nep-exp New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2022‒10‒31
33 papers chosen by

  1. The effect of pro diversity actions on discrimination in the recruitment of large companies: a field experiment By Laetitia Challe; Sylvain Chareyron; Yannick L'Horty; Pascale Petit
  2. Aversion to hiring algorithms: Transparency, gender profiling, and self-confidence By Dargnies, Marie-Pierre; Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kübler, Dorothea
  3. Eliciting Moral Preferences: Theory and Experiment By Roland Bénabou; Armin Falk; Luca Henkel; Jean Tirole
  4. Viable Nash Equilibria: An Experiment By Duk Gyoo Kim; Daehong Min; John Wooders
  5. How Does the Progressivity of Taxes and Government Transfers Impact People’s Willingnessto Pay Tax ? Experimental Evidence across Developing Countries By Hoy,Christopher Alexander
  6. With or Without Him ? Experimental Evidence on Gender-Sensitive Cash Grants andTrainings in Tunisia By Gazeaud,Jules; Khan,Nausheen; Mvukiyehe,Eric; Sterck,Olivier Christian Brigitte
  7. Can Grit Be Taught? Lessons from a Nationwide Field Experiment with Middle-School Students By Santos, Indhira; Petroska-Beska, Violeta; Carneiro, Pedro; Eskreis-Winkler, Lauren; Boudet, Ana Maria Munoz; Berniell, Ines; Krekel, Christian; Arias, Omar; Duckworth, Angela Lee
  8. Intra-Household Dynamics and Attitudes toward Vaccines : Experimental and Survey Evidencefrom Zambia By Hoy,Christopher Alexander; Rajee Kanagavel; Cameron,Corey Morales
  9. Measuring strategic-uncertainty attitudes By Lisa Bruttel; Muhammed Bulutay; Camille Cornand; Frank Heinemann; Adam Zylbersztejn
  10. A Note on Motivated Cognition and Discriminatory Beliefs By Lasse Stötzer; Florian Zimmermann
  11. Revisiting the Analysis of Matched-Pair and Stratified Experiments in the Presence of Attrition By Yuehao Bai; Meng Hsuan Hsieh; Jizhou Liu; Max Tabord-Meehan
  12. Information Design in Cheap Talk By Qianjun Lyu; Wing Suen
  13. The Social Tax : Redistributive Pressure and Labor Supply By Carranza,Eliana; Donald,Aletheia Amalia; Grosset,Florian; Kaur,Supreet
  14. How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion: a machine learning approach By Maximilian Andres; Lisa Bruttel; Jana Friedrichsen
  15. When do reminders work? Memory constraints and medical adherence By Kai Barron; Mette Trier Damgaard; Christina Gravert
  16. Missing Information : Why Don’t More Firms Seek Out Business Advice ? By Bruhn,Miriam; Piza,Caio
  17. Adaptive Experiments for Policy Choice : Phone Calls for Home Reading in Kenya By Esposito Acosta,Bruno Nicola; Sautmann,Anja
  18. In COVID-19 Health Messaging, Loss Framing Increases Anxiety with Little-to-No Concomitant Benefits: Experimental Evidence from 84 Countries By Brian Gill; others
  19. Strategic Behavior with Tight, Loose and Polarized Norms By Eugen Dimant; Michele Gelfand; Anna Hochleitner; Silvia Sonderegger
  20. Rate-optimal linear estimation of average global effects By Stefan Faridani; Paul Niehaus
  21. Imperfect Competition and Sanitation: Evidence from Randomized Auctions in Senegal By Jean-François Houde; Terence R. Johnson; Molly Lipscomb; Laura A. Schechter
  22. The "coy seller" problem: A market design to reveal willingness to trade By Apostolos Filippas; John Horton; Sehar Noor; Dmitry Sorokin
  23. Two Sides of Gender : Sex, Power, and Adolescence By Shah,Manisha; Seager,Jennifer; Montalvao Machado,Joao H. C.; Goldstein,Markus P.
  24. Can Information and Alternatives to Irregular Migration Reduce “Backway” Migration from TheGambia ? By Bah,Tijan L; Batista,Catia; Gubert,Flore; Mckenzie,David J.
