|
on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Daniel W. Derbyshire (European Centre for Environment and Human Health, University of Exeter); Michalis Drouvelis (Department of Economics, University of Birmingham); Brit Grosskopf (Department of Economics, University of Exeter) |
| Abstract: | We present the results of one-shot and repeated public good experiments that seek to understand the interaction between the endowment and marginal return in heterogeneous groups. Our focus is on treatments in which the endowment and the marginal return are either inverse or proportionally related to each other. While two normatively appealing contribution rules are aligned in the proportional treatment, a conflict between the two exists in the inverse treatment. In the one-shot experiments, we do not find significant differences across treatments. Contributions increase when the endowment, the marginal return or both increase. This is observed in all treatments except when the endowment and the marginal return are inversely related. In this case, the 'middle class' participants contribute more than both the high and low endowment types, mirroring real world observations with regards to a 'squeezed middle'. This suggests the presence of a conflict between the highly endowed subjects (but with low marginal return) and those with a high marginal return (but with low endowment). This pattern is similar when we elicit beliefs about others' contributions, whereby the two conflicting types expect others to contribute more than they do for themselves. In the long-run, however, when allowing for repeated interaction, the differences across types vanish in the inverse but not in the proportional treatment. This suggests that over time the conflicting interests arising from the interplay between the endowment and the marginal return can be overcome. Our findings have welfare implications indicating that the inverse treatment reduces inequality measured by the Gini coefficient but this is not the case for the proportional treatment, where inequality remains the same. |
| Keywords: | public goods, heterogeneity, endowment, marginal return, contribution norms |
| JEL: | H41 C92 D60 |
| Date: | 2022–10–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:exe:wpaper:2206&r= |
| By: | Grosch, Kerstin; Häckl, Simone; Kocher, Martin G. |
| Abstract: | We examine individual-level determinants of interest in STEM and analyze whether a digital web application for elementary-school children can increase children’s interest in STEM with a specific focus on narrowing the gender gap. Coupling a randomized-controlled trial with experimental lab and survey data, we analyze the effect of the digital intervention and shed light on the mechanisms. We confirm the hypothesis that girls demonstrate a lower overall interest in STEM than boys. Moreover, girls are less competitive and exhibit less pronounced math confidence than boys at the baseline. Our treatment increases girls’ interest in STEM and decreases the gender gap via an increase in STEM confidence. Our findings suggest that an easy-to-implement digital intervention has the potential to foster gender equality for young children and can potentially contribute to a reduction of gender inequalities in the labor market such as occupational sorting and the gender wage gap later in life. |
| Keywords: | STEM; digital intervention; gender equality; field experiment |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wus005:26023808&r= |
| By: | Mathieu Lefebvre (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Lucie Martin-Bonnel de Longchamp (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | This paper presents an artefactual field experiment with craftsmen working on renovation projects to assess the effect of training programs and incentive schemes on coordination. Workers frequently fail to coordinate their tasks when not supervised by a project coordinator. This is particularly important in the construction sector where it leads to a lack of final performance in buildings. We introduce two different incentives: a first contract paying craftsmen only according to their individual performance, and a second contract paying a group of three craftsmen with a weak-link payment according to the group's worst performance. In addition, we test these incentives on two different subject groups: one is composed of craftsmen trained to coordinate their tasks, and the others are not. The results suggest that trained subjects coordinate at significantly higher effort levels than non-trained subjects when facing an individual-based incentive. However, when facing a group-based incentive, non-trained subjects seem to "catch up" trained subjects in terms of coordination level, while these latter subjects do not significantly increase their performance level. |
| Keywords: | Coordination,Real-effort weak-link experiment,Artefactual field experiment,Individual incentive,Group incentive |
| Date: | 2022–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03777415&r= |
| By: | Kenju Kamei (Faculty of Economics, Keio University) |
