59000 Lille, France; iRisk Research Center on Risk and Uncertainty; RFF-CMCC European Institute on Economics and the Environment (EIEE), and Centro Euro-Mediterraneo sui Cambiamenti Climatici, Italy); Valentina BOSETTI (Department of Economics and IGIER, Bocconi University, and RFF-CMCC European Institute on Economics and the Environment (EIEE), Centro Euro-Mediterraneo sui Cambiamenti Climatici, Italy)
    Abstract: We report the results of two experiments designed to better understand the mechanisms driving decision-making under ambiguity. We elicit individual preferences over different sources of uncertainty (risk, compound risk, model ambiguity, and Ellsberg ambiguity), which entail different degrees of complexity, from subjects with different sophistication levels. We show that (1) ambiguity aversion is robust to sophistication, but the strong relationship that has been previously reported between attitudes toward ambiguity and compound risk is not. (2) Ellsberg ambiguity attitude can be partly explained by attitudes toward complexity for less sophisticated subjects, but not for more sophisticated ones. Overall, and regardless of the subject’s sophistication level, the main driver of Ellsberg ambiguity attitude is a specific treatment of unknown probabilities. These results leave room for using ambiguity models in applications with prescriptive purposes.
    Keywords: : Ambiguity aversion, reduction of compound risk, model uncertainty, complexity
    JEL: C91 C93 D81
    Date: 2023–01
  12. By: Benoît Le Maux; Sarah Necker
    Abstract: We use a ten-round online mind game to determine whether the effect of honesty nudges depends on timing and content. Reminding individuals about the right thing to do increases honesty. Including information that it is possible to assess an individual’s dishonesty strengthens the effect of the intervention. Both types of intervention are similarly effective when they take place before an individual has made any decision or after individuals have played five rounds of the mind game. Nudging an individual after they have made five decisions allows us to add personalized information based on the individual’s previous response; however, this does not increase honesty. Examining the reaction to nudges based on previous behavior shows that (presumably) honest and dishonest individuals respond by reducing overreporting. The effect of the different nudge content is driven by those previously dishonest.
    Keywords: dishonesty, lying, cheating, honesty nudge, moral reminder, deterrence
    JEL: C91 C92 M52 J28 J33
    Date: 2023
  13. By: Harold D Chiang; Yukitoshi Matsushita; Taisuke Otsu
    Abstract: This paper is concerned with estimation and inference on average treatment effects in randomized controlled trials when researchers observe potentially many covariates. By em- ploying Neyman's (1923) finite population perspective, we propose a bias-corrected regression adjustment estimator using cross-fitting, and show that the proposed estimator has favorable properties over existing alternatives. For inference, we derive the first and second order terms in the stochastic component of the regression adjustment estimators, study higher order properties of the existing inference methods, and propose a bias-corrected version of the HC3 standard er- ror. Simulation studies show our cross-fitted estimator, combined with the bias-corrected HC3, delivers precise point estimates and robust size controls over a wide range of DGPs. To illus- trate, the proposed methods are applied to real dataset on randomized experiments of incentives and services for college achievement following Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos (2009).
    Keywords: Randomized controlled trials, regression adjustment, many covariates
    JEL: C14
    Date: 2023–02
  14. By: Rustamdjan Hakimov (WZB Berlin); Madhav Raghavan (University of Lausanne)
    Abstract: Students participating in centralized admissions procedures do not typically have access to the information used to determine their matched school, such as other students' preferences or school priorities. This can lead to doubts about whether their matched schools were computed correctly (the `Verifiability Problem') or, at a deeper level, whether the promised admissions procedure was even used (the `Transparency Problem'). In a general centralized admissions model that spans many popular applications, we show how these problems can be addressed by providing appropriate feedback to students, even without disclosing sensitive private information like other students' preferences or school priorities. In particular, we show that the Verifiability Problem can be solved by (1) publicly communicating the minimum scores required to be matched to a school (`cutoffs'); or (2) using `predictable' preference elicitation procedures that convey rich `experiential' information. In our main result, we show that the Transparency Problem can be solved by using cutoffs and predictable procedures together. We find strong support for these solutions in a laboratory experiment, and show how they can be simply implemented for popular school admissions applications involving top trading cycles, and deferred and immediate acceptance.