  25. The Psychosocial Value of Employment : Evidence from a Refugee Camp By Hussam,Reshmaan Nahar; Kelley,Erin Munro; Lane,Gregory; Zahra,Fatima
  26. Private but Misunderstood ? Evidence on Measuring Intimate Partner Violence viaSelf-Interviewing in Rural Liberia and Malawi : null By Park,David Sungho; Aggarwal,Shilpa; Jeong,Dahyeon; Kumar,Naresh; Robinson,Jonathan M.; Spearot,Alan
  27. Using Social Media to Change Gender Norms : An Experiment within Facebook Messenger in India By Donati,Dante; Orozco Olvera,Victor Hugo; Rao,Nandan Mark
  28. Listen to Her: Gender Differences in Information Diffusion within the Household By Dietmar Fehr; Johanna Mollerstrom; Ricardo Perez-Truglia
  29. The Incidence of Housing Allowances: Quasi-Experimental Evidence By Eerola, Essi; Lyytikäinen, Teemu; Saarimaa, Tuukka; Vanhapelto, Tuuli
  30. Parental Risk Preferences, Maternal Bargaining Power, and the Educational Progressions of Children: Lab-in-the-Field Evidence from Rural Côte D'Ivoire By Basu, Arnab K.; Dimova, Ralitza; Gbakou, Monnet Benoit Patrick; Viennet, Romane
  31. Competition and Gender Inequality: A Comprehensive Analysis of Effects and Mechanisms By Klarita Gërxhani; Jordi Brandts; Arthur Schram
  32. Multiple Price Lists for Willingness to Pay Elicitation By Jack,B. Kelsey; McDermott,Kathryn; Sautmann,Anja
  33. Inverse Game Theory for Stackelberg Games: the Blessing of Bounded Rationality By Jibang Wu; Weiran Shen; Fei Fang; Haifeng Xu

  1. By: Laetitia Challe; Sylvain Chareyron; Yannick L'Horty; Pascale Petit
    Date: 2022
  2. By: Dargnies, Marie-Pierre; Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kübler, Dorothea
    Abstract: We run an online experiment to study the origins of algorithm aversion. Participants are either in the role of workers or of managers. Workers perform three real-effort tasks: task 1, task 2, and the job task which is a combination of tasks 1 and 2. They choose whether the hiring decision between themselves and another worker is made either by a participant in the role of a manager or by an algorithm. In a second set of experiments, managers choose whether they want to delegate their hiring decisions to the algorithm. In the baseline treatments, we observe that workers choose the manager more often than the algorithm, and managers also prefer to make the hiring decisions themselves rather than delegate them to the algorithm. When the algorithm does not use workers' gender to predict their job task performance and workers know this, they choose the algorithm more often. Providing details on how the algorithm works does not increase the preference for the algorithm, neither for workers nor for managers. Providing feedback to managers about their performance in hiring the best workers increases their preference for the algorithm, as managers are, on average, overconfident
    Keywords: algorithm aversion,experiment,hiring discrimination,transparency
    JEL: D91 J71 C9
    Date: 2022
  3. By: Roland Bénabou (Princeton University); Armin Falk (Institute on Behavior and Inequality (briq) and University of Bonn); Luca Henkel (University of Bonn); Jean Tirole (University of Toulouse Capitole)
    Abstract: We study the extent to which a person’s moral preferences can be inferred from their choices, and how behaviors that appear deontologically motivated should be interpreted. Comparing direct elicitation (DE) and multiple-price list (MPL) mechanisms, we characterize how image motives inflate the extent of prosocial behavior. The resulting signalling bias is shown to depend on the interaction between elicitation method and visibility level: it is greater under DE for low reputation concerns, and greater under MPL for high ones. We test the model’s predictions in an experiment with life-saving donations and find the key crossing effect predicted by the theory.
    Keywords: Moral behavior, deontology, utilitarianism, consequentialism, social image, self-image, norms, preference elicitation, multiple price list, experiments
    JEL: C91 D01 D62 D64 D78
    Date: 2022–05
  4. By: Duk Gyoo Kim; Daehong Min; John Wooders
    Abstract: This paper examines the usefulness of Kalai (2020)’s measure of the viability of Nash equilibrium. We experimentally study a class of participation games, which differ in the number of players, the success threshold, and the payoff to not participating. We find that Kalai’s measure captures well how the viability of the everyone-participates (eP) equilibrium depends on the success threshold; the measure does not capture other elements of the game which affect the likelihood that the eP equilibrium is played.
    Keywords: Nash equilibrium, viability, laboratory experiments, coordination game
    JEL: C00 C70 C92 D90
    Date: 2022
  5. By: Hoy,Christopher Alexander
    Abstract: This paper examines how the progressivity of taxes and government transfers impactspeople’s willingness to pay tax through a randomized survey experiment with over 30,000 respondents across eightdeveloping countries. Respondents increased (decreased) their willingness to pay taxes when they received accurateinformation that taxes in their country are progressive (not progressive). These effects were predominantly driven byrespondents in cases where the information they received was counter to their prior beliefs and/or consistent with theirpreferences. These results suggest changes in policies that increase (decrease) the progressivity of tax systems mayalso lead to increases (decreases) in tax compliance.