| Abstract: | This study reports the result of a novel laboratory experiment that shows for the first time that the state of people fs self-regulatory resources influences reliance on formal enforcement of norms in a social dilemma. In a laboratory, subjects f self-regulatory resources are rigorously manipulated using well-known depletion tasks. On the one hand, when their resources are not depleted, the vast majority decide to govern themselves through monitoring and decentralized peer-to-peer punishment in a public goods dilemma, and then successfully achieve high cooperation norms. On the other hand, when their resources are small, the majority vote to enact a costly formal sanctioning institution and then construct deterrent punishment toward free riders; backed by formal punishment, the groups achieve strong cooperation. A supplementary survey regarding the Covid-19 pandemic was also conducted to enhance the external validity of the finding, generating a similar pattern. The so-called self-control and commitment preferences combined with inequality aversion can explain these patterns, because the theory predicts that those with smaller self-regulatory resources are motivated to remove temptations in advance as a commitment device, thereby avoiding a large self-control cost. This underscores the role of commitment in a social dilemma context. |
| Keywords: | Institutional choices;social dilemma;public goods;self-control;punishment |
| JEL: | C92 D72 H41 |
| Date: | 2022–09–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:keo:dpaper:2022-014&r= |
| By: | Kai Barron; Robert Stüber; Roel van Veldhuizen |
| Abstract: | An extensive literature documents that people are willing to sacrifice personal material gain to adhere to a moral motive. Yet, less is known about what happens when moral motives are in conflict. We hypothesize that individuals engage in what we term “motive selection,” namely adhering to the moral motive that aligns with their self-interest. We test this hypothesis using a laboratory experiment that induces a conflict between two of the most-studied moral motives: fairness and truth-telling. In line with our hypothesis, our results show that individuals prefer to adhere to the moral motive that is more aligned with their self-interest. |
| Keywords: | motivated reasoning, dictator game, lying game, motives, moral dilemmas |
| JEL: | C91 D01 D63 D90 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9911&r= |
| By: | Barron, Kai (WZB Berlin Social Science Center); Stüber, Robert (NYU Abu Dhabi); Veldhuizen, Roel van (Department of Economics, Lund University) |
| Abstract: | An extensive literature documents that people are willing to sacrifice personal material gain to adhere to a moral motive. Yet, less is known about what happens when moral motives are in conflict. We hypothesize that individuals engage in what we term “motive selection,” namely adhering to the moral motive that aligns with their self-interest. We test this hypothesis using a laboratory experiment that induces a conflict between two of the most-studied moral motives: fairness and truth-telling. In line with our hypothesis, our results show that individuals prefer to adhere to the moral motive that is more aligned with their self-interest. |
| Keywords: | Motivated reasoning; dictator game; lying game; motives; moral dilemmas |
| JEL: | C91 D01 D63 D90 |
| Date: | 2022–08–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2022_016&r= |
| By: | Sang-Hyun Kim (Yonsei University); Chulyoung Kim (Yonsei University); Jaeok Park (Yonsei University); Jinhyuk Lee (Korea University) |
| Abstract: | We consider a scenario where a single indivisible object is auctioned off to three bidders and among the three bidders there is one bidder whose winning imposes a positive or negative externality on the other two bidders. We theoretically and experimentally compare two standard sealed-bid auction formats, first-price and second-price auctions, under complete information. Using a refinement of undominated Nash equilibria, we analyze equilibrium bids and outcomes in the two auction formats. Our experimental results show that overbidding relative to equilibrium bids is prevalent, especially in second-price auctions, and this leads to higher revenue and lower efficiency in secondprice auctions than in first-price auctions, especially under negative externalities. Our results are consistent with previous experimental findings that bidders tend to overbid more in second-price auctions than in first-price auctions, and they suggest that such a tendency is robust to the introduction of externalities. |
| Keywords: | auctions; externalities; experiments; overbidding; efficiency. |
| JEL: | C91 D44 D62 |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yon:wpaper:2022rwp-199&r= |
| By: | Erika Deserranno; Stefano Caria; Philipp Kastrau; Gianmarco León-Ciliotta |
| Abstract: | A classic problem faced by organizations is to decide how to distribute incentives among their different layers. By means of a field experiment with a large public-health organization in Sierra Leone, we show that financial incentives maximize output when they are equally shared between frontline health workers and their supervisor. The impact of this intervention on completed health visits is 61% larger than the impact of incentive schemes that target exclusively the worker or the supervisor. Also, the shared incentives uniquely improve overall health-service provision and health outcomes. We use these experimental results to structurally estimate a model of service provision and find that shared incentives are effective because worker and supervisor effort are strong strategic complements, and because side payments across layers are limited. Through the use of counterfactual model experiments, we highlight the importance of effort complementarities across the different layers of an organization for optimal policy design. |