    Keywords: school choice; matching; transparency; cutoffs; dynamic mechanisms; experiment;
    JEL: C78 C73 D78 D82
    Date: 2023–01–27
  15. By: Jonathan Chapman; Mark Dean; Pietro Ortoleva; Erik Snowberg; Colin Camerer
    Abstract: We use four incentivized representative surveys to study the endowment effect for lotteries in 4, 000 U.S. adults. We replicate the standard finding of an endowment effect—the divergence between Willingness to Accept (WTA) and Willingness to Pay (WTP), but document three new findings. First, we find little evidence that the endowment effect is related to loss aversion for risky prospects, counter to predictions of popular theories in economics. Second, WTA and WTP not only diverge, but are, at best, weakly correlated. Third, WTA and WTP strongly relate to other aspects of risk preferences. The structure of these behaviors points to different theories of the endowment effect.
    Keywords: Willingness To Pay, Willingness to Accept, endowment effect, loss aversion
    JEL: C90 D81 D91
    Date: 2023
  16. By: Quang-Loc, Nguyen; Nguyen, Minh-Hoang; La, Viet-Phuong
    Abstract: To check the ability of AI to identify precise and detailed scientific information, I experiment with how accurate AI recognizes scientific terms, their origins, meanings, and usages, and whether the accuracy increases over time
    Date: 2023–01–15
  17. By: Ajzenman, Nicolas (McGill University); Ferman, Bruno (Sao Paulo School of Economics); Sant’Anna, Pedro C. (Sao Paulo School of Economics)
    Abstract: This paper assesses the results of an experiment designed to identify discrimination in users' following behavior on Twitter. Specifically, we created fictitious bot accounts that resembled humans and claimed to be PhD students in economics. The accounts differed in three characteristics: gender (male or female), race (Black or White), and university affiliation (top- or lower-ranked). The bot accounts randomly followed Twitter users who form part of the #EconTwitter academic community. We measured how many follow-backs each account obtained after a given period. Twitter users from this community were 12% more likely to follow accounts of White students compared to those of Black students; 21% more likely to follow accounts of students from top-ranked, prestigious universities compared to accounts of lower-ranked institutions; and 25% more likely to follow female compared to male students. The racial gap persisted even among students from top-ranked institutions, suggesting that Twitter users racially discriminate even in the presence of a signal that could be interpreted as indicative of high academic potential. Notably, we find that Black male students from top-ranked universities receive no more follow-backs than White male students from relatively lower-ranked institutions.
    Keywords: gender, economics profession, discrimination, race, social media
    JEL: J15 J16 A11 C93 I23
    Date: 2023–01
  18. By: Damien Bol; André Blais; Maxime Coulombe; Jean François Laslier; Jean-Benoît Pilet
    Abstract: We study the choice of multi-person bargaining protocols in the context of politics. In politics, citizens are increasingly involved in the design of democratic rules, for instance via referendums. If they support the rule that best serves their self-interest, the outcome inevitably advantages the largest group. In this paper, we challenge this pessimistic view with an original lab experiment, in which 252 subjects participated. In the first stage, these subjects experience elections under plurality and approval voting. In the second stage, they decide which rule they want to use for extra elections. We find that egalitarian values that subjects hold outside of the lab shape their choice of electoral rule in the second stage when a rule led to a fairer distribution of payoffs compared to the other one in the first stage. The implication is that people have consistent ‘value-driven preferences’ for decision rules.
    Keywords: lab experiment; choice of decision rules; electoral rules; voting
    Date: 2023
  19. By: Emma van Inwegen; Zanele Munyikwa; John J. Horton
    Abstract: There is a strong association between the quality of the writing in a resume for new labor market entrants and whether those entrants are ultimately hired. We show that this relationship is, at least partially, causal: a field experiment in an online labor market was conducted with nearly half a million jobseekers in which a treated group received algorithmic writing assistance. Treated jobseekers experienced an 8% increase in the probability of getting hired. Contrary to concerns that the assistance is taking away a valuable signal, we find no evidence that employers were less satisfied. We present a model in which better writing is not a signal of ability but helps employers ascertain ability, which rationalizes our findings.
    Date: 2023–01
  20. By: Islam, Asad (Monash University); Kusnadi, Gita (CISDI); Rezki, Jahen (University of Indonesia); Sim, Armand (Monash University); van Empel, Giovanni (Monash University); Vlassopoulos, Michael (University of Southampton); Zenou, Yves (Monash University)
    Abstract: In settings where resistance and rampant misinformation against vaccines exist, the prospect of containing infectious diseases remains a challenge. Can delivery of information regarding the benefits of vaccination through personal home visits by local ambassadors increase vaccine uptake? We conduct a door-to-door randomized information campaign targeted towards COVID-19 unvaccinated individuals in rural Indonesia. We recruited ambassadors from local villages tasked to deliver information about COVID-19 vaccines and promote vaccination through one-on-one meetings, using an interpersonal behavioral change communication approach. To investigate which type of ambassador—health cadres, influential individuals, and laypersons—is the most effective, we randomly vary the type of ambassador that delivers the information at the village level. We find that the overall vaccination take-up is quite moderate and that there are no differences in vaccination outcomes across the treatment groups. These results highlight the challenge of boosting vaccine uptake in late stages of a pandemic.