    Date: 2022–09–07
  6. By: Gazeaud,Jules; Khan,Nausheen; Mvukiyehe,Eric; Sterck,Olivier Christian Brigitte
    Abstract: Is it possible to stimulate women’s employment by relaxing their financial and human capitalconstraints Does involving husbands help or hinder the effort Using an experiment in Tunisia, this paper shows thatproviding cash grants and financial training to women stimulates their income generating activities, but only whentheir partners are not involved. The program did not alter traditional gender roles. Instead, it encouraged employmentof other household members and investments in small-scale agriculture and livestock farming — two activitiestraditionally undertaken by women at home. The impacts on household living standards are overwhelmingly positive, andsuggest that the program is highly cost-effective.
    Date: 2022–07–28
  7. By: Santos, Indhira (World Bank); Petroska-Beska, Violeta (University of SS. Cyril and Methodius); Carneiro, Pedro (University College London); Eskreis-Winkler, Lauren (Northwestern University); Boudet, Ana Maria Munoz (World Bank); Berniell, Ines (University of La Plata); Krekel, Christian (London School of Economics); Arias, Omar (World Bank); Duckworth, Angela Lee (University of Pennsylvania)
    Abstract: We study whether a particular socio-emotional skill – grit (the ability to sustain effort and interest towards long-term goals) – can be cultivated through a large-scale program, and how this affects student learning. Using a randomized control trial, we evaluate the first nationwide implementation of a low-cost intervention designed to foster grit and self- regulation among sixth and seventh-grade students in primary schools in North Macedonia (about 33,000 students across 350 schools). The results of this interventions are mixed. Exposed students report improvements in self-regulation, in particular the perseverance-of- effort facet of grit, relative to students in a control condition. Impacts on students are larger when both students and teachers are exposed to the curriculum than when only students are treated. For disadvantaged students, we also find positive impacts on grade point averages, with gains of up to 28 percent of a standard deviation one year post-treatment. However, while this intervention made students more perseverant and industrious, it reduced the consistency-of-interest facet of grit. This means that exposed students are less able to maintain consistent interests for long periods.
    Keywords: socio-emotional skills, grit, gpas, middle-school students, field experiment, RCT
    JEL: C93 D91 I20 I24
    Date: 2022–09
  8. By: Hoy,Christopher Alexander; Rajee Kanagavel; Cameron,Corey Morales
    Abstract: This paper explores how intra-household dynamics relate to attitudes toward vaccinesin low- and lower-middle-income countries, by drawing on two novel data sources from Zambia. The first is a nationallyrepresentative, in-person survey of more than 10,000 households that asked all household members individuallyabout their willingness to get a COVID-19 vaccine. The second is a randomized survey experiment with almost 3,000social media users that tested how the impact of information about the benefits from receiving a COVID-19 vaccine onpeople’s willingness to get vaccinated varied based on intra-household dynamics. Both data sources showed thatpeople’s willingness (unwillingness) to get a COVID-19 vaccine was very strongly associated with whether otherhousehold members were also willing (unwilling). The experiment found that respondents who received informationemphasizing either individual or household benefits from getting a COVID-19 vaccine were around 20 percent morewilling to get vaccinated than those in the control group. This information was more potent among respondents whobelieved other members of their household would not get vaccinated but did not have a larger impact on respondentswho were involved in household decision making. There was also evidence of positive “second-round” effects wherebyrespondents who received the information treatments were more likely to encourage other household members to get aCOVID-19 vaccine. An important implication that flows from this analysis is that although household members tend tohave similar attitudes toward vaccines, communicating accurate information about the benefits of gettingvaccinated can counter intra-household dynamics that undermine acceptance.