| Keywords: | Incentives, multi-layered organizations, effort complementarities, side payments, output |
| JEL: | O15 O55 I15 J31 M52 |
| Date: | 2022–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:1346&r= |
| By: | Kremena Bachmann (University of Zurich - Department of Banking and Finance; Zurich University of Applied Sciences); Andre Lot (Norwegian School of Economics and Zurich University of Applied Sciences); Xiaogeng Xu (Hanken School of Economics); Thorsten Hens (University of Zurich - Department of Banking and Finance; Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH); Swiss Finance Institute) |
| Abstract: | We adapt the design of five experimental studies on retirement decision-making and conduct reproductions with a larger sample from the broader population. We reproduce most of the main effects of the original studies. In particular, we find that consumption decisions are less efficient when subjects need to borrow from the future than save from the present. When subjects collect retirement benefits as lump-sum instead of annuities, they choose to retire later. The duration of retirement affects the saving behavior of the subjects. Savings are higher when they are incentivized with matching contributions than with tax rebates. When faced with stochastic survival risk, subjects make partial adjustments to spending paths. We also propose a further experimental research agenda in related topics and discuss practical issues on subject recruitment, attrition, and redesign of complex tasks. |
| Keywords: | household finance; retirement decision; savings; annuities; life-cycle optimization; income smoothing; experiments; reproductions |
| JEL: | C91 D15 G51 J26 |
| Date: | 2022–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp2272&r= |
| By: | Simon Gaechter; Chris Starmer; Fabio Tufano |
| Abstract: | We introduce “group cohesion” to study the economic relevance of social relationships in team production. We operationalize measurement of group cohesion, adapting the “oneness scale” from psychology. A series of experiments, including a pre-registered replication, reveals strong positive associations between group cohesion and performance assessed in weak-link coordination games, with high-cohesion groups being very likely to achieve superior equilibria. In exploratory analysis, we identify beliefs rather than social preferences as the primary mechanism through which factors proxied by group cohesion influence group performance. Our evidence provides proof-of-concept for group cohesion as a useful tool for economic research and practice. |
| Keywords: | team work, group cohesion, social relationships, coordination, weak link games, experiments |
| JEL: | C92 D91 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9936&r= |
| By: | Maho Nakagawa (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Mathieu Lefebvre (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Anne Stenger (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | This paper addresses the question of the effectiveness and permanence of temporary incentives to contribute to a public good. Using a common experimental framework, we investigate the effects of a recommendation that takes the form of an exhortative message to contribute, a monetary punishment and a non-monetary reward to sustain high levels of contributions. In particular, we shed light on the differential impact these mechanisms have on heterogeneous types of agents. The results show that all three incentives increase contributions compared to a pre-phase where there is no incentive. Monetary sanctions lead to the highest contributions, but a sudden drop in contributions is observed once the incentive to punish is removed. On the contrary, Recommendation leads to the lowest contributions but maintains a long-lasting impact in the Postpolicy phase. In particular, it makes free-riders increase their contribution over time in the post-incentive phase. Finally, non-monetary reward backfires against those who are weakly conditional cooperators. Our findings emphasize the importance of designing and maintaining incentives not only for free-riders, but for strong and weak conditional cooperators as well, depending on characteristics of the incentives. |
| Keywords: | Public goods game,Monetary policy,Game theory,Conservation science,Experimental design,Experimental economics,Social psychology,Test statistics |
| Date: | 2022–08–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03777681&r= |
| By: | Sam Cosaert (UA - University of Antwerp); Mathieu Lefebvre (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Ludivine Martin (LISER - Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research, CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Tests of labor supply models often rely on wages. However, wage variation alone generally cannot disentangle the classical time separable model and its extensions: reference dependent preferences (income targeting) and time nonseparable preferences (disutility spillovers; timing-specific preferences). We set up a novel laboratory experiment in which individuals choose their working time. We vary, independently, wages, historical income paths, and cumulative past work. We also vary the timing of experimental sessions. Statistical tests and stochastic revealed preference methods cannot reject the classical model in favor of income targeting or disutility spillovers, but the data suggest that labor supply varies by time-of-the-day. |
| Keywords: | Working time,Lab experiment,Time separable model,Income targeting,Disutility spillovers,Timing-specific preferences,Revealed preferences |