    Keywords: misinformation, health behaviors, vaccine hesitancy, Indonesia, COVID-19
    JEL: I1 I12 I18 I20 I3
    Date: 2023–01
  21. By: Kai Barron; Tilman Fries
    Abstract: Modern life offers nearly unbridled access to information; it is the harnessing of this information to guide decision-making that presents a challenge. We study how one individual may try to shape the way another person interprets objective information by proposing a causal explanation (or narrative) that makes sense of this objective information. Using an experiment, we examine the use of narratives as a persuasive tool in the context of financial advice where advisors may hold incentives that differ from those of the individuals they are advising. Our results reveal several insights about the underlying mechanisms that govern narrative persuasion. First, we show that advisors construct self-interested narratives and make them persuasive by tailoring them to fit the objective information. Second, we demonstrate that advisors are able to shift investors’ beliefs about the future performance of a company. Third, we identify the types of narratives that investors find convincing, namely those that fit the objective information well. Finally, we evaluate the efficacy of several potential policy interventions aimed at protecting investors. We find that narrative persuasion is difficult to protect against.
    Keywords: narratives, beliefs, financial advice, conflicts of interest, behavioural finance
    JEL: D83 G40 G50 C90
    Date: 2023
  22. By: Alex Mari (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich); Andreina Mandelli (SDA Bocconi School of Management, Bocconi University, Milan,); René Algesheimer (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich)
    Abstract: Artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled voice assistants (VAs) such as Amazon Alexa increasingly assist shopping decisions and exhibit empathic behavior. The advancement of empathic AI raises concerns about machines nudging consumers into purchasing undesired or unnecessary products. Yet, it is unclear how the machine’s empathic behavior affects consumer responses and decision-making outcomes during voice-enabled shopping. This article draws from the service robot acceptance model (sRAM) and social response theory (SRT) and presents an individual-session experiment where families (vs. individuals) complete actual shopping tasks using an ad-hoc Alexa app featuring high (vs. standard) empathic capabilities. We apply the experimental conditions as moderators to the structural model, bridging selected functional, social-emotional, and relational variables. Our framework collocates affective empathy, explicates the bases of consumers’ beliefs, and predicts behavioral outcomes. Findings demonstrate (i) an increase in consumers’ perceptions, beliefs, and adoption intentions with empathic Alexa, (ii) a positive response to empathic Alexa holding constant in family settings, and (iii) an interaction effect only on the functional model dimensions whereby families show greater responses to empathic Alexa while individuals to standard Alexa.
    Keywords: Voice assistant; Voice commerce; Empathy; Shopping behavior; Service robot acceptance model; Social response theory; Voice app
    JEL: E24 J01 J21 L83
    Date: 2023–02
  23. By: Daniel L. Chen (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Martin Schonger (ETH Zürich - Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule - Swiss Federal Institute of Technology [Zürich])
    Abstract: Recent advances in economic theory, largely motivated by experimental findings, have led to the adoption of models of human behavior where decision-makers take into consideration not only their own payoff but also others' payoffs and any potential consequences of these payoffs. Investigations of deontological motivations, where decision-makers make their choice based on not only the consequences of a decision but also the decision per se, have been rare. We provide a formal interpretation of major moral philosophies and a revealed preference method to distinguish the presence of deontological motivations from a purely consequentialist decision-maker whose preferences satisfy first-order stochastic dominance.
    Date: 2022–05
  24. By: Timothée Demont (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Daniela Horta Sáenz (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Eva Raiber (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research - CEPR)
    Abstract: Worrisome topics, such as climate change, economic crises, or the Covid-19 pandemic, are increasingly present and pervasive due to digital media and social networks. Do such worries affect cognitive performance? The effect of a distressing topic might be very different depending on whether people have the scope and means to cope with the consequences. It can also differ by how performance is rewarded, for instance, if is there a goal that people can focus on. In an online experiment during the Covid-19 pandemic, we test how the cognitive performance of university students responds to topics discussing (i) current mental health issues related to social restrictions or (ii) future labor market uncertainties linked to the economic contraction. Moreover, we study how the response is affected by a performance goal by conditioning payout on reaching a minimum level. We find that the labor market topic increases cognitive performance when performance is motivated by a goal. Conversely, there is no such effect after the mental health topic. We even find a weak negative effect among those mentally vulnerable when payout is not based on reaching a goal. The positive effect is driven by students with larger financial and social resources, pointing at an inequality-widening mechanism.