    Date: 2022–08–03
  9. By: Lisa Bruttel (University of Potsdam); Muhammed Bulutay (Technische Universität Berlin); Camille Cornand (Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE UMR 5824); Frank Heinemann (Technische Universität Berlin); Adam Zylbersztejn (Univ Lyon, Université Lumière Lyon 2, GATE UMR 5824, Vistula University Warsaw)
    Abstract: Strategic uncertainty is the uncertainty that players face with respect to the purposeful behavior of other players in an interactive decision situation. Our paper develops a new method for measuring strategic-uncertainty attitudes and distinguishing them from risk and ambiguity attitudes. We vary the source of uncertainty (whether strategic or not) across conditions in a ceteris paribus manner. We elicit certainty equivalents of participating in two strategic 2x2 games (a stag-hunt and a market-entry game) as well as certainty equivalents of related lotteries that yield the same possible payoffs with exogenously given probabilities (risk) and lotteries with unknown probabilities (ambiguity). We provide a structural model of uncertainty attitudes that allows us to measure a preference for or an aversion against the source of uncertainty, as well as optimism or pessimism regarding the desired outcome. We document systematic attitudes towards strategic uncertainty that vary across contexts. Under strategic complementarity [substitutability], the majority of participants tend to be pessimistic [optimistic] regarding the desired outcome. However, preferences for the source of uncertainty are distributed around zero.
    Keywords: risk attitudes, ambiguity attitudes, strategic-uncertainty attitudes, stag-hunt game, market-entry game
    JEL: C72 C91 C92 D81
    Date: 2022–10
  10. By: Lasse Stötzer (Institute on Behavior and Inequality); Florian Zimmermann (University of Bonn and Instituteon Behavior and Inequality)
    Abstract: In this note, we provide evidence that motivated reasoning can be a source of discriminatory beliefs. We employ a representative survey experiment where we exogenously manipulate the presence of a need for justi cation of anti-social behavior towards an out-group. We provide causal evidence that survey participants devalue members of an out-group to justify taking away money from the group. Our results speak to a long-standing debate on the causes of racism and discrimination and suggest an important role of motivated cognition.
    Keywords: discrimination, stereotypes, racism, motivated reasoning, beliefs
    JEL: D01
    Date: 2022–10
  11. By: Yuehao Bai; Meng Hsuan Hsieh; Jizhou Liu; Max Tabord-Meehan
    Abstract: In this paper we revisit some common recommendations regarding the analysis of matched-pair and stratified experimental designs in the presence of attrition. Our main objective is to clarify a number of well-known claims about the practice of dropping pairs with an attrited unit when analyzing matched-pair designs. Contradictory advice appears in the literature about whether or not dropping pairs is beneficial or harmful, and stratifying into larger groups has been recommended as a resolution to the issue. To address these claims, we derive the estimands obtained from the difference-in-means estimator in a matched-pair design both when the observations from pairs with an attrited unit are retained and when they are dropped. We find limited evidence to support the claims that dropping pairs is beneficial, other than in potentially helping recover a convex weighted average of conditional average treatment effects. We then repeat the same exercise for stratified designs by studying the estimands obtained from a regression of outcomes on treatment with and without strata fixed effects. We do not find compelling evidence to support the claims that stratified designs should be preferred to matched-pair designs in the presence of attrition.
    Date: 2022–09
  12. By: Qianjun Lyu (University of Bonn); Wing Suen (University of HongKong)
    Abstract: An uninformed sender publicly commits to an informative experiment about an uncertain state, privately observes its outcome, and sends a cheap-talk message to a receiver. We provide an algorithm valid for arbitrary state-dependent preferences that will determine the sender’s optimal experiment, and give sufficient conditions for information design to be valuable or not under different payoff structures. These conditions depend more on marginal incentives—how payoffs vary with the state—than on the alignment of sender’s and receiver’s rankings over actions within a state.
    Keywords: Information design, cheap talk
    JEL: D82 D83
    Date: 2022–09
  13. By: Carranza,Eliana; Donald,Aletheia Amalia; Grosset,Florian; Kaur,Supreet
    Abstract: In low-income communities, pressure to share income with others may disincentivize work,distorting labor supply. This paper documents that across countries, social groups that undertake more interpersonaltransfers work fewer hours. Using a field experiment, the study enabled piece-rate factory workers in Côted'Ivoire to shield income using blocked savings accounts over 3-9 months. Workers could only depositearnings increases, relative to baseline, mitigating income effects on labor supply. The study varied whether theoffered account was private or known to the worker's network, altering the likelihood of transfer requestsagainst saved income. When accounts were private, take-up was substantively higher (60% vs. 14%). Offering privateaccounts sharply increased labor supply—raising work attendance by 10% and earnings by 11%. Outgoing transfersdid not decline, indicating no loss in redistribution. The estimates imply a 9–14% social tax rate. The welfarebenefits of informal redistribution may come at a cost, depressing labor supply and productivity.