| Date: | 2022–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03777314&r= |
| By: | Buser, Thomas (University of Amsterdam); van Veldhuizen, Roel (Department of Economics, Lund University); Zhong, Yang (University of Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | Many professional and educational settings require individuals to be willing and able to perform under time pressure. We use a lab experiment to elicit preferences for working under time pressure in an incentivized way by eliciting the minimum additional payment participants require to complete a cognitive task under various levels of time pressure versus completing it without time pressure. We make three main contributions. First, we document that participants are averse to working under time pressure on average. Second, we show that there is substantial heterogeneity in the degree of time pressure aversion across individuals and that these individual preferences can be partially captured by simple survey questions. Third, we include these questions in a survey of bachelor students and show that time pressure preferences correlate with future career plans. Our results indicate that individual differences in time pressure aversion could be an influential factor in determining labor market outcomes. |
| Keywords: | Time Pressure; Experiment; Gender |
| JEL: | C90 D91 J22 |
| Date: | 2022–09–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2022_017&r= |
| By: | Pablo Bra\~nas-Garza; Antonio Cabrales; Mar\'ia Paz Espinosa; Diego Jorrat |
| Abstract: | We experimentally study a game in which success requires a sufficient total contribution by members of a group. There are significant uncertainties surrounding the chance and the total effort required for success. A theoretical model with max-min preferences towards ambiguity predicts higher contributions under ambiguity than under risk. However, in a large representative sample of the Spanish population (1,500 participants) we find that the ATE of ambiguity on contributions is zero. The main significant interaction with the personal characteristics of the participants is with risk attitudes, and it increases contributions. This suggests that policymakers concerned with ambiguous problems (like climate change) do not need to worry excessively about ambiguity. |
| Date: | 2022–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2209.11079&r= |
| By: | Antinyan, Armenak (Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University.); Corazzini, Luca; Fišar, Miloš; Reggiani, Tommaso (Cardiff Business School) |
| Abstract: | There has been an increasing interest in altruistic behaviour in the domain of losses recently. Nevertheless, there is no consensus in whether the monetary losses make individuals more generous or more selfish. Although almost all relevant studies rely on a dictator game to study altruistic behaviour, the experimental designs of these studies differ in how the losses are framed, which may explain the diverging findings. Utilizing a dictator game, this paper studies the impact of loss framing on altruism. The main methodological result is that the dictators’ prosocial behaviour is sensitive to the loss frame they are embedded in. More specifically, in a dictator game in which the dictators have to share a loss between themselves and a recipient, the monetary allocations of the dictators are more benevolent than in a standard setting without a loss and in a dictator game in which the dictators have to share what remains of their endowments after a loss. These differences are explained by the different social norms that the respective loss frames invoke. |
| Keywords: | loss; framing; altruism; dictator game; experiment; social norms. |
| JEL: | C91 D02 D64 |
| Date: | 2022–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2022/16&r= |
| By: | Albert J. Menkveld; Anna Dreber; Felix Holzmeister; Juergen Huber; Magnus Johannesson; Michael Kirchler; Sebastian Neussüs; Michael Razen; Utz Weitzel; Christian Brownlees; Javier Gil-Bazo |
| Abstract: | In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a data-generating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in sample estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidence-generating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty: non-standard errors. To study them, we let 164 teams test six hypotheses on the same sample. We find that non-standard errors are sizeable, on par with standard errors. Their size (i) co-varies only weakly with team merits, reproducibility, or peer rating, (ii) declines significantly after peer-feedback, and (iii) is underestimated by participants. |
| Keywords: | non-standard errors, multi-analyst approach, liquidity |
| JEL: | C12 C18 G1 G14 |
| Date: | 2021–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:1303&r= |
| By: | Petra Nieken; Anna Ressi |
| Abstract: | This paper reports results of two controlled experiments on the behavioural effects of relative performance information (RPI) in different organizational structures. Our baseline study 1 focuses on a centralized organizational structure where employees are exogenously assigned to either a high-performing or a low-performing peer group. We find that RPI boosts performances when employees are assigned to the low-performing group. In contrast, when assigned to the high-performing group, our results point to a discouragement effect of RPI that can be attributed to low-performers. In study 2, we show that this or similarly undesired effects do not play a crucial role under a decentralized organizational structure where employees can self-select. In fact, we demonstrate that RPI especially induces employees with a relatively low performance to voluntarily choose the high-performing group. Analyzing subsequent performances suggests that providing self-selection options allows employees to use the high-performing group as a self-set target to spur motivation. |