    Keywords: cognitive performance, financial worries, Covid-19, financial incentives, anxiety, coping behaviors
    Date: 2023–01–16
  25. By: Ilke AYDOGAN (IESEG School of Management, Univ. Lille, CNRS, UMR 9221 - LEM - Lille Economie Management, F-59000 Lille, France; and iRisk Research Center on Risk and Uncertainty); Loïc BERGER (CNRS, Univ. Lille, IESEG School of Management, UMR 9221 - LEM - Lille Economie Management, F-59000 Lille, France; iRisk Research Center on Risk and Uncertainty; RFF-CMCC European Institute on Economics and the Environment (EIEE), and Centro Euro-Mediterraneo sui Cambiamenti Climatici, Italy); Valentina BOSETTI (Department of Economics and IGIER, Bocconi University, and RFF-CMCC European Institute on Economics and the Environment (EIEE), Centro Euro-Mediterraneo sui Cambiamenti Climatici, Italy); Ning LIU (School of Economics and Management, Beihang University and Laboratory for Low-carbon Intelligent Governance, Beihang University, China)
    Abstract: We explore decision-making under uncertainty using a framework that decomposes uncertainty into three distinct layers: (1) risk, which entails inherent randomness within a given probability model; (2) model ambiguity, which entails uncertainty about the probability model to be used; and (3) model misspecification, which entails uncertainty about the presence of the correct probability model among the set of models considered. Using a new experimental design, we isolate and measure attitudes towards each layer separately. We conduct our experiment on three di?erent subject pools and document the existence of a behavioral distinction between the three layers. In addition to providing new insights into the underlying processes behind ambiguity aversion, we provide the first empirical evidence of the role of model misspecification in decision-making under uncertainty.
    Keywords: : Ambiguity aversion, model uncertainty, model misspecification, non-expected utility, reduction of compound lotteries
    JEL: D81
    Date: 2022–11
  26. By: Elif Kubilayⓡ; Eva Raiberⓡ; Lisa Spantigⓡ; Jana Cahlíkováⓡ; Lucy Kaariaⓡ; Lisa Spantig
    Abstract: The recent expansion of digital financial products leads to severe consumer protection issues such as fraud and scams. As these potentially decrease trust in digital services, especially in developing countries, avoiding victimization has become an important policy objective. In an online experiment, we first investigate how well individuals in Kenya identify phone scams using a novel measure of scam identification ability. We then test the effectiveness of scam education, a commonly used approach by banks and institutions for fraud and scam prevention. We find that common tips on how to spot scams do not significantly improve individuals’ scam identification ability, i.e., the distinction of scams from genuine messages. This null effect is driven by an increase in correctly identified scams and a decrease in correctly identified genuine messages. We interpret this as an increase in caution. In addition, we find suggestive evidence that genuine messages which contain scam-like features are more likely to be misclassified, highlighting the importance of a careful design of official communication.
    Keywords: consumer protection, consumer fraud, digital financial services, scam susceptibility, scam education, Kenya
    JEL: D14 D18 G53 O12
    Date: 2023
  27. By: Czura, Kristina (University of Groningen); Menzel, Andreas (CERGE-EI, Prague); Miotto, Martina (CERGE-EI, Prague, and CAGE)
    Abstract: Menstruation can limit female labor force participation, especially in low-income countries, where menstrual hygiene practices are constrained by lack of finances and information. In a randomized controlled trial with around 1, 900 female workers from four Bangladeshi garment factories, we relax both constraints individually and jointly by providing free sanitary pads and information. Both access to sanitary pads and information improve menstrual practices, either by the adoption of new technologies, or by knowledge gains and improved use of traditional materials, and both interventions improve health outcomes. However, these positive effects do not translate to better labor outcomes, such as earnings and work attendance.
    Keywords: Menstrual Health, Health Behavior, Labor Force Participation, Export Manufacturing JEL Classification: O14, O15, O35, M54, J32, J81
    Date: 2023

General information on the NEP project can be found at For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.