    Date: 2022–08–30
  14. By: Maximilian Andres (University of Potsdam); Lisa Bruttel (University of Potsdam); Jana Friedrichsen (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, WZB Berlin Social Science Center, DIW Berlin)
    Abstract: This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices.
    Keywords: cartel, collusion, communication, machine learning, experiment
    JEL: C92 D43 L41
    Date: 2022–10
  15. By: Kai Barron (WZB Berlin); Mette Trier Damgaard (Department of Economics and Business Economics, CIBP & TrygFonden’s Centre for Child Research, Aarhus University); Christina Gravert (University of Copenhagen & CEBI)
    Abstract: An extensive literature shows that reminders can successfully change behavior. Yet, there exists substantial unexplained heterogeneity in their effectiveness, both: (i) across studies, and (ii) across individuals within a particular study. This paper investigates when and why reminders work. We develop a theoretical model that highlights three key mechanisms through which reminders may operate. To test the predictions of the model, we run a nationwide field experiment on medical adherence with over 4000 pregnant women in South Africa and document several key results. First, we find an extremely strong baseline demand for reminders. This demand increases after exposure to reminders, suggesting that individuals learn how valuable they are for freeing up memory resources. Second, stated adherence is increased by pure reminders and reminders containing a moral suasion component, but interestingly, reminders containing health information reduce adherence in our setting. Using a structural model, we show that heterogeneity in memory costs (or, equivalently, annoyance costs) is crucial for explaining the observed behavior.
    Keywords: Nudging, Reminders, Memory, Attention, Medication adherence, Structural model
    JEL: D04 D91 C93 I12
    Date: 2022–10–03
  16. By: Bruhn,Miriam; Piza,Caio
    Abstract: This paper tests whether providing more information on business practices can lead firms toseek out advice and improve their practices. The authors collaborated with a business advice provider in Brazil toimplement a randomized experiment with 866 small firms. The treatment groups received different versions of aninformation sheet that benchmarked business practices to other firms and listed five practices to improve. Receivingany information sheet increased demand for business advice by 7 percentage points, relative to 21 percent in thecontrol group in the first six months, suggesting that information matters for seeking out advice. However, thecontrol group catches up over the next 12 months. The intervention did not affect business practices andperformance outcomes, but it decreased the fraction of firms that report being happy with their performance.
    Date: 2022–09–15
  17. By: Esposito Acosta,Bruno Nicola; Sautmann,Anja
    Abstract: Adaptive sampling in experiments with multiple waves can improve learning for “policy choiceproblems” where the goal is to select the optimal intervention or treatment among several options. This paperuses a real-world policy choice problem to demonstrate the advantages of adaptive sampling and propose solutions tocommon issues in applying the method. The application is a test of six formats for automated calls to parents in Kenyathat encourage reading with children at home. The adaptive ‘exploration sampling’ algorithm is used to efficientlyidentify the call with the highest rate of engagement. Simulations show that adaptive sampling increased theposterior probability of the chosen arm being optimal from 86 to 93 percent and more than halved the posterior expected regret. The paper discusses a range of implementationaspects, including how to decide about research design parameters such as the number of experimental waves.
    Date: 2022–06–23
  18. By: Brian Gill; others
    Abstract: The COVID-19 pandemic (and its aftermath) highlights a critical need to communicate health information effectively to the global public.
    Keywords: Message framing, Anxiety, Nudges, COVID-19
  19. By: Eugen Dimant (University of Pennsylvania, USA; CESifo, Germany); Michele Gelfand (Stanford University, USA); Anna Hochleitner (University of Nottingham, U.K.); Silvia Sonderegger (University of Nottingham, U.K.)
    Abstract: Descriptive norms – the behavior of other individuals in one’s reference group – play a key role in shaping individual decisions. When characterizing the behavior of others, a standard approach in the literature is to focus on average behavior. In this paper, we argue both the-oretically and empirically that not only averages, but the shape of the whole distribution of behavior can play a crucial role in how people react to descriptive norms. Using a represen-tative sample of the U.S. population, we experimentally investigate how individuals react to strategic environments that are characterized by di˙erent distributions of behavior, focusing on the distinction between tight (i.e., characterized by low behavioral variance), loose (i.e., characterized by high behavioral variance), and polarized (i.e., characterized by u-shaped behavior) environments. We find that individuals indeed strongly respond to di˙erences in the variance and shape of the descriptive norm they are facing: loose norms generate greater behavioral variance and polarization generates polarized responses. In polarized environ-ments, most individuals prefer extreme actions that expose them to considerable strategic risk to intermediate actions that would minimize such risk. Importantly, we also find that, in polarized and loose environments, personal traits and values play a larger role in de-termining actual behavior. This provides important insights into how individuals navigate environments that contain strategic uncertainty.