| Keywords: | peer groups, self-selection, reference points, relative performance information |
| JEL: | C91 D83 D91 M52 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9940&r= |
| By: | Sang-Hyun Kim (Yonsei University); Chulyoung Kim (Yonsei University); Jinhyuk Lee (Korea University); Joosung Lee (University of Edinburgh) |
| Abstract: | In a veto game, we investigate the effects of “buyout” which allows non-veto players strategically form an intermediate coalition. First, our experimental findings show that the proportion of intermediate coalition formation is much lower than predicted by theory, regardless of the relative negotiation power between veto and non-veto players. Second, allowing coalition formation among non-veto players does not affect the surplus distribution between veto and nonveto players, which diverges from core allocations. These findings contrast to the literature, which views the ability to form an intermediate coalition as a valuable asset for non-veto players in increasing their bargaining power. |
| Keywords: | game theory; coalition bargaining; veto game; experiment; non-core allocation; intermediate coalition formation. |
| JEL: | C72 C78 C92 D72 D74 |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yon:wpaper:2022rwp-198&r= |
| By: | Philippe d'Astous; Irina Gemmo; Pierre-Carl Michaud |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we conduct an experiment with a large sample of financial planner professionals in Canada to elicit factors which may influence client recommendations. Using repeated client vignettes, we find that recommendations are often in-line with what one would expect from economic theory. In particular, advice is sensitive in expected ways to relative costs and benefits of particular options. In some domains, we find evidence that planners are more likely to recommend products they own themselves, their spouse owns, or they are licensed to sell. In the investment domain, we also find that planners are more likely to recommend products that clients inquire about even when this type of solicitation is randomized across clients and options. Finally, we find that planners are systematically sensitive to the gender of the client even when gender is uninformative regarding which recommendation to make. |
| JEL: | G51 G52 G53 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rsi:irersi:9&r= |
| By: | Manuela Schönmann (Faculty of Computer Science, Technische Hochschule Ingolstadt, Ingolstadt, Germany; TUM School of Social Sciences and Technology, Technical University of Munich, Munich, Germany); Anja Bodenschatz (Faculty of Computer Science, Technische Hochschule Ingolstadt, Ingolstadt, Germany; TUM School of Social Sciences and Technology, Technical University of Munich, Munich, Germany; Seminar for Corporate Development and Business Ethics, Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany); Matthias Uhl (Faculty of Computer Science, Technische Hochschule Ingolstadt, Ingolstadt, Germany; TUM School of Social Sciences and Technology, Technical University of Munich, Munich, Germany); Gari Walkowitz (Faculty of Business Administration, Technische Universität Bergakademie Freiberg, Freiberg, Germany) |
| Abstract: | The world’s population will continue to age significantly in the near future. One strategy to address the growing gap between supply and demand of professional caregivers in many regions is the use of care robots. Although there have been numerous ethical debates about the use of robots in elderly care, the important question of how (potentially) affected people perceive situations with care robots compared to situations with human caregivers has not yet been systematically examined. Using a large-scale experimental vignette study, we investigated the influence of the nature of the caregiver on participants’ perceived well-being when confronted with different care situations in nursing homes. Our results show that the views of people already affected by care dependency regarding care robots differ substantially from the views of people not affected by care dependency. The non-affected strongly devalued care robots compared to human caregivers, especially in a service context. This devaluation was not found among those affected; their perceived well-being was not influenced by the nature of the caregiver. These findings also proved robust when controlling for people’s attitudes toward robots, gender, and age. |
| Keywords: | Care robots, Elderly nursing care, Robot aversion, Well-being, Vignette experiment |
| JEL: | C83 I12 I31 |
| Date: | 2022–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aiw:wpaper:24&r= |
| By: | Michelle Acampora; Lorenzo Casaburi; Jack Willis |