    Keywords: Cooperation, Descriptive Norms, Variance, Peer Effects
    JEL: C91 D01
    Date: 2022–09
  20. By: Stefan Faridani; Paul Niehaus
    Abstract: We study the problem of estimating the average causal effect of treating every member of a population, as opposed to none, using an experiment that treats only some. This is the policy-relevant estimand when (for example) deciding whether to scale up an intervention based on the results of an RCT. But it differs from the usual average treatment effect in the presence of spillovers. We study both estimation and experimental design given a bound (parametrized by $\eta$) on the rate of decay of spillovers between units that are "distant" in a general sense, encompassing (for example) spatial settings, panel data, and some directed networks. We show that over all estimators linear in the outcomes and all cluster-randomized designs the optimal rate of convergence to the average global effect is $n^{-\frac{1}{2+\frac{1}{\eta}}}$, and provide a generalized "Scaling Clusters" design under which this rate can be achieved. Both of these results are unchanged under the additional assumption (common in applied work) that potential outcomes are linear in population treatment assignments and the estimator is OLS. We also provide methods to improve finite-sample performance, including a shrinkage estimator that takes advantage of additional information about the structure of the spillovers when linearity holds, and an optimized weighting approach when it does not.
    Date: 2022–09
  21. By: Jean-François Houde; Terence R. Johnson; Molly Lipscomb; Laura A. Schechter
    Abstract: We study the extent to which collusion can explain the under-provision of clean sanitation technologies in developing countries. Using desludging services in Dakar as a case-study, we document that prices are 66% higher in areas where prices are likely coordinated by a large trade association, compared to nearby neighborhoods supplied by unaffiliated companies. We then develop an experimental just-in-time auction platform with random variation in several design features aimed at learning about the extent of competition. Consistent with the collusion hypothesis, we find that most bidders systematically avoid competition by placing round bids and refusing to undercut rivals.
    JEL: L12 L41 O55
    Date: 2022–09
  22. By: Apostolos Filippas (Gabelli School of Business, Fordham University, New York, New York, United States 10023); John Horton (Sloan School of Management, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States 02142); Sehar Noor (John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard, Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States 02138); Dmitry Sorokin (Unafilliated)
    Abstract: Buyers pursuing de facto unavailable sellers is a common source of inefficiency in matching markets. We describe an experimental intervention in an online labor market where workers could rent the right to signal higher capacity via a badge that simply said “Available Now.” This badge was visible to treated employers looking to hire, but not to control employers. We find strong evidence of positive worker selection into badge-renting, and that employers viewed that badge as informative and sought-out workers who rented the badge. We also consider the problem of pricing such a signal in equilibrium, and present evidence from a series of quasi-experiments.
    Keywords: Market design; online marketplaces; online experiments
    JEL: D47 J32 J40
    Date: 2022–09
  23. By: Shah,Manisha; Seager,Jennifer; Montalvao Machado,Joao H. C.; Goldstein,Markus P.
    Abstract: Adolescents in Sub-Saharan Africa have some of the highest rates of intimate partner violenceacross the globe. This paper evaluates the impact of a randomized controlled trial that offers females a goalsetting activity to improve their sexual and reproductive health outcomes and offers their male partners a soccerintervention, which educates and inspires young men to make better sexual and reproductive health choices. Bothinterventions reduce female reports of intimate partner violence. Impacts are larger among females who were alreadysexually active at baseline. The paper develops a game theoretic model to understand the mechanisms at play. Inline with the model, the soccer intervention improves male attitudes around violence and sexual and reproductive healthand reduces sexual activity. In the goal setting arm, females take more control of their sexual and reproductivehealth by exiting violent relationships. Females in this arm have higher quality partners at endline.
    Date: 2022–06–01
  24. By: Bah,Tijan L; Batista,Catia; Gubert,Flore; Mckenzie,David J.
    Abstract: Irregular migration from West Africa to Europe across the Sahara and Mediterranean is extremelyrisky for migrants and a key policy concern. A cluster-randomized experiment with 3,641 young men from 391settlements in The Gambia is used to test three approaches to reducing risky migration: providing better informationand testimonials about the risks of the journey, facilitating migration to a safer destination by providinginformation and assistance for migration to Dakar, and offering vocational skill training to enhance domesticemployment opportunities. Current migration to Senegal was increased by both the Dakar facilitation and vocationaltraining treatments, partially crowding out internal migration. The vocational training treatment reducedintentions to migrate the backway and the number of steps taken toward moving. However, the backway migration ratefrom The Gambia collapsed, even in the control group, resulting in no space for a treatment effect on irregularmigration from any of the three interventions.
    Date: 2022–08–22
  25. By: Hussam,Reshmaan Nahar; Kelley,Erin Munro; Lane,Gregory; Zahra,Fatima
    Abstract: Employment may be important to well-being for reasons beyond its role as an income source.This paper presents a causal estimate of the psychosocial value of employment in refugee camps in Bangladesh. Thestudy involves 745 individuals in a field experiment with three arms: a control arm, a weekly cash arm, and anemployment arm of equal value. The findings show that employment raises psychosocial well-being substantially morethan cash alone, and 66 percent of the employed are willing to forego cash payments to continue working temporarily forfree. Despite material poverty, the individuals in the sample both experience and recognize the nonmonetary,psychosocial value of employment.
    Date: 2022–08–16
  26. By: Park,David Sungho; Aggarwal,Shilpa; Jeong,Dahyeon; Kumar,Naresh; Robinson,Jonathan M.; Spearot,Alan
    Abstract: Women may under-report intimate partner violence (IPV) due to several social andpsychological factors. This study conducts a measurement experiment in rural Liberia and Malawi in which women wereasked IPV questions via self-interviewing (SI) or face-to-face interviewing. About a third of womenincorrectly answer basic screening questions in SI, and SI generates placebo effects on innocuous questions even forthose who “pass” screening. Because the probability of responding “yes” to any specific IPV question is less than50 percent, and that IPV is typically reported as an index (reporting yes to at least one question), suchmisunderstanding increases IPV reporting. In Malawi, SI increases the reported incidence of any type of IPV by 13percentage points on a base of 20 percent; in Liberia, the study finds an insignificant increase of 4 percentage pointson a base of 38 percent. Our results suggest SI may spuriously increase reported IPV rates.
    Date: 2022–07–20
  27. By: Donati,Dante; Orozco Olvera,Victor Hugo; Rao,Nandan Mark
    Abstract: This paper experimentally tests the effectiveness of two short edutainment campaigns (under 25minutes) delivered through Facebook Messenger at reshaping gender norms and reducing social acceptability of violenceagainst women in India. Participants were randomly assigned to watch video clips with implicit or explicit messagingformats (respectively a humorous fake reality television drama or a docuseries with clear calls to action). After oneweek, the intent-to-treat effects of the implicit format on knowledge, gender norms, and acceptability of violenceagainst women oscillated between 0.16 and 0.21 standard deviations yet impacts diminished after four months. Bycontrast, the explicit format was more impactful in the short term in increasing willingness to share video clipswith friends and promoting online information-seeking behaviors. In the medium term, individuals who were exposedto the docuseries were 91 percent (7.5 percentage points) more likely to add a frame against violence against women intheir Facebook profile picture, a public display of their disapproval of this harmful practice. The general lack ofheterogeneous effects across social status indicators suggests social media as a potential medium for reachingdifferent online populations, including vulnerable ones.
    Date: 2022–10–05
  28. By: Dietmar Fehr; Johanna Mollerstrom; Ricardo Perez-Truglia
    Abstract: Efficient diffusion of economic information plays a critical role in the functioning of society, and, more specifically, households. We study information diffusion between spouses in a representative sample of the German population. We focus on an important economic belief: the household’s perceived rank in the income distribution. Our survey experiment consists of two waves. During each wave, all adult members of a household are interviewed separately with no possibility to communicate with each other. In the first wave, we randomly select a subset of respondents to receive accurate information about their household’s income rank. By chance, some members of a household, but not others, receive the information. A year later, we re-survey all members of the same households in the second wave, with the aim of measuring whether the information provided in the experiment had a long-lasting effect on their beliefs. We find that receiving information directly persistently affected household members’ beliefs. This direct learning worked similar for men and women. By contrast, for household members who did not receive information directly, we find striking gender differences in indirect learning. When information was provided to the husband, it affected his wife’s beliefs to a similar degree as if she had directly received the information herself. By contrast, when the information was provided to the wife, it did not affect her husband’s beliefs.