| Abstract: | Land market incompleteness is argued to have pervasive effects in Sub-Saharan Africa, including on agricultural efficiency, equity, and structural transformation. Yet experimental evidence on land market participation is virtually non-existent. We randomly allocate subsidies for agricultural rentals in Kenya and study who selects into land markets, what renters do differently from owners, and the resulting effects on agricultural and owner outcomes. The induced rentals increase equity - reallocating plots to farmers who own fewer plots and are younger and more market-oriented - and persist beyond the subsidy. Renters increase output and value added on the rented plot, by more than owners under an equivalent unconditional cash transfer, and they do so by increasing commercial crop cultivation and non-labor inputs, rather than labor. Although owners cultivate less land under the rental subsidy, their non-agricultural labor decreases. The results shed light on the nature and magnitude of land market frictions, and on their interactions with other missing markets. |
| JEL: | C93 O11 O12 O13 Q15 |
| Date: | 2022–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30495&r= |
| By: | Sylvain Chareyron; Yannick L'Horty; Philomène Mbaye; Pascale Petit |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tep:teppwp:wp22-17&r= |
| By: | Billur Aksoy; Christopher S. Carpenter; Dario Sansone |
| Abstract: | Using a US nationally representative sample and a double list experiment designed to elicit views free from social desirability bias, we find that anti-transgender labor market attitudes are significantly underreported. After correcting for this concealment, we report that 73 percent of people would be comfortable with a transgender manager and 74 percent support employment non-discrimination protection for transgender people. We also show that respondents severely underestimate the population level of support for transgender individuals in the workplace, and we find that labor market support for transgender people is significantly lower than support for gay, lesbian, and bisexual people. Our results provide timely evidence on workplace-related views toward transgender people and help us better understand employment discrimination against them. |
| JEL: | J0 |
| Date: | 2022–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30483&r= |
| By: | David Ehrlich; Nora Szech |
| Abstract: | We study the influence of social messages that promote a digital public good, a COVID-19 tracing app. We vary whether subjects receive a digital message from another subject, and, if so, at what cost it came. Observed maximum willingness to invest in sending varies, from 1 cent up to 20 euros. Does this affect receivers’ sending behavior? Willingness to invest in sending increases when previously receiving the message. Yet, cost signals have no impact. Thus, grassroots movements can be started at virtually no cost. App-support matters normatively as non-supporters are supposed to be punished in triage. |
| Keywords: | Grassroots movements, digital public good, social messages, Covid-19 tracing app, triage |
| JEL: | D90 I12 I18 H12 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9943&r= |
| By: | Jeanne Hagenbach (Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Charlotte Saucet (UP1 UFR02 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - École d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally study how individuals read strategically-transmitted information when they have preferences over what they will learn. Subjects play disclosure games in which Receivers should interpret messages skeptically. We vary whether the state that Senders communicate about is ego-relevant or neutral for Receivers, and whether skeptical beliefs are aligned or not with what Receivers prefer believing. Skepticism is lower when skeptical beliefs are self-threatening than in neutral settings. When skeptical beliefs are self-serving, skepticism is not enhanced compared to neutral settings. These results demonstrate that individuals' exercise of skepticism depends on the conclusions of skeptical inferences. |
| Keywords: | Disclosure games,hard information,unraveling result,skepticism,Motivated beliefs,C91,D82,D91 |
| Date: | 2022–09–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03770685&r= |
| By: | Natascha Nisic (Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz); Friederike Molitor (Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz); Miriam Trübner (Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz) |
| Abstract: | Despite a growing need for domestic help, many households refrain from outsourcing their domestic chores to the market. By drawing on transaction cost theory, the present study sheds light on how demand can be stimulated by overcoming trust problems that are related to the quality and professionalisation of domestic services. The experimental findings from our factorial survey (N=4024) further show how state-subsidised service vouchers not only facilitate outsourcing by alleviating budget constraints, but also how they contribute to better pay for domestic workers while simultaneously reducing the costs for households. Overall, the results support recent policy recommendations that emphasise the role of professionalisation, in combination with service voucher systems, in increasingly shifting paid domestic work from the informal to the formal economy. |
| Date: | 2022–10–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jgu:wpaper:2209&r= |
| By: | Alexander Usvitskiy (School of Advanced Studies); Dmitry Ryvkin (Department of Economics, Florida State University) |