    JEL: D1 D83
    Date: 2022–09
  29. By: Eerola, Essi; Lyytikäinen, Teemu; Saarimaa, Tuukka; Vanhapelto, Tuuli
    Abstract: This paper studies the effects of housing allowances on rents. Our research design is based on a reform that made the allowance more generous for small housing units as a quasi-experimental setting. We find that large increases in housing allowances for small housing units have little or no effect on their rents relative to larger units. Thus, the incidence of the reform is largely on allowance recipients and not on their landlords. Consistent with very moderate rent effects, we do not find evidence of recipient households responding to the increased incentive to choose small units. A possible explanation is that optimization frictions and short expected allowance spell duration limited demand responses to the reform.
    Keywords: rental housing, demand subsidies, housing allowance, rent, incidence, housing demand, Local public finance and provision of public services, Social security, taxation and inequality, H22, R28, fi=Asuntopolitiikka|sv=Bostadspolitik|en=Housing policy|, fi=Sosiaaliturva|sv=Social trygghet|en=Social security|,
    Date: 2022
  30. By: Basu, Arnab K. (Cornell University); Dimova, Ralitza (University of Manchester); Gbakou, Monnet Benoit Patrick (Félix Houphouët-Boigny University); Viennet, Romane (OECD)
    Abstract: We analyse the effect of parental risk preferences and a novel measure of maternal bargaining power over educational expenses - elicited via lab-in-the-field experiments in rural Côte d'Ivoire – on the educational progression of boys and girls. Data from 135 couples and their children show that father's risk aversion is negatively associated with school attendance for boys and lowers the likelihood of transition from no-schooling to primary schooling for both boys and girls. Mother's risk aversion, on the other hand, has a positive association with the transition into primary schooling and a negative association with the transition into secondary schooling only for girls. Mother's bargaining power is also negatively associated with girls' schooling, while greater bargaining power for mothers who are relatively more risk averse than the father adversely impacts the transition into primary schooling for boys. Our findings are in line with suggestive evidence that points to a preference for current income generated by the employment of boys in high value cash crop production and the concern for girls' safety associated with traveling long distances to attend secondary schools.
    Keywords: Côte d'Ivoire, bargaining power, educational progressions, risk preferences
    JEL: C93 J43 O55
    Date: 2022–09
  31. By: Klarita Gërxhani; Jordi Brandts; Arthur Schram
    Abstract: This study provides a comprehensive analysis of gender differences in performance caused by two different dimensions of competition –rivalry for resources and status ranking. It also examines two mechanisms behind such differences: (1) gendered beliefs about performance differences in competitiveness; and (2) prescriptive stereotypes about women having to show warmth towards others. The results indicate that in the absence of any competitive dimension men and women perform equally well. Any competitive dimension, however, leads to women doing worse than men. These results are explained by men’s beliefs that they are better than women, and by women’s adherence to a prescribed stereotype of not harming others. Gender differences under competition seem to be endogenous to situational contexts, just like they are without competition.
    Keywords: gender inequality, competition, status characteristics theory, mechanisms, experiments
    JEL: C91 J16
    Date: 2021–09
  32. By: Jack,B. Kelsey; McDermott,Kathryn; Sautmann,Anja
    Abstract: Multiple price lists are a convenient tool to elicit willingness to pay in surveys andexperiments, but choice patterns such as “multiple switching” and “never switching” indicate high error rates.Existing measurement approaches often do not provide accurate standard errors and cannot correct for bias due toframing and order effects. This paper proposes to combine a randomization approach with a random-effects latent utilitymodel to detect bias and account for error. Data from a choice experiment in South Africa shows that significantorder effects exist which, if uncorrected, would lead to distorted conclusions about subjects’ preferences. Templatesare provided to create a multiple price list survey instrument in SurveyCTO and analyze the resulting data usingthe proposed methods.
    Date: 2022–09–13
  33. By: Jibang Wu; Weiran Shen; Fei Fang; Haifeng Xu
    Abstract: Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may face the exact opposite of this game-theoretic problem -- instead of prescribing equilibrium of a given game, we may directly observe the agents' equilibrium behaviors but want to infer the underlying parameters of an unknown game. This research question, also known as inverse game theory, has been studied in multiple recent works in the context of Stackelberg games. Unfortunately, existing works exhibit quite negative results, showing statistical hardness and computational hardness, assuming follower's perfectly rational behaviors. Our work relaxes the perfect rationality agent assumption to the classic quantal response model, a more realistic behavior model of bounded rationality. Interestingly, we show that the smooth property brought by such bounded rationality model actually leads to provably more efficient learning of the follower utility parameters in general Stackelberg games. Systematic empirical experiments on synthesized games confirm our theoretical results and further suggest its robustness beyond the strict quantal response model.
    Date: 2022–10

General information on the NEP project can be found at For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.