| Abstract: | We consider competition for market shares between two firms that make costly investments to attract and retain customers. The value customers bring to the firms in the next period is higher if these customers are loyal, i.e., they remained with the firm. Based on the retention value and on the prior allocation of market shares, the firms' equilibrium investments either preserve the status quo or redistribute customers so that one of the firms gains and the other firm loses its market share. We conduct a laboratory experiment to test the theory and investigate the effects of the relative retention value and the initial state of the market on competition. The initial state of the market is either randomly assigned or endogenously generated through a preliminary contest between the firms. We find that competitors invest more as the customer retention value rises, but only when it is sufficiently high. Investment also rises with initial market share when it is low, but not when it is high. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that, for a given initial market share, investment is lower when this market share is endogenously won than when it is randomly assigned, which we attribute to within-match learning about the competitor's type. |
| Keywords: | Competition, Loyalty, Market shares, Dynamic game, Laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D21 L21 |
| Date: | 2022–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fsu:wpaper:wp2022_10_01&r= |
| By: | Luca Corazzini (University of Venice “Ca’ Foscari”, Venice); Matteo M. Marini (Masaryk University, Brno) |
| Abstract: | SThis paper is a single-project meta-analysis of four experiments that first model charitable giving as individual contributions to a multiplicity of competing threshold public goods. Given the centrality of the coordination dilemma as the number of recipients increases, we pool 15,936 observations at the individual level for the purpose of identi- fying the most effective focal points, their mechanics, and their implications for donors’ wealth. We find that competition between public goods implies massive coordination problems that originate from fewer contributions and result in lower profits. In this setting, the most powerful coordination device turns out to be the existence of a single contribution option that stands out on its merits. We also observe an inverted U-shaped trend in the successful provision of public goods, offering evidence for experience as a focal point peculiar to the multiple-public-good framework. The effective focal points do not leverage greater contributions to solve the coordination dilemma, yet they generate higher earnings. Finally, delegation proves to be a sound device for reducing the risk of miscoordination as long as the delegate is formally obliged to pass along a high enough percentage of the transferred resources. We discuss possible implications of our findings. |
| Keywords: | meta-analysis, threshold public goods, charitable giving, fundraising, focal points |
| JEL: | C90 C91 C92 H40 H41 L31 |
| Date: | 2022–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mub:wpaper:2022-10&r= |
| By: | Benedikt Maciosek; Mehdi Farsi; Sylvain Weber; Martin Jakob |
| Abstract: | Various energy investments are possible in residential buildings. Owners’ opportunities are moreover extending with smart technologies and optimisation options, as well as with the rise of collective investment projects. In this context, we investigate owners’ investment decisions by conducting a discrete choice experiment that includes all these elements. Our experiment allows to evaluate the willingness-to- pay (WTP) for investing in energy efficiency and for purchasing renewable energy. The effect of several energy policies is also investigated using treatment information messages displayed to randomly selected respondents. The results based on our sample of 1,451 Swiss homeowners suggest that WTP for energy investments is positive but marginally decreasing, so that it may be insufficient for very sophisticated and expensive investments. A general paradigm shift is not evident from our results, as the respondents prefer investing alone rather than collectively. Also, load management and storage appear to be valued only in combination but not separately. Amongst all policies, only for a binding CO2 cap per square meter of the accommodation a significant effect can be detected. |
| Keywords: | Energy efficiency, Renewable energy, Choice experiment, Conditional logit models |
| JEL: | D12 L94 Q41 |
| Date: | 2022–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:irn:wpaper:22-06&r= |
| By: | Xinrui Zhang (University of Nottingham Ningbo China); Tom Lane (University of Nottingham Ningbo China) |
| Abstract: | Policies offering material incentives for Covid-19 vaccination have been widely used around the world as countries pursue the pressing objective of boosting immunity. This paper reports an experiment in China aimed at testing the effects of such interventions on vaccination willingness. We provide the first Covid-19 vaccine study to separately consider and directly compare the effects of both monetary and gift-based incentives, both of which have been commonly employed in practice. Results from a sample of 1,365 individuals suggest that incentives in the range of 8-125 USD backfire, inducing lower vaccination willingness than simply offering vaccines for free. The effects of money and gifts of equivalent value do not significantly differ. We compare our results against the burgeoning literature on Covid-19 vaccine incentives, and demonstrate that the negative effects we identify are stronger than those observed to date in other populations. |
| Keywords: | Covid-19; Vaccine willingness; Incentives |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2022-14&r= |